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PLURALISM AND
ENGLISH LAW**

Sebastian Poulter

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THE FRENCH
POLITICAL EQUATION**

James J. Shields

**LICENCE TO KILL: IS
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CULTURAL PLURALISM AND ENGLISH LAW

by Sebastian Poulter

B RITAIN'S ethnic minority communities now account for some two and a half million people, characterised not only by the black or brown skins of many of their members but also by customs, traditions, beliefs and value systems which are often greatly at variance with those of the white majority community. Some idea of the enormous diversity of these communities was provided by a recent survey which revealed that pupils in London schools spoke no fewer than 172 different languages between them as their own individual mother-tongues. There are probably over a million Muslims living in Britain today, as well as hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Sikhs and Jews and smaller numbers of Buddhists and Rastafarians.

Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s it seemed to be assumed by those in government that the minorities who had recently arrived in Britain from the New Commonwealth would soon be 'assimilated' into mainstream English society and that any cultural differences would probably disappear during the course of a single generation, this approach has now been superseded by a much more liberal 'pluralist' outlook in which it is widely accepted that English society will contain a considerable diversity of behaviour patterns and cultural practices for a long time to come. Indeed, rather than merely learning to tolerate such differences many people in the majority community are coming to appreciate and welcome the greater variety in English life which a philosophy of cultural pluralism entails.

For the lawyer this phenomenon poses a new and exciting challenge. How capable is English law of accommodating foreign customs and practices? Will new laws be required? Is any greater adjustment needed for

Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs than has already been made for the Jews, who have been settled here since the middle of the 17th century? Is it sufficient to give everyone formal equality under the law or will special provision need to be made for religious and cultural differences? In recent years English courts have had to make decisions about such varied matters as whether Asian girls could escape from arranged marriages forced upon them by their parents, whether recognition should be given in England to polygamous marriages contracted abroad, whether Muslims and Jews may utilise their own divorce procedures in Britain, whether an English school could prevent a Sikh pupil wearing his turban, whether a female Muslim sales assistant could be dismissed for wearing trousers instead of a skirt and whether a planning inquiry scheduled for a Jewish holiday should have been postponed. Much attention has been focused by the media upon such matters as the discovery of 13 year old brides from the Middle East living in England with their husbands, Sikhs carrying around symbolic daggers, Hindus throwing the ashes of deceased relatives into English rivers and the merits and demerits of multicultural education and separate state-aided schools for Muslims.

Back in the 4th century AD a somewhat similar problem to that facing Britain's ethnic minorities confronted Saint Augustine and his mother, Monica. They were Berbers from North Africa who had crossed over the Mediterranean to live in Milan. Monica was puzzled by the fact that pious Christians in Milan didn't fast on Saturdays as they did in her native African city. On the other hand, she knew perfectly well that fasting on Saturdays was the normal practice in Rome. She therefore asked her son how the problem should be resolved and he in turn addressed the question to his guide and mentor St Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan. St Ambrose's response has since become proverbial, for the gist of the advice he gave St Augustine was not to fast on Saturdays in Milan but — 'When in Rome, do as the Romans do'.

This well-known saying is often employed in England today by those who feel that members of the ethnic minority communities should unswervingly follow English norms and standards of behaviour. The law banning the consumption of alcohol in Saudi Arabia is commonly cited in support of this principle. If English people abroad don't conform to the rules of the country in which they are living then they have no right to complain if they are caught and punished. Similarly, if members of the ethnic minority communities in Britain practise bribery or smoke cannabis or circumcise their daughters they must expect to be punished just like anyone else. This is because the English criminal law applies across the board to everyone, and corruption, the misuse of drugs and the physical mutilation of children are established criminal offences. For well over a century, at least, the broad approach of the English courts at common law has in fact been to decide the question of a defendant's guilt precisely in this manner, applying a uniform standard applicable to all-comers, regardless of their origins. For example, in a famous case in 1852 the accused, who were both Frenchmen, faced a charge of murder

as a result of having acted as seconds in a duel in England in which one of the participants was killed. The defendants sought to argue that as duelling was not at this time punishable as a criminal offence in France they should receive special treatment at the hands of the English courts. The judges had no hesitation in rejecting this argument, one of them commenting that 'to make a difference in the case of foreigners would be a most dangerous practice. It is of great importance', he said, 'that the administration of the law should be uniform; it would be dangerous and unjust to introduce into a general rule an exception in favour of foreigners'.

To adopt such a general approach to the issue of guilt does not, of course, preclude an English court from taking into consideration a variety of factors, including the cultural background of the offender, when it comes to the question of deciding upon an appropriate sentence. The fact that a new arrival in Britain didn't appreciate that what he did was unlawful or that he was merely complying with a custom practised in his country of origin or that he was having difficulty adjusting to English standards might well be successfully pleaded in mitigation and lead to a less severe punishment being imposed.

Significantly, however, there are three specific areas of English criminal law where there are clearly recognised exceptions to the 'When in Rome' principle. In each instance Parliament has legislated to exempt adherents to particular religious faiths from criminal liability. Jews may open their shops on Sundays without being in breach of the Sunday trading laws; Jews and Muslims may slaughter animals for food in their traditional ways without first stunning them; and Sikh motorcyclists may wear turbans in place of the crash-helmets which are compulsory for everyone else. In each of these three cases Parliament took the view that in a democracy the general principle of uniformity should give way to respect for important cultural and religious values, in furtherance of the dictates of individual liberty, religious toleration and the promotion of racial harmony. Nevertheless, in all three areas there has been some degree of controversy. Many people in Britain believe that the Sunday trading laws are so defective that they should be swept away altogether. The RSPCA allege that Jewish and Muslim slaughter practices cause unnecessary suffering to animals and argue that their exemption should be repealed. Some motorcyclists resent the paternalistic notions which underlie the rules about crash-helmets, while others take the view that considerations of safety and the cost of unnecessary accidents to the national health service should have led to the inclusion of Sikhs within the provisions of the general law.

The rules above all relate to the criminal law, that branch of the legal system which lays down the basic minimum standards of behaviour acceptable in British society. However, most legal rules deal with civil matters, that is to say, disputes between individuals which primarily affect themselves rather than the welfare of society as a whole and where a breach does not necessarily result in punishment by the state. Here we

are concerned with rules about the family such as those relating to marriage, divorce and the upbringing of children; with rules about schooling, about employment and about religious worship and observances and so on. Of course, there is often a degree of overlap and civil and criminal law complement one another to achieve the desired result. In many of these spheres members of the ethnic minority communities have distinctive customs which may come into conflict with English law. Should English law adapt its principles and rules to accommodate such customs or is it already a sufficiently flexible system to cope with such issues without undue difficulty? Or should the new arrivals bear the burden of any adjustment?

Some people in Britain take up a position which is roughly the opposite of the principle 'When in Rome, do as the Romans do'. They argue that this approach smacks too much of cultural imperialism, ethnocentricity or even some form of racism. Gone are the days, they say, when the British could be so confident of their cultural superiority over peoples from other parts of the world. They argue that the fullest freedom should be afforded to the ethnic minority communities to practise their traditions and customs in Britain. I have considerable sympathy with these sentiments, but only up to a certain point. I find it very hard to subscribe to a philosophy of moral or cultural relativism which asserts that all cultural practices are of roughly equal worth or merit and are therefore automatically entitled to recognition and respect in Britain. The idea that the state, through its law, should decline to take up a judgemental position on whether a custom or practice is acceptable seems to fly in the face of any notion of man's progress or development. To take an obvious example, having actively promoted the slave trade and practised slavery in our colonies in previous centuries and then seen the light and been instrumental in its abolition, is it conceivable that we would tolerate its practice in England today by those who come from the few corners of the globe where it still persists? Similarly the treatment accorded to women and children in Britain and the protection afforded them by English law are vastly superior to what they were in previous centuries—surely there can be no question of going back on these advances.

This raises two difficult questions for anyone who favours cultural pluralism rather than forced assimilation but who also rejects cultural relativism, at least in its extreme form, and yet is naturally frightened of being accused of ethnocentricity or racism as a result. The first question is—where do we draw the line between those customs which English law ought to respect and uphold and those it should reject? The second question is—how do we justify the division between the two categories in terms that we can expect will broadly satisfy both the members of the majority society and the members of the ethnic minority communities?

My answer to both questions is closely tied up with the 20th century movement for the international protection of human rights. Today, states from all parts of the world, from Eastern bloc countries to the liberal democracies of the West and including the developing nations of

the South as well as the richer states of the North, are parties to multi-lateral treaties designed to safeguard and guarantee basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Kingdom subscribes not only to the European Convention on Human Rights but also to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to anti-slavery conventions, to a treaty on the prevention of racial discrimination, to another on consent to marriage and so on. If we were to follow the principles of these agreements in our approach to ethnic minority customs we should not only be able to separate off those which are really offensive and abhorrent but also able to justify our stance on the basis of an *international* consensus in these matters rather than a parochial view based simply on what we are used to here in Britain. In this way we can uphold the *core* values of our society, those cardinal principles which would necessarily be incorporated in a written constitution as a bill of rights, if we possessed such a document.

Such an approach would generally lead to very tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minority customs because many of them would need to be recognised under the headings of freedom of religion or freedom of expression or the right of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own cultures, all of which are listed, for example, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, all these rights are subject to specific limitations in the treaty and are by no means absolute. Freedom to manifest one's religion can, for example, be restricted by the state if the limits are laid down by law and if they are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In a case in the late 1970s a Muslim schoolmaster in London attempted to rely on a comparable provision in the European Convention on Human Rights in a claim he brought against his employer, the Inner London Education Authority, for unfair dismissal. He claimed that his right to freedom of religion had been violated because the Authority wouldn't allow him to take time off from his classes to attend early afternoon prayers at a nearby mosque and still draw full pay. Instead, they offered him a new contract for a four and a half day week rather than a five day week, which he found unacceptable. Both the English Court of Appeal and the European Commission of Human Rights eventually concluded that his freedom to manifest his religion could legitimately be restricted by the need to protect the rights of others, namely the Authority itself, the pupils he was meant to be teaching and his fellow teachers, who were having to stand in for him during his absences. He therefore lost his case.

Which, then, are the customs which seem likely to fail the human rights test? Here are some of the major examples. First, 'forced marriages' — because the international treaties insist that marriages should only be entered into with the full and free consent of the parties. A forced marriage should not, however, simply be equated with an arranged marriage — the latter is at least *tacitly* accepted by the parties through

their upbringing and is worthy of respect, whereas the former is imposed upon the parties against their will by force of family pressure or threats of social ostracism or worse. Secondly, the custom long followed by most gypsies of not bothering to send their children to school should not be tolerated. A child's right to education is enshrined in a number of major human rights treaties. Thirdly, female circumcision — because it amounts to genital mutilation and such 'inhuman and degrading treatment' is outlawed by all the relevant treaties. Fourthly, slavery — which is similarly banned.

A fifth objectionable custom is a particular type of Muslim divorce known as a bare '*talaq*'. It takes the form of an instant and irrevocable repudiation of the wife by the husband, without the necessity of any grounds or of notification to anyone, even to the wife herself. It offends against two separate human rights — the right to sexual equality in the termination of marriage (because only the husband may pronounce the *talaq*) and the right to natural justice in the form of a fair and public hearing before an impartial legal tribunal when one's civil rights are at stake. Polygamy, which also involves sexual inequality in marriage might also fall within this list of objectionable customs. In any event, none of the six customs just mentioned is recognised as legitimate if practised in England. In some instances the conduct in question may amount to a crime, in others the sanction is that the action taken is denied its intended legal effect, either wholly or very substantially.

The essence of the approach outlined above to the relatively new phenomenon of a policy of cultural pluralism in British society is that English law should attempt to draw the line between those ethnic minority customs which are acceptable and those which are not by reference to the yardstick of internationally recognised human rights standards. Often the question will be one for Parliament to decide, but sometimes the English courts may find that they can determine the issue along these lines without legislative guidance — as occurred in the Muslim schoolteacher's case. In this way a compromise can be reached, in which a fair and sensible balance is achieved between the legitimate cultural aspirations of the ethnic minority communities, on the one hand, and the maintenance of certain key English values and standards, on the other.

[Dr Sebastian Poulter is Senior Lecturer in Law at Southampton University and the author of *English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs*, published by Butterworths in 1986.]

A NEW FACTOR IN THE FRENCH POLITICAL EQUATION

by James G. Shields

AS France approaches the critical presidential elections of spring 1988, the major contenders — the incumbent François Mitterrand, his would-be Socialist heir, Michel Rocard, and the eternal rivals of the Right, Jacques Chirac and Raymond Barre — are having to make room for a fifth and particularly troublesome challenger. Since becoming the first candidate formally to enter the presidential race in the early summer, the leader of France's extreme right-wing Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has worked indefatigably to undermine his opponents — be they left or right — and to increase his present 10% share of electoral support. Sir Alfred Sherman's invitation to the French nationalist leader to address a fringe meeting of the Conservative Party conference at Blackpool in October brought the name of Le Pen into the British political theatre and provoked some embarrassment in government circles. Though mounting hostility obliged Le Pen in the end to cancel his proposed visit, the episode provided a measure both of his current public profile and of the controversy which surrounds his message.

For all his thirty years of involvement in political life, this seasoned doyen of the French hard-right is a newcomer to the national centre stage. Through a combination of tenacity and political opportunism, he has steered his party, formed in 1972, from complete obscurity into a limelight it seemed destined never to enjoy. The performance of the Front National in the French General Election of March 1986 confirmed the new strength of a movement which came to prominence in the European Assembly elections of June 1984. On that occasion, Le Pen's party shocked the French political establishment by snatching almost 11% of the national vote and sending no fewer than ten MEPs to the European Assembly in Strasbourg. Though its proportion of the vote dropped marginally (to just under 10%) in the parliamentary elections of March 1986, its support in real terms was increased by almost half a million, rising from 2.2 million voters in 1984 to 2.7 million in 1986. This assured Le Pen's party representation for the first time in the National Assembly, with a solid wedge of 35 seats that all but deprived Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of the fragile centre-right majority with which he has governed since. The regional elections held on the same day gave Le Pen a total of 135 seats and a significant influence in a number of France's 22 regional councils. While support for the Front National peaks in the Mediterranean Bouches-du-Rhône *département*, where 22.5% of the vote in March 1986 makes it the most powerful right-wing party, its national strength is demonstrated by the fact that it exceeds a 5% share of the vote in all but 14 of France's 96 *départements*.

This swift series of electoral successes by the Front National has radically altered the French political balance. The extent of Le Pen's

achievement is all the more appreciable if one considers that his party could muster only a portion of the derisory 0.36% polled by extreme-right candidates in the General Election of June 1981. Now, as the unrivalled *porte-parole* of the far Right, it can lay claim to an established place within French national politics and to a quite new legitimacy as a protagonist in the democratic process.

Though the long-term significance of the Front National's success is unclear, the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen poses a number of compelling questions for politicians and political observers alike. For Le Pen has tapped a vein of political disenchantment, transforming what was ostensibly a protest vote in June 1984 into an enduring electoral powerbase. His populist rhetoric and national-chauvinist pronouncements have struck a chord among a voting public which has shown increasing political volatility in recent years. The dramatic victory of the Left in 1981, followed by its equally dramatic fall from grace when it converted from an ill-advised reflationary programme to the politics of austerity in 1982, did little to endear the political establishment to a public whose frustrations burst forth in street demonstrations and strikes. With the established Right still smarting from its 1981 defeat, rent by internecine rivalries and unable to pose as an attractive alternative to the discredited Left, a political space was opened up to the formerly marginal Front National, which registered its first results in a series of local elections in 1983.

Le Pen claims to articulate what others merely think: namely, that France has been condemned to a spiral of moral, social and economic decadence by the policies of successive governments, that the French are being robbed of their birthright by a burdensome immigrant population, and that radical solutions must be brought to bear if the decline is to be arrested. Among the measures he proposes are the reintroduction of capital punishment (abolished by the Socialists in 1981), the restriction of job opportunities to French nationals and the institution of a State-free popular capitalism. In his call for a *remise en ordre* of French society, he advocates that ills such as drug abuse and sexual promiscuity be vigorously combated, and that AIDS victims be quarantined in special sanatoria. The abrogation of the 1975 Abortion Law and the promotion of larger French families through financial inducements is essential, he contends, if France is to recover a healthy demographic profile. Central to his argument here is the need to reduce the immigrant population through a programme of selective repatriation. Le Pen has called for the retraction of welfare benefits from immigrants and for changes in the Nationality Code which would prevent children who are born in France of immigrant parents from acquiring French status as a right. A recent radio interview in which he referred to the holocaust as a 'point of detail' in the history of the Second World War caused a political outcry and brought a hail of charges of anti-Semitism against Le Pen both in the French National Assembly and in the European Parliament.

Support for this most provocative of France's politicians is strong in the highly industrialised east of France, where tensions over unemploy-

ment, immigration and a rising crime rate have made a substantial part of the voting public susceptible to the Front National's radical stance. The real heartlands of Le Pen's support, however, lie in the *départements* of the south: Bouches-du-Rhône, Alpes-Maritimes, Pyrénées-Orientales, Vaucluse, Var, Hérault and Gard. Here, large concentrations of North African immigrants live side by side with many of the *pieds-noirs* who were repatriated from Algeria when it won its independence after the bitter conflict of 1954-62. French Algeria still occupies a privileged place in the mythology of the 'nationalist' Right, and Le Pen, as an ex-paratrooper who served in both Indo-China and Algeria, exercises a particular appeal for those currents of right-extremism that found concerted expression in their violent opposition to de Gaulle's policy of Algerian independence in the early 1960s.

The old militaristic and nationalist constituency, however, represents no more than a fragment of an electorate which is strikingly heterogeneous in its character. While the Front National benefits mainly from a traditionally conservative electorate, it is clear that Le Pen has exploited a voter instability which cuts across the political spectrum. The appeal of the Front National transcends the conventional boundaries of class and ideology, attracting both defectors from the major parties and protest voters who have no allegiance to any one political camp. From the many electoral surveys which have attempted to chart the Le Pen phenomenon, it emerges that a significant percentage of current Le Pen voters supported François Mitterrand in the run-off against Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the 1981 presidential election. It is moreover likely, if recent polls are to be believed, that a substantial proportion of those who support Le Pen in the first ballot of the forthcoming presidential contest would countenance a vote for a candidate of the Left rather than help Jacques Chirac or Raymond Barre in the second round.

It is here precisely that Le Pen poses the greatest potential problem for the established parties. Though he has no realistic prospect of winning the presidential election, or even of making it to the second ballot, he commands a substantial reservoir of support. The nature of French presidential contests is such that the difference between victory and defeat comes down largely to the votes that a candidate picks up — or fails to pick up — from eliminated candidates in the second round. While Le Pen will exact no small price for any such support, the temptation may prove irresistible to the right-wing candidate in a second ballot run-off. The mainstream Right has succumbed already to the short-term expedient of alliances with Le Pen's party in a number of municipal and regional councils. Despite the RPR and UDF leadership's rejection of Le Pen's overtures at the national level, tacit sanction has been given for deals which keep the Left out of office at the local government level. The Right has sought some absolution in the argument that the Socialists themselves are to blame for allowing Le Pen's party into the National Assembly.

For the moment, though, all-party condemnation of Le Pen and his politics remains the order of the day. Conservative leaders are hoping to

avoid any future electoral bargaining by wooing back defectors and thus reducing Le Pen's political leverage. For the traditional right-wing parties, however, the task is far from straightforward. Whereas the dramatic collapse of the Communist vote is to the overwhelming advantage of the Socialists (who constitute the largest single party in the National Assembly), the presence of a powerful far-right fringe movement will continue to pose a serious dilemma for a conservative coalition born of an uneasy alliance between the centre-right UDF parties and the neo-Gaullist RPR. The French Right is a broad church. While some conservatives, such as Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, favour a muscular response which would neutralise Le Pen and appeal to far-right voters, others, such as the Foreign Trade Minister, Michel Noir, warn against the compromising of principle and the attendant risk of alienating a moderate centrist vote that remains essential to the election prospects of a right-wing presidential candidate.

The calculations of the Right are complicated by Mitterrand's studied refusal to state clearly whether he intends to run for a second term. The President's evasiveness on the issue is widely interpreted as a ploy to derive maximum benefit from his current popularity as Head of State before descending into the political arena. If Mitterrand does seek re-election — and the likelihood is that he will — he can expect to stand unopposed by his Socialist heir-apparent, Michel Rocard, and to attract up to a third of the vote in the first ballot. While the weakness of the Communist Party will allow the Socialists an unchallenged run on the Left, however, any transfer of support between the two rounds could be short of what would be required to secure victory against a conservative candidate who succeeds in mobilising the full potential right-wing vote.

It is at this point that Le Pen enters the equation. If he maintains his current standing, and if he can exert sufficient influence over the way his supporters vote in the second round, he could be in a strong position to arbitrate. Of all the presidential contenders, the leader of the Front National has cause to be the most sanguine. A victory for the Right may see his party established on a firmer footing vis-à-vis its mainstream conservative rivals. A victory for the Socialists, on the other hand, could ensure that the Front National remains, on the fringes of a discredited Right, a haven for the radical anti-Left vote. For Le Pen and his party, the presidential contest is but one further stage in a process of political habilitation. Le Pen contends that no future right-wing administration is possible without the co-operation of the Front National. Chirac and Barre, for their part, dismiss the prospect of any such collusion. The breakdown of the vote on the eve of the second presidential ballot will do much to determine whether political will or electoral arithmetic prevails.

[James G. Shields is Lecturer in French at Aston University. He has published articles and book chapters on a range of political and literary subjects concerning France.]

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE 1987: A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT

by Robert Stone

SOUTH Africa, once the black sheep of the Commonwealth family, was disowned and disinherited in 1961. It has continued, however, to dominate discussion and cause dissension ever since. Last year's Commonwealth Conference was no exception.

While leaders of the countries that once made up the British Empire had much to talk about—world trade, debt, economic development, war, peace and the future of the Commonwealth as an institution—the pressing question was what to do about South Africa. The response was influenced by the main forces which came together to shape last year's meeting in the west coast Canadian city of Vancouver.

On the one hand, there was conference host, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. With pathetic numbers in the opinion polls, he had an urgent domestic political need to be seen chairing a successful international gathering, and while Canadians are badly divided over such issues as constitutional reform and the terms of a trade deal with the United States, opposition to apartheid is something they can agree on. Mulroney made this distant and safe issue his personal cause. This fitted neatly with the Commonwealth's institutional need to be seen doing something about apartheid.

But predictably, this force ran straight into British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's determination to do nothing about South Africa.

At the last Commonwealth Conference, in Nassau two years ago, Mrs Thatcher's unyielding determination brought such a strain on the meeting that, reportedly, Queen Elizabeth had to intervene personally to calm things down. And in London last year, during a mini-summit of the Commonwealth's seven largest members, the Prime Minister compromised just enough with a voluntary British ban on tourism and new investment to keep the Commonwealth from coming apart.

Yet after more than a year of widespread, if uneven economic pressure, South Africa easily weathered a gold miners' strike, its trade shifted slightly to the Far East countries but did not shrink and white voters defiantly swept President P. W. Botha back to power with an increased majority last May.

No one at the 1987 conference was buying Mrs Thatcher's South African policy. Despite her strident, holier-than-thou attitude and the antics of the British contingent in lobbying against further sanctions, other Commonwealth leaders made it clear that they considered her position morally bankrupt. They know that her cynicism arises from the fact that she has vital interests to protect. With investments in South Africa now totalling over \$9 billion US, the British representatives were so eager to avoid the sanctions issue that they went so far as to publish false Canadian trade figures in an effort to undermine any push in that

direction. The British Government's true attitude toward sanctions was revealed by the fact that even as the discussions were going on in Vancouver, a British trade delegation was touring South Africa.

The Commonwealth claims the moral high ground on the South African issue but, despite British tradition, democracy is a fragile thing within the organization. Its moral authority is undermined by the fact that several countries are ruled by military dictators. In addition, an Amnesty International report, released to coincide with the meeting, said that 33 of the 49 countries in the Commonwealth, including India and the United Kingdom, are guilty of serious human rights violations.

No one had changed their position since the last conference but while both sides of the apartheid issue have toned down the rhetoric considerably in public, they have also dug in. As a result, hope receded quickly that any kind of compromise could be reached.

But if the decorum was preserved in public to a certain extent, in private, apparently, no one held back. According to Steven Lewis, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations who sat in on the private session on South Africa, wordplay among the leaders was blunt.

Zambia's President, Kenneth Kaunda, rebutted Mrs. Thatcher's opposition to sanctions by asking her that if the situation in South Africa was reversed — five million blacks dominating twenty-five million whites — whether Britain would argue so forcefully.

However, the Commonwealth nations' past timidity had now gone into reverse, and to avoid an open confrontation with Britain, a nine-member committee of foreign ministers led by Canada's Joe Clark was appointed to review existing sanctions and consider aid to South Africa's poor black neighbours. The decision to create the working group of ministers was seen as a way to maintain momentum against South Africa's racist policies and sidestep a political stalemate with Britain on the issue of sanctions. Even before the final statement of the conference it was clear that the foreign ministers recognised the impossibility of persuading the British Prime Minister to join in.

Nevertheless, without consensus, the committee recommended that existing sanctions against South Africa be intensified. They also reached agreement on the need for military and economic aid to the so-called 'frontline states' on South Africa's borders which are trying to cope with the Republic's military incursions and blows to their economies. Finally, they called for a monitoring system to track the effects of existing sanctions.

Meanwhile, South African President P. W. Botha issued a characteristic dismissal of the conference. He told a gathering of his ruling National Party in the port city of Durban that the Commonwealth should leave South Africa alone to reform its racial policies.

There were passionate speeches during the conference calling for full sanctions. Particularly eloquent were Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and India's Rajiv Gandhi. But Commonwealth leaders appeared to have lost their stomach for another fight with the

formidable Iron Lady. Efforts to avoid a confrontation were under way before the meeting even started. The preparatory document, produced by a group of Commonwealth High Commissioners, called only for 'effective action to secure fundamental change' rather than for 'action against apartheid through economic measures', as in the original version.

Despite the fact that the positions of Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth on South Africa had been clearly staked out prior to the bi-annual conference, the issue dominated the discussions. It was only upstaged for part of a day by the announcement of Fiji's expulsion from the organization.

That followed the resignation of the South Pacific island's governor-general who had tried to hang on following the September 25th military coup by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka — his second in five months.

Rabuka wants to assert political dominance for ethnic Fijians who make up 47 per cent of the country's 680,000 inhabitants. Another 49 per cent are of Indian descent. The Commonwealth leaders reacted with shock when Rabuka suspended the constitution and declared Fiji a republic.

It was a combination of democracy and demographic change that brought a predominantly Indian party to power in last April's elections. While eastern Fiji may be a land of palm trees and small villages with ethnic Fijians dressed in the traditional *sulu* (man's skirt), western Fiji is a place of sugar cane fields, mosques, Hindu temples and the *sari*. Much of the Indian population has been there for up to four generations and were first brought as indentured labourers. They now own many of the country's businesses.

The Commonwealth countries found the basis of the coup embarrassing. The parallels to South Africa are too great.

In the end, the Commonwealth was back at square one. It produced a two thousand-word statement which its leaders, with the exception of Mrs Thatcher, praised as a firm step along the road to ending apartheid.

Despite the break with Britain on South Africa, a split that produced the first non-unanimous Commonwealth communique in its forty-year history, other leaders maintained that the organization remains a strong world force. Many analysts however, see this as a hollow assertion. South Africa's media gag has kept it out of the headlines last year. The black township rebellion seen by millions around the world on television, though it raised international awareness of the racial confrontation in that country, has been all but crushed.

The summit's lack of originality in an area to which it devoted so much time and energy left many delegates saddened. Without British participation, it appears that the initiative has been lost. The political will to bring about an end to apartheid seems to have run out of steam.

[Robert Stone is a Canadian journalist. Currently he works as a writer for the CTV Television Network National News in Canada. Previously he was posted for several years in Central America.]

CHINA: THE PROBLEMS OF REFORM

by Keith D. Suter

CHINA is treading a tightrope. It is seeking rapid economic and technological development via greater private enterprise. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to ensure that it retains overall control of the nation.

India achieved independence in 1947 and the CCP gained control in 1949. These two Asian giants embarked upon separate economic programmes. India went for a mixture of private enterprise and state intervention. Its poverty is notorious. Its wealth tends to be overlooked. As a 'Third World' nation it also has its own 'First World' of wealthy families. However, in a mixed economy (and even more so in one with minimal government intervention) economic activities may proceed comparatively unhindered by power struggles among the politicians.

China, by contrast, opted for a programme based initially on Soviet experience. The Soviet Union offered large loans and thousands of technical experts to begin building a series of major steel works, truck and tractor assembly plants, aircraft factories and power generating stations. Much of this Soviet-provided infrastructure remains today as the basis of China's industrial system, although now seriously outdated in technology. In 1956 the state converted nearly all of the country's commercial and manufacturing companies to state-owned and controlled units. Capitalism virtually disappeared in China. The three-level system of socialist organisation on the farms — production brigade, production team and the People's Commune — was created at this time. The 'Great Leap Forward' in industrial production took place, culminating however in industrial chaos. Serious dissension between Chairman Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev developed into a split in 1960, and the Soviet Union pulled out its entire industrial aid programme, leaving vital projects half-completed, and thereby severely impeding the nation's industrialisation effort. A more pragmatic-minded group of leaders ordered a retrenchment from Chairman Mao's more radical ideas, which continued until 1966, when Mao launched a spectacular comeback to power through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, purging tens of thousands and drastically altering the governmental system. However, Mao had to depend on the army to bring order back to the country. The Cultural Revolution petered out in 1976, with Mao's death. There was no clear system of succession and in the ensuing political turmoil the economy once again suffered. In the past 12 years Mao's successors have tried to find an appropriate economic strategy.

In terms of ending extreme poverty, China's programme has been successful. The people in China have one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world, but there is little abject poverty. Leaving aside natural disasters, there are few signs nowadays of mass famine or disease.

The western world, since Britain's industrial revolution two centuries

ago, has shown that capitalism is not effective at distributing wealth. In many countries, such as Britain and the US, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting more numerous. However, it remains the case that capitalism is the most successful system in world history for creating wealth.

The challenge for today's CCP is how best to permit greater private enterprise — but without the country again falling into chaos and without eroding the CCP's grip on the nation. Recent events have illustrated just how difficult this is going to be.

In December 1986 student demonstrations took place in major cities. The students were campaigning for greater freedom. Education in China, and particularly university education, is one of the most controlled sectors of a society that is still highly authoritarian. Students privileged enough to attend tertiary instruction are expected to be disciplined elements within the whole system of State planning and national economic growth. With very few exceptions, they have no choice about what kind of career they will have, where they will start it, or what enterprises, government bodies or institutions they will pass through during the course of their working life. They are subject to strong indoctrination yet many of them also have the opportunity to learn about what is going on in the rest of the world.

These demonstrations were a far cry from the Cultural Revolution. They were orderly and the police were restrained in their response. China was not (despite some alarmist western reporting) back on the brink of chaos. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, one of the great survivors of Chinese politics, orchestrated the resignation of his veteran colleague CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang — he was evidently annoyed both that the demonstrations had taken place and that Hu Yaobang had not acted more quickly to end the unrest. Deng's hand was forced by the conservatives who for some years have been worrying that the pace and direction of reform were too fast and going in the wrong direction. Subsequent events have included some restrictions placed on leading intellectuals who were seen as spurring on the changes.

The CCP is the world's largest communist party. It has about 44 million members. This may seem at first sight an immense number (it is more than the total number of adult Britons). But, then, China has well over a billion people — probably close to a billion and a half. Additionally, CCP membership is a bonus for career and personal enhancement. Consequently, one could expect a far larger number. Additionally, the average age of membership is getting higher, thereby indicating that the CCP is failing to attract younger people.

But the CCP's problems are not just numerical. China does not now need more ideologies but more experts. Science, technology and marketing do not necessarily benefit from specialists in the details of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. (Medieval theologians who speculated on the number of angels who could dance on a pin head doubtless had the same feelings of redundancy). In some factories, the weekly political study

classes have become lessons in the latest technical developments. As greater — if still restrained — emphasis is placed upon private enterprise, then time spent on ideological discussion represents income lost from not doing private jobs. This is a far cry from the Cultural Revolution's slogan 'better Red than expert'.

The Chinese economy has three important elements: the state, the collective and the individual. The leading role is, of course, played by the state-owned enterprises, which presently number 87,000 and account for about 77% of total national industrial output. They are mostly in the urban areas. Collective or co-operative enterprises, numbering about 304,000, predominate in the rural areas. They account for approximately 22% of total national industrial output. The private or individual economy comprises mainly service trades and is located in both rural and urban areas. A major restructuring of the economy is taking place. In 1979 a series of rural reforms were introduced centring on a system of household responsibility by which remuneration is linked to output. This had a wide-reaching fundamental and beneficial impact on the rural economy. Output has risen to record levels and income accordingly for many rural residents, who make up about 80% of China's total population. The commune system has been disbanded and the main rural unit of production is now the household or family. The government is encouraging these rural workers to develop, on a voluntary and mutually beneficial basis, various forms of co-operation and joint management in the processing, marketing and transport of materials, in order to strengthen the rural co-operative economy.

An example of what these changes mean in practical terms can be seen in the need now to have a system to cope with the all too common problem in capitalism: bankruptcy. Under the former system, the issue of bankruptcy and unprofitability of enterprise did not arise. All profits after expenses and wages which had been paid were handed over to the state. In return, enterprises received investment and operating funds. Allocation of funds to enterprises had no relationship to earnings and how much was returned to the state. A loss-making enterprise which did not pay anything to the state would still receive funds. Investment was determined not by profitability but by the State Planning Commission's preferences. Consequently, enterprise management in China was less concerned with the profits than with meeting state production quotas. Enterprise management operated with a weak budget constraint since the state would cover losses.

With the introduction of an enterprise profit taxation system to replace the former scheme, the absence of provisions for bankruptcy was an anomaly in the reform programme. Profit taxation meant that enterprise management acquired greater responsibility for how profits were distributed after tax, but were not responsible for losses. The Government has therefore been obliged to develop a system to cope with the novel problem of unprofitable enterprises.

Another practical problem has arisen out of the way in which the

rapid economic growth since Deng's reformers took power in 1978 has seen a leap in average income but has also seen an increasing polarisation of those incomes. Growth has also seen inflation in China for the first time since the communists took power in 1949. Now running at an official 12.3% in the cities, inflation has been a shock to the Chinese, who cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that economic growth and inflation go hand in hand. The Government's attempts to introduce limited deregulation of prices has made the problem worse.

Another obstacle has been the settling of old international financial disputes. In June 1987 China and Britain signed an agreement settling all outstanding historical property claims between both countries and opening the way for China to issue bonds on the London capital market. Under the agreement China would pay Britain £23.47 million and Britain pay China \$US3.8 million in settlement of claims arising out of post-1949 disputes. Previously, China was barred from issuing bonds on the London market because of its refusal to honour debts incurred by governments before the 1949 Communist revolution. Britain was the first West European country to reach such an agreement with China, which has signed similar accords with Canada and the United States. China has, however, also reiterated its long-standing refusal to recognise or undertake obligations in respect of foreign debts incurred by pre-1949 governments.

The British Government agreed not to claim foreign debts incurred before 1 October 1949 by successive former Chinese governments. China defaulted on the bonds, which had a nominal value of £61 million. The debt has grown to nearly £200 million with accrued interest and default penalties.

China is, then, not only encouraging greater private enterprise at home but is also looking overseas to gain raw materials, hard currency and technology. For example, China has only six telephones per thousand of population and less than half the country's villages have even a single telephone.

China is rediscovering its past as an international trader. In the ancient world, economic and cultural contacts between Europe and Asia reached their zenith during the second century AD. At that time the Silk Road and its western connexions, the vital trade link between East and West, stretched across the known world from Xian to Cadiz on the Atlantic Ocean. Along it, from East to West, travelled Chinese silk, Arabian incense, precious stones, muslim and spices from India. In the other direction went glass, copper, tin, lead, red coral, textiles, pottery and currency. Internal unrest, foreign domination and periodic xenophobia have over the centuries disrupted China's trading role. But the sheer size of population has in recent centuries stimulated speculation about its potential as a market. Ever since the British emissary Lord McCartney came to the imperial capital in 1793, there have been visions of unlocking the latent consumerism of the country.

At present, despite the new policy, China is not a major trader. Measured against its national economy, trade is becoming more important

to China, but it still accounts for only 20% of its GNP. This is lower than most of the other Pacific Rim countries. If we were to redraw the map of Asia using total trade as the scale, the largest would be Japan — by far, eight times larger than the rest and six times larger than the next largest, Singapore. Then there would be a gaggle of medium-sized countries. China would be one of these, about the size of Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and South Korea. The 'island States' of this new map would be the Philippines, Thailand and New Zealand, but even these would be a third that of China. It is the potential that is important, but it is in the assessment of the potential in which the greatest difficulty has been encountered (not just now, but ever since the early 19th century). This underscores the need for careful, measured assessments of where the country is heading, or where it is capable of heading.

This policy, too, has run into problems. In August 1987, the Government imposed tighter controls to restrain the nation's foreign debt. The foreign debt in March 1987 stood at £9 billion, about half of it in low interest loans. Indeed when I was in Beijing in March 1987, the National People's Congress, which took place at that time, was notable for its emphasis on thrift, restraint and personal sacrifice. China's foreign reserves have been run down too quickly and now stand at about £7 billion — only a quarter of Singapore's.

An important growth area is in the development of joint ventures between Government agencies and foreign corporations. 80% are with Hong Kong based corporations, 7% American and 6% Japan, with most of the residue being Singaporean. The pattern is interesting after 1997 Hong Kong reverts back to China to be run as a 'one-country — two systems' policy. Beijing is co-operating largely with corporations which have a close affinity with it.

Thirty per cent of all joint ventures are in the service sector, especially hotels and tourism. China is certainly a tourist growth area, with about a third coming from Japan, a third from western Europe and a third from the Americas and Australia. It is hoped that the movie *The Last Emperor* (on Pu Yi, the last Manchu ruler, who died in 1967 as a communist and a gardener) will do for China what *Out of Africa* did for Africa's short-lived tourism boom (gravely affected by the AIDS scare).

Incidentally, one custom has now appeared (having been banned after the 1949 revolution) — tipping for waiters, taxi drivers and porters. This has attracted conservative criticism because tipping was banned originally because it was seen as demeaning. Another problem associated with foreign tourists is western immorality — pornography, AIDS and pop music. However, it is impossible to allow in what are seen as western advantages (such as technologists and tourists) without also allowing in western disadvantages.

To conclude, there are the wider implications of China's economic reforms. One is the way in which the 1990s look like being a turbulent decade for both China and the USSR. Both have realised that greater private enterprise is required for economic growth. But the political

demise of Mr Hu should be a warning to Mr Gorbachev that too much reform too quickly can be destabilizing and politically suicidal. The rediscovery of the value of the market system will create problems for Marxist ideologues around the world. But drastic reforms are required if economic growth is to be achieved.

A second implication concerns nations which have exports similar to those for which China will be a cheaper competitor. Australia, for example, will have its foreign coal market (especially to Japan) eroded by China. Australia is the world's largest coal exporter (92 million tonnes in 1986) and yet China in 1990 could be exporting 20 million tonnes. This will depress the world market and enable Japan to play China off against Australia. But if western hopes of China's domestic market for western products are to be realised, then China has to export items to pay for those products.

Finally, from a global environmental perspective, the environment could survive if Americans lived like the Chinese — but it could not if the Chinese lived like Americans. Trees are being cut down in China for industrial energy, factory waste is not subject to the restrictions now imposed in western nations and there is an increase in acid rain. The Chinese (and people throughout the Third World) are most unlikely ever to attain the American material standard of living — even the average American is now having difficulty maintaining it. But there is a warning here of the danger of widespread pollution and exhaustion of non-renewable resources.

In recent centuries, China has been on the margin of history. It has been seen as an exotic nation, ripe for exploitation. That ended in 1949. After a period of consolidation and isolation (partly enforced because of America's policies) it is now emerging back into the community of nations as a full participant. The impact of China's four modernisations, in industry, agriculture, technology and defence, poses challenges for the entire world. Along with Japan, China will dominate world affairs in the next century.

[Keith D. Suter is Foundation Director of Trinity Peace Research Institute, Perth, Australia.]

AIDS AWARENESS IN ZIMBABWE

by Doris Wisher

ON 4 July 1987, as the American public launched their Independence Day fandango, the Ministry of Health in Zimbabwe kicked off an event of far-reaching consequences

The Ministry's Health Education Department created a five prong nationwide AIDS awareness campaign. According to a Health Education Department spokeswoman, her office began with a survey to find out what the community knows about AIDS and, based on findings, provides missing information.

'We started out with a pamphlet for health personnel and found it to be too technical. Whoever met a T cell on the street? Now we hand out straightforward information,' she explained.

Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company (ZBC) airs a weekly AIDS panel discussion by doctors and other health professionals as well as broadcasting AIDS information every evening at 6.45. The most popular and effective depicts an emaciated man lying in a hospital bed as a voice declaims, 'AIDS. It attacks all races and classes. Avoid casual sex.'

Twice weekly, Zimbabwe Radio No. 3 broadcasts a phone-in programme, 'AIDS and You'. The usual format follows an interview with doctors on certain topics not limited to blood transfusions, AIDS in children and symptoms and prevention of the virus in adults.

Listeners jam telephone lines asking questions. Massive mail response to the programme has piled up bundles of letters in the Health Education Department office in Harare. Detailed AIDS literature is sent in response to each letter not aired on the radio.

The Health Education Department creates and distributes a series of 2' x 4' AIDS posters. In all corners of Zimbabwe, these can be seen strategically plastered on the walls of government buildings, clinics, cinemas, churches, schools, police stations, bus stations, beer halls, telephone poles and sign posts. 'AIDS has no cure. Don't help to spread AIDS. Choose your partner carefully. Beware! Your next sexual partner could be that very special person, the one that gives you AIDS.'

One poster depicts two women waiting in a dark alley with a caption: 'AIDS kills. Avoid multiple partners. Always insist on using condoms!'

The creators of these posters do not mince words and distribute them in English and the two major languages, Shona and Ndebele.

Lastly, the Health Education Department writes a short, concise Ministry of Health informational message for national distribution in the Harare *Herald*. The messages always begin with a hideous picture of a skull and crossbones with one minor update. One of the bones is a syringe. Each message clearly states the bare truth about AIDS, especially prevention, transmission and, of course, certain death from infection. A typical excerpt would be:

We are fortunate in Zimbabwe in that blood used from the Transfusion Service

is screened prior to use. In fact, we were the third country in the world to carry out routine testing of every single pint of blood donated. This test is carried out at every donation.

For an emerging nation such as Zimbabwe, the financial expense of this action only proves the sincerity of Prime Minister Mugabe's anti-AIDS policies.

Returning to the questions Zimbabweans pose to the Health Education Department in the mails, it seems that many people did not know the difference between AIDS and cancer. Another common refrain is centred on prostitutes and prostitution spreading AIDS. The Health Education Department has its work cut out in trying to clear prostitution, the planet's oldest controversial profession, of being the sole transmitter of AIDS. Many letters revealed a mixed attitude about the use of condoms. One testified that using condoms is like sucking sweets before removing the plastic wrapper. Another letter writer admitted to not knowing how to use a condom.

Several comments confirm the impression that AIDS was brought into Zimbabwe by foreigners. To expose the enormity of the misinformation problem, an American medical researcher in Zaka district in Masvingo province in the south of Zimbabwe was approached one dusty afternoon by two grade school teachers in their 20s. They politely inquired about 'the dreaded disease'. The bolder of the two asked, 'Is it true that AIDS is an American invention to keep Africans from having sex and not over-populating our continent?' Nonplussed, the researcher stared at him in disbelief and finally replied, 'Americans are trying to invent a *cure*. We did not *invent* the disease'.

In the same vein, many letters expressed a desire for mandatory blood testing or screening at the airport. This attitude is reminiscent of the American Midwest during the dust bowl '30s, when gypsy caravans were met at the outskirts of town and intimidated away.

Further misinformed inquiries were on transmission. People believed they could acquire AIDS by sleeping on carriers' bed sheets. The Zimbabwean drinking tradition of sipping a beer from a mug with a fellow beer drinker was also posed as a feared transmitter as was shaking hands with a stranger, and common among the inquiries was the need to know how to identify an AIDS infected individual on the street. And along with this, came volumes of inquiries about symptoms. The majority of the letters revealed panic in the hearts and minds of folks with a single perceived symptom.

On the provincial level, all eight provinces initiated AIDS awareness campaigns in co-ordination with the Ministry of Health. Workshops, town meetings, parades and mass media co-ordination fill out the action plan. A hopeful result is the involvement of the Youth Advisory Board in schools. These Boards of pupils disseminate information pertaining to AIDS-related prevention issues such as combining condoms in Family Planning (a non-governmental nationwide programme) and Sexually Transmitted Disease.

The Harare Junior City Council staged a demonstration in support of

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the fight against AIDS. Youths marched through the streets carrying posters from the Health Education Department. A spokesman for the Council said the purpose of the demonstration was to make people aware of the dangers of acquiring AIDS if they did not take precautions. 'We feel it is time that the nation learns about the consequences. All Zimbabweans should find a means to control the disease.'

The City of Harare has created a town-hall style health centre using videos in English from other Anglophone African countries for information dissemination and counselling. The target population was the individual citizen. Specifically, one programme provided presentations for domestic workers over their lunch hours. According to one city employee in attendance, employers, who happened to be white, were not keen to attend the so-called AIDS training yet the Ministry of Health sees the first sixty days of the campaign as a success.

However, at street level, graffiti emblazoned on the walls of public toilets in Harare may read as follows: 'We want to die in peace'. Regardless of this kind of protest, Family Planning distributes condoms and birth control pills free of charge throughout the country, sometimes by bicycle to rural health clinics.

Recently, *The Sunday Mail* printed a letter from a reader: 'AIDS and STD are not a menace, it is human beings who are a menace to themselves. Some people know they have STD or AIDS symptoms yet they continue to have sex with unsuspecting partners. Passing on AIDS should be treated as first degree murder.'

The Ministry of Health issued a directive to all registered medical practitioners authorizing doctors to arrange for patient testing. A doctor in Bulawayo, a provincial capital, said many of his patients have been found to be infected but he could not disclose the figures. Asked what procedures for testing are followed, he explained that the patient is sent to the blood Transfusion Service for HIV testing. If the first test is positive, it doesn't necessarily mean that the patient is infected. An HIV antibody test is conducted several times and if the result is positive and confirmed, it means definite infection. The infected person's name is then submitted to the HIV Advisory Committee, who would monitor the patient via reports filed by the doctor. The patient is then referred to the health department, where he is privately told that he has AIDS. The patient's partner is called in and both are told to keep the information private. The couple are then advised not to have casual sex and to keep to themselves only.

Since there is at present no treatment or cure for AIDS, the doctor tells his patients to go about their daily work as though nothing has happened.

The frantic search for a cure has led a traditional healer in Southern Zimbabwe to lay claim to the cure of two AIDS patients in Malawi. According to *The Chronicle*, the healer said he was proud of his ability to cure the disease and had written to the local medical superintendent for patient referrals. The healer uses three tree herbs from Malawi for

his concoction. During the first week of treatment, the patient eats a herbal mush cooked with sap extracted from the bark of a certain tree. This is followed by one week of drinking milk mixed with sap from the bark of a second tree.

'I did not want to come forward with my cure, but my ancestral spirits kept pestering me through dreams, saying I should help save lives. My ancestors direct me to the appropriate medicine for this disease', explained the healer.

Unfortunately, neither patient is available for comment.

'AIDS could become a major epidemic in Africa if no immunization or treatment is forthcoming', Jonathan Mann, director of World Health Organization's special programme on AIDS, reported recently and indeed press reports from neighbouring countries that one in five people in Central African cities has the AIDS virus is a horrifying prospect for the non-infected.

The impending AIDS epidemic is a global problem and to this the planet is responding. The World Health Organization has earmarked about US \$50 million to help countries fight AIDS. WHO Director-General, Dr Hafdan Mahler, told newsmen upon arrival in Zimbabwe that in addition to this amount WHO would mobilize between US \$50 million and US \$100 million every year to enable countries to sustain their AIDS campaigns. He contends that the money will enable all African countries to start their own national strategies against AIDS.

Zimbabwe's AIDS campaign received US \$850,000 from the United States Agency for International Development to fund projects. The largest project is expansion of the serology laboratory at the blood Transfusion Service, which also received US \$10,000 from the American Ambassador's Self-Help Fund for purchase of equipment from the United States and locally manufactured refrigerators needed by blood centres around the country to store blood at optimal temperatures. Another project will fund the printing of thousands of pamphlets in three languages for the Health Education Department.

Dr Sydney Sekeramayi, Zimbabwean Minister of Health, called on all Ministry personnel to utilize funding in a wise and prudent manner in the hope of preventing AIDS cases. At least seventy cases have been reported so far in Zimbabwe. An unidentified health official speculated on this figure since neighbouring Zambia reported 395 AIDS cases.

And what is most on the minds of women in this campaign for life? Mrs Eunice Takawira, Health Education Officer, said fewer women than men responded by mail to the radio and television campaign.

In a nation where contraception of any sort, including hysterectomy, must be by permission of the husband, women are exposed to AIDS unwillingly because they cannot instruct their husbands to use condoms or to be monogamous.

'We are captive targets', Mrs Takawira read in one letter 'Sex practices in this country will bury us if we don't change our ways', although a letter written by a woman and signed by several others con-

cluded, 'With AIDS, we will finally be allowed to control our own bodies and decide for ourselves'.

Concerning future projections, the AIDS campaign will continue until the Ministry of Health is satisfied with the community awareness level. The Ministry is not simply shoving information down the throats of Zimbabweans. Private companies, organisations and clubs constantly ask for doctors and AIDS experts as speakers as well as the inimitable AIDS pamphlets from the ever-diligent Health Education Department. A senior health education officer ventured a general opinion that people are changing their sex practices in the light of an impending AIDS epidemic.

We in the West stand to learn much from Zimbabwe's campaign to save their nation from becoming empty landscapes, devoid of human life.

[Doris Wisher spent much of the summer of 1987 in Zimbabwe working as a public health adviser researching maternal nutrition. She has travelled widely in Africa and was granted an interview with Ministry of Health officials.]

The February issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Poland: the Struggle for an Ethos* by Jonathan Luxmoore, *Arms Control in Europe* by Manfred R. Hamm, *Man's Radio-Active Cradle* by J. H. Fremlin and J. P. Nond and *The Triumph of Barbarism* by David Holbrook.

NICARAGUA: STAYING THE COURSE

by Jan Knippers Black

DURING the week that saw April give way to May, Managua enjoyed seven full days of running water, rather than the usual five. The Nicaraguan government was hosting the convention of the World Interparliamentary Union, some 1,000 parliamentarians representing about 85 countries.

The US delegation was to make a point of meeting leaders of the political opposition, and State Department was urging other delegations to do the same. At the very least that was sure to mean a number of complimentary lunches, for a limited cast of characters already kept very busy by the steady stream of US delegations. The Independent Liberal Party (PLI), which has a few seats in the National Assembly, had found a means better than over-eating of taking advantage of the international attention. It charges \$5 a head for its briefings.

It was on the opening day of the parliamentary convention that the Nicaraguan front in America's readily mobile civil war claimed its first casualty among American noncombatants. Twenty-seven-year-old Benjamin Linder, an engineer from Portland, Oregon, was the first of the approximately 60,000 Americans who have offered their services in support of the Nicaraguan revolution to be killed by the Reagan Administration's 'contras', or counter-revolutionaries. Nicaraguan casualties of the contra war, however, amounted to more than 16,000 dead and another 16,000 injured. The United Nations Economic Council on Latin America calculated that the material costs of the war from 1981 through to 1986, including actual expenditure and losses in production and trade, amounted to about \$2.8 billion, a figure comparable to the size of the total Nicaraguan economy. The war continues to take a heavy toll. Flush again with overt US funding and under intense pressure from US sponsors to demonstrate military prowess and strategic potential, the contras, now claiming some 20,000 troops, were wreaking havoc in Nicaragua's northern and eastern margins.

Nevertheless, with measured optimism the New Nicaragua promulgated a new constitution in January 1987. The ambience in the capital remained remarkably calm for a country at war. Sandinista soldiers were commonly seen in uniform on the streets of Managua but, unlike their counterparts in San Salvador, they normally carried no arms and they neither expected nor received deferential treatment from civilians. Sandinista leaders did not seem to be concerned about military defeat, even in the event of a direct US invasion. The people, they noted, are armed — block by block — and would surely defend themselves. What they fear is the defeat of their own revolutionary model.

Defence-related activities now absorb half of the national budget, and the economy is a shambles. Advances are still being made in some aspects of social welfare. Whereas in the twilight of the Somoza government

there had been only three day-care centres for the entire country, there are now more than 100; and the social security retirement system has recently been expanded to cover rural workers, including migratory ones. University attendance, tuition-free for all, and additionally subsidised for 25% of the students, has more than doubled since the revolution.

The redistribution of land, which got off to a slow start (perhaps leaving some disappointed peasants to join the *contras*), has been accelerated. Half of the 70,000 families that have benefited since the revolution received their land in 1985 and 1986; but another 70,000 are in need of land, and apart from the state farms and plantations operated productively by 'patriotic' landowners, there is little left to give. The government has even begun to distribute parcels from its own farms, confiscated initially from the fleeing *Somocistas*. While the private sector continues to control 60 percent of the economy in general, 80 percent of the arable land is in private hands.

Nevertheless, most of the development programmes that had been launched or planned have been on hold. Officials are particularly concerned about preserving the dramatic gains already made in literacy and health care. Gains from the polio vaccination campaign, carried out by the neighbourhood *Sandinista* Defence Committees and cited as a model by the World Health Organization, are holding; no new case has been reported since 1982. But gains in the malaria eradication campaign have already been reversed in some of the areas under *contra* assault.

The literacy campaign has of course been halted, as young people are drawn into combat or other emergency functions. But the hunger for creative expression unleashed by the revolution remains undiminished. Julio Valle Castillo says that the poetry magazine he edits sells out in a day and that he has found copies of it at crafts fairs marked up to four times the original price.

The economic 'plan' for the time being calls merely for survival — in effect, for outlasting Reagan. In part because the *Sandinistas'* revolutionary constituency was predominantly urban, the terms of trade had initially favoured the city over the country. In 1985, however, the government found it necessary to drop price controls and subsidies on most consumer goods. Inflation for goods no longer rationed immediately shot up to 700 percent. Countering speculators has become a major challenge for the government, but no coercive crackdown on blackmarketeers was contemplated. It was assumed that most of them were just poor but industrious people trying to get by as best they could. Meanwhile, given the relative worthlessness of money, many Nicaraguans were turning to bartering — in some cases with government encouragement.

In a sense, the *Sandinista* management style, responding, in turn, to a politically mobilized population, is well suited to the endurance of a prolonged crisis. That style is above all pragmatic and flexible. Whereas initially each ministry had its own self-contained revolution, there is greater co-ordination and central control now at the national level. However, policy decision-making and implementation affecting subnational

units and outlying areas have been increasingly decentralized. Lacking the resources to promote change in the orderly manner they might have chosen, leaders have shown the good sense to be supportive of popular initiatives that show promise, to give way where they must — as in holding back the tides of new squatters pouring into already overcrowded Managua — and to revise their own policies when they confront strong popular resistance.

One of the areas in which this very young and inexperienced leadership group has shown its ability to learn and adapt is that of dealing with the ethnic minorities on the country's Atlantic coast. Although some 1,500 inhabitants of the coastal area are still in armed rebellion, the autonomy provisions of the new constitution, worked out in lengthy negotiations with Indian and Creole leaders, have served to defuse hostilities in much of the area. According to Ray Hooker, a Creole who headed the autonomy commission, 90 percent of those now defending the region are locals rather than ethnically alien Hispanic Nicaraguans from the more populous Pacific plains.

Public opinion surveys conducted by social scientists based in Nicaragua have indicated a consistent 64 to 70 percent level of support for the Sandinista government over a period of several years. Neither the business elite linked to the contras nor the traditional parties that have opted to compete within the system have shown any potential for seriously eroding the Sandinista political base. The most serious threat to that base has come from antagonistic elements of the Catholic hierarchy under the leadership of Archbishop Obando y Bravo. That threat appeared to be dissipating, however, in early 1987, as the newly assigned papal nuncio assumed a conciliatory stance toward the Sandinista government.

Meanwhile, Nicaragua's proximity to the United States, a factor used constantly by the Reagan Administration to emphasize the security threat its government posed, was cutting both ways, as Americans went down in droves to see for themselves. Of the much maligned 'foreign advisers' to the Sandinista government, there are far more Americans than Soviets or Cubans. The Brigadistas, or *internacionalistas* (some 20,000 strong in 1986), who have learned about the revolution and the contra war first hand by picking coffee or building houses or clinics in threatened areas, have been largely Americans. And Americans comprise 40 to 60 percent of the 100,000 tourists who visit the country each year to see what is so inspiring or frightening about this revolution.

With seemingly limitless grace and patience, Sandinista leaders give as much attention to those Americans invading with cameras and notebooks as to those invading with machine guns. Like the Salvadorans on all sides of that country's tragic strife, the Sandinistas know that their war is ultimately for the hearts and minds of the US Congress.

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THE GLASGOW RENAISSANCE: A PERSONAL VIEW**by Andrew Hook**

IN recent years Glasgow has become a quite extraordinary place in which to live. I arrived in 1979 and was quickly made aware of a pattern of change in the city's life the implications of which long-term residents had scarcely begun to register. Looking for a house to buy, I was frequently told by local friends that there were whole streets and areas near the University, in the West End, where I wished to live, which were strictly off-limits. When I actually looked at these streets and areas what I found confronting me was not decadence and decay, urban neglect and shabbiness, but attractive rows of Victorian flats or terraced houses, light and bright in their newly stone-cleaned splendour, sometimes complete with art nouveau motifs in doors and windows. My well-intentioned colleagues had clearly been talking of a Glasgow of the past — and of their own past, ten or twenty years ago, when for the middle and professional classes desirable Glasgow living meant a house in the suburbs, in Bearsden or Milngavie on the north side of the city, or Giffnock or Newton Mearns on the south.

It is the physical transformation of its inner-city housing which today provides the most striking evidence of Glasgow's urban renewal. In street after street the stripping away of a century of grime has revealed a creamy stone with a lightness of texture which seems able almost to float the buildings free from their own mass and volume. But it is not only stone-cleaning that is in question. In the post-war years, a massive programme of slum-clearance in Glasgow, just as in other cities, replicated and extended the devastation produced by war-time bombing. Now a combination of Housing Associations and private sector housing development is slowly filling Glasgow's gaunt and gaping urban spaces with decent red-brick houses which, if of no architectural distinction, at least put to flight the dereliction of the past. Even in the heart of the city the pattern recurs. Abandoned ware-houses and office-buildings are being converted into flats making inner-city living an attractive proposition for the young and socially mobile, as a result, increasingly in Glasgow it is smart to live in the city, not out of it.

All in all, the lessons of the post-war past have been learned. Demolition and site-clearance are out of fashion, renovation and restoration are the order of the day. And it works. Even along the derelict and neglected banks of the Clyde — once the dynamo of the city's economic life — progress is being made. The new Scottish Exhibition Centre, the Garden Festival development for 1988, and new blocks of private housing, are beginning to bring the river area back into the living city. Of course Glasgow still has an enormous housing problem but its focus is in the vast post-war housing estates, miles from the city centre, not in the inner city itself. The restoration and revitalisation of the city's streets cannot solve the problems of Easterhouse, Drumchapel and the rest, but Glasgow

is proving that inner city renewal can be a great deal more than a pious dream.

Glasgow's physical renaissance, however, is in one sense only a mirror of its spiritual one. In the 1940s F. O. Matthiessen called his book about America's literary culture in the 1850s *The American Renaissance* and as a result laid himself open to the rebuke that the notion of a 'renaissance' could not apply to a new country such as the United States. No such charge can be made against the idea of a Glasgow renaissance. We all know that in the nineteenth century Glasgow was the second city of the Empire, and that its driving enterprise and industry had brought it much wealth and economic strength. The outward evidence of that power, and the sense of Victorian self-confidence that accompanied it, are permanently preserved for us now in such structures as Gilbert Scott's University building, dominating the city from its site on Gilmorehill, the splendid Kelvingrove Art Gallery directly below, and the marvellously Italianate City Chambers presiding over George Square in the city centre. But Glasgow's wealth was created on the back of an urban working-class whose community — of poverty and deprivation — was constantly threatened by the divisiveness of religion and race. In that situation lay the seeds of the fate that overtook Glasgow in the hard times of the twentieth century. Then it was that the city's rich cultural tradition of painting and architecture, of art and design — a tradition still flourishing at the turn of the century with Charles Rennie Mackintosh and the city's major contribution to art nouveau — was forgotten, replaced by an urban image of a quite different kind.

At that time, Glasgow became identified everywhere as an archetype of twentieth-century urban alienation: the city seen as a waste land, a physical and spiritual desert, characterised by squalor, decay, and violence. This is the Glasgow of the Gorbals slums and its razor-gangs, the Glasgow crudely but vividly evoked by Long and McArthur in *No Mean City*. This is the Glasgow that made workers in the Ministry of Defence recoil with horror some years ago at the suggestion that they should be moved from London to Glasgow as part of a government decentralisation scheme. But this is the Glasgow which contemporary Glasgow is at last repudiating. On the face of it, Glasgow's self-promoting advertising campaign with its familiar slogan — Glasgow's Miles Better — seems to fit all too depressingly into that strain of cosy, self-congratulatory, inward-looking sentimentality, which has recurred so often in Scottish culture since its successes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet the reality is different. The campaign has been a remarkable success. The logo and its stickers blossom everywhere. And its message has somehow proved to have nothing in common with a standard Scottish self-indulgent complacency. Symbolically, Glasgow's cars carry the message in a variety of European languages — French, Spanish, Italian, German and several more local wit goes international. The whole campaign has been a gesture, a creative moment, a cultural statement, and, as such, an appropriate symbol of the Glasgow renaissance.

It is appropriate because the Glasgow renaissance has not occurred in a climate of economic recovery. Glasgow has not solved its long-established and deep-seated economic problems. Not that there has been any lack of trying. Immense effort and energy have gone into schemes for economic revival, and some progress has been made. GEAR (Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal) has become a model of its kind, widely studied as an imaginative solution to the problems of inner-city economic decay. Bringing together investment from the local authority, from national government through the Scottish Development Agency, and from the private sector, GEAR has been remarkably successful. In ten years some £500 million has been spent in one of the most economically and culturally deprived areas of the city, with £200 million of that sum coming from private investment. New flats and houses have been built, old tenement buildings have been cleaned and restored, small factories and work-shops have been built, grass and trees grow. Self-respect has been restored to an apparently hopeless and abandoned urban area. But even the success of GEAR is a qualified one. Tested on the most sensitive of social barometers — level of unemployment — not a great deal has been achieved.

According to the Scottish Development Agency, GEAR has created four thousand new jobs, but that figure does not begin to match up to the number of jobs lost through the apparently irreversible decline in Glasgow's traditional industries. In the city as a whole, unemployment figures remain stubbornly high, well above the national average. On the vast post-war housing estates, unemployment among young people in particular is a way of life. Yet, in the face of such a massive problem with its potentially dangerous consequences (think of Belfast), the renaissance is real. The life of the city is buoyant, one's sense is of energy and vitality, not of depression and defeat. The West End, for example, provides urban living at its exhilarating best. With its varied population, ethnically diverse, and a recognisable community of actors and writers, painters and musicians, students and academics from the University, media people from BBC Scotland and Scottish Television, its German beer and Italian restaurants, its all-day bars and shops open half the night, the West End offers more than a hint of bohemia.

When the announcement came through that Glasgow was to be European city of culture in 1990 the city took the news in its stride. There was satisfaction, a sense of something achieved, a job well done, rather than any kind of embarrassed self-consciousness. What lay beneath that reaction, though, was a feeling that at last the old image of Glasgow, the Glasgow of urban violence and decay, had been publicly, officially, internationally, repudiated. Glasgow's smile was indeed better.

We have known it for some time. Art and music and drama and writing have become very central to the contemporary Glasgow experience. For whatever reason, in recent times the Scottish cultural pendulum has swung from the east to the west. There is much that is tiresome about the alleged rivalry between Glasgow and Edinburgh. The two cities are less than an hour apart; many people live in one city and work in the

other The East-West divide is often more of a myth than a reality Scotland is a small country, and its cultural life, its artists, actors, and writers, cannot afford to be divided into two hostile camps And yet it is impossible not to feel that in recent years there has been a change of focus When I was an undergraduate in Edinburgh in the 1950s, reading English Literature, my friends and I never doubted that if there were any serious Scottish writers they were centred in Edinburgh

What is in question is not a single art form — not even Glasgow painting or Glasgow writing, nor a single institution — Scottish Opera, Scottish Ballet, the Scottish National Orchestra, the Citizens' Theatre or the splendid Burrell Collection, already Scotland's major tourist attraction Rather it is a spirit of creativity manifesting itself in a tremendous range of artistic forms from film and television, through poetry, fiction, and drama, music and painting, to pop groups and stand-up comics Inevitably some names and places stand out Bill Forsyth, whose films at their best catch the flavour of west of Scotland humour, Alasdair Gray, offering us a post-modernist vision of urban Glasgow, William McIlvanney whose novels — including his crime thrillers — provide disturbing analyses of some of the harsher aspects of west of Scotland life and culture, and are already much imitated in prose and film, the rich and diverse school of younger Glasgow painters, of whom Stephen Campbell is only the most famous in international terms, Giles Havergal's Citizens' Theatre, resolutely internationalist in its ethos, the Tron Theatre, providing a stage, under its young and gifted Artistic Director Michael Boyd, for new writing from Scotland and elsewhere, inevitably the Theatre Royal, the home for Scottish Opera that Edinburgh signally failed to provide; Sauchiehall Street's Third Eye Centre, an exciting combination of bookshop, exhibition and performance space; individual women writers such as Liz Lochhead and Marcella Evaristi, amazingly versatile in the modes in which they work, but always verbally brilliant and with a profoundly feminist sense of the tragi-comedy of life

All of these are supported by, and help to support, a richness of artistic activity, both popular and experimental, which shows no sign of losing strength John Byrne's widely-acclaimed television production, *Tutti-Frutti*, perhaps hints at the sources of strength in Glasgow's contemporary culture, an unselfconscious readiness to draw on local and regional strengths in language, expression, and attitude, linked to an emotional directness and honesty which confounds parochialism or provincialism in any limiting sense The Glasgow renaissance should indeed continue to produce smiles — of better and better aesthetic satisfaction

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LICENCE TO KILL: IS THERE A CASE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY?

by L. F. Lowenstein

RECENT horrific killings, such as the Hungerford massacre, the Enniskillen bomb outrage and the multiple killings in the Hampshire mansion have inevitably prompted a revival of the debate on whether capital punishment should be restored, at any rate for particularly bestial crimes. Of the latter, copious press reports of the trial at Winchester crown court illustrated beyond doubt a picture of merciless rape and homicide but completely ignored the views of the relatives closest to the victims, among whom were a son, daughter and sister of one of the women victims who was raped and then strangled. The views of the victims, had they been alive to state them, could only be surmised but nevertheless should not be ignored when considering the heinous crime committed. The suffering of those left behind probably equalled that of the rape victim subjected to wholesale degradation and was probably greater than that of the perpetrator of the crime.

Strong identification with the victim or perpetrator, personality traits, socio-economic status and intellectual status are some of the considerations which influence and colour the views of individuals when forming a decision on capital punishment. Those who are decided in their views will either be anti-capital punishment or pro-capital punishment. Those who are undecided may discuss the implementation of capital punishment with uncertainty as to whether or not it is of value on legal, moral or practical grounds.

There are very few studies at the present time carried out in countries other than the United States on this subject and hence the viewpoints tend to be entirely based on the American situation. Incidentally, very little research has been carried out on the prevention of murder and the study of the psychology of murder. A close look at the three groups based on points of view expressed on capital punishment as compiled by researchers mostly in the United States may reveal the pros and cons of capital punishment.

The review of the recent research literature relating to homicide and capital punishment showed that despite the 'presumed conclusiveness' of the evidence against the death penalty, most studies suffered from a number of theoretical and methodological short-comings. There appeared to be personality traits which were likely to influence attitudes towards capital punishment. These included extroversion/introversion as studied by McKelvie and Daoussis (1982). Using the Eysenck Personality Inventory administered to 89 male and female undergraduates, it was found that extroverts tended to be more likely to favour capital punishment than introverts, and males more likely to seek this penalty than females. It supported Eysenck's theory that toughmindedness was related to extroversion traits. A later study, McKelvie (1983) of 91 Canadian under-

graduates completed this study. Here again extroverts who were male reported more favourable attitudes towards capital punishment than females who were introverts

A Japanese study by Saito, Zvekic and Ghirlando (1985) surveyed 254 journal articles and books published between 1979 and 1983 primarily in the United States and other Western developed countries. This consisted of research on capital punishment and the findings did not indicate any major decision in this area. A similar study carried out on 282 jurors (Moran and Comfort, 1986) provided similar uncertain results. On one side, research results indicated that subjects who were more favourably disposed towards capital punishment were significantly more likely to be white, male, married, wealthier, Republican, politically conservative and authoritarian. They were also reported to have a tendency to make quicker decisions and be more persuasive of the remainder of the jury.

Most arguments on the question of capital punishment have been against such punishment. It has even been suggested (Solomon, 1975) that it may actually contribute to the incidence of murder because it could be sought as a result of suicidal motivations and because it set a malignant example of the use of killing as a legitimate coping device. In Germany a study by Reuband (1980) showed a significant amount of attitude change against the death penalty among more educated constituents in all vocations. Attitudes among the lower socio-economic class citizens were equivocal and fluctuated over the same 30 year period and showed no clear trend in attitude change. It was speculated that highly educated citizens showed trends before they were manifested in society at large against capital punishment.

Perhaps the greatest argument against the death penalty was put forward by Forst (1983) in that he analysed homicidal rates in the United States for the 1960s and suggested that the death penalty did not have a perceptible influence on the homicide rate. It was admitted that sometimes knowledge of capital punishment deterred individuals from committing homicide but the death penalty may have also provoked many persons to commit murder in order to hide evidence or kill witnesses. This was especially the case in the killing of policemen or witnesses who may have brought about their arrest and execution.

Similar results were obtained by Bailey (1983) in his study between 1950 and 1960 of 35 American states. Data compiled by the Federal Bureau of prisons was used in the analysis. The results did not support the deterrence argument for the certainty of the death penalty when a number of models of the execution rate/murder rate relationship were considered.

A study of the effect of four recent American executions studied by McFarland (1983) did not support the existence of a general deterrence as a result of executions that took place.

The view that retribution through execution was not likely to act as a deterrent was also studied by Neapolitan (1983) in the assessment of 366 undergraduates. Respect for human life was given as an important reason

for the avoidance of believing in capital punishment.

The association of moral reasoning and attitudes to capital punishment were investigated by de Vries and Walker (1986). The results indicated that subjects at higher moral stages were increasingly likely to oppose capital punishment.

As already mentioned there were very few studies that favoured even moderately the use of capital punishment. Those who accepted the death penalty as a feasible alternative saw it as not being significantly more severe than life imprisonment (Hamilton & Rotkin, 1979). A relatively large study of 500 Californian residents by Ellsworth & Ross (1983) indicated that 58.8% were proponents of capital punishment, 30.8% were opponents and 10.4% were undecided. It was the general view that neither the ordinary population nor the intellectuals were likely to be for the death penalty under certain conditions and for certain crimes. When asked about their reasons for favouring or opposing the death penalty, the subjects in this study tended to endorse all reasons consistent with their attitude, indicating that the attitude did not stem from a set of reasoned beliefs, but may have been an undifferentiated, emotional reflection of an ideological self-image. It was however, the general view that those who favoured capital punishment required a considerable amount more of additional evidence than was currently acceptable to convict someone for murder which would result in capital punishment.

Perhaps the most valid argument of all was that which recognised the feelings and suffering of the victims, such as the relations of individuals who had been murdered. An interesting psycho-analytically oriented study by Schoenfeld (1983) concluded that there may be unrecognised unconscious motives behind those who did not favour the death penalty in certain instances. It was suggested that those individuals who were totally against capital punishment may have unconsciously identified themselves with the criminals, as did most law-abiding citizens.

Although Lampe (1985) did not come out in favour of capital punishment, he expressed a view that there was a greater need for concern in the legal profession, and especially among the judges to establish an official goal or hierarchy of goals for that system to deal with a variety of offences. This may have or may not have included the death penalty. The hierarchy that was suggested was probation, fines, community based alternatives, prison and capital punishment.

Relatives of the victims who have had such crimes committed against members of their family will feel a combination of emotions including the obvious hatred for the perpetrators, guilt and depression. They too, however, are innocent victims as much as those that were murdered.

Society, however, seems bent on providing justice for the perpetrators in a most considerate way while providing very little for those who are the victims or close to the victims and who are totally innocent of any criminal act. A more primitive, less sophisticated society than ours would consider that relatives of the murdered individuals, as in the case of the Hampshire mayhem, would undoubtedly take and have the right to seek

revenge upon the perpetrators personally. Such revenge would take the form of 'doing unto others what has been done to those unto you' . . . an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth . . . This, of course, is not the case to-day and we therefore have judges and laws and courts to deal with murderers and other offenders.

The question is, how far removed are the courts of law and the punishment they invoke from the natural feelings of those who have been severely damaged emotionally, physically and frequently financially? Society, too, must feel outraged by lenient sentences being given in cases since society can identify with both the victims and the relations of those victims. It is for this reason that once such individuals have been proven guilty, the death penalty is the only logical way of resolving the matter, although obviously not bringing back the dead or completely satisfying the relations of victims. Their feelings of injury and desire for revenge might well go beyond the death penalty.

There are some who would say that the death penalty is no deterrent to future acts of a horrific kind. That may well be so but there is another aspect and that is that a natural form of justice must somehow be approached in a court of law in order for society to feel satisfied that true justice has been done.

There is yet another argument in favour of the death penalty. Why should society bear the burden financially and otherwise of keeping alive depraved individuals, treating them with humanity when lives have been forfeit by their acts? Clearly, there are many more deserving causes which need to be considered within our society than those criminals who murder for gain or for pleasure without concern for victim or relatives of victim alike.

This is not to say that all murders should be considered in the same vein. Murders that are committed as crimes of passion or not highly pre-meditated would not be seen in the same light as those that are committed as a result of careful planning and frequently in the most barbaric manner. Also, in order for the death penalty to be invoked there must be virtually 100% certainty of the guilt of the individual as well as his state of mind being declared *compos mentis*. Only then will the feeling of natural justice be experienced by people who have been most damaged by those who commit murder as well as those who cannot, alas, speak for themselves, i.e. the victims of the murder.

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WILLIAM CAMDEN AND THE BRITANNIA

by John McGurk

FEW read Camden's histories today, but the quarter-century last year marking the publication of his *Britannia* must prompt some reflection on the foremost historian of the Elizabethan age. William Camden is surely one of the first writers of his age who fits the modern view of the academic professor of history. Some historiographers would go further and claim for him not only a European reputation but also that he introduced continental historical criticism to re-establish England's reputation in the world of learning. Certainly his purpose in compiling and writing the *Britannia* was in part patriotic to demonstrate that Britain was an imperial province sharing in the common culture of the ancient world, but his principal aim was to make European readers more aware of British history, antiquities, and places of interest.

Camden's industry was phenomenal. The *Britannia* alone is based on much travelling up and down the country, on maps, on first hand information, and on long service in libraries. He did have the benefit of John Leland's manuscripts and collections for a similar venture on which he laboured for twelve years but did not live to complete. Camden consciously assumed Leland's mantle, so that in a sense he is Leland's continuator. In the collective endeavours which went into the production of the *Britannia* it is tempting to see the inspiration for the founding of the Society of Antiquaries sometime between 1586 and 1590, in any case, William Camden was among the founders and one of its most active spirits which included peers, lawyers, judges, heralds and courtiers.

Who was William Camden? His father Sampson Camden, a native of Lichfield, followed the trade of painter and stainer in London, his mother, Elizabeth, came from the anciently established family of Curwen in Cumbria. Their son, William was born on the 2nd May 1551 in London. He received his early education at the Edwardian reform foundation of Christ's Hospital and at St Pauls. In 1566 he went up to Magdalen possibly as a chorister, and later to Broadgates Hall, thence to Christchurch where Philip Sidney was his fellow student. Like many students of his time he left Oxford without taking a degree, but in 1570 he supplicated in vain for his B.A. However, on a renewed application three years later he was granted it. At Oxford, Camden was noteworthy in debate as an ardent defender of the established religion, and this is the likely reason for his rejection by All Souls, then a bastion of the old faith. Dean Gabriel Goodman of Westminster School came to Camden's rescue offering him the post of second master at the school in 1575. During the vacations, the solace of the schoolmaster, Camden tells us in the preface to the *Britannia* how he was then able to give full rein to his obsession for and collection of antiquities. Norfolk and Suffolk were covered in 1578, Yorkshire in 1582 as well as Lancashire on his return journey. In 1589 he spent the long vacation in Devon and on a tour of Wales which

was completed the following summer in company with Francis Goodwin, the Bishop of Llandaff, his friend and fellow antiquary

Camden enhanced the reputation of Westminster School not only by his antiquarian writings but also maintained the name the school had for Greek studies under Edward Grant, the associate of Ascham. In 1593 Camden succeeded Grant as Headmaster and had written a Greek Grammar which was to hold the field for nearly three centuries. But by then the *Britannia* had made Camden celebrated and in 1597, due to the patronage of Fulk Greville, Camden was appointed to the heraldic office as Clarenceaux King of Arms in the College of Heralds, a position eminently to his taste. The re-establishment of the College of Arms in 1555 had given a new impetus to heraldry and genealogy, then the common past-times of the country gentry. The Cecils, for example, spent much time and money constructing, amending and pruning the family tree for, depending on taste, the College of Arms could find either a Roman or a British family origin.

Cartography, too, had much advanced in Camden's day with the work of Saxton and Norden. The latter had proposed to produce a *Speculum Britanniae* or Looking Glass of Britain in which the whole country would be mirrored in maps. In fact, it may however have been Abraham Ortelius (1527-1598), the wealthy German cartographer settled in Amsterdam who first inspired Camden to continue Leland's work in the *Britannia*, Ortelius certainly consulted Camden for his own map of Roman Britain. Camden spent his concluding years from 1609 to the year of his death in 1623 at Chislehurst. The year prior to his death Camden made final arrangements for the foundation of the Camden Professorship of History in Oxford endowing the chair from his lands in Bexley and from the wealth his books had then brought him. Camden insisted that the holders of the chair practise 'civil history' and he nominated Degory Wheare as the first Camden Professor. Camden died on the 9th November 1623 and is buried in Westminster Abbey in the south aisle, near to the place where his monument may still be seen.

Camden's true monument, however, is the *Britannia*. There were nine Latin editions by 1594, but the 1600 edition, dedicated to Elizabeth I, is the usually accepted definitive one. A new and enlarged edition appeared in 1607 and was translated into English by Philip Holland in 1610 and this one has contemporary maps by Norden and Saxton. Bishop Gibson's new English edition of 1694 became the basis for the four enlarged editions produced in the 18th century. In 1838 a learned society was founded to continue the spirit and activities of Camden in translating and printing the documentary sources of English history—the Camden Society, which now happily flourishes under the auspices of the Royal Historical Society.

Few historians have so well conveyed the joys of research in their work, or of arranging materials and writing to re-create 'living' history as William Camden; in his own words, his aim was nothing less than 'to restore Britain to Antiquity and Antiquity to Britain'. More prophetically

he said his work was only a beginning for 'a new age, a new race of men, will daily produce new discoveries'.

Camden's was a pioneering task of prodigious proportions, his own account in the Preface to the *Britannia* gives us a clear idea of the scope needed to undertake the work:

I got myself some insight into the old British and Saxon tongues for my assistance I have travelled almost all over England, and have consulted in each county the persons of best skill and knowledge in these matters I have diligently perused our own writers, as well as the Greek and Latin, who mentioned the least title of Britain I have examined the public records of the kingdom, ecclesiastical registers and libraries, and the acts, monuments and memorials of churches and cities These I have built upon as infallible testimonies, and cited them as I had occasion in their own words, tho' never so barbarous, that by such unquestioned evidences justice might be done to truth.

For the philistines of his day who thought antiquarian studies a waste Camden had a healthy scorn 'If there are any who desire to be strangers in their own country, foreigners in their own cities, and always, children in knowledge, let them please themselves: I write not for such humours'

To many people Camden means little more than an antiquarian topographer of the late Elizabethan age but these interests were subordinate to his love of historical lore of all kinds, land contours, scenery, climate, roads, are given limited space in the *Britannia* for to him a region was of interest because of its people, their origins, manners, religion and history in general.

He is too the first to admit that in the wide scope of his histories errors were bound to creep in. 'For who is so skillfull as in this dark ocean of antiquity to struggle with time without splitting on the rocks.' And he did make some curious mistakes, for example, his derivation of the English place name 'Sweinsey' (i.e. Swansea in Glamorgan) he defined as 'so called by the English from the porpoises' In his descriptions of towns Camden's accounts are inferior to those of Leland, but the increasing professionalism of cartography by his day and the labours of topographers made it possible for Camden to concentrate on antiquities so that even by today's rigorous standards he is recognised as the pioneer in the study of Romano-British inscriptions and numismatics.

The modern historian can easily forget that in Camden's time access to state papers and rare documents often depended on the grace and favour of a high ranking official at court and even on the monarch It was Lord Burghley who encouraged Camden to write a history of Elizabeth's reign and licensed him to use the state papers. In this task Camden was an honest and courageous historian of contemporary events. After the *Britannia*, the Latin Annals of the reign of Elizabeth was his greatest performance, a subtle but total picture of the Elizabethan age, its wars, trade, exploration and the arts viewed as a great explosion of the national genius orchestrated by the Queen

Camden's laudatory version of Elizabethan history was reproduced time and again in biographies of Elizabeth down to Sir John Neale's biography of the Queen in 1934, but since the revisionist work from the 1960s onwards almost every theme in the Camden version has been chal-

lenced; the cohesion, for example, the Queen is supposed to have brought to the state is now difficult to see as recent county research studies have shown; Calvinism is no longer viewed as the creed for rebels but rather as the unifying theology of the national church, foreign policy is also now seen as being much more complicated than the patriotic nationalism of Camden would have us believe.

His history of the reign is however nothing more than we should expect from a court historian of the time and though a veritable panegyric on Elizabeth's achievements Camden is critical of the Londoners of his time. He noted their changing fashions and spending habits, he wrote: 'our apish nation displayed a certain deformity and insolency of mind . . . jetted up and down in silks glittering with gold and silver . . . indulging in a riot of banquetting and bravery in building to the great ornament of the kingdom but to the decay of the glory of hospitality'. While every theme of Camden's *Annals of Elizabeth* may well be demolished by modern scholarship his *Britannia* is still in Spenser's epitaph — 'the nourice of antiquitie and lanterne unto late succeeding age'

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CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

ONCE more, I come before you a grouch, and it's the same complaint again. What they had led me to believe . . . I read only good things about *Shoah*. It's now been on television, again to good notices. In a television discussion George Steiner spoke of honouring it. A letter to *The Independent*, however, laments the lack of discussion on this event — we are, after all, seldom offered movies lasting nine-and-a-half hours, and this one concerns the most significant event of this century, the attempt of the Nazis to exterminate the Jews. It is almost certainly the most appalling, the most loathsome, the most vicious crime in the annals of recorded history. My words are inadequate.

But the response to *The Independent's* puzzled correspondents (the letter was signed by two people) is that few people want to sit down to nine-and-a-half hours of reminiscences of a time of great evil. This was the first mistake of Claude Lanzmann, its French compiler and director. He would have lost an hour if he had only hacked out the translations leading to the answers. Channel 4 chose to show Lanzmann's documentary without commercials, but it wouldn't have mattered. What with pretty views of lakes, of Corfu harbour, meadows, forests and endless shots of trains you would have been forgiven for thinking you were watching a commercial. Lanzmann's miscalculations are on so vast a scale that the result is a disaster. He interviewed a large number of the survivors of the camps, who discuss what happened against the banal happenings of their lives today. Presumably we are supposed to feel 'life goes on' when the Nazis intended that it shouldn't — for these particular people. Lanzmann doesn't know how to select or how to use the medium to make his points. Long, long sequences dissipate any sense of shock, amazement, revulsion. A barber remembers for so long that you start looking at the other customers, admiring the fittings. He is saying only what the other survivors have said, and you wonder why Lanzmann doesn't cut to avoid overkill.

The answer would seem to be that the barber takes twenty minutes of memory before he begins to cry. The unimaginable happened and it takes one who was there twenty minutes before he breaks down. A great documentarist like Jennings could use the tools of fiction (as in *Fires Were Started*) but Lanzmann doesn't even know how to present his facts. The Nazis who speak do so frankly, seen by a hidden (?) black and white camera. But if they agreed to be interviewed they agreed to be interviewed. One of them, responsible for planning the trains which took the Jews to the camps, is asked whether a king travelling in Germany today would get a special train. Neither the question nor the answer bring us any nearer understanding the Final Solution. That is something humanity may never come to grips with. This film, between irrelevant shots of two men in a Video monitoring van, lets us know why it happened. It could

not, because of its subject, be unimportant, but it fails — trivialises — because it doesn't begin to ask why it happened. *Aus einem Deutschen Leben* did, and is therefore worth much more than this prolonged essay in self-pity. By not including any of the newsreel material of the period Lanzmann, I assume, hoped for purity. Resnais's *Nuit et Brouillard* was a juxtaposition of the atrocities as filmed then and a coloured tour of Auschwitz now — or as it was when Resnais made it, in 1956. Lanzmann's film is by definition emotional, Resnais's is not. It is also twenty times shorter. Its impact is a thousand times greater. I watched it through tears. It was hours afterwards before I could speak. It is not something willingly to sit through twice. I did so a second time for study purposes — and though I had steeled myself it again reduced me to that expected in Greek tragedy: pity and terror.

It is strange to think that we were taught that we could only experience that when the gods brought down a great king. Misguided — and, frankly, dull — as *Shoah* is, I have little pleasure in discussing the other movies around and about. There is an obvious link to *Hope and Glory*, since it also concerns the War, but I do it with a shrug of distaste — and because it's less demeaning than the bonk-bonk and bam-bam of what's otherwise on offer. After Colin Welland and John Schlesinger — *Yanks* — here is John Boorman with memories of his childhood, evidently autobiographical. The audience with me chortled quite a bit over the quaint ways of the British in wartime, particularly their inhibitions about matters sexual, but I don't really know at whom this piece is aimed. It's about a particular time, a strange time — strangest of all to a child who didn't have the shaky precedent of the First World War. The boy observes, half-understands. From the suburbs, Dad joins up. The Blitz brings destruction all around, there are excitements like the descent of a German parachutist, a barrage balloon broken from its moorings, exploring bomb sites, seeing girls in their underwear in the parish hall while thumbing over used clothing. The house is burnt down and the family goes to stay with grandparents at a comfortable riverside villa — oh, so different from suburbia, though it's clear (if not in Sarah Miles's negative performance) that mother married beneath her. The school is shut on account of a stray hit and the boy returns to the villa. 'In all my life' says Voice-Over, 'nothing ever quite matched the perfect joy of that moment. My school lay in ruins, the river beckoned with the promise of stolen days.'

The War, in other words, as Nostalgia. There is a certain piquancy in the way children refuse to take it seriously — oh yes, wasn't it all a lark? There is one odd sequence representing the height of the Blitz when all within sight is rubble, fires light the sky and figures are seen against that light as if in some epic retelling of *Mother Courage*. But war isn't hell for long in this part of the Avenue. Its first bomb finds the teenage daughter dancing in the garden before noticing that the house opposite is blazing. I would just accept an incendiary but the sound of a nearby bomb was so terrifying that you were numb with fear — and relief that it wasn't you.

In other words, when I match my own experiences with Mr Boorman's I find his wanting. Much of the film is right — that floating barrage balloon, straying wives, teenage girls obsessed with foreign uniforms and (best of all) a shot of vapours in the sky after a dogfight. The narrative is sufficiently wayward as to suggest that the quest was for autobiography rather than a statement on war — or even that particular one. What is on offer then is a personal statement on an odd time, but it doesn't get us very far. The War made huge changes on the way we thought and behaved. It wouldn't matter that the aim was so small if the piece was better — more entertaining, more gripping, for instance — as good as we know that this director can do.

War is also the subject of *Full Metal Jacket*, directed by Stanley Kubrick, who made two of the finest movies ever on the subject, *Paths of Glory* and *Dr Strangelove*. Such was the acclaim that greeted his early movies that he must find it difficult to live up to his reputation — not that he seems awed by that, for his last few films have arrived garlanded with praise from the critics of other lands — or even this one, before they have publicly pronounced. Which is to say that we're not allowed to make up our minds for ourselves. 'The Best War Film Ever Made' is how a Canadian critic greeted this one, which would seem to be the only one he had ever seen. Thus arrived, as I said, *Barry Lyndon* and *The Shining*, I can't recall the ad campaign for *A Clockwork Orange*, but speaking for myself *Full Metal Jacket* completes a diverse quartet but one in which I spent more time looking at my watch than at the screen. The first fifty minutes look at base-training on a marine camp in South Carolina. Base-training or 'square-bashing', and again I speak from experience, is both degrading and humiliating. Here it is also repetitive. The wrong people are in charge, weaklings suffer and any other number of platitudes are paraded. When the film moves to Vietnam — not to the jungles of the far superior *Platoon* but to the prettily fired ruins of a city constructed in London's dockland — it remains superficial. We watch some young men under fire, and since we don't know them their deaths hardly move us. After an hour of this and the discovery that the chief sniper is a girl the men go marching off to R & R singing a song about Mickey Mouse against a background of burning buildings. Oh, war is hell all right.

Still, the film is a masterpiece beside *Duet for One*, which I commend to you as worthy of an evening out whenever it comes on television. More seriously, I thought you might be interested — since it did get some of the worst notices within memory. Well, I thought, Andrei Konchalovsky's two films in the West so far — *Maria's Lovers* and *The Runaway Train* — were both distinguished works, in the first instance triumphing over a doubtful script. Tom Kempinski was one of the three writers (along with the director) and his play was much admired — a duologue between a psychotherapist and his patient, a famous concert violinist dying of multiple sclerosis. These roles are played by two of the screen's greatest artists, respectively Max Von Sydow and Julie Andrews. He merely pops

in and out of this opened-up version, thus salvaging his reputation, but Miss Andrews has to cope with some of the worst dialogue since the 1935 *Cleopatra* ('The wife is always the last to know') 'I'm backing a totter' she says to shock him — and she is, too, till she meets that rag-and-bone man's understanding wife 'You don't mind?' she asks, incredulously. Earlier, she had merely smiled indulgently when her husband (Alan Bates, in a ghastly performance) objects to her objecting to his affair with his secretary, 'I'm not going to fire a perfectly decent person just on a whim of yours' It's the audience who is incredulous.

What the world doesn't need is this actress spouting four-letter-words, and I don't care if they suit the role she's playing. The same goes for Shelley Long, and the crime here is more heinous since this actress (as readers of this column know) made her name in television's *Cheers*. That programme had more laughs in any five minutes than may be had with *Outrageous Fortune* — though nowadays that's par for the course. You can only tell these days if it's supposed to be a comedy because the cast act brightly and do silly things. Miss Long plays so broadly that the actress in *Cheers* may well be a lookalike with the same name. Perhaps she is trying to match Bette Midler, who isn't funny either. But at least the idea of this movie is amusing: two acting students, stuck-up Long and slob Midler, are in love with the same bloke, joining forces when he disappears, discovering in the search both a respect for each other and that he is a very dirty dog indeed. The thing gallops from situation to situation, and therein lies the only compliment I can pay it. It never lets up.

Nor can the least logic be found in *Beverly Hills Cop II*. The original wasn't the greatest movie in the world, but it was entertaining. This sequel isn't boring, but it's hard to discern any other merit as directed by Tony Scott with the same hi-tech flashy impersonal style he brought to *Top Gun*. It's informative to have these visuals on a story not worth telling in the first place — informative of Hollywood today, and of the star, Eddie Murphy, who is now so popular and hence powerful that he could steamroll this story co-written by him — past Paramount's normally astute executives. For the inquisitive it concerns a series of heists and murders in Beverly Hills, bringing Murphy back to team up with his old police foes (John Ashton, Judge Reinhold) as a Three Musketeers detection unit. The cheek, humour and surprise of the earlier film are completely absent, the violence and four-letter-words are not.

It is not only the graphic violence which makes *The Untouchables* so inferior to the gangster movies of the early 30s. The story is again undernourished, and there are none of those comic or demotic notes of observation which make them always such a pleasure to see again. Yet as the four Untouchables go about their business of enforcing the law they offer us many a thrill, some of low degree and some of vintage quality.

Literary Supplement

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The Child in Time Ian McEwan Cape. £10.95 *Davy Chadwick* James Buchan. Hamish Hamilton £9.95 *The Book of the Brotherhood* Iris Murdoch Chatto & Windus £11.95 *Imagining Argentina* Lawrence Thornton Bloomsbury. £11.95 *The Day of Creation* J. G. Ballard Gollancz £10.95

There are some aspects of human experience so fundamentally catastrophic and traumatic as to provide a frequent inspiration for novels and short stories. Others, equally devastating, are seldom used. One of these is the tragic loss of a small child, whether by death or abduction, and it is a curious coincidence that two of the outstanding fiction publications of the late Autumn season are centred on this situation. Ian McEwan is one of the leading young contemporary writers and his clever handling of the child-loss experience in the opening chapters of *The Child in Time* promises an intriguing mystery. Although set a few years in the future, with indications that 'Thatcherism' has accomplished its deadly worst, most of the background scenario seems relevant to the present time. An inconvenient suburban flat is home for Stephen, his wife, Julie and three-year-old daughter, Kate. Stephen, although rather staid and priggish, is author of successful childrens' books. He is also a considerate husband and father, and takes Kate to the supermarket for a Saturday morning 'shop', thus allowing Julie a few hours extra rest in bed. Stephen is half in love with the gay, intelligent little girl. Riding exultantly on the shopping trolley, Kate assists with the checking-out. And then—a quick turn of his head at the pay till, but when Stephen returns his attention to the child she has completely disappeared, and no one is in sight who might have kidnapped her. The ensuing moments of panic and confusion, followed by his return to the flat to inform Julie, must rank among the finest examples of controlled reportage.

Kate is never found and presumably joins the long queue of 'missing persons'. The police fail to uncover the slightest clue and the narrative moves briskly on to other happenings, political and cultural, so that the possibility takes root that the disappearance of the angelic child is not intended to be taken too literally, but rather as a Barrie-esque blend of fantasy and satire. Stephen and Julie part as a direct result of their loss and Stephen embarks on a dreary round of committee meetings and visits to friends—even managing to get back to writing. His relationship with his parents is poignantly explored in a skilful flash-back, and it seems that the dramatic opening theme of the novel has been finally abandoned. But then, suddenly, it bounces back. Stephen, on his way to lunch with the Prime Minister, is convinced that a child seen playing in a school recreation ground is his daughter, though changed and several years older. Proof that he is mistaken finally extinguishes all hope of recovering the little girl. After a further period of desolation, he and Julie are re-united in a remote country cottage in time for the birth of their second child. Now

we are back in the real world with a wealth of obstetric detail, as Stephen is obliged to deliver the child himself. After which, the auguries are good for a resuscitation of the marriage. Following the polemics and ideologies it seems a perfunctory finale, and yet *A Child in Time* is no mere domestic saga of little girl-lost and happiness regained. With a novelist as astute and diverse as Ian McEwan the other, hidden meanings are not too difficult to assimilate.

Davy Chadwick, by James Buchan, could not be more different, for here is a genuine kidnap, set against a very credible background of the countryside around Naples. The life of an Italian village is a law unto itself, with its own mythologies and taboos. The Anglo-Saxon expatriate who settles in such a close community does so at his peril, unless he can unconditionally accept the local standards. For Dawn and John Chadwick that was no problem. Dawn, whose home it was by inheritance, loves everything about the damp, primitive house crammed with valuable antiques. And husband John is happy to live out his own off-beat life-style among the amiably eccentric neighbours. And then there is Davy, the precocious five-year-old who manages to make do with his unconventional parents and the motley bucolic and business acquaintances who comprise the Chadwick circle, and might have continued to do so *ad infinitum* but for a sequence of unexpected events over which no one had any control. These are set off by the arrival in the household of William Nelson, former lover of Dawn, possibly father of Davy, and the two men, William and John, clash predictably in between bouts of heavy drinking and financial negotiations. The climax is the disappearance of Davy. Leaden-footed policemen attempt an investigation but in the face of confused and often untruthful statements they do not get very far. The outcome of Davy's abduction must not be revealed. Sufficient to say that tragedy is narrowly averted. People such as William and John are not often met with but are by no means unconvincing. Keen observation, a true sense of comedy which is often hilarious, and the ability to convey every detail of a bizarre scene in few words combine to make this short novel by John Buchan's grandson entirely compelling and entertaining.

Reading *The Book of the Brotherhood* is an altogether different and more demanding experience. At first glance, the 600 closely packed pages might seem daunting. In fact, this is not the case. Irish Murdoch has not written a more absorbing novel. It is as though the conglomeration of superficially incredible characters in the earlier books have finally come together to express the author's ultimate views on contemporary people and events. Precisely what these are may be difficult to assess for the scene is not instantly identifiable. It is a seemingly fantasy world in which the encroachment of unpleasant outside truths are kept at bay, while nonetheless leaving no doubt as to what these unpleasantnesses may mean in real terms.

For the individuals themselves it must be accepted that they belong mostly to a close-knit group of Oxford ex-University students for whom the three years — or more — spent amid the gleaming spires was the be-all and end-all which will set them forever apart from lesser human beings. It is a curiously naive snobbery, kept alive by the circumstances in which many of them are still working or living in or near the University. That said, it is necessary for the reader to get to know these people on their own terms. Once this has been accomplished there are rich rewards.

The mammoth size of the novel does not mean a lessening of pace. The narration is brisk and immensely capable. People are minutely described — their clothes, their rooms, and above all their motivations. One of these, as indicated

in the title is the commissioning by the 'friends' of a book on a political and social theme. This high flown purpose is reminiscent of the Causobon manuscript in *Middlemarch*, unlikely ever to be completed. Far more important than this central strand of the narrative are the human and dramatic scenes in which the characters are experiencing emotions common to all periods in time—the scene when Crimond is discovered in bed with his friend's wife Jean, for example and, perhaps most memorable of all, a conflagration between the young girl, Tamar, and her mother, when the bitter woman unloads on the ambitious girl a great burden of financial and emotional responsibility with the simple aim of disrupting Tamar's studies and forcing her to go out to work. That will not easily be forgotten—but there is also much more to savour and consider in a novel which demands and deserves close and careful attention.

With so many horrific happenings jostling each other for attention and sympathy it is scarcely surprising if the springs of emotion and concern sometimes tend to run dry. Even more difficult is remembering the atrocities of a few years ago. This could be the case with the scandal of the missing people, or 'disappeareds', as they were called, in Argentina during the reign of terror over which the 'generals' presided. Yet the image of the bereaved and bewildered relatives, denied even the comfort of a religious funeral for their loved ones, was sufficiently unusual to remain in the mind, even after the persecution was mercifully ended and those responsible—or some of them—brought to trial. Such repressive dictatorships usually spawn many works of fiction, but the Argentine story does not seem to have done so in the profusion of, for instance, the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland. Thus, *Imagining Argentina*, a first novel by Lawrence Thornton, would appear to break new ground, particularly as his approach is so extremely original.

As is well known, the mothers and relatives of the victims of abduction, torture and worse paraded in the streets carrying the names of the lost ones on placards. Possibly, they did not achieve much except to keep their protest alive, but in *Imagining Argentina* they find an unexpected champion—Carlos Rueda—who, after his wife, Cecilia, was 'taken', joined the mourning women with fearless demonstrations within sight of one of the chief administrators of the secret police. And, for good measure, Rueda developed a strange ability, as inexplicable as it was weird, to experience mediumistic contact with the missing people, conversing with them, knowing their circumstances of detention and whether they were alive or dead. Much gruesome and presumably authentic information came through the mouthpiece of Rueda. Often, hope is abortive, but in the end, after almost succumbing to a nervous breakdown Rueda's own case has a happy conclusion. Cecilia is released, not seriously harmed, although many thousands of others were not so fortunate.

J. G. Ballard is a writer skilled in the use of personal experiences as a basis for his novels. The circumstances of his early life were often so painful that it might have seemed desirable to distance himself before setting them down in print. *Empire in the Sun*, winner of the *Guardian* Fiction Prize and James Tait Black Memorial prize, describing his childhood in China and Japan at the beginning of World War II, made for compulsive reading, partly because much of the background information was new to most people.

His new novel, *The Day of Creation*, also has an original setting but its progress is frustratingly slow. As the narrative is halted to consider yet another amazing aspect of the Chad/Sudan jungle, the impression given is that this unusual tale cries out for film treatment—which may have been the original intention. There is more than a touch of fantasy about the 'creation' of a

brand new river, which is Doctor Mallory's achievement while working in unsalubrious Port-la-Nouvelle. In fact, the birth of the new waterway follows the random shift of a fallen tree, the upsurge of an underground spring or even the diversion of some other river swollen by heavy rain, but to simple minds the birth of the 'Mallory' is accepted as a miracle.

Dr. Mallory is surrounded by a diverse group of characters. Some are tragically left over from a more civilised way of life at the local World Health clinic, others mere flotsam from nomadic tribes or armed bandits. Those who are supposed to be the 'military' are ignorant, unorganised and frighteningly cruel. Some of these would have repaid analysis in depth. Instead, the main thrust of the novel is to follow Dr. Mallory and his young companion, Noon, on a voyage up the newly born river to its supposed source. There is a strange, unrealised relationship, short on communication and emotion, doomed to extinction and disappointment, for the doctor at any rate, after the river vanishes as quickly and mysteriously as it appeared.

Also Received

The Coast of Bohemia Zdena Tomín Hutchinsonson £11.95

The talented Czechoslovakian writer Zdena Tomín, author of the much discussed *Stalin's Shoe*, has chosen the lack-lustre city in an East European zone for the setting of *The Coast of Bohemia*. Shortages of the basic necessities of life, together with unheralded short term arrests and brutal questionings, make the consistent good humour and optimism of the inhabitants all the more remarkable; Zdena Tomín writes in English, fluently and with grace, and this has the advantage over a translation.

Come the Deep Water Elizabeth Batory Tabb House Publishers £2.95

Sea Stories have a fascination and are always popular. Not many, however, are set in the comparatively quiet waters which surround the Isle of Purbeck in Dorset. In *Come the Deep Water* Elizabeth Batory, deeply familiar with this often neglected region and Swanage in particular, presents character sketches of a very varied collection of local characters all concerned with the coastal scene, boating, fishing — or just village life. There are twelve of these sketches in the present volume — all capably written and observed.

Basi and Company Ken Saro-Wiwa Saros International Publishers £3.95

M.R.B. Ken Saro-Wiwa Saros International Publishers £1.50

These two slim volumes of short sketches and stories are to some extent based on a popular Nigerian comedy series on television. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian, is the author of many books and children's stories. He has a very marked ability to present instant effects. Extreme brevity and sharp, pointed dialogue are the tools of his trade. All the contents of the two small books are interesting. If a choice is to be made it could be *A Transistor Radio* from *Basi and Company* and a different story with the same title in *M.R.B.*

The 1987 Booker Prize for Fiction was awarded to Penelope Lively for *Moon Tiger* (Deutsch £9.95)

NON FICTION REVIEWS

THE STATE OF TERRORISM

Contemporary Research on Terrorism, edited by Paul Wilkinson and A M Stewart Aberdeen University Press £45 00

This is not a book for the casual reader, or for addicts of crime fiction. It is a massive 600 page volume on the academic research being done on terrorism, to which 36 experts from across the world contribute. Almost every article, however brief, is thoroughly footnoted — two, each of 8 pages, have 37 footnotes each, one of 30 pages, has over 200. Yet the editors tell us that it is the outcome of a weekend conference in Aberdeen attended by 150 people. In their hunger for information and speculation they must have had no time for food or drink or small talk, nor even for a side-excursion to Balmoral. But then, happily, Balmoral would have had no professional relevance for them. Perhaps Peterhead would have done?

In this rich cornucopia, there are many arresting and disturbing analyses of terrorism in Italy, Germany, South Africa and Ulster (including a fascinating study of NORAID and of the methods whereby the IRA is financed). The most moving are the studies of the victims, and of the effect on them of days or weeks of ill-treatment, of their steady loss of pride and identity, and of the Stockholm Syndrome whereby the captives gradually develop bonds with their captors. There are brief essays on the Basques, on the Armenians, on the range of American terrorist groups, and even — as a reminder that terrorism did not begin with the PLO or as a product of Vietnam or of the wave of student protests in the late 1960s — on the Camisards in the Cevennes and Languedoc in the seventeenth century. And there is a full awareness of the disturbing links in some parts of the world between terrorism and messianism, and again between terrorism and liberation theology in Latin America.

Despite its range, its depth and its diversity, this is a book primarily of description and analysis, with each chapter competing in horror. Although there are, towards the end and notably from the experts from the Rand Corporation, wise words of counsel about the future, the professors are disturbingly imprecise about how to cope with terrorism when it comes. A team of crisis-copers or disaster-managers permanently on call and located in the Executive Office of the President might be the answer in the US — but it is easy to imagine the storm that such a proposal would arouse, leaving aside its unconstitutional character. There are no detailed case-studies here — perhaps the skill displayed by Sir Robert Mark in handling hostage-taking in London ten years ago is now seen as too small in scale, too 'low' in 'intensity' to be a model for handling trans-national terrorists?

This book, in all its detail of incident and grimness, serves as a reminder that outside a few privileged regions of the world, violence is a fact of life, and the use of terror is seen as the norm of political action. The political world in most of Africa, Latin and Central America and in the Lebanon is one which Hobbes described three centuries ago as one of 'warre of every man against every man'. And, as further proof of how ugly that world really is, the editors add a daunting bibliography of books and articles on terrorism, in English alone, that runs to 24 pages of single-spaced printing, and an index of no less

than 74 distinct national and international terrorist groups. There is abundant evidence here that terrorism is a subject that has certainly won recognition in universities in the American and English-speaking and West European world. Has it done so in the USSR, in Eastern Europe, in Latin America or in South East Asia? Or is it there simply another instrument of policy, a tool of state to be used abroad, or in any domestic crisis to destroy any opposition that should arise at home? We no longer live in an Age of Reason, if we ever did.

ESMOND WRIGHT

EUROPE WITHOUT AMERICA?

The crisis in Atlantic relations John Palmer Oxford University Press £14 95

These essays on the last twenty years of European-American relations by the European editor of *The Guardian* are written to a thesis that the Atlantic accord that has held since 1945 is crumbling, about to crumble, and ought to crumble. He compiles a daunting list of the difficulties that have arisen between Europe and the US, all of which have truth: the unwillingness of Europeans to foresee their territory as a battlefield between the Super Powers, the trade war, the recent anxieties in some countries in Europe that other countries allowed themselves to offer bases from which American planes could bomb Libya. Given these tensions, and given the threat from some Congressmen to push the US down a protectionist path, John Palmer foresees the probable end of the Atlantic alliance. And he offers a prospect of life in a post-Atlantic Europe, in which our futures will depend, it seems, on government by the Kinnocks and the Benns and those like-minded in Europe, happily blessed apparently by a benevolent USSR.

There is much valuable material in this book, and some fresh writing on the likelihood of a steady approximation of Western and Eastern Europe, spear-headed by the German desire for the reunification of the Germanies, and the evidence of capitalist forces at work in Poland, Hungary and Rumania. The diagnosis, however, is as partisan as the prognosis is frightening — though not it seems to the writer. The book can be read as a catalogue of the iniquities of the US since 1945, especially its sponsoring of the Cold War and NATO, inflicted, as Mr Palmer sees it, on a battered Europe. Britain is blamed, first, for not having asserted its leadership in Western Europe from the beginning (a Labour responsibility), then for decades of debates over its role. Its relative industrial decline is noted, though neither the scale nor the causes are analysed. The striking omission of this book, however, is of today's major theme, of which in recent weeks we have been sharply reminded of the inter-linked economic character of the two worlds divided by the Atlantic, so that a *frisson* on Wall Street produces chills in Tokyo and pneumonia? . . . in the City of London. It is this interlocked international economy, far more than the talk of nuclear war and the safeguards against it, that secures the peace of the world. The alarums and excitements, such as Mr Palmer recounts, do not betoken wicked America and victimised Europe, but are the normal matters of international relations, blown up daily now by the instant communications of press and television.

This is a stimulating, disturbing and highly partisan view of our own stormy times. He fails to mention that in all the storms, only the Atlantic world has since 1945 been free of war and revolution, and that to Indians and Sinhalese, Africans and Asians it is their real Mecca, secular though it is.

ESMOND WRIGHT

IRISH REPUBLICAN PIONEER

Terrible Beauty. A Life of Constance Markievicz. Diana Norman Hodder & Stoughton £14 95

If many believe that Lady Astor was the first woman to be elected to the House of Commons it is because Countess Markievicz, in a manner made familiar by today's *Sinn Féin*, abstained from taking her seat

It was appropriate for Diana Norman to apply to her subject the phrase used of the Easter Rising by Yeats who wrote some fine verse about her She was an heroic and compassionate figure, larger than life but not always too serious Sprung from the Anglo-Irish, Protestant, hunting Ascendancy, she married a Pole One could say that Poland was to the Tsardom as Ireland was to Imperial Britain 'Con' declined to 'obey' her husband in their Anglican wedding. Admired for her republican zeal, she was less honoured in Ireland for her feminism Legendary Ireland was personified by a lady on a pedestal. De Valera wanted no women in the ranks of 1916

He and his adherents fought a bitter, bloody war with the Free Staters more over the symbols of sovereignty than the reality which had been largely conferred in the Irish Treaty Eventually, they took the Oath of Allegiance with reservations 'Con' could not have done that But by then she was dead De Valera was a pall bearer In a scene such as is repeated in Ulster churchyards, 'the Free State had sent one hundred soldiers with rifles to make sure' that no republican salute was fired over one who had suffered and striven selflessly for what she believed

This is a beguiling book Yet, in the manner of many popular writings about Irish troubles, there is uncritical retailing of quotations and anecdotes from such as Dorothy McCardle and other keepers of the Myth The oft repeated story of the atrocious Colonel Smyth of the Royal Irish Constabulary is one example In fairness, we are told that Michael Collins did not believe it, but thousands do There are surely enough authenticated British crimes and follies to justify some mention of another side Lord Salisbury's regrettably offensive opinion of the Irish is quoted, but George Wyndham, the Tory Chief Secretary, whose legislation gave the Irish peasantry their land, is ignored

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

ESSAYS ON SEVENTEENTH CENTURY RELIGIOUS ISSUES

Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans Seventeenth Century Essays Hugh Trevor-Roper Secker & Warburg £17 50.

The question is sometimes asked why Professor Trevor-Roper, in spite of his pre-eminent talents has never written a BIG BOOK The answer might be found in Chesterton's hero *The Man Who Knew Too Much* The same could be said of Lord Acton but in Trevor-Roper's case (not in Acton's) one would have to add 'and wrote too well' Everything that comes from Hugh Trevor-Roper's pen is elegant, precise and imaginative His vast erudition must inevitably be distilled in brilliant but limited measures All five Essays in this volume are, as was to be expected, arresting in their different ways

That on Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist deals with a character so obscure that even Trevor-Roper himself admits himself baffled The Essay on James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, bears too many traces of its origin It began as a lecture in Trinity College, Dublin, on the fourth centenary of the Archbishop's birth Hugh Trevor-Roper seldom errs in the direction of eulogy.

But this Essay begins: 'James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, is the great glory of the Church of Ireland and of Trinity College, Dublin' Trevor-Roper in other moods would have made plenty of fun of Ussher's dating of the Bible fixing 4,000 B C as the date of creation Here he resists the temptation He goes to the other extreme in his treatment of *Milton in Politics* Every now and then he remembers to remind us that Milton was a very great poet But, for the most part, he leaves him quite discredited Among all the many characters touched on in these Essays no one comes out worse than Milton

The other two Essays *Laudianism and Political Power* and *The Great Tew Circle* strikes me as much more profound When he was a very young man Trevor-Roper wrote an Essay on Laud which is still well worth reading Many years later in a new Preface he said that if he were writing the book at that time he would have been more sympathetic to Laud and less sympathetic to his ideas On the whole in this new and wider treatment he is sympathetic to both Laud is usually associated with Arminianism though he disclaims the label 'The essence of "Arminianism" was that God's grace was universal, that Christ died for all men, and that all men, therefore, were capable of salvation by the exercise of their free will, they could benefit by that freely offered grace'

It was not those propositions which would seem acceptable to most Christians today which, in Trevor-Roper's view brought about his downfall 'The real distinguishing mark of Laudianism was its single-minded systematic support of world power it was not Laudianism that ruined Charles I but Charles I who royal Laudianism' Archbishop Laud on this analysis was extraordinarily unlucky to find himself executed But without Royal support he might not have enjoyed such a prolonged period of supremacy, and, after all, his main ideas triumphed at the time of the Restoration

It was these ideas in their most sophisticated form which Trevor-Roper discovers in *The Great Tew Circle* I confess that before reading his Essay my knowledge of that Circle was strictly limited One knew about the Heroic Falkland but little else Trevor-Roper traces the emergence of their ideas at the time of the Restoration He acknowledges that their tendency towards scepticism had untoward consequences later For my part the least attractive feature of the restored Anglicanism with its professed toleration was its extreme intolerance towards Roman Catholics and to a lesser extent dissenters But that is taking us away from these fine Essays

FRANK LONGFORD

THE LAST IMPERIALIST

Lord Lloyd and the decline of the British Empire John Charmley Weidenfeld & Nicolson £18 00

Has the author done it again? His first book, *Duff Cooper The Authorized Biography*, won him the 1986 Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Best First Work award Now in 1987, he has written this excellent life of Lord Lloyd — 'George Lloyd' as he was known to contemporary colleagues, but not a man widely known to the modern world

In a discerning Prologue John Charmley suggests that Lloyd's dashing defence of Imperial rule in Egypt and India and his anti-German policy in Eastern Europe and Turkey were overshadowed by Winston's world-wide reputation There may well be some truth in this comment Lloyd not only worked hard

as a soldier and leader, but became Governor of Bombay and High Commissioner for Egypt. He was ignored by Baldwin and only achieved Cabinet rank at the Colonial Office and Leader of the Lords when Churchill finally became Prime Minister. But it was too late, Lloyd had worn himself out.

The author has had the advantage of seeing the Lloyd Papers at Churchill College and of many sessions with David and Jean Lloyd, son and daughter-in-law, who with two private friends of Lord Lloyd himself persuaded the author to undertake this difficult biography.

Lord Lloyd is not an easy subject and utterly different from Duff Cooper. Duff was a scholar, wit and poet, who loved good food, wine and pretty women. Lloyd was a soldier, diplomat, and a passionate traveller who made himself a master of Middle East and Turkish land and languages. He knew Gallipoli, Egypt and India before he was appointed to posts of high responsibility. Whereas Duff wore his learning lightly and loved a rubber of bridge, Lloyd was a workaholic. Duff won a D S O in the First World War, Lloyd tried to be in the thick of the battle, but the chance never occurred.

Perhaps Lord Lloyd was not meant to find himself sympathetic to the age in which he was born. He held his views too strongly and too sharply. He tried in the early days of the British Council to understand the difference between propaganda and good cultural relations, but he was always restless to be doing a more dynamic job. He did not fit into any political party and gradually lost his friendship with Austin Chamberlain and Edward Wood (later Lord Halifax). Too often the chapter headings in the book illustrate his state of mind: 'Ambition and Frustration', 'Prelude to a Conspiracy', 'Wilderness Politics', 'Private Wars'.

Lloyd spent only nine years in the Commons as Liberal-Unionist MP for West Staffordshire, in 1919 he was appointed Governor of Bombay. He served four years and inaugurated practical schemes for irrigation and housing, but naturally fell foul of those who wanted to introduce parliamentary government in areas like India or Egypt and other Middle East countries. Lord Lloyd had his own conception of existing British rule in most underdeveloped areas of the Middle East and indeed of Africa. He had made a personal study of most areas of the Turkish and Middle East countries. He was a devoted traveller and had a passion for visiting, preferably by horse, the most hazardous and inaccessible places. He was a dedicated man in every sense—to his wife and son, to his church and country, and above all to the Empire.

This is the portrait John Charmley, with infinite care, gives in this excellent biography.

KENNETH LINDSAY

GRENADA: 'THE COMMONWEALTH SOVIET SATELLITE'

The Grenada Documents The Sherman Press H. Bach £9.95

Edited by Brian Crozier with an introduction by Sir Alfred Sherman, *The Grenada Documents* is no more than a European digest of *The Grenada Papers* edited by Paul Seabury and Walter A. Macdougall, long available in the UK.

Assuming that the documents are authentic, they show how US tolerance of right wing and military regimes have forced many educated, albeit naive, idealists into sectarian Marxist groups, using jargon entirely unsuited to the Caribbean.

In fact, Eric Gairy was not toppled by US Marines any more than 'Papa Doc' or Samozza. Castro must have looked on in horror at the developments that led to the murder of Malcolm Bishop and the book, in a useful chronology states

fairly that Cuba protested. Indeed, the Khymer Rouge of the Caribbean was a frightening prospect.

The fears of Sir Alfred Sherman are justified but the historical background of slavery, colonialism, under-development, support for sadistic regimes on the basis of anti-Communism has frequently pushed the young Turks of the area in the direction of the Eastern bloc, or even more extreme positions. The isolation of Cuba or Nicaragua by the US is, in my view, as self-defeating as the intervention in Vietnam, which might have become the Yugoslavia of the Far East. Certainly the assassination of the New Jewel activists supporting Malcolm Bishop would have produced either a backlash or a temporary reign of terror and isolation. To equate the Sandanistras, Bishop or Castro is a simplistic anti-Communist viewpoint.

Currently, the Soviet Union has its own Vietnam in Afghanistan and if that intervention was without justification then the call for intervention by Miss Charles — Dominican's most able politician — and other Caribbean States has an inherent danger. It gives carte blanche for the great powers to intervene in the internal affairs of tiny nations — or larger — in their spheres of influence. It neglects the difficulty of the Third World in facing intolerable problems and the temptation to become puppet states or satellites.

If Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are examples of Soviet aggression, preceded by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, then however revealing the *Grenada Documents* may be, they are neither new nor do they justify armed invasion. In the Caribbean only a revival of a federation to unite these small islands with Jamaica, Trinidad and possibly Guyana can provide the stability needed to prevent the growth of pockets of sectarian and curious examples of Marxism. The ground has to be fertile for Communism to take root and the exposure of well known Communist methods adds nothing if there are no proposals to raise living standards and protect human rights on the doorstep of the world's richest and most powerful nation.

What justification is there in International Law and why Grenada and not Haiti — these are the problems to which the writers and editors should address themselves rather than applauding Grenada as the third place from which Soviet power has been prized away during decades of expansion. Sir Alfred Sherman and H. Bach forget that there are as many brands of Marxism as there are variations of democracy and that China and the BEC have made common cause against the Soviet Union. This two dimensional view, as developed in *Grenada Documents*, of the world is self-defeating in its simplicity and silliness.

PAUL ROSE

THE TOLSTOY'S MARRIAGE

Lev & Sonya: The Story of the Tolstoy Marriage Louise Smoluchowski Sidgwick & Jackson

In September 1862 Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy married Sofya (Sonya) Beris. He was thirty-four, she eighteen. It was a marriage that was to last forty-eight years. Of the fourteen children born to them eight survived into adulthood. The history of the Tolstoy's marriage has been recorded in one form or another many times but Mrs. Smoluchowski's account has the advantage that through her knowledge of the Russian language she has had direct access to the Tolstoy's diaries and notebooks and therefore this gives her account an added authority.

'I lived for thirty-four years and did not know one could love so much and be so happy'—so wrote Tolstoy shortly after his marriage, and Sonya, in the same vein, 'when I looked at him I was seized by such a feeling of strength and love'

On September twenty-second 1910 Tolstoy wrote in his diary, 'I am going to Yasnaya (the family home) and horror seizes me when I think what is waiting for me there.' Between these two extremes the Tolstoy marriage fluctuated until the final curtain, which was to be shortly after the above words were written, during his self-imposed exile from Yasnaya Polyana and only six weeks before he died

The author's account of the intervening years is engrossing and her assemblage, through the diaries and her own linking text, of every aspect of the Tolstoy's life, both domestic and literary, is a model. Particularly so in the latter sphere with the writing of *The Kreutzer Sonata* and its effect upon Sonya, the wound remaining for some years. A deeper more serious rift occurred during the last years of Tolstoy's life over the ownership of the copyrights to his works and it was not until 1914, four years after his death, that the Russian Senate ruled that all Tolstoy's manuscripts be handed over to his widow, she in turn giving them into the custody of the Lenin Library

Tolstoy's flight from the family home is now part of literary history. The mutual laceration of husband and wife continued to the end, Tolstoy writing to Sonya that he could no longer tolerate her spying and eavesdropping, to which she replied 'Levochka, sweetheart, return home, darling, save me from a second suicide'. Sonya died in 1919 at Yasnaya aged seventy-five

Their biographer, Louise Smoluchowski, has produced a well-balanced and engrossing work, sympathetic to both the Tolstoys, which sympathy perhaps gives a little too much blandness to the writing in her scrupulosity to be fair. An index would have been helpful

SYLVIA SECKER

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Jacaranda Flower Toril Brekke Methuen £9.75

A fortunate chance invitation to visit Kenya sent the young Norwegian writer, Toril Brekke, on a mission of exploration. Her assignment was to investigate the various modes of existence of African women. The high birth rate in Kenyan women has long given cause for concern and an enquiry as to why this should be so, together with related problems to heavy child bearing, were to be the basic areas for research. Toril Brekke has a lively tolerant mind, never likely to be confined to mere statistics and the result of her journey is a slim volume of twelve short stories, *The Jacaranda Flower*, illustrating the underlying facts in a variety of ways (R W)

Political Handbook of the World, 1987 (CSA Publications, NY) This 1987 edition is edited by Arthur S Banks, with Thomas C Muller as Assistant Editor and Cindy Christian and Thomas Uthup as editors of the

section on Intergovernmental Organisations. It is certainly a very useful volume of over 800 pages with a huge quantity of information on independent countries, and their related territories. There are also carefully

drawn up lists of territories, such as Bermuda. Furthermore, the work includes information relating to the Intergovernmental Organizations, including the PLO. The latter is added because of its role in any peace-keeping operation in the Middle East. The same could be said of the ANC in relation to ultimate racial reform and peace in Southern Africa. Perhaps the only limitation on its current usefulness is the inevitable time taken in preparing the material for publication. The editors have attempted to make the information current as of March 15, 1987, with unusually important later-breaking developments — particularly leadership changes — updated through June 30.

Dangerous Precincts (Jonathan Cape, £10.95) This is a fascinating study in depth by John Treherne, President of Downing College, Cambridge of the notorious cause célèbre in 1921, when Archdeacon Wakeford was found guilty of immorality. John Wakeford was an Anglican priest with a national reputation as a preacher. On the other hand, as John Treherne shows, he had many enemies both at Lincoln, where he was Precentor of the Cathedral, and elsewhere. His wife's brother, also a priest, pressed the charges of immoral behaviour in sleeping at a Peterborough hotel with a woman unknown. He was found guilty by the Lincoln Consistory Court, and he then appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This was presided over by Lord Birkenhead, then Lord Chancellor, and Wakeford had as his counsel the outstanding advocate of the day, Sir Edward Carson. The author discusses the evidence in detail. The prosecution produced, from the hotel, witnesses who claimed to know detailed particulars of the couple spending nights together in a single room and

eating together, before and after, in the hotel. This evidence was, however, singularly unsatisfactory in its probative value, as Carson was able to show Wakeford's case was a complete denial of any association with a woman, and he alleged a conspiracy to destroy him. Lord Birkenhead, however, delivered the judgement of the Board, which found against the Archdeacon. One element in the prosecution's case was the latter being seen friendly with a girl in Peterborough Cathedral. In spite of national appeals for her to come forward, she failed to do so. The author, however, discovered her, now in her eighties, living in London. She explained that she did not wish to become involved, but she made it clear that she was not the woman in the hotel. John Treherne closely analyses the evidence and points out the many weaknesses in the prosecution's case. There seems little doubt that had this been a criminal trial before a jury, there would have been an acquittal. This is a book of great interest, and a joy to read.

Royal Holloway College 1886-1986 (Constable £15.00) Caroline Bingham has produced an admirable and sympathetic history of the then women's college founded in 1886, out of the influence of Thomas Holloway. A pioneer in women's higher education, it became part of London University in 1899 and played a considerable part in the development of the growing university. After the 1939-45 war, it became infiltrated by male graduates, and eventually in 1965 male undergraduates were admitted with a target of 1,000 students in all in 1967. The final metamorphosis was reached in 1985, when Royal Holloway and Bedford Colleges were merged as the Royal Holloway and Bedford New College. It is a story of sadness, but of academic achievement.

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BRITAIN AND THE NEW EUROPE

by John Coleman

EUROPE is faced with a dilemma as the two major superpowers retreat more and more into themselves. Their internal problems loom large and a kind of isolationism is probably an inevitable concomitant of the arms agreements that have been signed or are in sight. Both superpowers have a feeling that they have overstretched themselves and have been moving in directions that are not indefinitely sustainable. The question of the validity and manageability of such vast structures lurks beneath the surfaces they show to the world.

Europe's dilemma — not just the EEC's dilemma — is that on the one hand enormous pressures are still generated by the ideas of the economies of a scale to make the EEC into another superpower comparable with Russia or the United States, and on the other hand the drive for smaller local and national units is coming to be acutely perceived and is reinforced by a long history of struggles for independence by so many of the nations and cultures of modern Europe. Each of the old nation states of Europe has a momentum of its own. Each has the power to contribute to the whole but does not have the capability in the long run to surrender its own identity or sovereignty. The grinding and protracted battles at official EEC meetings bear witness to this.

For Britain, joining the EEC was decisively harmful. The Common Agricultural Policy did not suit Britain, the restraints on trade that it entailed were deeply damaging to Britain's industrial base; the European legal system was ill-matched with Britain's Common Law practice and the British party political system was incompatible with Continental party groupings and coalition governments. The so-called 'dynamic' advantages of membership failed miserably to outweigh the disadvantages. Indeed, the unsuitability of the EEC structure for Britain was so marked that it caused the Austrian professor, Leopold Kohr, to declare that from the moment Britain joined, the EEC in its present form was doomed. To a lesser degree the EEC puts the other member states in an uncomfortable straitjacket also. Common policies devised for the whole must almost inevitably be harmful to some of the member countries. It has long been plain that the EEC, founded as it was on the Treaty of Rome, was rigid and inflexible which, of course, is the main cause of its failure to arrive at prompt and sensible decisions.

Unfortunately, owing to the long running battle over membership,

Britain started off divided into two camps the pros and antis and, as William Pickles pointed out in his introduction to *Britain and Europe since 1945* (Harvester Press):

The majority, both of supporters and opponents (of the EEC) were led to these attitudes more by instinct than by knowledge, and that fact led to the use of arguments that embarrassed the better informed on both sides. So that serious discussion was impeded by Utopian dreams on the one side and improbable nightmares on the other.

Had a constructively critical debate developed in Britain right across the board from the moment of joining there would by now either have been a fundamental restructuring to the European Community under way, or Britain would almost certainly have withdrawn. Instead, an internal battle went on between the pro- and the anti-Marketees and Britain characteristically 'played the game' on what was viewed as the European field.

Throughout the period during which Britain has been a member there has been a certain amount of juggling with names to make the organisation more acceptable to the public, yet the fundamental problems remain. Two attempts, however, have been made to change the way in which the European Community functions. The first was to use direct elections to the European Parliament as the means of improving Community decision-making. David Marquand in his book, *Parliament for Europe*, wrote

Community Europe is overwhelmingly a technocrats' Europe. Except during the long summer holidays, when it is practically deserted, Brussels seethes with committee meetings, at which civil servants talk to other civil servants about policies suggested by yet more civil servants. Eventually proposals reach the summit of officialdom, the weekly meeting of COREPER, from where they proceed at last to the politicians in the Council of Ministers the policies which finally emerge from this cumbersome machinery are sometimes good and sometimes bad. But, good or bad, they are almost always tardy, and they rarely inspire much public enthusiasm.

Oddly enough, Marquand's message is that politicians (in the directly elected Parliament, of course) are the solution. Odd because it is so out of tune with the present day public hostility to politicians as was demonstrated by the extremely low turnout in the direct elections, not only in Britain but throughout the Community. John Eidenow, the BBC political journalist, put his finger on the problems at a conference on *The Public Image of the European Parliament*. 'I should like to consider', he said, 'whether there is a deeper-seated problem for the (European) Parliament based on the fact that it has arrived at the table of history too late, at a time when its idea has passed by and that this is reflected in its (media) coverage'. He made the further significant point that 'Eurobarometer showed that fewer European Community citizens cared about the European Parliament in 1984 than before the first direct elections in 1979'.

What that conference revealed was that, even in the eyes of its strongest supporters, the European Parliament has not proved to be the instrument to put the structural problems of the EEC right. The next attempt to make the apparatus of the Community work did involve some change in its basic structure. It was the Single European Act. Briefly, the Act was to enable some decisions, particularly on matters relating to the EEC's 'Internal Market', to be arrived at by majority voting. The diffi-

culty of achieving unanimity was seen to be the cause of all the problems. It is important to note that the Single European Act is an attempt to solve the same problems it was hoped would be resolved by direct elections. The Council of Ministers would make quick decisions and the Community would acquire a positive image both within itself and in the world. But the reality will not be quite like that, and again it is a measure of desperation liable to cause the most bitter resentment in those countries which are out-voted in matters they regard as supremely important. In fact, the Single European Act may well be the instrument that fragments Europe and does the most severe damage to the potential for co-operation in those areas where interests genuinely converge, and where joint action would be highly beneficial to all concerned. In practice, however, the power to make decisions on the basis of majority voting may well be very little used because when ministers come close to the realities and see the consequences they will tend to shy away from making any decisions at all. Thus, the Community will be back to square one.

Sir Fred Catherwood estimated the cost of the Community's failure in decision-making at £84 billion per annum (a little of that would be very nice for the Health Service!) and his solution was to create a United States of Europe immediately but few regard that as practical politics. The Community is clearly bashing its head against a brick wall and it really is high time that somebody stood back and did some lateral thinking. Indeed, this is already beginning to happen. Michael Ignatieff in his BBC 2 programmes, Richard Hoggart and Douglas Johnson in *An Idea of Europe* and the *New European* are already beginning to do it.

Real European unity was achieved during the Second World War. The majority of the countries of Europe, and certainly the majority of its peoples, saw the cancer of Nazi-ism in its body and after a spell of unfortunate hesitation decided upon the most drastic surgery. On the one hand, Hitler sought to unite Europe by domination; on the other side the wish to unite Europe in freedom flourished. Other shared principles emerged as hostilities ceased and reconstruction began. The Council of Europe grew out of Winston Churchill's great speech at Zurich University and for the twenty-one member countries it underpinned the fundamental principles and the cultural heritage which Europe shared. The Iron and Steel Community was established and was seen as a bulwark against any further conflict between two of the great powers of Europe. The present French Prime Minister described it as 'a reality dictated by history and geography and it should not give anyone offence'.

So far, so good.

Then, in 1956 came the Treaty of Rome. It was a massive theoretical blueprint for running the countries of Europe. That was the trouble with it. It can be strongly argued that it contradicted the fundamental principle of the English system of government which is simply and forcefully expressed in the following passage from a speech by Lord Salisbury when he was Prime Minister at the end of the last century. The essence of Conservative philosophy, he said, was '... that people in the localities

should govern themselves — and that attempting to imitate Continental plans by drawing all authority from central power, though it might produce a more scientific, a more exact and furthermore a more effective administration, yet it was destitute of these two essentials of all good government. It did not produce a government that was suited to the facts and idiosyncrasies of the particular community for whom it was designed, and it did not teach people to take an interest in their own government . . .’

At a time when England herself was feeling low and suffering from a sense of inferiority it is not surprising that the apparently efficient Continental system exerted so much attraction, especially for politicians, themselves under a good deal of general public criticism. In better times Britain might have spoken up boldly. ‘Look,’ she might have said, ‘in this matter we have a better system than you. That has been recognised by one of your own greatest thinkers, Voltaire. Let us build a European Community on our principle. We have never hesitated to use what we saw to be best in your cultures. You should not hesitate to use what is best in ours. Let us build a European Community based upon our great principle. To make your grand plan work properly we will finally have to give absolute power to the centre and none of us really believes in that’

In this way we would be looking at a wholly different approach to the structure of the European Community, one that would never arouse the hostility that built up in Denmark and Britain and would never have kept Norway, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden outside the Community. Such a Community would be no threat to the internal sovereignty of any country and it would enhance the self-determination of many groups of people who at present feel themselves oppressed within the nation states.

The climate of thought for such a transformation of the European Community to occur is now becoming very favourable indeed. The former Conservative Commissioner, Christopher Tugendhat, was able to say in his Montagu Burton Lecture:

It is now clear that the hopes that were widespread at the time of the Community’s birth that the nation state would wither away and die were misplaced. The faith, which was also prevalent at the time, in large centralised units and the efficacy of ‘planning’ has also been destroyed by experience. The idea that markets and competition are more likely to lead to the greatest good of the greatest number is enjoying a revival, and by no means only in countries with right of centre governments. For these reasons the Community cannot be expected to develop in a supranational fashion nor is it possible to conceive of a massive transfer of responsibilities from the national to the Community institutions. Most people in most countries do not want to be run from Brussels. Moreover at a time when national governments are trying to decentralise and to divest themselves of responsibilities it is absurd to advocate moving in the opposite direction at the European level.

In other words, we should give up the attempt to build the European Community from the top down and set about recreating it from the bottom up. We should try to discover how better decision-making processes can be arrived at from that angle. In doing so we would be attacking the cause of the Community’s problems, not just the symptoms. One simple idea would help. It is to stop trying to apply blanket policies to the

whole Community. Instead, the Commission in some form should identify those areas where the interests of groups of European countries — both inside and outside the EEC — genuinely converge. It should then frame common policies to meet those interests and invite *any* European country to join. An example would be the pollution of the Rhine. The countries through which the Rhine runs could then operate an appropriate common policy. Another might be the Mediterranean countries defence satellite which enables a group of countries collectively to keep an eye on what is happening in the military sphere.

The consequence of such an approach would be that Europe would rapidly develop an overlapping and interlinking network of common policies. The list of possibilities is a long one but one thing is clear: a Europe that was involved in such a network of common policies would be a Europe that was pulling together, not a Europe that was pulling itself apart.

Thus not only could the Utopian dreams be fulfilled in the best sense of the term and the nightmares of those who rightly cared about their own self-determination be avoided in such a Europe, but the very pattern of this European development with its emphasis on true Liberty might contain lessons that the superpowers themselves will eventually be glad to learn, since their problems also spring largely from size and inflexibility.

[John Coleman is Editor of the recently founded quarterly, *New European*.]

ATTAINING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

by Mattityahu Peled

THE Middle East is at present undergoing one of the most severe crises in its modern history. The Irani-Iraqi war and its extension to the sea routes along the Gulf present the international community with an almost impossible choice of alternatives. Faced with the growing danger to world peace, the international community finds itself incapable either of bringing about the cessation of hostilities or securing the safety of the sea routes through which a considerable portion of the world's petrol is transported. This sense of impotence in the face of a most dangerous situation has created in many circles the impression that all other problems in the Middle East have lost their urgency and can be ignored for the time being. In particular, the problem of the Palestinian people and their claim to be recognised as a people entitled to exercise their legitimate rights is seen by many as of much less importance now that the war of the Gulf is creating so much apprehension and absorbing so much of the world's attention.

This erroneous assumption that the Palestinian problem can be shelved for the time being compounds the danger to world peace because the Palestinian problem is by no means lying dormant. On the contrary, it becomes more complicated and more threatening the longer it is ignored. In some ways it is gradually becoming a component element in the crisis of the Gulf, just as the war of the Gulf infiltrates and increasingly plays a role in the Palestinian crisis. Actually, the very expression 'the Palestinian crisis' is gradually assuming a new meaning. Originally signifying the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people and the grievances of the Palestinians against the occupation of their land by Israel — not forgetting the oppressive military government instituted by Israel over the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip — it has now assumed far wider significance. The attack of the Syrian army against the Palestinians in the area of Tripoli in 1983, less than one year after the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli army which resulted in the evacuation of Tripoli by the Palestinian fighting elements one year after evacuation of Beirut and the subsequent attacks on the Palestinian refugee camps by the 'Amal' militia supported by the Syrian government, epitomizes not only the predicament of the Palestinians but also the centrality of the Palestinian problem within the Middle Eastern context. It also shows that military measures can aggravate the problem. The senseless Israeli attack on Ein al-Hilwa is just one more instance proving that.

The tenacity of the Palestinian, fighting for his existence against enormous odds, is both proof of his determination not to give up the struggle for his inalienable rights. As long as the problem remains unresolved through negotiations in which the Palestinians play an independent role, no other nation or community in the Middle East will enjoy

peace and security.

Thus, the danger of a new Arab-Israeli war is just as imminent in the Middle East today as it has been for the last 40 years. Just as imminent, indeed, but several times more dangerous, for it must be recognised that the next war in the Middle East will be fought with weapons more deadly than any of those used in past wars. It has only recently been discovered, to the amazement and shock of many in Israel itself, that Israel is busy developing long range missiles which would evidently carry nuclear war heads. It is inconceivable that any nation would develop a long range missile in order to fire over the distance of a thousand k'm a conventional war head. Such a dangerous enterprise cannot be explained by Israel's fear of so-called 'Palestinian terrorism', which is a frequent excuse given for many of Israel's unwarranted adventures. Its only excuse, if indeed there can be any excuse for such an act of aggression, is that due to the ongoing state of war between Israel and most of its Arab neighbours the arms race has achieved proportions which make it necessary for Israel to arm itself with long range missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

The nuclearisation of the military arsenal in the Middle East has already reached alarming proportions. It is of the greatest urgency to persuade all the governments of the Middle East to sign a pact prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Not all the detailed information is available, but sufficient has been revealed to justify alarm. Recently, in desperation, Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at the nuclear reactor of Dimona in Israel, out of concern for the future of humanity decided to reveal the information at his disposal at great risk to himself. Though not revealing information unknown to professionals, his action drew the attention of wider circles to the alarming facts. As a result, Vanunu faced trial behind closed doors.

The warning sounded by the Soviet Union against the new Israeli development of a long range ballistic missile is entirely justified. The response of the Israeli government, that the Soviet Union has no reason to be concerned, sounds rather unconvincing when it is remembered that the Memorandum of Understanding concerning strategic co-operation between Israel and the USA, signed in 1981, states explicitly that the Soviet Union is considered an arch-enemy of the signatories. That Memorandum has not been revoked and is governing important steps taken by the Israeli government, by way of implementing its provisions. One such step is the agreement to instal in Israel extremely powerful transmitters of the Voice of America, aimed at broadcasting to the Soviet Union, without reserving for the Israeli government the right to supervise the contents of these broadcasts or object to any part of them. If you take these two measures, the development by Israel of long-range missiles and its servile acceptance of American demand to instal the VOA transmitters, it is easy to see how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is already acknowledged in the USA as a regional reflection of the world-wide conflict, with the Palestinians perceived as serving the Soviet interests.

and Israel as naturally reflecting those of the USA. This perception is due primarily to the conduct of Israeli governments who willingly became subservient to the USA; but it is fundamentally erroneous. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians should and can be removed from the superpower confrontation and dealt with accordingly.

Such a distorted perception of the conflict is in itself extremely dangerous, because it invokes arguments which are unrelated to the nature of the problem. One instance of such arguments is found in the opposition of the USA, in concert with the Israeli government, to the participation of the PLO in any international peace conference. Considering the task of making peace in the region as exclusively reserved for the USA, and wishing to keep the Soviet Union out of the peace process, the American politicians seek to exclude the PLO since in their thinking the PLO is another arm of Soviet policy in the region. The basic fallacy here lies in the belief that the peace process can be revived without the participation of a major party to the conflict, a flaw in the thinking of both the USA and Israel, which they try to correct by claiming that King Hussein of Jordan is the representative of the Palestinian people and can speak in their name. Unfortunately, the King seems to be giving this illusion his support, which is the only possible interpretation of his recent agreement with Shimon Peres, Israel's foreign minister, the terms of which provide for bilateral negotiations between the two governments to the exclusion of the PLO, provided only that an international opening ceremony can be guaranteed in order to create the illusion of international backing.

The Jordanian king seems to be labouring under the fear that if the next Israeli government is formed by Likkud, following the general elections in Israel, it might carry out the threat, voiced by several Likkud leaders, of invading Jordan and establish there a Palestinian state. Indeed, some Likkud leaders are repeating this idea in their public addresses, but it should suffice to recall the outcome of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the futile attempt to form a Lebanese government conforming to Israel's wishes, to realise how insane and worthless are such boastful claims coming from the mouths of those responsible for the Lebanese debacle.

In any case, it is unclear what the King expects to achieve by assuming the responsibility to negotiate with Israel, on his own, a solution of the Palestinian problem. He is certainly not likely to gain control of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Bearing in mind the political commitments of the Labour Party, the most he can expect to achieve is what Peres calls 'functional partition' which would recognise the King as the Suzerain of the West Bank, while leaving the responsibility for the security of the territory in Israel's hands. The population of that territory would then elect representatives to the Jordanian Parliament but would have no political rights in their own country. The upshot would be that Israel, in effect, will nominate the Palestinian members of the Jordanian parliament and that laws relating to the West Bank, legislated in Amman, would

have to be enforced by Israeli law-enforcement agencies, since no Jordanian military or para-military force would be allowed in the area of Israel's responsibility. Imagine for a moment the Israeli army collecting taxes in the West Bank in order to pass the money into the Jordanian treasury!

Should the Israelis allow a Jordanian police force to be established in the West Bank, so that law and order and tax collection would be enforced by Jordanian agencies, it must be assumed that an arrangement of this kind, reached without PLO consent, would be met with opposition on the part of the Palestinian population inhabiting the West Bank. So, in the event of the population refusing to pay taxes or abide by laws distasteful to them, the Jordanian police will be obliged to appeal for Israeli support to put down any resistance shown by the people. Does the King really believe he could rule over the West Bank under such circumstances? Would he be able to survive, as an Arab ruler, under such circumstances?

No other more optimistic situation can be envisaged as a consequence of a bilateral agreement between Jordan and Israel. The fact that the Likkud, so-called 'national unity government' in Israel, is opposed even to this procedure and that it will never agree to Peres's 'functional partition', makes any further discussion of this eventuality of merely academic interest, but the overall picture is clear. The refusal of Israel and the USA to allow the PLO to take part in the search for peace drives them into all kinds of desperate efforts to surmount the obstacle they have themselves placed before the peace process. It is clear that no solution will ever be found as long as the refusal to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people continues to block the way to a truly international peace conference.

Yet, as already mentioned, the Palestinian problem does not lie dormant and its non-resolution is at the root of very dangerous developments. The situation in Lebanon is becoming more aggravated daily and the local ever-changing coalitions plus the presence of Israel in the south all contribute to make the situation practically unmanageable. But, over and above all else, it contributes to the sense of insecurity of all countries in the region with an unparalleled arms race.

The solution of the Palestinian problem by itself will not cure all the Middle East difficulties, but it will contribute significantly to the alleviation of tension. The mediation of an international peace conference in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly may prove adequate to deal with those other problems, once it has succeeded, as we must hope, to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.

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THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

by Esmond Wright

I hear America singing', wrote Walt Whitman a century ago, 'the varied carols I hear' American politics, amid all the hoopla and hysteria, move to a rigid ritual Presidential elections (along with those of all Representatives and one-third of the members of the Senate) are held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year Thus, this coming November, all Americans—or, more accurately, all those who are citizens and who are registered as voters in their states—will cast their ballots They will vote not directly for the candidate of their choice but for members of their state's Electoral College, which meets a month later (on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December)—and only this once—to elect that man who is favoured by the majority of their state's voters Since the meeting of each State's Electoral College has become a formality, the knowledge of the name of the victor is clear nowadays even before each state's tally is in in November.

This complicated system is a legacy of the Founding Fathers' anxiety that the 'mob' should not be entrusted with power, and that sober men should choose a sober chief executive But since 1789 the system has held, regardless of Civil War (in 1864) or World Wars (1916, 1940 and 1944) In Britain, where a General Election was due in 1940, it was effortlessly abandoned for the duration of the War, and the General Election of 1945 was thus the first for a decade The United States has a binding and fundamental covenant in the Constitution. The date is sacrosanct

The Founders' vision of the process, however, has been transformed by three developments Andrew Jackson, a good frontier soldier and a man of large estates with a rough manner and a strong will, who felt himself blocked by the social Establishment of the 1820s, got to the White House by developing the national nominating convention, and the demagoguery and razzamattaz that, in the 1820s as in the 1980s, go with it—to constitute, in his case, almost, election by public acclamation; ever since, oratory has mattered Woodrow Wilson, a Southerner by background and a Princeton man, had practised as a youngster, declaiming in the pulpit of his father's empty church Franklin Roosevelt's rich vibrant voice and his skill as a radio performer made his speeches a nationwide asset Secondly, the economic and military solutions he devised for the crises of his Presidency, the longest 'reign' of them all, made the President not only the elect of the nation but the wielder of tremendous power A J Schlesinger, Jr has written of 'the Imperial Presidency', but the authority of the office derives as much from the power to tax, and as Commander-in-Chief to use troops abroad to protect American security, and at home to enforce desegregation, as from its role as a world policeman. And, thirdly, ever since Eisenhower's day television has

added vision, colour, drama and instantness of appraisal — and of critical response — to the process of the selection of the man. The politics of deals in smoke-filled rooms and bargains made in corridors went out, and *glasnost* by television came in. But what made information instantly available, also and paradoxically increased the length of time, and the remorseless publicity, of all the processes. For at least a year before that decision in November, all potential candidates are seeking, and often buying, personal publicity; they are hunting headlines and 'name recognition'. Not that the remorseless probing of today's press is always welcome. Nowadays muckraking is disguised as morality.

The campaign proper runs for three months from the selection of the party's nominee (the Democrats meeting this year in Atlanta in July, the Republicans in New Orleans in August) until November. For the six months that have already gone, and for the next five, all the candidates seek their party nomination, by exhausting and carefully-programmed festivals of talks from state to state, being followed and endlessly chivvied by cameras and press-hounds, pontificating and smiling, arguing issues across a continent, and always 'pressing the flesh'. And in the coming six weeks the heat will be increasing, for on February 8th, in the 2,500 Iowa precinct-caucuses, voters in the heartland of America will have their first opportunity to say who the party nominees should be, and wintry New Hampshire holds its preferential primary a week later. It was his success in Iowa and New Hampshire that put Jimmy Carter on the road to the White House. And on one single day, 8th March ('Super-Tuesday') this year, no less than 14 Southern and some border states will hold their primaries. If one name, by any chance, came top in all of them, he would be well placed to go on to success in the national convention. In the past, each separate Southern primary has not had the attention that was focussed on tiny New Hampshire or on farm-belt Iowa; and conservative leaders supported by Southern professionals (like Senator John Glenn in 1984) made little impact in the South after being beaten in Iowa and New Hampshire. This tactic, clearly devised to help a conservative (like Sam Nunn?), might boomerang, however. To contest some fourteen states on the same day will test both organisational strength and financial resources. The idea of a super-primary has thus long been favoured by that well-heeled Republican front-runner, George Bush. But will the Democratic front-runner also be a centrist? If not, and in the unlikely event that Jesse Jackson came through, might there then be a sharper ideological confrontation, of white, wealth and privilege *versus* black, poor and radical, than ever before in American presidential contests? It does not, in fact, seem likely.

What a way to choose the Executive of the world's most sophisticated, prosperous and complex society, say many British — and some American — observers. For in Britain pride is taken in what seems the simpler and certainly a briefer task. the campaign lasts only three weeks, and indeed candidates' schedules are heavily burdensome only for the last ten days before polling day. For the member for Finchley that is as true as for any

would-be backbencher, for she too, like the President, must get elected first to the House of Commons, then to leadership of her Parliamentary party

Such British superiority is ill-founded. For the gruelling ordeal may, for an American candidate for President, be long, while the British Prime Minister's 'campaign' may be short, but the central fact remains that there is laid down in the Constitution a sharp division between the Chief Executive and Congress: neither the President nor his Cabinet nor his major officials can sit in Congress, whereas in Britain it is in the House of Commons day after day that their 'opposite numbers' are visible and vulnerable. Few British Members of Parliament—and no Cabinet Minister—need worry about 'name recognition'. With all its risks, it comes with the job.

Moreover, the President, is, first and last, a crisis-manager and problem-solver, who must be prepared to cope—for at least four, probably for eight, years—with the unplanned and the unexpected. Men with strong views on domestic reform are thrown into world wars (Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt); compromise choices like Abraham Lincoln are thrust into the danger and the horror of Civil War, a good liberal like Jimmy Carter is bedevilled and his Presidency ended by the Iranian seizure of consular officials as hostages, and—in an area where no diplomatic or human rules are binding any more—by his apparent incapacity to protect them, and one of the country's most experienced foreign-policy statesmen, Richard Nixon, is destroyed as President by a Washington burglary that was blown-up into a scandal. It is always the unpredictable that occurs.

However distasteful, even sordid, the prying, it is therefore wise that the character of the man, far more than the bundle of promises and compromises labelled as his programme, should be probed and analysed, and every effort made to test him under stress. If the Russians had, after all, been developing a Star Wars system of their own, as they now half-admit, that concealed a 'first-strike' capacity, and if for any reason or mischance they unleashed a nuclear war, if in an age when any Russian satellite like . Cuba or . Nicaragua . might strike at the Florida Keys . . there would not even be time for the President (if he were in Washington) to travel down Pennsylvania Avenue quickly enough to summon Congress to ask it—as the Constitution prescribes—to declare war, if it were not a week-end or a summer or Christmas recess. (Though it should be added that both House and Senate have a better attendance record than does the present or the preceding House of Commons. For their actual days of attendance there, many MPs are vastly overpaid.) By the nature of the job as it has developed, the US is thus regularly looking for a White Knight who will ride in from over the hill or from the shadows, and possibly from outside the overlit political arena: a Wendell Wilkie (1940), a Dwight D. Eisenhower (1952), a Jimmy Carter in 1976, a Lee Jacobca, a Governor Robb, in . 1988? Moreover, the length and exhausting character of the campaign, and the remorseless

prying into private as well as public life, have their merits. On this occasion, they seem to have killed off the bids of Gary Hart (though he is clearly reluctant to abandon hope) and Joseph Biden, to have weakened the moral standing of Massachusetts Governor Mike Dukakis and Pat Robertson, the Virginian fundamentalist preacher; just as in 1972 in New Hampshire Edmund Muskie faltered, and never recovered, since tears in a public man under fire, do not help his cause, and as in 1984 the tax-man's investigation of Geraldine Ferraro's (and her husband's) finances weakened whatever chances she had had of becoming America's first woman Vice-President. The real world, unlike a national convention, can be a sordid place.

Can an interim verdict be offered at this mid-point, just before the winnowing machine mows down a few more? A year ago, the general verdict might have been that—given the then-absence of issues and the continuance of the Bull Market—1988 was not going to be a good year for Democrats. As American problems increased in the summer-autumn of 1987 in Nicaragua and in the Gulf, and as Congress was about to act as Grand Inquisitor of Reagan's henchmen in the Iran-Contras affair, with television lights beating down on the victim in his chair, it looked as if it might be a better year for Democrats, and on October 19th even the Reagan boom of prosperity and tax-cuts seemed to be a-sliding, as the Federal and the trade deficits grew. Time indeed for a change! Again, there are this year to be many more television confrontations than in the past, not only inside each party, but even including all the candidates, and these are usually held to favour the underdog and the ideamen, the Outs rather than the Ins. Now, the scene has changed again. If the problems are still there and unsolved, one glamorous summit conference in December in Washington is likely to be succeeded by another in the summer in Moscow, both at Reykjavik and Washington it was clearly the President who behind his blarney stood firm on Afghanistan, on the plight of the refugees, and on the absolute priority of the defence of the US; both on the summit treaty, as on the Executive-Congress discussions on solving the deficit, many Senators and Congressmen have been brought in from the cold, and are seen to have influence if not power. There has been a new premium on experience, on personal skills in handling foreigners—and Senators and Congressmen, on economic knowledge, on familiarity with the political game. As a result the Democratic dwarfs are apt, now, to appear to be . . . still dwarfs.

Of the 24 major Presidential candidates since 1932 all but four, before running, were senators or governors, mostly from the populous states. Those who were neither of these were a general, a secretary of commerce, a corporation lawyer, and Gerald Ford, a senior congressman made vice-President and then President as a result of Nixon's resignation. Of today's candidates, only one is a serving Governor, Mike Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts, two other Democratic contenders are former Governors, Bruce Babbitt of Arizona and Pierre Du Pont of Delaware, both small states. In the past, Governors of large states had great political advan-

tages, as occupiers of roles that alone were comparable to that of the President: witness F D Roosevelt, whose ambitious welfare programme and personal style as Governor of New York (1928-32) equipped him to cope with the 1932 national crisis, and Ronald Reagan as Governor of now the most populous state in the Union

In offering a verdict, one must accept that in the next six months much can happen. Some of the lesser known names might make an impact. They include the 55-year-old right-wing Republican Pat Robertson of Lynchburg, Virginia, a Yale man who is head of the Christian Broadcasting Network, the second largest cable network in America and with a 230 million dollar annual offertory, who leads a moral crusade against homosexuality, abortion and communism; when *The Washington Post* revealed that his son was conceived out of wedlock, he replied 'Judge not, that ye be not judged . . .' and went on to say that he had 'a direct call from God' to run for the White House. They also include the lesser known name of Jack Kemp, a 'Buffalo Bill' as a former Buffalo quarter-back, and a Congressman, the favoured candidate of hard-core Reaganite economists and the leading advocate of supply-side ideas — though he has not been helped by the dollar slide, nor by a certain fuzziness of response in his TV appearances. Senator Gore must also be mentioned with his photogenic good looks and who is likely to make an impact when the campaigns gather momentum in the South. The fringe parties will catch headlines, as will short-lived and exotic crusaders; that candidate is still there who in 1984 appealed to the electorate with, among other slogans, the appealing promise 'to feed Jane Fonda to the whales'.

Given the continuing dominance of the problems of the deficit, and of Super-Power relations, there are clearly two strong and experienced Republican contenders.

Nine months ago, George Bush seemed to be the man most likely to succeed. For seven years President Reagan's most loyal lieutenant and with most experience abroad and at home, he is a decorated war hero, a former Director of the CIA, an Ambassador to the UN and for several terms a Texas Congressman (six big jobs in 21 years of public service), a loyal ally of Reagan on aid to the Contras and on standing firm against tax increases; he also has the biggest campaign chest of all (over 8½ million dollars). But he has difficulty in revealing the steel fist concealed in the gentlemanly glove; a 'wimp', they say, whom it is easy for tough Al Haig to attack on TV, (references that have probably hurt Haig not Bush), too loyal to his leader to appear combative, in manner more a Yale than a Texan, and appearing on TV as something of a bore. But in his TV confrontation with his Republican rivals in his home-town of Houston in October, he had strong audience support when he recalled his war-time experience as a fighter pilot. 'I've been co-pilot for seven years. I know how to land a plane in a storm.' 'In our family,' he said, 'loyalty is a strength, not a character flaw.' George Bush is still the Republican front-runner, with over 40% in recent opinion polls.

Washington gossip appears now to see Senator Robert Dole as a more

likely winner in the Republican convention. Dole is a Kansan and — unlike Bush — is the grandson of dustbowl farmers who died on welfare. Like Bush, he has a good war record — wounded in Italy, two weeks before the end of World War II, he spent over three years in hospital and cannot use his paralysed right arm. He has a long experience in Congress, and was Vice-Presidential candidate, alongside Gerald Ford, in 1976. He has one rare advantage: he comes to the Senate, as he would to the White House, with the power of two. His wife, Liddy, is a rarity among American political wives as a national public figure in her own right. She resigned as Reagan's Secretary for Transport to help her husband's campaign. Such a duo is unique in American presidential history, and as a hostess in the White House she would be as much at ease in the Oval Office as in the Blue Room. With twenty years experience in the Senate, Dole is strategically placed at a time when Executive-Senate relations could be crucial on the summit treaty, and his years on Capitol Hill as a Washington insider would be as effective as, twenty years ago, were Lyndon Johnson's. He is a middle-of-the-roader, and more at ease on the box than the Vice-President. He can be sharp, even waspish, however, in manner, and is too unpredictable, and too moderate, to please hard-core conservatives in the Eastern Establishment. But, with or without his wife's glamour, style and knowledge, he is a formidable rival to George Bush, and his long experience in Congress might bridge the ugly gulf between the White House and Capitol Hill.

Is there a conclusion? Not until November. But no sitting vice-president has been elected president (if the terms are completed) since Martin Van Buren of New York in 1836 succeeded his own party leader, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee. There are other less happy historical parallels: vice-president Teddy Roosevelt succeeded William McKinley of Ohio, when McKinley was shot, and Harry Truman succeeded F.D.R. when he collapsed at Warm Springs in 1945. It is no disrespect to George Bush to say: Let us hope that he does not have to follow that path to the White House.

Of the Democratic dwarfs, some have clearly grown in size and stature, notably Dukakis, if none is yet a giant. Dukakis as a serving Governor can boast of Massachusetts, economic revival. He made his mark as a smooth TV presenter — the image helps him in New England, but can seem remote and 'Eastern' in the corn-belt. He suffered a blow when he had to ask his chief aide and campaign manager John Sasso to go, when it was revealed that Sasso had 'leaked' to the press a video pointing out fellow-candidate Jo Biden's unacknowledged indebtedness to Neil Kinnock for his oratorical highlights. The opinion polls indicated thereafter a slump in support for Dukakis. His name is anathema to conservatives of all parties: his governorship saw savage tax increases, support for abortion and sympathy to homosexuals, and Massachusetts has become for many a 'People's Republic'. Senator Paul Simon of Illinois, despite his 'fuddy-duddy' image, looks more likely to impress the solid citizens of Iowa. The most forceful and most arresting of the candidates is one who

probably peaked too early, 46-year-old Jesse Jackson, the spell-binding black orator of the 1984 Democratic Convention in San Francisco. At this point, he still leads the Democratic field, supported — according to the opinion polls — by 26% of Democrats. His declaration of his candidacy in October, however, was that of a new 'JJ' — a conventional 'God-bless-America' speech that put him not on the radical fringe but in the mainstream, speaking for the farmers, for the minorities of all colours in his Rainbow coalition, for the victims of corporation exploitation and of indifferent Government. As an index of today's America, he is the most interesting candidate of them all.

Jesse Jackson was born illegitimate and raised among the poorest blacks in South Carolina, he went to the University of Illinois on a football scholarship, but stayed only a year, disliking the treatment blacks received, even in the prestigious football squad. He went back home, and graduated at the predominantly black Agricultural and Technical College at Greensborough, North Carolina, before returning North to train as a Baptist preacher in Chicago. He was ordained in 1968. He was one of Martin Luther King's lieutenants in his civil rights campaign, and was with him in Memphis, when he was shot.

His base was Chicago, where he headed Operation Breadbasket, the boycotting of businesses to compel an increase in black employees. He led a rival delegation to Mayor Daley's team at the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1972, and got the Mayor's crew unseated. From the start he was aware of economic as well as civil rights issues — not least in the city where one in two of all black families are one-parent families. He seeks greater equality of wealth, but rather, he claims, by establishing black-owned businesses than by bitter political confrontation. It mattered more for blacks 'to have a job than to have a dream'. In his 20 years of crusading, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were enacted and massive registration drives held. Black representation in the House has risen from 5 to 20, with 7 serving as committee chairmen, the number of black public officials has increased from 100 or so to over 6,000. The size of the black vote in the Congressional elections in November 1986 was impressive. In the 1986 Senate democratic victories in Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina, more than 90% of black voters voted, and they voted for Democrats.

By the 1980s, despite the success of registration, the Black cause was nevertheless a thing of shreds and patches. In the 1984 elections King's SCLC, the moderate NAACP, the Urban League, Jackson's PUSH, the black Congressional Caucus, the Nation of Islam all differed in diagnoses as in programmes. Jackson had never taken the hard, slow, unshowy path of local government, with all its drudgery and its endless compromises. He has not faced the realities of the black problem: that, despite the end of formal segregation, blacks and whites in schools still hunt with their own kind, that black exam grades are strikingly poorer than white — or even those of Japanese, Vietnamese or Puerto Rican — and that, as in the 1986 elections, campaigns are now being waged to set up new black

towns, like 'Mandela's' wish to separate from Boston. Other black leaders, notably Andrew Young in Atlanta, spoke scornfully in 1984 of Jackson's lack of experience, and of his 'ego trips'. He might electrify the 1984 Convention with his high moral tone and his call for a spirit of redemption, alternating with virulent criticism of Reagan's America, and weave before them a tapestry of 'a rainbow coalition' of blacks, women, peace activists, Hispanics, Indians, Chinese, Europeans and all who felt heavily laden, and discriminated against. This was, however, in fact a coalition of political outcasts.

His own speeches, moreover, have been marked by criticisms of 'the white press' ('with its Aryan arrogance') and 'white women'. He was dangerously close to Louis Farrakhan, head of the rabidly anti-white Nation of Islam, his remarks of New York City as 'Hymie Town' and of Jews as 'Hymies', and his open support of the PLO led to the organisation of 'Jews against Jackson'. In the course of the 1984 campaign, his California campaign offices in Garden Grove were fire-bombed, and his own life threatened. It is safe to say that any white candidate guilty of his remarks would have been hounded by camera crews and harangued by his opponents; but in the US, as in Britain, a double standard still prevails. Will it last?

A more serious criticism can be made. Free from official duties, Jackson could afford the time for foreign adventures, in which he enjoyed a high profile. In December 1983, he visited Syria, had talks with President Assad, and secured the release in January 1984 of Lieutenant Robert Goodman, the black US pilot shot down over Lebanon a month before — which President Reagan recognised as 'a mission of mercy'. In June, 1984, he visited Cuba and Central America, made some sharp anti-American speeches, and again returned with freed prisoners, 26 Cuban, 22 Americans, of them, on returning, six were immediately arrested for drug offences. In 1986, he visited eight African countries, where he was the advocate of an 'alternative' American policy of identity with blacks, and vigorous opposition to apartheid. Here he talked to the leaders of the African National Congress, talked and prayed in the Congo, with his hosts of the Marxist-Leninist Central Committee, and in Angola embraced President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, whom the US does not recognise, and whose regime it seeks to overthrow by its aid to Jonas Savimbi's rebels in the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

His African tour had one moment of truth. When his plane — a Boeing 707 lent him by the President of Nigeria — touched down for a night-halt at the little Botswana capital of Gaborone (10 miles from the South African border), he enquired whether the hotel booked for him was part of a South African chain. If so, he would not stay there. Unfortunately it was, and so was the only other hotel in Gaborone; and so he had no choice. He discovered too that all the food came from South Africa, the taxis that conveyed him and his party were assembled in South Africa, and all the petrol used came from there. *Realpolitik* can make nonsense of rhetoric. In January 1985, South Africa refused him an entry visa to

permit attendance at Bishop Tutu's enthronement as Anglican Archbishop of Johannesburg. Add: the under-current of black anti-semitism in his speeches, the contacts of Farrakhan with Gaddafi of Libya, his advocacy of racial quotas, and his folly in trying to argue that white-collar crime on Wall Street is a worse problem than mugging on the streets around it. And add also his frenetic swings of mood and his promptness to abuse opponents, and there is an unfortunate legacy here. All that he enjoys at present is some eight years of high visibility, a preacher-politician's sense of theatre, and a considerable black following. He is now an established Democratic leader, no longer an eccentric looking in from outside the fold. Moreover, in 1988 as in 1984, the machine is not his to command. It still favours liberals and activists, and the pre-Convention campaign is always rich with calls for 'action now', and generates hyperbole. But the reality is that Dixie provides only one-third of the delegates to the Democratic Convention: a black and extremist Southerner is at a disadvantage. As is the bravest (and the 'brainiest?'), Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, who urges rigorous economies to cut the deficit. Strongly European-minded, he held a postgraduate Marshall Scholarship from Notre Dame University — and studied (1960-62) not at Oxbridge but at the University of Newcastle.

Will Mario Cuomo come in from the shadows? Governor Mario Cuomo of New York, eloquent keynote speaker at the Democratic Presidential Convention in 1984, and proud of being the son of immigrants Andrea and Immaculata Cuomo, first said 'Yes', then 'No', and now . . . maybe? To his skills as rhetorician he also brings a lawyer's experience in Brooklyn, and his years in a hot seat in Albany. In recent months he has been speaking far and wide, in Moscow, California and Texas, and plans a trip to Mexico, while continually protesting that he is not a candidate. He is thus conducting a carefully-scheduled 'non-campaign'. Is this the self-doubt of an introspective man, or a political tactic? Is there a Mafia skeleton to be revealed in his past? But in experience and in stature, as in oratory, there is a parallel with F.D.R. Perhaps he is the answer to the Democratic Party's quadrennial quest for a hero? We shall see. There are still 'nine' months to go.

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CITIES THAT SHUN THE ARTIST, ARTISTS THAT SHUN THE CITY

by John Elsom

I want to begin with an obvious point — great plays, or even moderately good ones, cannot be legislated into existence. They can sometimes be legislated out of existence, but that's another matter. I mention this because sometimes in Britain we fall into the trap of believing that there is some kind of ideal social structure in which art is bound to thrive. We look back to the days of Pericles's Athens or Florence during the Cinquacento, and say, 'Ah yes, well, it's all very simple. These were societies where the arts were honoured, artists were treated as respectable citizens and not as self-indulgent layabouts; and look at the results! *The Oresteia*, the *Mona Lisa*'.

In Britain, the Arts Council often justifies its existence by suggesting that it is the modern democratic equivalent of the great feudal patrons of the past. I do not quite know to what period in British history they are harking back with such nostalgia, but perhaps it would be the early eighteenth century, when noblemen of various titles and descriptions flocked to the studios of Sir Godfrey Kneller to have their portraits painted and those of their wives, daughters and dogs, though not always in that order. It was certainly an age of patronage on a grand scale. Even today, our regional art galleries suffer from a glut of Knellers, their walls positively bulging with bucolic barons, while the mansion which Sir Godfrey built from the ill-gotten gains of portraiture, Kneller Hall, has become a centre for brass bands of military disposition. Some artists, with better patrons than they deserve, could benefit from more neglect.

The Arts Council would never refer back to the bad old days when the Puritan fathers of the City of London kicked the actors out of the city gates in mid-winter, and forced them to settle among the stews and bawdy houses of Southwark on the unfashionable South Bank, where they had to cobble together from old logs a new ramshackle playhouse — the Globe — and hastily improvise new plots from history books — *King Lear*.

I do not want to simplify. Of course, Shakespeare had help from his aristocratic patrons, who hated the Puritans even more than he did, and from the estimated 15% of the population of London who came to see his plays, and of course, in Sir Godfrey Kneller's time, there were better artists than he was, who died in poverty and neglect. My point is simply this — that the relationship between an artist and his or her society is a complicated matter, with unpredictable effects arising from unknown causes. Very often the cultural climate matters more than the social system, and the climate, if we can analyse it at all, is composed of a multitude of individual likes and dislikes; personal choices, which collectively provides the atmosphere within which the artist lives and breathes and works. Nor does a hothouse climate, warm, moist and sympathetic, necessarily benefit the arts. Sometimes a cooler temperature

produces better results, where a certain wariness exists between the artist and the public — where audiences are not easily impressed and the artist has to work hard to gain any kind of recognition. But I'm not putting forward any romantic notion that the artist *has* to be an outsider, that social antagonisms, storm and stress are good for the soul. I'm simply warning about false connections and the belief that good societies produce great art, and bad societies don't, and that the key to creativity lies in the disposition of grants.

In Britain, during the 1960s, we thought that we had devised a very good system for supporting the artist. Of course, there was never enough money available but the system, as systems go, seemed to work well enough. Politicians had generally grown accustomed to the thought that the theatre needed public subsidies, which were given from two main sources, from the state through the Arts Council of Great Britain, and from the local authorities, representing the towns or regions. Not all theatres required subsidies in the sense that they would go bankrupt without them — we had a commercial sector — and not all theatres required subsidies to the same degree. But it was generally agreed that too great a dependence on the box office vulgarised the theatre: it led to tatty girlie revues which were then touring around the old music halls, or to over-opulent musicals and society dramas with high ticket prices which only the rich could afford to pay.

Subsidy was not given to the theatre primarily for economic reasons — but to raise the standards and to spread the benefits of the arts to those people who had previously been unable to afford tickets to the theatre, ('raise' and 'spread', two key words in Arts Council documents). But it was feared that too great a dependence on subsidy would place artists in the hands of their new political benefactors who might try to tell them what to write, what plays to perform and which to avoid — a kind of censorship by bribery, typical, as we were then told, of Eastern bloc countries. This was long before Mrs Thatcher: a Labour government was in power. And so, in a British way, we built checks and balances into the system. The government would give a block of money to the Arts Council, whose members were not selected for their political affiliations but usually because they were known benefactors of the arts. Sometimes, these benefactors were artists, but not very often, for it was thought that they couldn't be trusted to administer public funds impartially. By benefactors, governments usually meant lawyers and members of the House of Lords. This was known as the 'arm's length principle', and the Arts Council in turn would give grants to those theatres thought worthy of subsidy without telling the artistic directors how the money should be spent.

The theatres themselves were 'non-profit-distributing' companies, which meant that their grants could not be used to speculate in the commercial theatre for private profit. Thus, on all sides, artistic freedom was to be respected, while public money was not to be abused. And it is this system which survives today, within the subsidised sector of British theatre,

although much battered and discredited. But it is not so discredited that Mrs. Thatcher's government, which doesn't like giving away public money if it can be avoided, has tried to get rid of it. On the contrary, the Arts Council has been given a 17% increase in its grant, spread over three years.

I do not wish to dwell on parochial British politics. I do not even want to spend too much time on trying to explain why the system has become discredited. We actually have fewer professional theatres in Britain than we did in the days before subsidies, though many more multi-purpose arts and leisure centres, and the unemployment rate among actors is far higher. But I do not think that too much should be read into these statistics. In the 1920s, when the theatre had no subsidies but was specially taxed instead, and censored through the Lord Chamberlain's Examiner of Plays, and generally abused, we had more than a thousand theatres in Britain. Now we have less than three hundred, with only a third of them subsidised. But I do not conclude from these figures that the best way to have a thriving theatre is to tax it and censor it.

I want instead to concentrate on those historically surprising years in the mid-1960s, when politicians of all persuasions suddenly decided, after centuries of thinking otherwise, that the theatre was not so wicked after all, that it could be quite good and socially beneficial if it were not forced to debase its tastes by pandering to the box office, and that public money should be given to it on the understanding that it could do what it liked with these grants, more or less, provided that it did not make profits with them. Theatre censorship was abolished, and if we wanted to destroy the capitalist system the theatre was the best place for us.

What caused this sudden enlightenment? What models inspired us? I think there were two. One model undoubtedly was that of the great state and civic repertory theatres on the continent of Europe, of which those in Germany were prime examples. Our theatrical traditions had grown up in quite a different way. We had very little state patronage. Shakespeare, Sheridan, Oscar Wilde and Bernard Shaw were all commercial dramatists. Our system was based primarily on commercial touring companies which stemmed from three or four metropolitan centres, such as London and Manchester, where successful productions could play for months, even years, on end. For the lucky impresario or star actor the rewards were great — but so were the risks, which is one reason why, a century ago, the critic Matthew Arnold, who had just seen and admired the *Comedie-Francaise*, called on British theatre to emulate the examples from France and Germany. Arnold believed that the public mind could be cultivated by coming into contact with the great minds of all ages and societies, and he pointed out that Shakespeare was more often performed in German theatre than British ones, hoping to shame us with patriotism.

He called for large theatres with large permanent companies to perform repertoires of great classic plays, and eighty years later, in the 1960s, his call was answered. We tore down the large Edwardian and Victorian theatres and built medium sized repertory theatres in their place. While

it is true to say that artistic directors were not told what plays to perform in these theatres, it was very clear to most directors what was expected of them, namely, to provide a repertoire of great plays, with the occasional modern one thrown in. The theatres were to provide civic libraries of drama, with seasons composed of perhaps a Moliere, an Ibsen, a Chekhov, a Brecht, an Ayckbourn, a Shaw and a Shakespeare.

This kind of programming makes heavy demands on a company, for if you simply think of the different acting styles which are appropriate for this handful of playwrights, you will realise that what is being asked from the casts is not just a Protean technique, but the capacity to switch from one kind of theatrical philosophy to another, and to another and another, all within the space of a season. And it also makes heavy demands on an audience. We assume too easily that great plays can transcend the gulfs of social, geographical and temporal difference. It is in fact very difficult to understand Shakespeare, which is not to suggest that we shouldn't produce his plays or see them, but that we should recognise the magnitude of the task. There have been too many attempts to make Shakespeare in Britain a little easier, a bit more accessible, and relevant to our times. They nearly always do Shakespeare injustice.

But, above all, it makes heavy demands on the creative artist, who has to struggle to make his or her voice heard against the murmurings of ancestor worship. It's hard enough to launch a new play, without the embarrassment of knowing that, in a classic repertoire season, *Hamlet* was playing last night and *Mother Courage* will be on at the weekend. It isn't just the problem of unfair comparisons, or of directors who simply don't want to take the risks of producing new plays at all, and do so only in a spirit of condescension: it is rather that the whole cultural atmosphere surrounding classic repertoire theatres becomes ponderous and self-important, so that a possibly interesting idea has to be instantly elevated into a major statement if it is to survive.

I am referring to the British experience and, in truth, only a small part of it, for it was quickly realised in the late 1960s and early '70s that very few of the new civic repertory theatres were capable of handling repertoires on the scale of the French and German civic theatres. They never had the financial resources. Our traditions lay elsewhere — and quickly the repertory theatres in Britain slipped back into that mixture of social worthiness and commercial caution which they had been created to avoid, leaving only the national theatres, the Royal Shakespeare Company and the National Theatre, trying, and often not trying very hard, to live up to an ideal which everybody else had abandoned as a lost cause.

That was the first model — and the second was not of a theatre company, but of the Artist. 'I like to think', wrote Lord Redcliffe-Maud in one of the innumerable and interminable papers on how to organise the arts better', not of the artist as a special kind of person, but of every person as a special kind of artist. I find that very revealing. Nobody talks like that of any other profession, even in Britain. Nobody says that every person is a special kind of doctor or maintenance engineer. It suggests

that anybody can be creative if they let themselves go enough. And so artistry becomes muddled up with self-expression and the development of the personality; and the idea that artists have skills to learn and jobs to do, and functions to perform, seems rather philistine.

On one level, of course, it must seem rather degrading to the artist if their work is something which anyone can do if he or she tries hard enough. But that is not really the problem. The trouble is that here is someone who is writing about how to organise the arts who has only the haziest notion as to what the artist can really do, if anything. Artistry is just some kind of subliminal impulse which will fade away if you look at it too closely or ask it to do anything practical. Is this why artists have to be kept free, or at least at arm's length? Is this why they can't be expected to manage their own affairs?

I really do not see why artists have to be more or less free than anybody else, except perhaps in this respect, that their work often draws them into considering the moral, social and political choices that underpin our lives. These choices exist, nobody denies that they do, and nobody, East or West, denies that it is wise and prudent for them to be examined from time to time, to see what they are like; and traditionally, the artist in European and European-based societies has been the one to undertake this function. And of course, from a serious examination of these choices, many consequences may flow.

And I suspect that it is the general nervousness about what artists may say when they look at the choices on which our societies are based that tempts benefactors like Lord Redcliffe-Maud into some kind of pre-emptive strike, to suggest that artists are really only expressing their personal opinions which anybody can do with enough time and self-indulgence. I may be doing him an injustice, yet I am increasingly drawn into the belief that the systems we devise for helping the artist are in reality doing no such thing, that they deliberately mystify and confuse and make elaborate that which is simple, and stifle with false notions of culture the impulses towards change and evolution, so that the artist is forced into isolation by the menacing arms that reach out in an embrace.

There is always an underlying tension between the artist and the city; and states which pretend to be too generous to the artist, either in money terms or in the sense of letting them do or say what they like, often haven't realised how disruptive the arts can be. And similarly artists who let themselves too easily be embraced by the societies around them need to watch to see what aspects of their work they are sacrificing for popularity and security. What is needed at a social level is not indulgence but a mutual respect, tinged with warmth. Artists always have to define the standards by which they are to be appreciated. Cities which impose standards upon them eventually destroy what they are trying to foster. This is why I am suspicious of systems. They simply fossilise the life that they are trying to preserve.

POLAND — STRUGGLING FOR AN ETHOS

by Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch

THE intelligentsia stratum develops in a nation when the educated members of the establishment are unable to face and solve the nation's growing problems' Thus wrote the Polish-born sociologist Alexander Gella back in the 1970s 'In response', he went on, 'the intelligentsia appears as a new element in the social structure, a stratum placed between the power establishment and all other social classes'

A decade of economic crisis and social fermentation, according to Gella, had witnessed the reawakening in Poland of an old class stratum — small groups of independent-minded people, whose attitude and social role placed them in the best tradition of the 'classical' intelligentsia of the Nineteenth Century They were characterised by an objective form of alienation, which resulted in a negative or revolutionary attitude towards the ruling establishment, and in a rejection of the traditionally conservative way of life of the middle and lower classes

The new intelligentsia were still partly distinguishable by their educational attributes But these were not intellectuals in the Western sense Whoever wanted to be treated as a member must first accept the special ethos which went with it — not aspiring to intellectual autonomy, but finding his place within the social group 'The spiritual case for its formation', said Gella, 'is the calling' struggle for fundamental socio-political change, and help to liberate the lower classes from their economic and cultural poverty and socio-political oppression'.

'Today', he concluded, 'the groups which most resemble the old intelligentsia in Eastern Europe are known under the term "dissidents"'

Gella was exaggerating, although in one sense he was right Today's Polish intelligentsia may no longer be identifiable as a coherent social stratum, but its classical ethos survives, despite the changed historical circumstances, and the struggle to define and harness this ethos, which has pitted the Party, the opposition and various social groups against each other for much of the post-War period, provides one of the keys to understanding the present situation

What happened in Poland happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe too, but in different senses The combination of a decaying social order and late economic modernisation created a new class At the time of the Partitions, industrial and commercial development was monopolised and held back by the occupying powers of Prussia, Russia and Austria, making the emerging bourgeoisie a predominantly foreign class Poland's indigenous nobility, facing the loss of its political and economic power after the abolition of the traditional order, cast around for new forms of social acceptance to avoid becoming *déclassé* it found them in the acquisition of educational and cultural skills, as well as a sense of patriotic responsibility as national patrons

In the West, the stability created by pluralistic state institutions enabled

the 'intellectual' to emerge as an autonomous leader, expanding his freedom and prestige according to a capitalistic ethic of individual success. But the foreign usurpation of Poland's institutions placed the exercise of authority at the level of the social group.

In material terms there was nothing to distinguish the nineteenth century intelligentsia, with its noble pedigree, from other social classes, yet the intelligentsia saw itself, and was treated by society, as an elite endowed with moral authority. The romantic poets and writers — Cyprian Norwid, Juliusz Slowacki, Adam Mickiewicz and others — offered an answer to the great national dilemma: how to keep the idea of a Polish nation alive, with its own language and culture, when foreign powers were set upon eradicating it. It was the same whichever face of the intelligentsia you looked on — the Catholic face, the 'socialist' face or any other. They were not in opposition; instead, they were linked together by a single ethos — service to the nation.

This, at any rate, is the explanation of history which successive generations of Poles have inherited. And it largely explains what happened later on. In the immediate post-War period the intelligentsia bided its time. Most were prepared to give the new Marxist programme a chance, and the government, recognising the need for their co-operation, did its best to woo them. But when the communists consolidated their power in 1948 and set about dismantling the old order in earnest, the ascendancy of the traditional intelligentsia class began to slip. Under the new system the intelligentsia were identified increasingly with a non-utilitarian, anti-socialist mentality. A barrage of ideological rhetoric depicted them as an unduly privileged, hermetic elite, evincing a disdain for manual work and a tendency to bureaucracy and intrigue in compensation for their lack of real deserts.

The Party understood the social importance of an elite class — and the extent to which the intelligentsia ethos, as the social group most truly reflecting the national consciousness, was rooted in Polish culture. The Marxist-Leninist concept of a revolutionary avant-garde appeared to conform well with it. In place of the intelligentsia's guardianship of national identity and traditional culture came its guardianship of the state planning apparatus. And by reconstructing society within the same cultural framework the government could secure a vital source of legitimacy for itself.

It was therefore an axiom of policy to prevent representatives of the traditional intelligentsia from rising to managerial posts, and to replace them with workers whose political views and ideological dispositions were reliable. By overhauling the education system the government also set about creating a new 'workers' intelligentsia' as a counterweight. These were to be the communist power elite, whose corresponding ethos of service would be expressed not in humanitarian, cultural terms, but in a pragmatic, rational attitude, in professional effort and economic progress.

For a time the strategy appeared to work. After the disorders of 1956, when Gomulka was embarking on his 'Polish road to socialism' and

appealing to national tradition, fresh efforts were made to provide some space at least for the traditional intelligentsia. But its representatives were still looked on with suspicion and the administrative barriers remained. By the 1970s the government had all but achieved its goal of a technical intelligentsia distinguished by its professionalism and practical occupational status. But by depriving its traditional counterpart of any recognised social role it had also created a dangerous reservoir of alienation and disaffection. It was one element in the explosive mixture brewing in Poland.

As it happened, Solidarity provided the best proof that the government's policies of social engineering had failed. Its intelligentsia members came from both strata, the old and the new. The workers needed advice — about language, tactics, priorities. To get it, they turned to the 'experts' — sociologists, economists, philosophers and intellectuals who were best equipped to help. What was new was the extent to which Solidarity's values as a practical movement transcended the social barriers. It also showed that, amongst the workers at least, the intelligentsia ethos remained alive, and with it the idea of an elite social class which could be called upon to use its authority and expertise for the benefit of the nation.

Only later, when the new stratum of educated workers whom Solidarity swept to prominence acquired their own authority and expertise, and became able to form their own expert analysis independently of their intelligentsia advisers, did disappointment and distrust begin to spread.

Jadwiga Staniszkis, who was one of the Gdansk advisers, saw it as a kind of surrogate conflict. The 'experts' understood the situation in the same categories as the Party and were expected by the government to bridge the gap between the establishment and the workers. But their high profile in Solidarity led, according to Staniszkis, to an artificial over-articulation of the movement's aims. It also shifted the emphasis away from radical anti-bureaucratic and anti-hierarchical concepts, towards a concentration on liberal symbols and semantics which underlined the human rights problem but was less radical in relation to the political framework existing in Poland.

'During the period of its highest mobilisation', wrote Staniszkis, 'Solidarity was infected, so to speak, with two diseases. One was a detachment from reality, as when Solidarity and the ruling group collided without ever touching upon their real problems. The other was its symbolic politics, a malady caught from the intelligentsia.'

If the intelligentsia ethos still existed, in other words, and still evoked positive images amongst the workers, few of its representatives appeared to meet the exacting standards and expectations which the ethos imposed.

In the end, the Solidarity experience went some way towards bridging the conceptual rift between the old and the new intelligentsia but the key issue remained open: how was the intelligentsia ethos to be expressed in the new historical confrontation — in support for the workers, in support for the state or in some tentative class neutrality?

And the debate goes on. To some representatives of the opposition, influenced by the historical interpretations of such writers as Bogdan Cywinski, the 'true intelligentsia' must stand four square in the tradition of national resistance: and this can only be expressed in solidarity with the working class and opposition to the ruling establishment.

To the government, meanwhile, the ethos of resistance, inherited from the Partitions, can only be relevant under conditions of foreign occupation and whilst Poland's economic crisis continues, the true intelligentsia must identify themselves by their readiness to serve society, pragmatically and imaginatively, in its hour of need 'The national goals we must achieve call for the intelligentsia's knowledge, experience, patriotic attitudes and total commitment to its progressive heritage', the Party's central committee declared at a specially convened plenum in May 1985, 'Poland needs the efforts and commitment of all intelligentsia communities. In view of the seriousness of our situation we must not waste creative energy in disputes and conflicts'

For those who see themselves as members of the elite class, but are unable to define the attitudes and social role which membership of the intelligentsia entails, the effect of the stalemate is one of growing uncertainty and demoralisation. Pulled in both directions, and with its identity and consciousness eroded, the intelligentsia senses its vulnerability. It lacks the economic leverage of the workers, and the relative independence and self-sufficiency of the peasants. Since 1980 the mantle of opposition has also passed elsewhere, and its traditional role has declined, but its response to the government's coaxing has been limited.

'The intelligentsia still sees itself as a vehicle of national sentiment', says the dissident historian Professor Bronislaw Geremek. 'It realises that the experience of 1980-81 created for the first time in Polish history a sense of solidarity on a truly massive scale between itself and the workers and it regards this social alliance as a kind of capital asset. But its actual importance is difficult to judge'.

In the meantime the struggle for the intelligentsia ethos continues. Today, as clearly as any single issue, it reflects the mainstream of national debate — how best to serve the nation's interests, and how best to assess its most desirable direction. And what comes out will be one of the factors which determines Poland's future.

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MAN'S RADIOACTIVE CRADLE

by J. H. Fremlin and J. P. Bond

IN recent years close media attention has been focussed on the dangers seen as arising from the application of nuclear energy to the generation of electricity. As a result of this perhaps the wider perspective of nuclear energy and its more general significance has tended to be lost and perceptions of the adverse consequences of civil nuclear power have sometimes grown out of all proportion in relation to the pervading natural levels of radioactivity that exist with crucial benefit to mankind. In deploring the undesirable effects of excessive amounts of ionizing radiation received in a short time as at Hiroshima, we forget the benefits we have received from radioactive heating and radiation effects in the earth over a very long time in the past and which have been quite fundamental in determining the whole nature and pattern of our existence. It may be apposite now to review this crucial role of radioactivity.

Observations of the present universe suggest an explosive start from a very small volume fifteen thousand million years or more ago. Soon after this 'Big Bang' the material of the universe consisted essentially of hydrogen with a few percent of helium and a trace of lithium — the three lightest elements. None of these was radioactive. Gravitation concentrated the gases into galaxies and within the galaxies into stars. Release of gravitational energy raised the temperature of the highly compressed centres of these stars, to the point where four hydrogen nuclei (protons) could be transformed into a helium nucleus with the release of a great deal of energy. This process involved two radioactive transformations, either by electron capture or positive electron emission.

After the hydrogen at the stellar centre had been used up, three helium nuclei at a still higher temperature would combine into a carbon nucleus with the release of further energy. This energy release occurred in the form of a radioactive gamma decay. When the helium was used up, further gravitational compression led to further interactions in which carbon nuclei interacted to form heavier elements. Further and faster combination of particles actually *reduced* the central pressure, allowing complete collapse of the star, followed by a rebound which blew the star apart as a supernova, and a huge collection of new heavy and violently radioactive elements were dispersed through a large volume of the surrounding region of the galaxy.

Our sun was one of a second generation of stars, formed with its planets from a mixture of these elements with primordial hydrogen and helium, and is still in the safe early stage of hydrogen fusion. Without radioactivity and the resultant supernovas the elements needed for the world and for ourselves could never have been made.

The gravitational release of energy in star formation could not have kept the stars shining for long. Without radioactivity there would by now be a dark cold universe, 'peopled' by dark galaxies of invisible stars.

The mere existence of radioactivity is not enough. It must not be too great, because a high level of radioactivity means a short half-life. If no element had any radioactive isotope with a half-life more than a million years, the transformations of elements in stars and supernovas need not have led to a very different distribution of elements from that now existing. But all such radioactive elements would certainly have decayed to stable elements before our earth was old enough and cool enough to carry an ocean and an atmosphere.

As it is, some shorter-lived nuclides such as plutonium-244 (half-life 8×10^7 years) and uranium-235 (7×10^8 years) made significant contributions to the earth's internal heat in the earlier part of its existence, and there were sufficient quantities of uranium-238, thorium-232 and potassium-40, having half-lives of 4.5×10^9 years and 14×10^9 years and 1.3×10^9 years respectively, to have sustained a steady though slowly falling heating effect ever since the time when the gravitational separation of different types of material into the various radial zones within the earth took place. These elements, being chemically active, formed compounds which were soluble in the less dense materials that later formed the lithosphere (crust) and the magma outside the earth's heavy nickel-iron core. They are therefore found everywhere in the earth's surface rocks and soils, where their presence is an important source of the background radiation which still has direct effects upon all forms of life on earth.

It is fairly clear that this heat source powers the convection currents in the magma that have induced the vast tectonic plate movements producing continental drift — and indeed has provided the heat required to keep the magma zone in the fluid and semi-fluid state that permits these movements. The upwelling of this material and the plate collisions have caused the formation of the mountains, through crustal stresses, and the concentration of mineral deposits, which are formed through the action of sea-water leaching metals, for example, from hot rocks deep in the earth's crust along the mid-ocean ridges, and eventually introduced into the continental masses through volcanic action in the plate subduction regions where the edge of one plate over-rides the edge of another. As well as the necessary geological processes required for its concentration where the spreading sea floor and the continental margins join, the formation of oil requires temperatures between about 80°C and 160°C . Heat is also needed to transform lignite into bituminous coal, and more still for the further transformation to anthracite. Thus thermal effects, having radioactive isotopes in the sub-surface zones as the heat source, have been of key importance in shaping our world and in the provision of readily available mineral and energy resources.

At an earlier stage the heating that they provided was a major contributory factor in the melting of the earth's interior, making possible the release of water from oxygen and hydrogen in chemical combination in various minerals. Through volcanic action this, together with the gases that eventually gave our present atmosphere, escaped to the surface and eventually formed the oceans.

The sun, while providing by far the major contribution to warming the earth's actual surface, causes erosion of the land masses by evaporating water from the seas and dropping it as rain upon the land. Thus, had there been no heating from radioactive isotopes the higher parts of the land masses, which would not have been regenerated by plate movements, would have been gradually washed down into the sea, raising its level and decreasing its depth. Coastal erosion by storms and tides would have removed an ever larger proportion of the remaining land area, and by now the whole planet might have been covered by a shallow sea. Clearly life forms would have been radically different. Giant octopuses might have been the highest living forms.

We do not know whether the presence of radioactive elements in the primaeval ocean did or did not accelerate the development of the earliest living organisms. But at least from the time of the earliest living cells, ionizing radiation must have been responsible for a proportion of all mutations, including a whole class which could hardly have been produced in any other way. An ionizing particle can produce a large number of chromosome breaks and base changes simultaneously, making possible rearrangements and changes of many genes at the same time, which would be impossible if the individual bits of damage had occurred at long intervals. Almost all of such changes would of course have been destructive, but a tiny and important few would not. Radioactive elements must have caused an important fraction of the uncountable numbers of useful mutations that have made all living things on the planet, including ourselves, what they are. Life without radioactivity there might have been by now, but could not have included *homo sapiens*.

Many people perhaps seeing nuclear energy as an unnatural manifestation of the twentieth century are afraid of the long-term effects of radioactive wastes, not realising that 90% by weight of each one of us and of the earth besides is composed of decayed high level radioactive wastes from colossal nuclear explosions in the past.

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THE TRIUMPH OF BARBARISM

by David Holbrook

IN a breezy article some years ago Mr. Chris Dunkley poured scorn on the assertion that violent and pornographic television can affect conduct. He castigated the popular press for putting forward theories that there is a connection between television and behaviour. In *The Times* of 6th May 1982 there was a report from Michael Hamlyn in New York on a study carried out for the United States Government, a two-year review of work made by the National Institute of Mental Health. This came to the conclusion that the evidence is 'overwhelming' that television violence leads to aggressive behaviour in young people. 'Television violence' it said, 'is as strongly connected with aggressive behaviour as any other behavioural variable that has ever been measured'. The question was now no longer whether the link existed, but what explained it. This seems also the view of Professor H. J. Eysenck in *Psychology is About People*, that research work shows quite clearly that films depicting violence and pornography have an effect and that the effects are long-lasting.

That the suspicions of a connection between the educational influences of television film and behaviour are justified was also made clear by a summary of the evidence presented in the *British Medical Journal* as long ago as 9th June 1973. In one summary of research work, the article stated that 'In general the conclusion is that brief exposure to unpunished violence in films increases the subject's subsequent aggressive behaviour despite societal prohibitions'. There is, of course, a positive side: the article concludes that 'even if television violence is ultimately proved, as seems likely, to have a damaging effect on some individuals, especially if frequently presented, yet the positive potentialities . . . may be even more striking'. And in a recent piece of work by a Professor of Psychology in Canada (Neil Melmuth at the University of Manitoba, *Journal of Research into Personality* Volume 15 (1981)) it appears to have been found that 'exposure to films portraying violent sexuality increased male subjects' acceptance of interpersonal violence against women.' Pornography is in fact, 'visual rape', the excitement of which is based on the humiliation of women.

It was deeply distressing, during the seventies and early eighties, that in the face of all serious evidence television and film critics went on upholding the 'right' of the public to enjoy any kind of spectacle they chose. Meanwhile the newspapers reported cases of abuse which stated that this cruel manifestation has often been prompted by child pornography. At the same time, Dr Gilmore of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children declared that there was now a new form of cruelty to children — the deliberate exposure of the child to sadistic and pornographic videos. The NSPCC consulted its own psychologists and medical advisers, and all had agreed that such experiences damaged children — the damage being often permanent. Yet despite

many instances in court cases in which crimes were linked with addiction to pornography, the Home Office was not even collecting this evidence, a situation which has presumably now been rectified.

Today, the horrors of the Michael Ryan massacre at Hungerford and other catastrophic events have exposed the naivety of those who deny the effects of violent and sensational films, but there have been those of us who have known all along that 'evil communications corrupt good manners', as St Paul put it.

I was interested to read that Michael Ryan was a 'C' stream child at school I have taught such children, and remember well what violent fantasies some of them had. Indeed, I wrote a book about teaching English to 'C' stream children, *English for the Rejected*, in which I examined some of their writing and drawing. One boy could draw a beautiful woman's face, but as soon as he had finished would scrawl a scar across it. He drew images of men being stabbed in the genitals, and naked women standing over men with stab holes in them. One day he wrote a story which went: 'One day a man kill a woman and cut her kidney out and eat them. He was called the vampire. He had horrible teeth.' His stories were so full of violence that they frightened me, and one day a member of staff said, 'I don't like to say this, but he's the sort who might well one day do someone in.'

What has concerned me ever since has been the thought of how such a child would respond to the intense fantasies of sex and violence which might be thrust into him by film and television. It has always seemed to me unforgivably cruel to exploit a child's anxieties for commercial entertainment. Since my teaching days I have turned to psychology, and read many case-histories in which psychotherapists discuss patients who have a feeling of inner weakness. Many of these came to adopt a kind of black, outward masculinity, which provided them with a sense of being somebody. One patient told his therapist, 'I feel that my physique is weak and girlish, but I felt I was becoming masculine when I got a motor-bike'. When I feel anxious I still put on my leather jacket and a tight belt round my waist and look at myself in the glass and feel tough and masculine.'

It is this kind of image which is peddled by the mass media, whether you take the 'Hustler' image from pornography, or that from the latest magazines urging a certain stance for survival—as for instance the *Rambo* magazines, which purvey a fantasy of keeping yourself strong, in a society which rejects you, by a military posture and the gun. The same kind of fantasy is encouraged by violent films like *Top Gun*, *Rambo* itself and *Death Wish*.

The posture is that of the 'James Bond' myths, of course, in which a particular kind of masculine strength is idolised. The author of the Bond novels, Ian Fleming, offered to the problems of life the solutions of the psychopath. The message is that the world is full of inimical forces which are trying to take the goodness out of you and to thrust harm into you: so, be aggressive!

There is a most revealing paragraph in Ian Fleming's thriller novel, *Goldfinger*. 'James Bond' is reflecting on a Mexican he has killed:

What an extraordinary difference there is between a body full of person and a body that was empty. Now there is someone, now there is no one. This had been a Mexican with a name and an address, an employment card and perhaps a driving licence. Then something had gone out of him, out of the envelope of flesh and cheap clothes, and had left him an empty paper bag waiting for the dustcart.

Throughout Ian Fleming's work, we find a preoccupation with the 'insides' of things, their emptiness, attempts to 'fill' this emptiness, or to avoid having destructive things thrust into an inner emptiness. James Bond is perhaps protecting the gold inside the 'Old Lady of Threadneedle Street', while enemies are trying to place 'thermite bombs' in there. Life and death, as with the Mexican, are contemplated in these terms.

Sexuality, on the other hand, in Fleming's fantasies, is thought of very much in terms of 'taking'; the taking — a form of eating — yielding something to one's own substantiality. It would be wrong to say that the James Bond fantasies are pornographic, but they have the same symbolic quality, for the woman images in them are completely under control and are, so to speak, detached sources of satisfaction. In psychoanalytical terms, they are detached 'breasts', or, to put it more revealingly, fantasy streams of milk, like those in a reported patient's dream — a schizophrenic who used to dream of a stream of milk completely detached from any living person.

In our kind of civilisation, provision for primary existential needs is slight. For one thing, much of the work that goes on in our factories and other institutions provides minimal satisfaction: the worker does not see the end product, his efforts are mechanical, or he is part of a fragmented process. He does not have the kind of responsibility a worker had in the past, such as a farrier, farm worker, carpenter or other kind of craftsman. It is difficult to find one's sense of identity in one's job, and certainly this problem is acute if one is unemployed. We live in vast impersonal communities, in which people make only the minimal contact — and, as is often reported, they can sit in their flats watching people being attacked in the street or robbed, and they do nothing, a clearly schizoid phenomenon. We all try to base our sense of identity on our family life and our homes: perhaps on the achievements we find in sport or hobbies. Everyone needs continual opportunities to establish, by creative achievement, a sense of meaning in their lives so that they can feel what one branch of psychoanalysis calls the 'Dasein' sense of having been meaningfully 'there' in the world, that is to say, counting in some way before we die.

But without sufficient opportunities to establish this sense of meaning, we live in what Rollo May calls a *schizoid* society. We live perhaps through remote satisfactions, watching TV or reading commercial fantasies. We feel cut off from the big decisions about weapons or political issues. In such a world we find it hard to feel a deep and substantial sense of identity and a rich sense of meaning — not least when the only real authority in our world, science, tells us we are no more than a random collection of atoms, operating on the basis of brutal chance. What we fail to under-

stand is that this itself is a schizoid view of existence, and of the universe — a view which omits one of the primary and most miraculous aspects of the world, our own consciousness.

In this situation, our commercial, industrialised culture offers us paranoid-schizoid fantasies, like those of Ian Fleming. These pick up the puzzlement as to whether we have anything 'inside' us

The tendency in a schizoid culture is exactly the same as in the desperate schizoid patient. Since the joys of love are barred from him, he will give himself up to the joys of hatred, and get what satisfaction he can out of that. This leads to the immoral motives of 'Evil be thou my good' and 'Good be thou my evil'

But when a culture relies so heavily on the false solutions of hate, ought we not to be concerned? For, through the endorsement of thrillers such as the James Bond novels and films, the solutions of hate are glamorised. Their vicious message is sicklied o'er by technicolour, apparent political justifications, and an emphasis on smart clothes, sophistication, pretty women and even, in Britain, by Royal Command performances. Yet it seems possible that certain disturbing new forms of group behaviour among young people which are troubling the world may be the consequences of the continual educational influence of a culture of hate and false solutions.

The message offered is that to counteract the paranoid threats, you have to be immensely strong, and have the *right to kill*. This is combined with the right to take women, using them as sources of substance to boost your strength. What you must not show, either in sexual behaviour or in combat, is any human feeling. To take a phrase from psychology, 'the safety of your own ego is the only consideration', and hate and destructiveness are justified because your life exists under the continual threat of persecution. So, commercial culture continually offers a myth in which a fearful impression of the world is presented to people together with an urge to find a strength in denying their own human weakness. Some weak individuals feel that because they cannot find any strength in love, they cannot trust the normal processes of human 'togetherness'

Now that we have witnessed some of the consequent catastrophes of media-transmitted violence it is highly significant that the television companies have withdrawn certain films. This exposes their previous position as hypocritical. It was never true that there was 'no effect'. There *are* effects — as in football hooliganism, the increase in sexual crime, the deterioration of driving manners, and in adolescent sexual casualties. It is time for a change — but the real change needs to be the recognition of the dangers of exploiting the fantasies of hate through powerful media, and a profound change of taste at large which will condemn and resist the cruel trade which has grown up, in the exploitation of the emotional life, and feelings of weakness of identity, urging unstable individuals towards desperate solutions, and even endangering democracy.

The 1979 Williams Report on Obscenity and Film Censorship Report found pornography 'empty' but, as I have tried to show it is by no means

empty when one looks at its symbolism. And E. F. W. Tomlin — reviewing the Report in *Universities Quarterly* — found least convincing of all the parts where it declared that there is little harm done by pornography. For one thing, it is clear throughout the Report that the authors recognise that there is an 'offence', and Tomlin confirmed that this means, according to the dictionary, a 'wounding of feeling'. Are not wounding and harming compatible? Of course, the Report is concerned with offences to reasonable people, and it makes its criterion, as Tomlin says, the *homo rationalis*. But this position seems too intellectual. Tomlin declares that 'reasonableness is not enough, even if nothing is enough without reasonableness'.

In the background of the Report there lurks a perception of the misuse of symbolism and meaning in pornography. Under the surface there is a tacit recognition that pornography is an aggressive intrusion into the secret lives of others, and that in this it is full of hostility. The connections are made clear in a psychoanalytical study, Stoller's *Perversion — the Erotic Form of Hatred* (Harvester, 1976). To Robert Stoller, perversion is the eroticisation of hate. For him, 'there is no non-perverse pornography'. This casts a doubt on the Williams Report's blandness. It sometimes seems in the Report that it regards as perverted only those sexual acts depicted which are not normal and heterosexual. But Stoller's point is that *all pornography is perverted*, and this raises questions of voyeurism, over which Williams seems confused. *Even the depiction of 'normal' acts is perverted*.

Stoller calls pornography, 'the great *dehumanising* device', and quoting Erwin Straus he says 'the delight in perversions is caused by . the destruction, humiliation, desecration, the *deformation* of the perverse individual himself and his partner'. This is partly in fantasy, of course, but the dynamic is there. Of course, Stoller is aware that there can be benign perversions, in some who develop respect for their partners. Yet in other words, pornography is *not* good for you. Indeed, insofar as it separates individuals from their own fulfilment, it is capable of doing a great deal of emotional and psychic harm, at a deep level. My view is that instead of demanding an impossible 'proof' we should rely upon our capacity to make appropriate cultural analysis and criticism, and where pornography is judged to be likely to *wound feeling and inhibit sexual development*, we should place restraints upon it. I believe the restrictions suggested by the Williams Committee would be welcome: the new laws on child pornography are a step forward. Surely, a far greater concern about the whole coarsening of tone and attitudes in recent decades should be expressed by the intellectuals? What needs to be added is reasonableness and commonsense. The commonsense response of a mother who is outraged by paedophilia, for example, should be taken into account, and we shall always need safeguards to defend us and others for whom we are responsible against offence and exploitation. Throughout the Williams Report this kind of commonsense, which speaks of ugliness, emptiness, offensiveness, dismalness and awfulness indicates a possible

THE KHYBER RESTAURANT, KABUL

which, in 1969, was a staging-post for Hippies on their way to Khatmandu

by J. C. E. Bowen

US citizens in Uzbek caps,
Nuristani headgear worn by Japs,
A blond young man in embroidered shirt
Wearing a *dhoti* (or is it a skirt?)
Beads, and bangles, and beards galore —

What is your Che Guevara medal for?
Are you living here? Yes I am,
I've just walked barefoot from the Kargha Dam
I wonder if your hashish tastes like mine
That was *The Khyber* in 1969!

I doubt whether, even if I had had many more words available, I could have improved on the description contained in this brief verse describing the Hippie scene enacted every evening at the Khyber Pass Restaurant in Kabul during the summer of 1969. That was the year when, like some strange species of human lemmings, Hippies of all races, transported in every imaginable kind of clapped-out motor vehicle, were flooding through the bottleneck of Kabul on their way towards the imagined Elysium of Khatmandu

My friends, Lewis and Felicity Baxter, and I, during the course of our own long journey by road across Asia Minor and Iran, had often conversed with members of this strangely-assorted throng. It was I who, one morning before breakfast after a night spent at a 'Mocamp' outside Tehran, noticed that the young man I was talking to was wearing a medal. When I asked what it was he replied simply, 'It is a Che Guevara Medal'. I was so surprised to learn that he was an admirer of a blood-thirsty revolutionary that I quite forgot to ask him what frightful deed had earned him the right to wear it.

As for 'walking barefoot from the Kargha Dam', it astonished me that so many European Hippies, brought up in a tradition of socks and shoes, should have accustomed themselves to walking barefoot through the dust of the incredibly dirty streets of Kabul.

The Kargha Dam was a sheet of water in the hills about ten miles north-west of Kabul, where in those days the weary traveller, having traversed the seemingly endless miles of desert road from Meshed to Herat and thence southward (to avoid the roadless mountains of central Afghanistan) to Kandahar and Ghazni would eventually arrive at an area of rough grass above a lake, which the Afghan Government had set aside as a free camping ground for travellers passing through Kabul.

No one could feel warmly welcomed to a camping ground which offered neither running water nor any sanitary facilities, but evidence that an enterprising Australian had found a use for it was provided by the sight of an abandoned motorcoach, lying propped on its side like a

stranded whale, with its name **THE BUSHWHACKER** emblazoned on it. Underneath was written, in crabbed handwriting, an offer to transport 46 passengers the remaining six thousand miles to the UK on unbelievably generous terms

When, some time later, I took up residence for a while in an hotel in Kabul, I made a point of bringing into use a small distilling machine I carried with me — having by then learned that the Kargha lake supplied drinking water to the whole of Kabul. Not for me *that* drinking water having, during the time we were camping by the dam, watched an Afghan shepherd on the far side of it watering his flock and, nearer at hand, various individuals swimming in its water!

It was noticeable that, in each of the Hippies' unofficial staging-posts, large or small, strung across Asia one conveniently-situated low-priced hotel would be chosen as an acceptable temporary lodging-place, from whose door, however strange the languages they spoke and the garb they wore, they need have no fear of being turned away. In Kabul, during the summer of 1969, their choice was the Shahfuladi Hotel (named after a mountain range in the north of Afghanistan). It was evident that large numbers of Hippies stayed there, because curiosity one day led me to its open door, through which I could see in the entrance hall a loosely-stacked pile of guitars — a guitar being, in those days, an essential item of luggage for anyone setting out upon the journey to Khatmandu. If the Shahfuladi was the Hippies' chosen Hotel, their chosen Restaurant was certainly The Khyber Pass, and it was there that, while I was staying alone in Kabul, I used to go for supper. I liked it because not only was the food served there good and moderately priced, but because everything about it was colourful and eccentric. It did not matter that the Restaurant stood in a drab Kabul street, for its owner had planted a line of little fir trees to mask its long windowless street-wall. On each diminutive green tree was hung a selection of coloured electric bulbs, which gave the impression that, in spite of the month being August and the heat oppressive, some kind of old-fashioned Christmas festivity was being celebrated on that, and every other summer night, in the heart of Muslim Kabul.

The victims of the Hippie migration for whom I felt truly sorry were a few hollow-eyed pale little waifs of children (presumably born during the course of the journey) who, rubbing their sleepy eyes, were kept up long after their proper bedtime; there was no suitable food for them to eat; and only tainted water from the Kargha Dam for them to drink. Their mothers and fathers were, of course, no better protected from the damage to their health caused by drinking water supplied through polluted water-pipes in this and other Afghan towns.

Such indeed was the fate of the charming Danish girl of gentle birth, whom we had got to know upon the road to Kabul. At Herat, while on our way home, we heard that she was lying ill in a small hotel in the Old City. When I sought her out in the cheap (and, alas, squalid) hotel which is all that she and her fiancé could afford, she told me how, two years before, she and her young man had set out from England. Using any

available transport that their limited means could afford, they had travelled through France and Spain to Gibraltar. From there they had made their way gradually along the North African coast to Egypt, thence north to Turkey, where, turning east they were at last upon the highway through Persia to Afghanistan. While staying in Herat she had succumbed to a severe attack of dysentery — a result of having had to drink the Municipal supply of water polluted by the Municipal drains. Reluctantly, because she had never previously sought any help from her family, she had telegraphed to her parents in Copenhagen asking them to send enough money to pay for the medical treatment needed to make her well again — and to enable her and her young man to set out once more upon their journey.

*We are the Pilgrims, master, we shall go
Always a little further . **

*From the Epilogue to 'The Golden Journey to Samarkand', at p.147 of The Collected Poems of James Elroy Flecker, Martin Secker, 1929

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PARIS & LONDON: TWO IMPORTANT EXHIBITIONS

FRAGONARD — THE QUINTESSENTIAL FRENCH PAINTER

by Muriel Julius

IS it unkind to assume that only a unique perversity in the French can explain why their most popular eighteenth century painter has not had a major exhibition in their capital city for sixty-six years?

It comes as no surprise that *le tout Paris* is flocking to the Grand Palais to see the superb showing of some three hundred paintings, drawings and etchings by Jean-Honoré Fragonard (1732-1806), the most quintessentially French of all eighteenth century artists. The exhibition continues into 1988. It is an immensely joy-giving experience.

In the Louvre catalogue of 1855, when Fragonard was unfashionable the critic Frédéric Villot wrote 'Fragonard works in every genre; portraits, domestic scenes, landscapes which he does beautifully, skilful copies of old masters, miniatures of particular grace and delicacy, pastels, gouaches, watercolours, charming engravings'

This extraordinary versatility is only one sign of Fragonard's genius. The result of his unrelenting industry enabled him to describe every possible type of motion. Not a tree, shrub or flower remains static. All his forms are endowed with an inner vitality.

No other period in French history has been so thoroughly documented as the eighteenth century—a time of easy morality, great luxury, exquisite manners, the pursuit of pleasure. It was Fragonard's good fortune to have a disposition totally in harmony with it. He sought to please and was the last one to wish to reform his fellow creatures. He was born in Grasse, and the brothers Edmond and Jules de Goncourt suggest that 'the warmth, fragrance and colour of Provence were woven into the personality of the artist'.

If he can be reproached for being neither a thinker nor a poet it was because the gaiety of the libertine scenes he executed so freely suited his mood, and that of his rich Parisian patrons, better than the sedate dignity of Watteau or the idealized artificiality of Boucher, his former teacher. If these scenes are risqué they do not offend. The lightness of touch in their execution charms one: they have wit; they are elegant.

In 'The New Model' (No. 150 Musée Jacquemart-André) the young painter stands beside his easel admiring her ankles, while the girl's mother, whose own décolletée lacks modesty, has uncovered her breasts for approval. The novelist and art historian Anita Brookner has commented that the girl looks like a celluloid doll with legs of kapok, but the autobiographical flavour of this scene is intriguing.

'La Chemise Enlevée' (No. 72 Louvre Museum) shows a nude girl, the milky tones of her skin touched with the palest pinks and blues, aroused in her disordered bed to discover an impudent little putti removing

her nightdress The de Goncourts describe this as 'the most fragrant of Fragonard's erotic paintings' In 1835 the great collector Dr La Caze bought this painting off a street stall for one louis

Naughtier still is 'Jeune Fille jouant avec son chien dit a tort la gimblette' (No 110. Pinacothèque, Munich). Again the languid young girl lies in bed balancing her white curled poodle between her raised knees There exist many versions of this scene, with or like No 110 without 'la gimblette'—a type of biscuit Fragonard was charmed by the playful gestures and movements of women alone, in the morning, in the whiteness and warmth of their beds

From Leningrad comes 'Le Baiser a la Derobée' (The Stolen Kiss) No. 304 This exquisitely painted vignette depicts a youth stealing a parting kiss from a young woman in a gleaming satin gown, while through a half-open door her unsuspecting elders play at cards This lovely painting once belonged to Stanislas Pomiatowski, the last King of Poland Tsar Nicholas II of Russia bought it and it came to the Hermitage in 1895.

A more menacing sexual encounter is 'Le Verrou' (The Bolt) (No 236 Louvre Museum) A determined suitor has penetrated the bedroom of a young woman As she struggles desperately against his embrace he reaches up in a fierce diagonal movement to bolt her door In this painting force and emotion are marvellously balanced, another aspect of Fragonard's virtuosity

As a landscape artist Fragonard could be counted with Gainsborough and the Dutch Masters 'The Two Windmills' (No. 91 Private Collection) with its pastoral calm, delicately painted trees and scurrying clouds in the manner of Ruysdael is an example

As a portrait painter Fragonard had the ability to make his sitters seem remarkably alive Nowhere is this more evident than in a series of heads of old men (Nos 98-102) that owe much to Rembrandt. In 1769 he painted some thirty portraits of his contemporaries of which fifteen are exhibited Of identical size, half length, they were possibly painted to hang in the rooms he and his family then occupied in the Louvre Known as the 'Faces of Fantasy' most of the sitters are dressed in the fancy dress costumes the painter had brought back from Italy Painted in rapid, fluent brush strokes one is of the philosopher Diderot dressed as a Doge of Venice, another of a young singer, her throat generously revealed by a Medici collar Yet another is of his lifelong friend, the witty, art-loving Abbé de Saint-Non who had befriended him in Rome

Another portrait supposedly of a Comedian is, in fact, of a Monsieur de la Bretèche, a friend of the Abbé de Saint-Non, playing a guitar (No 132) Fragonard who almost never signed or dated anything wrote on the back of this canvas 'painted in one hour' Years later the poet, Théophile Gautier (1811-72) wrote of it 'He could not come more alive in twenty sittings' This painting was included in an exhibition at the Orangerie, Paris in 1946 of 'Chef d'oeuvres from French Collections Recovered from Germany' Once the property of the Baron Alphonse and then the Baron Edouard de Rothschild, it had been earmarked for Hitler's personal

collection.

By contrast, the portrait of La Guimard is painted with meticulous care. She was the premier dancer at the Paris Opera and Fragonard met her in 1767 at the height of her fame. Of her the portrait painter Madame Vigée-Lebrun wrote 'Her dancing is exquisite She only takes small steps but her movements are so graceful the public prefers her to any other dancer. She was small, thin, very well made, and although plain at the age of forty-five she appeared on stage to be no more than fifteen' Her gaiety and charm attracted a host of admirers and lovers Georges Grappe in his book *La Vie et L'Oeuvre de Fragonard* (1946) is convinced that Fragonard was among the latter and even traced a descendant of the artist's family to confirm the fact which Georges Wildenstein disputes Certainly before their tempestuous quarrel Fragonard painted her many times.

In 1769 the architect Ledoux was building a pleasure pavilion at Louveciennes for Madame du Barry, the mistress of King Louis XV He purchased four overdoors for it from Fragonard The subjects were 'Three Graces' (No. 153 Louvre Museum) 'Love Embracing the World' (No 152 Museum of Fine Arts, Toulon) 'Night' and most charming of all 'Venus and Cupid' This depicts a nude Venus in a gilded chariot; at her feet is an adorable baby, Cupid or Amor. She holds aloft a circlet of pink roses which she is about to add to those already encircling Cupid's fat little arm Two symbolic doves and turquoise clouds complete this untroubled scene Ironical that it belongs to the National Gallery of Ireland

Madame du Barry was so delighted with the overdoors that she commissioned Fragonard to paint some wall panels for one of her rooms. He chose the progression of a courtship as his theme, set in a sunlit garden of shimmering luxuriant trees, with statues and urns garlanded in roses The four panels are of 'The Surprise Meeting', 'The Pursuit', 'Love Crowned' and 'Love and Friendship' For some reason they were refused and the commission given to another artist, Le Vien

These panels, which are not exhibited in Paris, were kept for many years in the artist's studio and only by chance have they survived. In 1790 at the height of the Revolution Fragonard and his family left Paris and took refuge in a house in Grasse He took the panels with him and installed them there At the beginning of the twentieth century they were bought by Mr. Pierpoint Morgan who owned them for some years. On his death they were purchased by the famous art dealer, Duveen, who sold them in 1914 to Henry Clay Frick. Today, they grace the Frick mansion on New York's Fifth Avenue, incorporated into beautiful boiserie walls, surrounded by fine examples of French eighteenth century furniture and porcelains

Fragonard had become famous in 1765 After the four years spent in Italy, his reward for winning the Prix de Rome, he had to submit a major work in order to be elected a member of the Academy He sent a vast, over-the-top dramatic history subject, 'Corésus et Callirhoé' (No 104

Louvre Museum) It won extravagant praise on all sides, and he was received into the Academy, 'with a unanimity and enthusiasm of which there have been few examples', wrote M. de Marigny, brother of Madame Pompadour. The painting was reproduced as a tapestry in the Gobelins factory by Royal command.

Turning quickly away from heroic painting which he found tedious and ill-paid, Fragonard became rich. Soon he was to become notorious. The cause was a painting called 'Les Hazards heureux de l'Escarpolette', known at the Wallace Collection, London, as 'The Swing'. Its origins were recorded by Collé in 1766. It was originally commissioned from Doyen, a serious history painter by the licentious Baron de St. Julien: 'I desire', he said, 'that you should paint Madame (pointing to his mistress) on a swing which is being set in motion by a Bishop. You must place me where I can have a good view of the legs of this pretty little thing...' Poor Monsieur Doyen was speechless but recovered to suggest that Fragonard would be a more suitable executant.

It was a perfect subject for him. In a garden of luxuriant green and turquoise foliage he flings the young girl in her pink and white frilled gown so high that her slipper flies in the air and her skirts shoot upwards to the delight of her lover reclining among roses below. A statue of Cupid by Falconet gestures to tell him to keep the secret of what he has seen. Engraved by Delauney, this image sold in vast numbers.

Because of its statutes none of the seven paintings in the Wallace Collection could be loaned to the Paris exhibition. The Dulwich Gallery sent a portrait, the British Museum some drawings and the National Gallery its only authenticated Fragonard, 'Psyche showing her sisters her gifts from Cupid'. It is a beautiful canvas but a very early one. Painted in 1754 when the artist was only twenty-two and still a student at the *Ecole Royale des Elèves Protégés* it was exhibited at Versailles in the same year. Although thus documented it was sold as recently as 1977 in the Earl of Rosebery sale at Mentmore as the work of Carle van Loo, who was Fragonard's teacher at that date. The late David Carritt, whose art memory was prodigious, bought it. It came to the Museum in 1978.

The sensation of colour, above all the wonderful variety of yellows, of sunshine and gaiety is all pervasive at the Grand Palais. All these are present in Fragonard's undoubted masterpiece 'La Fête à Saint Cloud' (No 161. La Banque de France, Paris). It was most probably painted between 1775 and 1780 on Fragonard's return from his second voyage through Italy as the guest of his rich patron, M. Bergeret de Grancourt.

The scene is the fête held each year on the three final Sundays in September in the lower part of the park, the upper portion being reserved for the King. Behind a balustrade a vertical jet of water spurts high into a sky of luminous clouds. Tall, feathery trees stand at each side and in the foreground the vivacity of the scene is revealed. On a stage to one side the charlatans are telling their tale to groups of lounging or strolling spectators. On the opposite side a marionette show is in progress, while in the centre are booths selling toys and oddments. With a freedom

reminiscent of Tintoretto the scene is recreated in ambers and emeralds with accents of blues, red and white. The graceful figures Fragonard loved to paint are of little importance as people, they are like bouquets of bright flowers scattered here and there. The landscape is the theme. This is a painting of studied casualness of design, amiable and grandiose at the same time, that makes for a Rococo masterpiece.

It was commissioned by the Duke de Penthièvre for his home, l'hôtel de Toulouse. The house was pillaged during the Revolution. In 1795 it became the Printing House of the Republic, and later the Imperial Printing House. In 1808, with the painting miraculously intact, it was sold to the Banque de France. Today it hangs in the dining room of the director of the Bank. It has only been exhibited ten times since 1903, and was last seen in London at the Royal Academy Winter Exhibition in 1954-55.

Drawings are where one can observe an artist at his purest and most exposed. All his life Fragonard shed drawings like leaves in every possible medium with seemingly effortless grace. Of the many dozen in the exhibition only flagging stamina prevents one from admiring every one. Among the vast number that survive, over four hundred belong to the Museum of Fine Arts in Besançon.

The Revolution put an end to Fragonard's patrons, now either fled or dead. There was no demand for his kind of art which was entirely superseded by the high-mindedness of David. In 1791, desperately poor, he returned to Paris from Grasse, and it was David who got him a job in the Museum Service. It lasted until 1780 when all functionaries were told to leave the Louvre. Fragonard died in 1806 at the age of seventy-four. His fame had diminished and apart from some kind remarks in a few newspapers of the day, he was forgotten.

In his delightful book, *Diary of an Art Dealer*, René Gimpel relates how his father, a stockbroker, came to London with Nathan Wildenstein in 1889 when it was possible to buy splendid paintings by Watteau and Fragonard from Martin Colnaghi in Pall Mall, who had rooms full of them that he couldn't sell. It was not until 1900 that British collectors again bought French 18th century paintings and then, alas, they favoured Greuze.

THE AGE OF CHIVALRY

by Cyril Fradan

THIS exhibition at the Royal Academy of Arts, London, until 6 March (and many others nowadays) presents one with an exposition of the major artefacts of a society from the year 1200 to 1400. Even though it is limited to England (and Wales) its scope is enormous. Being called the Age of Chivalry it does, at least, cut out all the objects belonging to the lower classes. To the great expert it must bring up all the areas in which one could agree or disagree with one's predecessors —

past and present For the ill-informed it presents a dazzling array of creations The catalogue is, in itself, a vast treatise on the many aspects of the civilisation we are called-upon to assess. It begins with informative essays on 27 subjects before reaching the Catalogue which has, within it, a further 18 subjects. From the general to the specific it also deals with the Reigns of the Kings during the period and divides them into coins, seals, sculpture, painted panels and miniatures, having already started with the photographs of architecture. The whole is of inestimable value to anyone who could buy it.

All this talk of reading means that one can speak to an audience which has this ability There have, of course, been many people, in the past and in the present, who have been analphabetic. In the Age of Chivalry this was the case for most of the population in Western Europe — even to the upper-classes. What you saw was elemental to your recognition of the world around you It was to operate your reception in Heaven or in Hell, it was to make the hierarchy of the world intelligent to you.

The form and decoration of the church, its steeples its statuary, both inside and out, its stained-glass windows, its painted panels and its constituents and furnishings were all there to take your mind to God. The castles and great houses were there to make you respect the hierarchy on land. It was not only the biblical scenes which, according to Pope Gregory the Great, were to be there to 'read with their eyes upon the walls what they were not able to read in books' but also, among the clergy and the laity, all the armorial signs which also communicated their status in society All this became part of the vocabulary, the visual vocabulary, of all the people Along with it went the other decoration, walls, floors, ceilings, statues, windows, and every kind of artefacts mazers, enamels, chests seals and many other materials Even if you were not illiterate you still had to use your eyes

When you had to contemplate the ideals of the Heavenly hierarchy you were presented with the ideals of the urbane models of this world The lower orders became the corbels and bosses, the Miserichords or the grimacing mockers of Christ. A most beautiful Crucifix, dating from 1230-45, (cat 99) illustrates this movingly. The figure is well proportioned except for a slightly large head The skin colour (and a lot remains of the pigment) is pinkish with the nipples and wound etc in a darker shade. The double loincloth swathes the lower half of the figure What is most remarkable is the carving of the crowned head with its quiet acceptance of its fate. This, together with the restful body, no twisting or curving, makes an almost classical figure

Within ten years of each other two very different statues were made. One is a St. Michael (between 1250-60) (cat. 290) and the other one of a pair of Censing Angels (1270-80) (cat. 341) St Michael stands (wingless) above quite a small dragon. He is seven head lengths long, sloping shouldered and carrying a long shield His very long feet stand above the dragon He has lost the spear in his right arm. His face carved upon the narrow place left for it is, in itself, narrow, long nose and eyes gazing

elsewhere His mind is not on his prey The Censing Angels are carved in limestone (as against the oak of St Michael) and conceived so differently that you would be hard pressed to imagine that they were so close in time. Their classical format is given by the relative broadness of the face, by the modelling of slightly incised eyes and the finely defined mouth; all gaze toward Heaven. The body is also in proportion. The two statues are so different in conception; one so close to the Romanesque and the other to the classical

From the lower orders one could find many among the fine examples Catalogue 298 shows a corbelled head which is clearly based upon an individual It has proportions which argue the fact; the long face, the eyes with their crowsfeet, the slightly pursed lips and the furrowed brow. There are four inventive figures (cat 502-5) in which two of the corbels hold back the walls to which they would have been attached, as though restraining it The other two are bent to the front and to the side. Each one looks real and there is a great deal of differentiation in their faces

Among the many Miserichords I have chosen three. From the Cathedral of Winchester comes a cat and mouse (cat. 528) of the most charming, and mortal, scenes The cat, with small body and free of the semblance of hair, has pounced upon its prey and taken it back to its crouching posture Both are generously carved, in oak, and nothing is omitted — including the slightly wary look in the cat's eyes — as if fearing that the mouse could be wrested from it. From Lincoln Cathedral, dating from 1370, comes an image of a Knight, shot by an arrow and falling from his horse The fall of the horse has folded its front legs under him and twisted his neck upwards The Knight, following the flight of the arrow, falls forward in its momentum and is ready to fly over the body of his mount. This is a masterly account of the moment in all its detail. From much later, though more primitive in conception, comes a Miserichord from Worcester Cathedral, of three men mowing (cat. 220) The trio stand in almost identical poses with their hair and hats in the same positions and their scythes at an equal distance from the bodies This frontality shows the activity for July for the peasants. On either side they are flanked by a wolf dressed as a priest with a sheep's head on an altar before him, and a rabbit riding a dog with a chain around its collar The first is an impious reference to the clergy, but permitted in these nooks in the churches.

In the Matthew Paris chronicle *Flores Historiarum* we are shown a miniature of the Coronation of St. Edward. The date is between 1250-2 In a rectangle, the King is flanked by bishops and courtiers The speed with which it has been drawn is witnessed by the way in which the line goes from one to the other of the figures, the hands drawn in a flurry, the feet, which like many others in the period stand upon one another, also omits the second foot of the bishop, the right. The blue of the background is crudely applied — cf how it comes over the one remaining foot of the bishop and between the feet nearby. The faces, although they look like each other, still have an exchange of glances that is convincing.

The same may be said of the 'Prefatory' miniatures to a Psalter (cat 353) The three figures do look roughly at each other I have chosen this particular work because it includes real nudes — not where the legs cross each other in a way that hides the pudenda Nudes were, for the period, a matter of shame and used for such subjects as the Temptation

The De Lisle Psalter of 1310 onwards (cat 569) decorated in style and courtly in manner shows the Madonna and Child Here we are back in the world of the elongated figures — for the main players The Saints round about, and the Angels above, are in proportion and surround the Virgin and Child in the formal niches, one above the other and in the spaces above the arch over the main figures The half-angels, with their wings overlapping the frame of the miniature, hang down two censers which, as was common at the time, go under the crockets into the space reserved for the Virgin and Child — even though its decoration is quite different from that above The main figures, haloed and crowned for the Virgin, look away from each other as the Child touches the veil of the Virgin and carries a bird in the other hand, The Lion and the Dragon beneath the feet of the Virgin have the most vicious looks in their eyes as the Lion stares at the Dragon and the Dragon stares at the Virgin.

The Pepysian Model Book (cat 466) gives one an idea of the kind of sketchbook which the artists had. This one page contains nine drawings of birds of which one, a falcon, falls upon a duck All are so well conceived in naturalistic terms that they must have been taken from the life. Only one is an exception his feet stand upon a branch which goes through his left leg

It is interesting how the forms of stained-glass become hidden or released by the glazing-bars Some follow the forms while others become obscured Beatrix van Valkenberg (cat. 226), of about 1270-80, is placed in a blue frame broken only by roundels of the imperial eagle The only architectural motif is in the shape of the three arches above. Beatrix, crowned, kneels in a garment of ruby and black stripes with her hands in an undergarment of green. The leading follows the shape of her face, hands, costume etc and does not interfere with the details drawn with them If you were to take the 'Annunciation' of 1335-50 (cat 563) you would find so many glazing-bars that the shapes become almost impossible to read, cf. the head of the Virgin herself

The finest stained-glass work must be that of the 'Virgin Annunciate' (cat 740) of about 1330-50 She stands in a long panel with a border of diamond-shaped forms alternating with flowers. Within this stands the architectural motif is in the shape of the three arches above Beatrix, Virgin is in an S-shaped curve which gives some depth as she overlaps the two columns which enclose her. The Holy Ghost, in the form of the dove, flaps before her face and she, with hands out-stretched before her bosom, regards its revelation with the greatest feeling in her face

Nearly all these artefacts proclaim the 'horror vacui' which haunted the artists Perhaps it reflected the primitive life which they led. What it provides for us is this style which we call the Gothic.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE WORLD IN THE YEAR 2000

Dear Madam,

A modern study of the future indicates that the way we will enter the next century will depend on whether mankind succeeds in resolving its global problems, i.e. food, raw materials, education, population increases, public health and culture. From the standpoint of resources and technologies, there are no impediments to feeding a population of many billions, to educating it and providing it with housing. The creation of living standards fit for all the Earth's inhabitants seems attainable. At the same time, the danger of nuclear war puts into question the very survival of the human race.

Can the ordinary man-in-the-street resist the powerful military-industrial complex? Is there a realistic prospect for disarmament?

More than thirty years ago, I began my work as an historian with two dissertations. One dealt with the Crimean War of Russia against Britain, France and Turkey in 1853-56; the other, with the struggle between parties in Russia over foreign policy matters on the eve of World War One. Could the Russian Emperor Nikolai I, the French Emperor Napoleon III and the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston have foreseen that their political gambling, sabre rattling and military muscle-flexing would lead to the exhausting nine months of bloodshed near Sevastopol and bring Europe to the verge of disaster? Had they been given merely a hint of the outcome they would surely have staggered back in horror.

Equally, could any of the powers involved at the outbreak of World War One possibly have realised that it would drag on for four years — costing millions of lives and destroying whole empires? Historical studies show, however, that even if someone had warned the various leaders in 1853 or in 1914 of what was to come, it would by then have been too late.

The point is that the arms race and preparations for war have their own devilish process of development, which is at variance with normal human logic. It is like a quagmire — every step taken gets you stuck ever more deeply into it, and the moment comes when guns, so to speak, start to fire of their own accord!

Has Mankind reached such a situation in the 1980s? Historians of the 21st century (if we survive that long) would have every basis for including the mass movements of ordinary people for peace and disarmament as one of the reasons why World War Three had been avoided. For this movement to become even more effective it is essential to reiterate to ever wider sections of the population the consequences of another world war.

The Soviet Union sees the future of Mankind being guaranteed by a comprehensive system of international security. It is a matter for the United Nations to inspire and lead the collective effort to build such a system.

Yours faithfully,

PROFESSOR IGOR BESTUZHEV-LADA
USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Literary Supplement

SINN FÉIN

The Provisional IRA. Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Maille Heinemann £12 95

A recent opinion survey in the Irish Republic reveals a large Southern disbelief in a United Ireland. A Conservative & Unionist candidate with no organisation behind him scored respectably in Cork South-West in the election that replaced Garret FitzGerald with Charles Haughey. Another opinion survey shows Northern Catholic support of a United Ireland to be a mere 22 per cent (But Ministers shut their eyes to what they should acclaim.)

Mr Tom King has however gladly noted that only something over 3 per cent of the electorate throughout Ireland has been voting Sinn Féin. This is the political and propaganda arm of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The split from the more Muscovite Officials makes interesting reading. Official Sinn Féin is now known as the Worker's Party.

Today's Sinn Féin is a revolutionary party that brilliantly exploits the media, the civil liberties and social welfare of the realm it does not recognise and forges links with elements of the British Labour Party. It can abuse the Pope when he pleads for peace, parade Catholic devotion and ally itself with Trots and terrorists across the globe.

Sinn Féin thus degrades a famous name (as has the UVF). The Sinn Féin of Arthur Griffith, who drew example from the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, originally appealed to the pre-1800 constitution. An interesting passage in this book also recalls today's Sinn Féin utopian aims. Some of them, such as the restoration of the four historic provinces of Ireland, might tickle 'Peter Simple's' fancy. But Sinn Féin's function is to add the ballot to the bullet as means to revolution and to serve as apologist for the armed struggle. What it does not publicise is the protection racketeering and tax fiddling that helps finance that struggle and are well described here.

PIRA is an elitist conspiracy that can claim no democratic sanction. Sinn Féin seeks votes wherever they may be gathered. PIRA differs from some other terrorist groups, such as the *Baader-Meinhof* gang, in recruiting mainly from the working class. It is 'implacable and unappeasable'. This is a fair book which those who know the subject will find useful for reference and those who do not a readable introduction to its bloody intricacies.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

A PROCESSION OF CHANCELLORS

Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1940-1970 Professor R. F. V. Heuston Oxford University Press £25 00

This second volume follows naturally Professor Heuston's earlier work on the lives of Lord Chancellors 1885-1940. This new study covers six chancellors, namely Lord Simon, Conservative, 1940-45; Lord Jowitt, Labour, 1945-51; Lord Simonds, Conservative, 1951-54; Lord Kilmuir, Conservative, 1954-62;

Lord Dilhorne, Conservative, 1962-1964 and Lord Gardiner, Labour, 1964-70 Professor Heuston notes that all had similar social backgrounds, were privately educated at public schools and all obtained Oxford University degrees This was not always the case. As he points out, the law could be a stepladder to social advancement and recognition, so important in the past

The office of Lord Chancellor offends every constitutional principle on the separation of powers He is at once a party minister sitting in the Cabinet, Speaker of the House of Lords and thereby impartial politically, a government debater in the Lords, and head of the Judiciary As such he can preside in the Lords Appellate Committee Professor Heuston remarks that Chancellors sit judicially less than in the past Nonetheless, during his few weeks in office, Lord Havers presided in the Lords Appellate Committee It is really in the choice of the Chancellor of the day according to his particular background and interest

Professor Heuston has contributed a short biography of the political life and achievements of each of his subjects They vary enormously, he pays special attention to Lord Jowitt, 'whose legal and political achievements, especially in the field of law reform, seemed to me to have been seriously under-valued'. By contrast in 1951 in his new government, Churchill chose as his Chancellor Gavin Simonds, already a distinguished judge It is difficult to understand Churchill's reasoning in making this political appointment, he probably under-valued its importance He quotes Kilmuir's comments Simonds 'was as innocent of politics as a newly baptised babe, and obviously enjoyed his immersion enormously' He was not a very successful incumbent

This is an admirable study, erudite and scholarly and at the same time delightful reading The book is also well illustrated.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

SPIRITUAL GROWTH

God of Surprises Gerard W Hughes, Darton, Longman & Todd £4.95

This book won the Collins Biennial Religious Book Award 1987. Its author, Gerard Hughes, is a Roman Catholic, a priest and a Jesuit but his theme is of value to members of any denomination concerned about their faith or anxious to deepen it The biblical approach will be attractive to many It would also be useful for any minister trying to prod his congregation into liveliness in sermon or address The style is vigorous with much quotable illustration

Like so many devotional writers before him, of whom Bunyan is the best known, he sees the Christian life as a journey through varying scenery Periods of doubt and difficulty are to be regarded as normal, though it is sometimes said that a few like St Anne or Archbishop Temple, never doubted God and his goodness throughout their lives

He adopts from Von Hugel three elements in Christianity corresponding to three stages in human growth, institutional, critical and mystical In the complete person all three are considered to be needed for spiritual health, and he warns of the dangers of undue emphasis on any one of the three. Some of the things the author says may be disturbing to those favouring a more authoritarian approach. About tolerance he has impressive things to say

He is addressing himself primarily to the individual Christian and emphasises personal experience 'If we insist that we must first prove that God exists before we turn to him, then we will not find him' Some of the exercises he

suggests at the end of chapters may seem over introspective but this should not detract from the general argument I wonder how many people are capable of such detailed self-analysis? On some good people, not necessarily those with uncomplicated minds, faith in a blessed way seems to rest so lightly and apparently effortlessly

A climax of Gerard Hughes own Odyssey would seem to be the chapter on the nuclear threat By no means all would reach his conclusions. However this is a challenging book and can be warmly recommended

LAURENCE E TANNER

THE QUINTESSENTIAL MAN OF LETTERS

Arthur Symons A Life Karl Beckson Oxford: Clarendon Press £35 00

It has for a long time been obvious that the critical biography of Arthur Symons published by Professor Roger Lhombreaud in 1963 was an inadequate, and less than totally accurate, monument to an important transitional — Victorian to Modern — period figure in literary history Professor Beckson, whose interest in the eighteen-nineties in general and Symons in particular is of long standing, has with this new biography adjusted the astigmatism of the previous perspective Where Professor Lhombreaud's 305-page text devoted a mere 37 pages to the period following upon Symons' mental breakdown in Italy in 1908 — that is to the final thirty-five years of his life — Professor Beckson has brought to his task a rich documentation to cover this neglected portion, based not only upon the scrutiny of more than three thousand letters, many of them hitherto unknown, previously restricted or unavailable, but also upon the additional material produced since 1963 by the considerable harvest of scholarship relating to figures closely associated with Symons

To those familiar only with T Earle Welby's *Critical Study* (1925) and Symons' own *Memoirs*, edited by Professor Beckson in 1977, Symons may have appeared as a fugitive figure from the closed world of Beardsley and Dowson, Plarr and Teixeira de Mattos It is easy to forget — or never to have discovered — that Arthur Symons published Conrad's first story, jogged forward the elbow and reputation of Joyce, and was acknowledged to be owed a great debt — for his seminal *Symbolist Movement in Literature* — by Eliot — 'the Symons book affected the course of my life'

Symons was extraordinarily precocious By the age of nineteen he had written an Introduction to *Venus and Adonis* in Furnivall's Shakspeare Quarto Facsimiles series By the time he was twenty-one he had published *An Introduction to the Study of Browning*, and earned the poet's plaudits, as well as those of Pater and Meredith Although the 1880s were a time of rapid intellectual growth and amazing literary achievement for Symons, it was the succeeding decade which he was to make especially his own, shaping it and leaving his ineradicable stamp upon it He knew everyone and wrote superlatively well about them He went in with the undertakers to provide the perfect memorial card likenesses of such fleeting contemporaries as Aubrey Beardsley and Ernest Dowson He caught the essence of Verlaine in a few deft strokes

Professor Beckson captures all of the magic of the man, his friends, his period, his short, terrifying madness and his long, sober recovery — the typical nineties man of letters gone to rookery nook retirement in a wood-smoky, book-lined cottage in the country far from the long-ago tempting hub of Piccadilly

and Empire and Alhambra — in a well-balanced biography which provides at last a wreath worthy to be laid with pride on a small grave at Wittersham

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

VIRGINIA WOOLF'S REVIEWS

The Essays of Virginia Woolf: Volume II 1912-1918 Edited by Andrew McNeillie. The Hogarth Press £25 00

There is no reason to suppose that the discipline of reviewing was a let or hindrance upon Virginia Woolf's own, major work, because, as she herself perceived it, the reviewing well fitted the spaces of time when her novels were 'dormant' — they were not composed in a continuous, uninterrupted, sequestered stream. Equally, she felt the normal reviewer's ambivalence about the demands of reviewing, Mr McNeillie, in a rather tight Introduction to this collection, as if he is aware of the breath of giants on his neck, believes that, on the whole, she enjoyed the activity. If, briefly, not called upon for a contribution, she declared herself (half-jokingly) 'dismissed'. She enjoyed the drama of the deadline, the waiting messenger warming himself at the fire. Especially, she enjoyed the opportunity to fluff out sideways, to 'slip in some ancient crank of mine'.

These ninety-eight 'essays' are, in fact, with the exception of one feature published in *The Times*, all journeyman reviews written for the *Times Literary Supplement*. Fifty-eight of them have not previously been reprinted. Obviously, for completeness, we must have them, and, obviously, their distinction and critical power speaks for itself. We know that she laboured hard upon them, polishing and rewriting, her own voice is always imminent behind the sonorous reviewing style of the time, which she adopted effortlessly. She employs the royal, reviewing 'we' to great effect. Mr McNeillie diffidently selects a handful of memorable expressions, to which this reviewer would add her 'crank' (concerning the 1890s) — 'The little shelf of books bequeathed to us by the writers of that age has always seemed the fruit of an evening time after the hot blaze of day, when swift, moth-like spirits were abroad, a time of graceful talent and thin little volumes whose authors had done with life long before they were old'. This 'confession' may stand as a characteristic point characteristically made.

Waspish as Virginia Woolf was by popular legend, these reviews show her, on the contrary, to be a compassionate and constructive critic, however she may, in private, in her diaries or letters have deplored, for example, Viola Meynell's 'lack of realism'. Sometimes she declares a prejudice — the war in fiction (while the Great War raged) or the supernatural (when she was mad, then there were enough phantoms in the trees). J. C. Squire is 'well-drubbed', and Galsworthy is also given a good drubbing, but these are exceptions. Her open mind can expand across unfamiliar territory, such as Thoreau, or anatomize subjects dear to her — Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, or the Russians, excitingly becoming available in translation, and, as Mr McNeillie shows in a valuable discussion, used by Virginia Woolf, in comparison with George Meredith, to the detriment of Meredith — 'The doubt is rather whether he can be called a great novelist, whether, indeed, anyone to whom the technique of novel-writing had so much that was repulsive in it can excel compared with those who are writing, not against the grain, but with it'.

Apparently Virginia Woolf did not contribute elsewhere during this period 1912-1918, following her marriage on August 10th, 1912, the period in which she was writing *The Voyage Out* (1915) and *Night and Day* (1919). This was also a period marred by two extremely severe attacks of mental illness, so that there are gaps in the flow of reviews, which came to her thick and fast when she was able to deal with them, so that it was like breasting 'one short choppy wave after another'. In 1917, the Woolfs launched the Hogarth Press, which, Virginia saw, could have devoured their entire lives. The war, running its course, was reflected somewhat obliquely in her writings, as is now well recognised, she was much affected by it. She greatly admired Siegfried Sassoon's poetry.

Every review is admirably presented and annotated by Mr McNeillie, although it must have been a wrong decision in a scholarly volume of this nature to gloss so exhaustively down to, for instance, 'S. T. Coleridge, "Kubla Khan, a Vision in a Dream" (1816)' following a passing reference to that poem. This sort of activity is quite pointless. (Oddly enough, it is absent from the *Diaries*, edited by Anne Olivier Bell, with the assistance of Mr McNeillie himself.) Transcribed as an interesting Appendix, are two sets of Virginia Woolf's reading notes for two separate reviews, (Berg manuscripts) and they are enchantingly much like any other wave-breasting reviewer's.

MOLLY TIBBS

A MEDICAL PIONEER

Granville Sharp Pattison Anatomist and Antagonist F. L. M. Pattison Canon-gate. £12 95.

At four generations safe remove from his formidable forebear, a gentle, Glasgow-born Ontario medico recalls, in a nicely researched and well assembled biography, the colourful life and riotous times of his far-from-gentle kinsman. It is a tale of five cities — Glasgow, Philadelphia, Baltimore, London and New York — wherein Granville Sharp Pattison distinguished himself not only as the greatest anatomy teacher of his day, but, less *cum laude*, as body-snatcher, wife-napper, duelist and wrangler (but not the mathematical sort).

Born, also in Glasgow, in 1791, Pattison, Osler's 'vivacious and pugnacious' anatomist, had, before he was twenty-seven, been tried before the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh for his entanglement with a dead woman — he raised her from the Ramshorn Churchyard in Glasgow for purposes anatomic — been tried by his peers at the Glasgow Royal Infirmary for surgically unprofessional conduct, and been disgraced by his entanglement with a living woman, a university colleague's wife. Aged twenty-eight, sagely, he departed across the water to America — Philadelphia — but was soon embroiled in multifarious dissension there, including a pamphlet war culminating in a pistol duel. He moved to Baltimore, where he set up one of the first residential teaching hospitals in the United States. But with the 'Scotsman's ability to pluck defeat from the jaws of victory', he crossed the water again, accepting the first chair of anatomy at London University. This proved disastrous. Racial prejudice played its part. The student body disliked Scots. After much unpleasantness and powerful student activism, he was dismissed *sine causa*. He returned to Philadelphia and thence moved finally to New York, where he died in 1851. Given his proclivities, one of his greatest achievements was surely, in an age not noted for longevity, his notching up of sixty glorious years. The anatomist anatomised

post-mortem was found to have succumbed, appropriately, to cholecystitic overflow of bile. This is a picaresque and picturesque tale, well told in a pleasantly produced and excellently illustrated volume.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

THE LIFE OF EZRA POUND

Ezra Pound The Solitary Volcano John Tytell Bloomsbury £17.95

The historical importance in twentieth century poetry of the American poet Ezra Pound has never been a matter for doubt. He was so active on the English literary scene until after the end of the First World War, helping and encouraging James Joyce, Wyndham Lewis and especially T. S. Eliot to such good effect that he was not only their mentor but also something of an entrepreneur on their behalf. His influence on contemporary movements such as free verse writing, imagism, vorticism and on the poets William Carlos Williams (American like himself and a childhood friend), W. B. Yeats and other less memorable figures was both personal and professional. He paid little attention to his own literary reputation, using it rather as a means of assisting other writers to become recognised and appreciated by publishers and readers alike.

John Tytell has made a thorough and scholarly study of Pound's troubled life and controversial work, having gained access to unpublished manuscripts and carefully preserved letters, psychiatric reports and FBI files. After 1915 Pound began writing his *Cantos*, an intended 'epic' in 120 sections which formed his continuing poetic credo and, even at the end of his life, remained unfinished. Just as in the work of an innovative painter the course of his changing ideas about form and content may be followed through successive paintings, so Pound's discoveries of varying verbal patterns can be seen at different points in the text. John Tytell has perceptively matched the *Cantos'* progress with shorter books of poems published at intervals. These books include the early *Personae*, *Homage to Sextus Propertius* and *Hugh Selwyn Mauberley* for in them can be seen, thus early in his career, the height of Pound's achievement. Even to those critics who see in the *Cantos* nothing of distinction and little of interest these other works demonstrate a coherence which Pound never again attained and a masterly handling of free verse form. Where he was already technically most original was in his way of mixing archaism with modern slang, resurrecting forgotten modes because he saw there an element lacking in the language of his own time. A particularly rich source of continuity for him was Provençal poetry, its romantic attachment to 'beauty' in the abstract appealed to his idealistic nature.

In imagism, the transliteration of the Japanese miniaturist's art, there was, however, a counter balance for him to that abstraction with its inherently elusive quality. Pound became the first Western poet to understand fully the Japanese poetic spirit. Introduced to it by F. S. Flint and T. E. Hulme, Pound wrote some of the most perfect examples of *Haiku* in existence. The straightforward statement, followed by a striking image reinforcing it, it is best illustrated by his poem 'In a Station of the Metro':

The apparition of these faces in a crowd,
Petals on a wet black bough

The repetition of miniature images, with their required imaginative leap, cannot easily, however, form a major part of the grand design of epic verse. Its use in the *Cantos* does not 'cohere', as Pound himself was aware. For this reason many critics, including Noel Stock, author of a former biography, Santayana and

Tytell himself find the imagist form only a partial answer to problems of poetic clarity

The book contains a moving account of the long tribulations which Pound endured and the distress his self-inflicted sufferings caused to his friends during and after the Second World War. The author shows both sound judgement and compassion for Pound, often the subject of opprobrium for his anti-Semitism and his admiration of Fascist ideas under Mussolini. Talks on Mussolini on Italian radio before the War and on Hitler's rightness during it were clearly the result of total misapprehensions in Pound's already deranged mind, and the inevitable end was his incarceration, first in Pisa and then in New York. The tragic final collapse makes painful reading even now. But the question of whether Pound's poetry endures is the important one and this Dr Tytell answers with conviction in the affirmative.

BETTY ABEL

COLERIDGE WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL PLEASED

Penfriends from Porlock A N Wilson Hamish Hamilton £14.95

To those not entirely unwelcome cash-and-commission bearing persons from Porlock who, to good effect, interrupted the fictive ruminations and biographic labourings of that industrious scrivener, Mr A N Wilson, we are beholden for an excellent assemblage of culled *variosa*, certainly deserving of rescue from the early grave of fugitive delivery. From first — a brilliant and unusual evocation of Venice, before, after, and in contrast to, the Victorian idea and ideal, — to, appropriately, last — an alarmingly unalarmed, not to say clinical, look at the facts of death, the cold statistics of our universal heritage from our parents, mortality — the essays in this collection are of the highest quality, informed by wit and embellished with a nice, lightly-worn fancy weskit of erudition. There are thirty-eight of them, and since each will be some discerning reader's favourite, it is, as the quasi-cliché has it, invidious to particularise. This I must, however, by the terms of my Porlockian commission, proceed to do.

I appreciated especially the revenant glimpse of the arcane shade of the Reverend Montague Summers, white-maned in dog-eared biretta and shabby soutane, trailing ghost, holy and otherwise, ghou, werewolf and vampire in his occult path to his own lair in Richmond Cemetery, the contrasting spectacle of the 'fabulous griffin', G K. Chesterton, immense, bluff, right-headed, resisting the temptation to become a philosopher of the grotesque and enthusiastically apologising for Distributism, in an adjoining room Miss Pym is busily transcribing with gossipy curiosity the miseries and marcescent splendours of quiet lives, solitary in small houses and bleak flats, unfulfilled in cowslipped Oxfordshire villages; while at the establishment next door but one (that is in the seedy tenancy of C P Snow) Miss Compton-Burnett is practising distribution of poison ivy — best china cups — at a final Braemar Gathering.

It is no surprise that Mr Wilson's staunch wayward churchishness should pose a celestial riddle. And what image for Heaven's sake would you expect? Jerusalem's scorched, unpleasant land? Eating yourself sick on *moules marinières* as golden leaves fall on the canals and golden grace-notes from the gothic bell-towers of Bruges? Or a perpetuation of the perpetual succour of the Pump Room at Bath, angel-pretty waitresses bringing you doughnuts and hot chocolate as the Palm Court Trio (Trinity) saws (soars) on, tinkle and string

This is a touchstone book. It opens magic doors to enchanting acquaintances. Mr Wilson is a very sensitive, perceptive writer, with an eye and an ear for the quint and quaint essential. I find myself placing him in apostolic line between John Gray and Lionel Johnson, but that is a purely personal rubric, he is his own valid self, bringing his especial brand of perception, interpretation and exposition to such of life and literature's quiddities as engage his Will-o'-the-waspish fancy. That is a kind of genius. My kind.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Building the Trireme (Constable. £12.95.) This is an enthralling book. In 480 BC, the Greeks defeated the Persians under Xerxes at the naval battle of Salamis. It was, of course, the turning point in the Persians' advance upon Greece. The Greeks fought with the trireme. Now in this erudite and delightful study, Frank Welsh tells how he came to build a trireme, based upon all the technical material he and others could find. Nothing was left of the Greek triremes which had become legendary ships, without even a wreck upon which to learn. There were many technical problems to solve, such as the seating arrangements for the crew of 170, and the length of the oars and their position in the ship. Eventually the technical problems were solved and the ship was appropriately built in Greece. It has become part of the Greek navy. It has now achieved useful speeds, though whether as fast as the original triremes is doubtful. The story of this great achievement between 1982 and 1987 is told in this superbly produced volume, with nearly eighty illustrations, and a useful bibliography.

Human Rights and Responsibilities in Britain and Ireland (Macmillan. £12.95 pb.) This 'perspective' arises from a working party appointed by the Advisory Board of the Churches on Human Rights and Responsibilities in the United Kingdom and the Re-

public of Ireland. This organisation represents all sections of Christian Opinion. The Report, the work of many hands, has been edited by Dr Sydney D. Bailey, is an ambitious undertaking. It sets out to define the basic characteristics of both the British and Irish constitutions and their operation. Curiously, comparative little weight is given to the press and media, which are becoming more and more involved in the rights of free expression and publication. Much of the study is concerned with the Christian approach which should be applied to the relations between North and South, irrespective of denominational differences. The Report deserves careful study, although many may think that the Christian principles are self-evident. It is their application that is the problem, and the Report tries to assist in this.

Discontent and Liberal Opinion (Metaballion Books. £9.95.) The author of this high-sounding title, Roman Baczyński, has selected from a million letters sent to the local press since the late 1960's some 200 for publication in this interesting volume, categorised under twenty-seven subject headings. As might be expected, they cover mainly complaints and comments on everyday life in matters both serious and trivial, to which the writer wishes to give publicity. He may seek redress thereby or to give publicity to his views.

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
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'SEMI-ALIGNMENT' — GREECE'S ORIENTATION

by Atanasios Drougos

DURING the last two decades the relationships between the USA and its small but strategically located allies have been the subject of much analysis. Small states allied to the US, such as Israel, Portugal, Turkey, South Korea and Greece have acquired a degree of highly-influential accessibility to US decision-making. The US has, in the last ten years, found itself faced with a variety of difficulties, attempting to deal with its small allies within an extremely complex and inter-related global system. The small allies, as victims of the superpowers' polarisation, are trying to develop a policy of flexibility, to find room to manoeuvre and to act much more independently according to their capabilities. The 'bone of contention' between the superpowers' global and regional interests and their small allies is one of the most serious problems of international relations today. Alignment and non-alignment are the opposite poles of grouping, each of which is selected as an instrument of safeguarding national security. In the last decade a new term has emerged — 'semi-alignment'.

The role of 'semi-alignment' is a complex one. What precisely does this term mean? It is difficult to define. In fact, 'semi-alignment' means that one is aligned with a particular body, but that one retains differing positions on various individual problems which the other allied nations have to take into account. For instance, the distancing of Denmark from NATO's official nuclear policy; Canada's decision to distance itself from the Cruise Missile Firing Programme and various roles assigned to Canadian forces, the declaration of the Icelandic Parliament that the country would be considered a Nuclear Free Zone; the Spanish non-integration to NATO's military infrastructure, about which negotiations are still in progress; the nuclear allergy of New Zealand and its decision to impose restriction on port visits by nuclear-powered and armed American ships are clear indications of semi-alignment to the US, but also within the NATO and ANSUS treaties.

Greece is a small country in South Eastern Europe, a strategic cross-roads close to the high, volatile regions of the Middle East and North

The Editor regrets the error on page 57 of the February issue of *Contemporary Review* (Vol 252, No 1465). The date under the main heading should read 'February 1988'.

Africa. It is a European and Balkan country with a history stretching back thousands of years. Since February 1952 it has been integrated into the Western bloc. The cornerstone of Greek foreign policy since the '50s has been the NATO alliance. The decision to join the Alliance was political, strategic and economic. In addition to its NATO membership the Greek governments of the mid-50s decided to go ahead with an agreement between the US and Greece, providing the former with some strategically extremely important military facilities. In the 1970s the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations created serious problems between Greece, NATO and US, mainly because of the Cyprus issue and the Aegean Sea, plus the experiences of Greece under the undemocratic colonels' regime. During the years 1974-1981 various changes took place concerning Greek foreign and defence policy, the main characteristics of which were as follows.

- 1 A re-orientation of the Greek foreign policy options by broadening its foreign policy style;
 - 2 partial withdrawal from NATO's integrated command;
 - 3 basic shifts in the Greek military doctrine;
 - 4 an application for full membership status to the EEC, thus confirming its status as a West European country;
 - 5 a Greek *Ostopolitik* with approaches towards the USSR and other East European countries,
 - 6 promotion of intra-Balkan co-operation of belonging to NATO, while seeking for a distinctive position;
 - 7 re-negotiation of the status of American military bases on Greek soil.
- The enlarged agenda of the Greek-Turkish dispute in the 1980s about rights to the continental shelf, fortification of certain regions adjacent to each other, difficulties on the Aegean airspace control as well as deterioration of the Cyprus situation had a major impact on the shift of Greece's search for an alternative (limited) position in the Western system.

The socialist government which came to power in Athens in October 1981 added some new dimensions and ramifications to the new Greek role in NATO. Despite the strong pre-election anti-NATO and anti-US rhetoric, premier Papandreou explained to the people that certain national interests necessitated remaining in the Alliance; yet Greece will frankly express its disagreements with official NATO policies. Instead of withdrawing from NATO, Greece, under Papandreou, decided to build an independent foreign policy through semi-alignment variables. These may be summarised as follows:

- 1 In December 1981 Papandreou, in bitter dispute with Turkey during a DPC meeting of NATO, did not sign the final communiqué.
- 2 Greece does not participate in NATO military exercises in the Aegean.
- 3 Papandreou took the line that the existing American bases in Greece are strictly American and do not serve NATO interests.
- 4 He called for the establishment of a Balkan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and supported various resolutions as the case of Nuclear Freeze

and the Zhivkov-Ceausescu call for a Balkan Chemical Weapon Free Zone

- 5 Greece staunchly supported a different view from the other NATO members regarding the INF negotiations.
- 6 Greek semi-alignment was also expressed with regard to Greek participation in the Five Continents Peace Initiative with a number of non-aligned or neutral states such as Sweden, India, Tanzania and Argentina

Papandreou's semi-alignment is larger and more wide-ranging than that of the '70s when the semi-alignment was predominantly concentrated on the Greek-Turkish relations without touching nuclear issues or expressing disagreements with the officially-declared NATO policies of nuclear deterrence. This policy mainly serves the national interest with a continuing membership of the NATO 'family', but also with a very flexible role which has the support of Greek public opinion. The role of the small countries in various widely-important issues, such as nuclear disarmament, has been presented by Greece during the last six years. The limited alternative of semi-alignment is the best option for Greece, a country highly-involved in the dependence and independence complexities of the contemporary world.

Since the '60s there have been in Greece various nuclear weapons, especially nuclear artillery, Nike-Hercules missile warheads, etc., all for delivery by Greek military units. Based on the expanding nuclear technology all these weapons have been considered as obsolete and the Greek Prime Minister recently pledged that some of them will be removed from Greek soil by 1989.

The Greek support of a Balkan-Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone as a part of regional disengagement underlines the position that in the case of positive response by all the Balkan countries the weapons will leave. Even a limited Balkan-Rapacki plan to include three countries as a first stage has received support by Greece.

Over the last two years the plans for setting up a disengagement zone in Southern Europe have stagnated. The negative position of Turkey, the non-positive response of Albania to any intra-Balkan project and the recent pre-occupation of Romania with chemical weapons rather than nuclear ones left Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the only remaining active supporters of the establishment of such a zone. The decision of Greece to go ahead in joining the Five Continents Peace Initiative and seeking for a more enhanced role came also as a result of the slow Balkan progress towards regional denuclearisation.

The six-nation initiative was presented on May 22, 1984. It was a result of three years consultation, with Greece joining the 'club' last. The six leaders asked for a halt to all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Greek participation in the group was of crucial importance because it expressed the will of the people to promote peace and security and to halt the escalation of the nuclear build-up. It could be considered as an expression of a semi-aligned

reaction, and in August 1986 Papandreou described the Greek involvement as 'an injection of logic into NATO', seeking a less unstable and more conventional method of security. The case of Greece is very important because of being a member of the NATO's Nuclear Planning Committee. The Greek involvement goes back to the draft resolution 'Nuclear Arms Freeze' (October 19, 1982), asking for a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons. It had been submitted by Mexico and Sweden and Greece decided to support the resolution.

As has already been mentioned, one of the most complex issues concerning Greek-American relations is the case of the American military bases on Greek soil. The ramifications of US-Greek relations are many, but the status and future of the US installations have recently become a major source of disagreement.

After months of intensive negotiation a new five-year Defence and Economic Agreement was concluded on 15 July 1983 and signed on 8 September 1983. The US considers the NATO and American presence to be vital to Greek security. The major military installations used by the US in Greece are airbases, communication stations, an AWACS airbase and nine NADGE stations. They support the operation, maintenance and activities of US maritime patrol aircrafts, the operation and maintenance of airborne logistical missions and the storage and maintenance of conventional munitions. The Nea-Makri and Kato Souli communication sites make it possible for US forces to communicate with DCS stations in Italy (Sigonella) and Spain (Torejos and Rota bases) as well as with the US 6th Fleet.

Under the DECA the US offers direct financial and military aid to Greece in the form of loans in return for the bases. The Greeks consider that such aid should be sufficient to maintain the balance of military power in the area. The Agreement commits the US to restrict its activities at the bases to defensive purposes which would rule out the possibility that in the event of a new Middle East crisis the US would undertake military initiatives, and that the agreement terminates after five years. At the same time, the Greek government has recently expressed its interest in extending the US presence in Greece through a new DECA. Given the unstable relations between Greece and Turkey, only the USA has the power and prestige to influence the current situation on the southern flank, using its channels of communication with both sides. Any unilateral abrogation of the DECA would create more problems than it would solve; yet it may be concluded that semi-alignment serves Greek interests perfectly. In a duel between two highly independent players, there can be no overall winner.

[Atanasios Drougos is Research Fellow at the Polemological Institute, R U Groningen, The Netherlands]

IRAN'S ISLAMIC ECONOMY

by Rodney Wilson

NINE years have passed since the Iranian revolution, a sufficiently long period to assess the economic achievements of the Islamic government. The economic policies of the Shah's regime were much criticised, and the economic crisis of 1977-78 was a contributory cause of the revolution. How has the Iranian economy performed since the revolution? What measures were taken to overcome the problems left by the Shah? Has the revolution brought about a change in economic priorities, and to what extent has the economy been Islamised? What has been the cost of the Gulf War in economic and financial terms? Can the West still do business with Iran, and what is the trade potential for the 1990s?

Iran has a rich resource base, with the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. The country also has a substantial population of over 42 million, most of whom have received a basic education, and over a million university graduates, many of whom are trained in highly technical subjects including engineering, sciences and medicine. The Persian civilisation was one of the greatest in the ancient world, and cities such as Esfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz were centres of rich craft traditions, especially in the fields of carpet making and textile design. With such resources and skills, Iran has clearly enormous potential, yet under the Shah opportunities were wasted, especially that resulting from the 1974 quadrupling in oil prices, which increased the country's foreign exchange earnings enormously.

The Shah mistakenly equated modernisation with westernisation, and tried to develop Iran on secular lines, ignoring the religious convictions of the majority of the population. The strengths of the bazaar economy and traditional manufacturing were also overlooked, the emphasis being on the development of consumer goods industries totally dependent on western technology to cater for an essentially middle class urban market. These industries, created at much expense, were never viable, as the market was small, and they could only be sustained through protection with tariffs and quotas. At the same time the needs of the poorer urban classes were disregarded, and the countryside virtually neglected, except for wasteful investment in dubious agri-businesses with western joint venture partners who had little understanding of Iranian conditions.

By 1978 Iran was in real economic difficulty due to the insensitive and inappropriate policies which had been implemented. The balance of payments was in deficit despite a continuing high level of oil exports. Food prices were rising by over 50 per cent annually, and the country was becoming ever more dependent on food imports. School leavers and even university graduates were finding difficulty in obtaining employment, and the state was being forced to cut expenditure due to a budget deficit, plunging the economy into recession. The deficit was largely the result of

the high level of defence spending, as the Shah was urged by his western allies to play a major role in Middle Eastern regional security, both vis à vis Iran's neighbour the Soviet Union to the north, and the Gulf to the south. The sophisticated armaments purchased could often only be serviced with American technical support however, and were generally ill-suited to Middle Eastern conditions. Iran was increasingly serving as a proxy for the United States in regional affairs, while becoming ever more dependent on the West both economically and militarily.

The Iranian revolution had mass support from the poorer sections of society as the enormous display of solidarity for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini illustrated. For the government of the new Islamic republic, the first priority was to re-orient the economy so that it served the needs of the masses, rather than merely catering for the demands of the rich and the urban middle classes. Time was needed to reorganise the planning ministry, but by 1982 a new five year plan was formulated to cover the 1983-88 period. The major priority was the elimination of consumerism, which had resulted in material greed at the expense of spiritual values. Instead, luxury consumption was to be curtailed, and productive investment encouraged in activities which would create socially satisfying jobs.

Agriculture was seen as the axis of development, and investment in basic food production was increased. At the same time secondary industries at village level were encouraged, with improved equipment installed in traditional craft industries, and new crafts developed harnessing locally available skills. The excessive urbanisation of the Shah's era was halted, with the policy aim being to bring employment to the countryside to prevent rural-urban migration. At the same time, the economic structure of the cities themselves was to be transformed, as urban centres were a drain on the government's finances and the country's exhaustible oil resources. Oil exports were merely used to finance urban consumerism, not to aid self sustaining productive activity. In the long run the cities must generate enough production to sustain themselves, otherwise they would only continue to deprive the rural areas of funds. The aim was balanced development, not lop-sided growth.

The policies outlined in the 1983-88 plan have been implemented with a considerable degree of success. This largely reflects the enthusiastic support which they have received from the majority of Iran's population, in contrast to the Shah's policies, which always faced much opposition. Agricultural production has increased remarkably since the revolution, especially wheat output with yields rising by over one quarter and production by almost one third over the 1980-86 period. As a result grain imports have fallen which has saved almost £250 million in foreign exchange. Cotton prices have been allowed to rise, but this has halted the decline in production, and since the early 1980s deliveries to local textile factors have increased by an average of 15 per cent annually, with natural cotton increasingly substituted for man-made fibres. Rice production has also risen in the north of the country by over 5 per cent annually, saving an estimated £30 million annually in foreign exchange.

The transformation of industry and urban regeneration has proved more difficult given the unviable manufacturing structure inherited from the Shah. Assembly industries dependent on imported components were affected by the shortage of foreign exchange, and high tech ventures were hampered by the severing of foreign technical assistance. By 1982 however, output from basic industries was restored to pre-revolutionary levels. In the vehicle industry priority was given to minibus, bus production and tractors, rather than private cars, the objective being the expansion and improvement of public transport and equipment for agriculture. Truck production has also been increased to over 50 per cent above the level of the mid 1970s. Basic food processing such as sugar refining and vegetable oil production has been increased at the expense of luxury items such as caviar, which was much consumed by the richer classes under the Shah.

Iran's famous hand woven carpet industry has experienced a revival since the revolution, with exports increasing by almost one quarter in value over the 1985-87 period, and the quantity exported rising by 15 per cent. In the carpet industry the emphasis is on ever increasing quality, as Iran faces considerable competition from China in both wool and silk carpets. Traditional designs are being reintroduced, and new designs encouraged with the artistic reawakening in the provinces. Iranian designs are much appreciated in the discerning West German and Swiss markets, the major customers for hand woven carpets. Carpets from Esfahan and Tabriz can command high prices in these affluent markets, where purchasing power is increasing with currency appreciation.

Since the Iranian revolution there has been much less obsession with economic growth. Material objectives are no longer emphasised as spiritual fulfillment through religious devotion is seen as much more important. For most Iranians this was, of course, always the case, but after 1979 the government also shared these values. This has resulted in a much greater community spirit, and in a sense of belonging, feelings which are enhanced by the manoeuvrings of the country's enemies in Iraq and further afield. As a consequence there is a greater willingness to work harder for the common good and not merely for individual material reward. It is this which has under-pinned the economic achievements of the post revolutionary period. Real development has occurred, and not merely growth in gross national product dependent on the oil sector as in the 1970s.

A genuine attempt has also been made to apply moral values to business management, and run the economy in accordance with Islamic principles. The Prophet Mohammed provided a complete code of conduct for everyday living, guidance being given both in the Koran and in the Islamic Sharia law. In financial dealings, for example, interest is forbidden, as it is seen as wrong to reward those with excess funds and penalise those who need to borrow. Even for business loans interest is prohibited, as it is thought unjust to levy interest on those engaged in productive activities who inevitably take risks, while providing a riskless return to those who

merely provide finance. A law for interest-free banking was therefore enacted in August 1983, and since 1985 all interest transactions have been prohibited in Iran

The banks now employ a profit sharing principle. Those who have current accounts earn no return, but those with investment accounts earn a profit share, the amount of which is not known in advance. The banks in turn invest in the business of their clients, rather than providing fixed or variable interest loans. A dividend is earned from these investments, which is passed on to the depositors, with a deduction for overheads. The depositor with an investment account is rewarded for the risk shared with the business being funded, and not merely for deferring consumption. For short and medium term trade credit, a mark-up principle is used, with the bank purchasing the import on behalf of the client, and reselling it at a future date for a higher price. In this case the bank's profit is also a reward for risk sharing, as the bank has ownership and responsibility for the goods until they are resold.

The banks appear to have adapted well to Islamisation, having already been re-organised into larger units after the revolution. Depositors have welcomed the new system, and the value of deposits has increased by over 12 per cent annually since 1984. Many who were reluctant to use banks because of religious objections to interest have now opened bank accounts for the first time. Most bank deposits are now in investment accounts, as chequing accounts are little used in Iran. Short term deposits account for 64 per cent of the total, and long term deposits around one third. The banks have been encouraged to lend to farmers for rural development projects. Lending to agriculture is increasing by over 20 per cent annually, compared to 19 per cent for industry, 10 per cent for construction, and a 5 per cent growth of trade credit. Hence directly productive credits have increased at the expense of credit to wholesalers and middlemen.

Islamic economic principles have been applied at the macro as well as at the micro level in Iran since the revolution. The government has pursued cautious monetary and fiscal policies with the aim of reducing the government's dependence on oil income, which is unstable. At the same time efforts have been made to lower the budget deficit inherited from the Shah's regime. Taxes have been increased, with income tax and taxes on capital doubled, these mainly being aimed at the richer sections of society, low income earners being exempted. Import duties and consumption taxes have also been increased substantially, especially on luxury items. Zakat, the Islamic wealth tax which is paid annually on the basis of 2.5 per cent of net worth, is also applied throughout the new republic, the proceeds going to help the poor and needy through social security payments. Redistributive goals are essential in taxation policy.

The government's long term aim is to cut public expenditure, but this has been difficult to achieve due to the war in the Gulf. Initially, after the revolution defence spending was curtailed, as some of the ambitious armaments programmes undertaken by the Shah involving the purchase

of sophisticated aircraft were halted. This was mistakenly interpreted as a sign of weakness by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, which prompted Iraq to start hostilities against Iran over the Shatt al Arab waterway below Basra. The Iraqis under-estimated Iranian determination to safeguard their territorial integrity, including rights of navigation, and the Tehran government vigorously resisted the Iraqi invasion. The tables have now been turned and Iraq, despite western material assistance, cannot win.

For Iran, however, the war has been an unwelcome burden, which has been a drain on resources, in addition to the terrible toll in terms of human lives. Expenditure on the war has risen by almost 20 per cent annually during the 1980s, and by 1987 total expenditure exceeded £1,200 million, while spending on the renovation of the battle areas was over £300 million. This has deprived the rural areas of much needed funding. As well as the local currency cost, the foreign exchange burden has also been considerable as much of the sophisticated equipment inherited from the Shah requires western spare parts. With the United States boycott over supplies to Iran, parts could only be obtained from arms dealers at considerable premiums.

Iran has tried to improvise as far as possible, and considerable ingenuity has been displayed, particularly in keeping British built, but locally assembled, Chieftain tanks in service, and in maintaining naval facilities. The servicing of aircraft has proved more difficult. A new light weapons industry is being established, with some Chinese assistance, largely in order to ensure greater armaments self sufficiency. A large manufacturing plant has been built to produce mortars, and a factory in Esfahan produces bullets for Kalashnikov sub-machine guns. Iran is now self sufficient in hand grenades, and an anti-chemical defence project is being implemented to give protection against Iraqi chemical warfare. The pontoon bridges used in the successful offensives in the marshlands of southern Iraq were also locally manufactured.

The Tehran government would, of course, like to see an end to the Gulf War, but an unjust peace would be meaningless, and an insult to the hundreds of thousands of martyrs who have died in the conflict. Every year International Peace Day is celebrated in Iran on September 1st, but a week later Martyrs' Day is remembered. There is a willingness to continue the war for as long as is necessary, especially as developments on the battlefield now favour Iran. With greater self sufficiency in equipment, and a growing armaments industry, there is less need for a speedy resolution to the conflict, desirable as this might be.

The resentment against the West in Iran is considerable, and should not be underestimated. There are several factors which have caused poor relations in recent years. Firstly, the West was perceived to be a major source of support for the Shah's unpopular regime, and with the overthrow of the regime relations were inevitably strained. Secondly, Western interference in Iran's internal affairs was widely resented. This dated from the time when the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now British Petroleum, gained the first oil concessions and the banking system was

the monopoly of the British owned Imperial Bank of Iran, now the British Bank of the Middle East. Thirdly, the material values of the West are disliked, and there is disapproval of western social relationships and attitudes on religious grounds. Iran has a strong culture, which it wishes to preserve, and Muslim values which it does not want undermined.

Co-existence is, however, possible as some of the Far Eastern states, notably Japan and China, have demonstrated. The Japanese regard Iran as the most important state in the Middle East, with considerable trade potential. Japanese companies and the Tokyo government have tried to maintain as normal relations as possible with Tehran, and refused to join United States boycotts of Iran despite the close relationship with Washington. China views Iran as a crucial neighbour of the Soviet Union and of geo-political significance for the Indian Ocean. The Peking authorities take a long term view, and have sought to cultivate good relations with the Islamic Republic, despite the obvious ideological differences.

The United States and the Western European states have been much less adept in handling relations with the post-revolutionary regime, and their actions have only increased resentment. Where attempts have been made to improve relations, as with Irangate or the French hostage releases, there have been much-publicised blunders. Yet the maintainance of reasonable relations should be possible, and influential Iranians would like to see an improvement, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, and President Khomeini. In many respects, Islamic economics is more compatible with capitalism than socialism. Islam stresses the importance of private property rights, and the Koran itself has much to say on inheritance. Trading is praised in the Koran as a productive activity. The Prophet Mohamed was himself a trader and later as a ruler arbitrated in trade disputes. Rafsanjani was one of a bazaar family and worked as a merchant in his youth. There is no ideological objection in Islam to private markets, provided transactions are conducted fairly and social justice prevails.

The Iranian revolution was of as great significance for the Islamic World as the French Revolution was for the West. The revolution is viewed with pride by Iranians and by many in other Islamic countries. Islam is seen as the way forward, which gives a central purpose to life. This is widely misunderstood in the West. It is only when the fundamental importance of the events of 1978-79 are understood in the West that reproachment can begin. Any scepticism concerning Iranian intentions or attempts to interfere would be met with new hostility. Co-existence between the systems is the best that can be hoped for, as the differences need to be recognised and respected.

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FORTY YEARS OF UNICEF

by Mark Cocker and Helen Taylor

ON the morning of the 21st September 1987, the latest ceasefire in Lebanon's ten-year-old civil war descended in silence on the dilapidated streets of Beirut. Like previous lulls in the fighting, this one was short-lived — only 96 hours — offering to the country's 2.7 million inhabitants an all-too-brief taste of normality. Yet, this was no simple period of inaction, nor was it snatched up by the various factions as a convenient opportunity to regroup and re-equip after weeks of exhausting battle. It had not even been convened by Lebanon's military and political leaders, although it did enjoy their universal support. The organisation behind an unprecedented spell of national co-operation and intense activity was UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, whose objective was to immunise the country's 350,000 children against six common diseases — diphtheria, measles, polio, tetanus, tuberculosis and whooping cough.

A decade of war has overwhelmed Lebanon's official medical services, leaving the nation's health dangerously exposed, particularly amongst the infant population, where mortality rates have climbed steadily in the last few years. UNICEF, drawing on techniques developed and successfully employed in other strife-riven areas, like El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Uganda, was able to galvanise rival politicians, religious leaders, army generals and government officials into a nationwide operation of child vaccination. This was co-ordinated with a full-scale publicity campaign involving newspapers, TV and radio announcements, posters, leaflets, even religious services that advised parents of the forthcoming 'three days of tranquillity' — as it was officially called — its purpose and the location of vaccination centres throughout the country. On the days of actual immunisation, military personnel and vehicles established independent communication networks in their particular territories and helped to ferry vital equipment as well as mothers and children to the various centres. Radio communications, normally used to direct accurate artillery fire, sent out messages of request to ensure that fresh supplies were brought to the centres running short of vaccine; while jeep-loads of troops scoured outlying villages for parents and children who had so far missed out on their shots. The campaign had originally been designed to last for only three days, but gathered such a healthy momentum that an extra twenty-four hours truce was agreed for the task to be completed, and two other ceasefires were called for October and November to allow follow-up vaccinations at monthly intervals.

By the end of the four days it was clear that the whole project had been an immense success. On top of the obvious practical achievements, it constituted an important morale-booster for the Lebanese people, demonstrating a capacity for national co-operation and unity in the midst of their chronic disorder. For UNICEF the campaign had fulfilled a number

of goals: firstly, their drive towards universal child immunisation by 1990 had been given a healthy fillip; secondly, it had established a valuable precedent for the organisation's contention that in times of conflict children should be set apart as a 'zone of peace'; similarly, it had vindicated their strategy of patient, low-profile diplomacy, capped at the decisive moment by a full-scale publicity campaign.

In recent years UNICEF has become a past-master in the art of advertising, a fact most fully demonstrated in May 1986 in 'The Race Against Time' campaign, which was jointly organised with Sport Aid. This was a media occasion on the most colossal scale. When the Sudanese athlete, Omar Khalifa, plunged a torch he had carried from Africa into a symbolic flame outside the United Nations building in New York, he launched the largest sporting event in world history, involving twenty million people in eighty-nine countries. In Britain alone a quarter of a million people took part in a single race in London's Hyde Park, while of the £15,000,000 raised, half went to UNICEF. As important as this financial success was the global interest it generated for weeks after the 25th May itself. No other charity, not even Band Aid of the previous year, had done more to put before the conscience of the world the plight of developing nations. 'The Race Against Time', which coincided with UNICEF's fortieth anniversary, gave the organisation double cause for celebration.

However, success of this kind must always be a distinctly double-edged experience for UNICEF. While the scale of achievement is impressive and a source of satisfaction, it carries with it an implicit irony. No matter how wide and generous the response, its magnitude must ultimately reflect the size of the problems it is attempting to meet. The immense size of the task facing UNICEF may seem obvious and urgent today. Yet the very existence of UNICEF in any long-term capacity was seriously in doubt shortly after its initial establishment.

UNICEF had been called into being at the close of 1946 in an attempt to address the widespread problems of child dislocation, malnutrition, and poverty in post-war Europe. The work of its predecessor, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which since 1943 had tackled the civil chaos left in the wake of an advancing Allied army, had eventually foundered on the tensions in East-West relations. Since much of the \$4.5 billion of aid that UNRRA had distributed in its brief life was needed in those countries now under Soviet influence, there was a reluctance on the part of the West to continue UNRRA's funding. However, a strong lobby, spearheaded by Ludwik Rajchman, the Polish delegate to UNRRA, and Herbert Hoover, the former US President, campaigned for a separate organisation to continue operating specifically in the interests of children. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund — a non-political organisation mandated to offer non-discriminatory aid solely on the basis of need — was the result.

In the first year of its existence, under the executive directorship of Maurice Pate, an American businessman and close associate of Herbert

Hoover, UNICEF provided food supplements for four million children; while in its first three years it administered aid to thirteen European countries (eight of those in the Soviet bloc) to the value of \$87.6 million. Bulk supplies of milk powder and other foodstuffs, blankets, clothing and shoes were distributed as an emergency stop-gap, but UNICEF quickly recognised that the long-term success of their programme hinged on the healthy development of locally based food production, particularly dairy industries. To this end, they provided national organisations with milk-sterilising and drying equipment and in Poland, for example, gave technical assistance in the construction of five large dairy plants. In tandem with efforts to solve the problems of malnutrition, they launched a massive vaccination campaign, particularly against tuberculosis, which had been a major cause of infant mortality in Eastern Europe.

The success of UNICEF's programme, coupled with the recovery of individual national economies, had done much to alleviate the crisis in post-war Europe, and by 1950 the sense of emergency was abating. Simultaneously, the Cold War and the worsening East-West relations had interrupted UNICEF's work in the Eastern bloc, where Yugoslavia was the only remaining recipient of aid. To many donor countries, particularly the USA, it appeared that UNICEF was no longer essential. It had been established as an emergency fund only, its work was more or less complete — now was the time to disband and pass any remaining functions to other UN institutions such as the World Health Organisation or the Food and Agriculture Organisation. The Director of UNICEF, Maurice Pate himself, had originally only thought of the agency as an interim crisis measure, and never envisaged any extension of its mandate, but by the time of the UN General Assembly in October 1950 his position had shifted to accord with many UN representatives from developing nations.

They felt that although the emergency in Europe was coming to an end, it was short-sighted to believe that problems of child-deprivation had been eradicated. While the ill-health and malnutrition of European children had been treated as a high-priority crisis, such conditions passed in other parts of the world almost as the norm. It was here — largely in Asia, Africa and South America — that the emergency continued, and here that efforts were now most needed. Eventually, after much negotiation, a compromise was unanimously adopted authorising a continuation of UNICEF's work for three years. There would be no statutory financial support from the UN, although, in the event, UNICEF's resources were maintained at their existing levels through purely voluntary contributions from individual donor nations. The words, 'international' and 'emergency' were dropped from its title to reflect its wider sphere of interest, while the familiar acronym was retained.

In a sense, UNICEF had anticipated its new global mandate by a number of years. In 1948, for example, it had switched attention from Europe to the conflict in the Middle East, where half a million Palestinian refugee mothers were provided with supplementary foodstuffs. At the same time, Israel received medical supplies to combat epidemics of disease.

amongst the fresh influxes of immigrants. Similarly, in China both sides in the country's long drawn-out civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, were given some form of aid while in 1949 health and disease control measures had been started in Latin America. After the dramatic three-year reprieve of 1950, therefore, the important changes were not in the geographical loci of UNICEF's work — since it simply stepped up funding to already-established projects in developing countries — but rather, in the nature of the assistance given. Bulk supplies of food, while they had been an essential part of efforts in Europe, could only ever be used to combat short-term emergencies. By themselves they offered no long-term solution to the problems of poverty and ill-health in the Third World. In the 1950s UNICEF had begun to direct its efforts towards the elimination of a number of widespread, debilitating diseases for which modern 'miracle' drugs seemed to have provided the answer. The campaign, lasting until the mid-1960s, gave UNICEF some of its most dramatic successes and some of its greatest failures.

Modern unfamiliarity with one of these disorders — Yaws — clearly indicates the efficacy of this particular eradication programme. However, that same unfamiliarity belies the previous virulence of the disease and the damaging social consequences which it once had. Yaws is a highly contagious infection disfiguring the sufferer's face, hands, and feet with raspberry-coloured lesions, and was extremely common in the West Indies, parts of West Africa and South-East Asia. In Indonesia, for example, the country of widest occurrence, of 56,000,000 people examined almost a fifth were treated for the disorder. Fortunately, although yaws was visually extremely distressing, its treatment with penicillin cleared almost all signs of infection in a matter of days. UNICEF's control programme, which had originally hoped to tackle a million cases in five years, achieved its initial target in only three, while the dramatic fall in the price of penicillin halved the costs of treatment. The campaign's spectacular success — yaws had been almost wiped out in some parts of South-East Asia — encouraged UNICEF to embark on similar eradication programmes against diseases that were to prove far more intractable opponents

In the case of malaria, treatment involved widespread use of the insecticide, DDT to eliminate the mosquito vector — a much more complex process than a simple antibiotic injection. Although there were initial successes and a sharp fall in the number of deaths, the campaign ran into increasing difficulties. Firstly, it was extremely expensive: between 1957-59 UNICEF allocated \$25,000,000 to anti-malarial measures. As time wore on the malaria-bearing species of mosquito developed strains resistant to the insecticide. Effective, repeated spraying throughout the insect's range proved impracticable, and any small reservoir of malaria allowed for a rapid come-back. By the early 1970s, when UNICEF had recognised the hopeless nature of its programme and curtailed funding, malaria was once again on the increase

The lack of success of some of its operations in no way damaged

UNICEF's standing at the UN; in fact, ever since the lapse of the initial three year mandate in 1953 its position and reputation had gone from strength to strength. Its scrupulously non-political character, coupled with that most potent symbol of deserving innocence—the child in distress—gave UNICEF a universal appeal. In the West the highly emotional nature of its work brought distinct advantages. Celebrities like Danny Kaye, Peter Ustinov, Liv Ullman and Harry Belafonte were only too willing to act as ambassadors, promoting the organisation and drawing attention to the problems of the developing world. Similarly, at a grass-roots level UNICEF has a network of National Committees working on its behalf which last year raised one fifth of its total income. Those in turn have developed a widespread network of local, voluntary branches, which have done much to raise funds and advertise both the organisation's successes and further needs. At the other end of the chain, in the countries where assistance was most needed, its reputation as a non-political agency gave it advantages over other relief organisations. In Nigeria, for example, where the eastern region's declaration of independence as the republic of Biafra sparked off a civil war in 1967, UNICEF's low-key diplomacy and exclusively humanitarian concerns, gave it access to the secessionist regions when other agencies were excluded. In 1979, after the Khmer Rouge regime in Kampuchea had been toppled by an invading Vietnamese force, and political considerations threatened to exclude international assistance just when the people of Kampuchea faced mass starvation, UNICEF was once again one of only two organisations (the other was the International Red Cross) allowed to enter the country. Both played a leading rôle in co-ordinating the largest and most complete relief programme ever mounted.

Natural and man-made crises on the scale of Kampuchea, or the civil war and cyclone in Bangladesh (1970-71), the Sahelian/Ethiopian droughts of 1973-5 and 1984-5 drew UNICEF into emergency fund-raising in the most direct form. Media images of dramatic airlifts or of the haunting expressions, matchstick limbs, and swollen bellies of malnourished children touched the hearts of Western nations and opened pockets as never before. Yet emergency relief, although a vital part of UNICEF's work, was complemented by more patient, undramatic efforts that did not arouse the attention of the media.

It was felt that aid programmes operating from the 'top downwards' failed to take account of the needs and wishes of the community for whom the help was intended. The search for an alternative, more integrated approach revolved around the fundamental concept that all human societies have evolved methods of providing for food supply, water needs, health, and education. The best way, therefore, to build up the vigour and well-being of a community was to tap these local resources and make them the vehicle for change. Lay personnel had originally been used in the campaigns against malaria and yaws for reasons of economy, but now it was recognised that a programme of basic health care operated by local community workers conferred definite benefits. Firstly, the econ-

omies of most countries could support a scheme along these simple lines; secondly, it gave a community greater confidence to know that their health needs were being met by 'one of them' UNICEF believed that a system of local workers, quickly though practically trained in health care, was the only feasible way to work effectively

If in its first three decades UNICEF has witnessed a gradual movement towards more flexible and locally integrated methods of child relief, in its fourth decade it has developed a programme which combines the best of these techniques with the best from the earlier, large-scale campaigns. The Child Development And Survival Revolution, first expounded in 1982, is UNICEF's attempt to eradicate the biggest threat to child well-being in the world today. The 'Silent Emergency' — the chronic, pernicious ebbing away of human life from malnutrition and infection, accounts for more deaths than any single disease, drought, flood or cyclone, but its effects are so widespread and gradual that it passes largely without notice. The weekly death toll is 280,000 — an annual total of fourteen million children. Yet UNICEF's visionary measures to combat it consist of a simple four-point charter: growth monitoring to ensure healthy development, the promotion of oral-rehydration techniques to combat the devastating cycle of diarrhoeal infection, weight loss and reinfection, the promotion of breast feeding as opposed to artificial bottle feeding, to capitalise on the former's immunological and higher nutritional properties; a campaign of universal immunisation against six preventable diseases that were most recently tackled in the Lebanon.

The recent ceasefire in the Middle East, and the campaign of vaccination there, bore all the hallmarks of UNICEF's latest approach. Quiet diplomacy secured the co-operation of all sides, full-scale publicity ensured maximum awareness, full utilisation of local resources — even military personnel and equipment — guaranteed widest effect. If it can carry out such a campaign on a global scale, focusing on a limited number of objectives which are obvious, effective and affordable, while mobilising the resources of both the industrialised and developing worlds, then it may reach a crucial milestone in human history — the elimination of the worst effects of absolute poverty on our planet.

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HAMMARSKJOLD'S DREAM

by A. L. Rowse

HAMMARSKJOLD has never been my cup of tea. When I read his inmost thoughts, as transmitted by my old friend, W. H. Auden, from Bryan Urquhart's book, recently published in the USA to great acclaim, and compare them with his actions recorded by an earlier acquaintance, I sympathise with the protest of a British ambassador to the United Nations, 'Don't be so damned high-minded.' Even Auden, who was a close friend of the lofty figure in the UN building in New York, has his reservations and refers to Hammarskjold's 'exceptionally aggressive super-ego', his 'narcissistic fascination with himself', even his 'megalomania'. He quotes, 'if you fail, it is God, thanks to your having betrayed Him, who will fail mankind. You fancy you can be responsible to God. can you carry the responsibility for God?'

Hammarckjold once told Auden that to be Secretary General of the United Nations was like being a secular Pope. This was supposed to be taken as a joke, but it revealed his inner mind.

Auden was sometimes impatient with his 'relentless earnestness' and the admixture of Scandinavian high-mindedness and Teutonic humourlessness which made him intolerable. 'In our era the road to holiness passes through the world of action.' One does not need to be very subtle to see that he is thinking of himself, a piece of self-promotion. Nor is it necessarily true. The great religious thinkers have usually thought that the road to holiness led through meditation.

Auden saw clearly what the case was, Hammarckjold's 'thorn in the flesh' never to be able 'to hope to experience either a passionate devotion returned, or a lifelong happy marriage.' He was a repressed homo-erotic, but he could have found both, if he had not been so obsessed with himself. Auden — hit-or-miss, as usual — makes a few silly statements by the way. He quotes Thoreau, 'it is as hard to see oneself as to look backwards without turning round' that is not the same thing as Auden's comment, 'the truth is that our friends, and our enemies, always know us better than we know ourselves.' That may be true for some people, but it is certainly not true for most. The truth would seem to be that Auden was afraid to know himself: the great defect of his poetry — one rarely gets any intimacy with the inner man, as with Eliot or Yeats.

Or he quotes the remark of an inferior Italian writer who happened to be 'in' at the time. 'We can all do good deeds, but very few of us can think good thoughts.' Is that true? I should say that most people find it easy enough to 'think good thoughts', in the ordinary meaning of the phrase — even if only very few can think at all, in any significant way.

'Never look down to test the ground before taking your next step', Hammarckjold advises himself. I should have thought this rather bad advice: you might trip up, as he eventually did in the Congo. 'Only he who keeps his eye on the far horizon will find his right road.' That is,

himself Doubtful anyway — I prefer the middle distance. 'Never measure the height of a mountain until you have reached the top. Then you will see how low it was' True, *in fact*? Condescending, anyway

'If your goal is not determined by your most secret pathos, even victory will only make you painfully aware of your own weakness' I do not object to the self-pity implicit in this — many other people have had to put up with that particular form of 'pathos' — only to the perpetual engagement with himself, like a kind of mental masturbation. 'What you have to attempt — to be yourself.' It ought not to be difficult to be oneself, to take oneself as it comes. 'What you have to pray for — to become a mirror in which, according to the purity of heart you have attained, the greatness of life will be reflected.' Perpetually engaged with the image of himself in the mirror. Why not take it naturally and go ahead? 'For man shall commune with all creatures to his profit, but enjoy God alone', he quotes, and comments, 'that is why no human being can be a permanent source of happiness to another' This is quite untrue: he is again generalising egoistically from himself. There have been innumerable happy marriages, even within the same sex — as he could have found within the UN building, and for himself too, if he could have subordinated his own colossal ego. Hammarskjöld quotes St. Jean Perse — another of the high-minded group for whom the Nobel Prize was reserved: 'There is no history but that of the soul, no peace but that of the soul.' Also untrue. there is always History itself.

'Life will judge me by the measure of the love *I myself* am capable of, and with patience according to the measure of my honesty in attempting to meet its demands, and with an equity before which the feeble explanations and excuses of self-importance carry no weight whatsoever.'

'We have to acquire such a peace and balance of mind that we can give every word of criticism its due weight, and humble ourselves before every word of praise.' Humility is partly compounded of humbug, and partly inverted pride I do not object to the pride — a due proportion of pride is good for a man's morale; it is merely the inversion I find distasteful. Actually, the sage Aristotle thought humility a vice.

A marginal comment in my copy of this prodigious best-seller concisely expresses my direct reaction to these sentiments To hell with it. No sense of humour The constant self-questioning becomes self-posturing, like Kierkegaard's *Enough!* No real help to anyone . Nevertheless the book was regarded as gospel by many thousands of people, especially in the United States, where high-mindedness has good sales value.

So he goes relentlessly on, as Auden found 'Still a few more years, and then? The only value of a life is its content — for *others*' This is also untrue the content of a creator's life is what he creates That is its proper justification I distrust statements about 'the only' this or that too sweeping, too exclusive. 'Apart from any value it may have for others, my life is worse than death.' False exaggeration' I do not believe that he thought that. If considered objectively he would have to admit that there was much good in it If he truly thought that his life was worse than

death, it was a piece of sentimental subjectivism.

'Therefore, in my great loneliness, serve others. Therefore, how incredibly great is what I have been given, and how meaningless what I have to "sacrifice"' This is in contradiction to what he has said just before one cannot have it both ways. He goes on, 'Hallowed be Thy Name, Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done...'

Hammar skjold reflects on creativeness, again not objectively but screwing it round to reflect on himself: 'The ultimate surrender to the creative act — it is the destiny of some to be brought to the threshold of this in the act of sacrifice rather than the sexual act, and they experience a thunderclap of the same dazzling power'

Auden shuts up the book with the sober reflection that Hammar skjold was 'not a genius', that he lacked the 'single overwhelming talent and passion' and also the original insight into general problems possessed by real religious thinkers. However, he was a man of brilliant gifts. Let us see how these gifts and ideas carried over into the realm of action. Hammar skjold's admiring Assistant and biographer, Brian Urquhart whom I knew as a charming boy at Oxford, tells us that 'the United Nations has had to operate in an atmosphere poisoned by failure to reach agreed settlements of problems arising out of the Second World War' *Poisoned?* They were the natural conflicts for power of the powers super, great and small: the fundamental fact of international life, no high-mindedness about that. We are similarly told that the post-War arrangements of France and Britain 'had already sown the seeds of the Arab-Israeli problem.' But it was already *there* we did not invent it. We were harassed by the fratricidal hatreds and feuds of these peoples, burdening ourselves with the constant endeavour to accommodate them and find for them some *modus vivendi*. If it proved impossible to find a solution, it was not Britain's fault, any more than the irreconcilable enmity of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, or between Hindus and Moslems in India.

Let us take the crucial case of Suez, 1956, when Hammar skjold appeared at the apogee of his power, a world-figure, acting as if he were Prime Minister of the United Nations. It was easy enough to topple Britain — less so France — when they had put themselves partly in the wrong against all the high-mindedness arrayed against them. They were not wholly in the wrong. I should say that they were mainly in the right, and had a just case. But historic issues are not settled by whether one has a just case or not: they are settled by the balance of power, by the force at one's command.

Nasser was a major factor of disturbance in the Middle East, as Hitler and Mussolini had been in Europe. At the end of his life Nasser reversed his position and became a factor of stability; paradoxically — but it highlights the fact that for most of his career he had been the chief menace to peace in the Middle East. At bottom he was playing the obvious game of bidding up the West against the East, accepting credits and armaments from both. It is strange that small powers can blackmail greater and even superpowers in the conditions of Cold War between East and West.

John Foster Dulles, least successful of American Secretaries of State, a combination of religious humbug with the mind of a sharp-practising corporation lawyer—who had been responsible for the Reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles—tried to buy off Nasser with an offer of \$56 million to build the Aswan Dam to feed Egypt's over-population. Britain was persuaded to offer \$14 million. Meanwhile, Dulles was affronted in June 1956 by the arrival in Alexandria of a flotilla of Soviet destroyers and torpedo boats. Suddenly, abruptly, hardly even consulting President Eisenhower, Dulles withdrew the offer, leaving Britain and France to bear the consequences. Nasser's neutralism and his recognition of Peking—with the American obsession about China, about which the US had cherished starry-eyed illusions for so long—convinced Dulles that Nasser was 'a traitor in the Cold War', which Dulles was waging with alternative threats ('brinkmanship') and all his Presbyterian moral fervour ('There is no one in the State Department who knows so much about the Bible as I do'). Both Churchill and Eden had expressed the hope that Eisenhower would not make him Secretary of State. He proved a disaster.

Immediately upon Dulles's renegeing on Aswan, Nasser seized the Suez Canal with all its assets, which belonged to an international consortium in which France and Britain were the dominant partners. After all, the Canal had been built by the French, the British share bought and paid for by Disraeli's government. Egypt was engaged in strangling Israel's trade by blockading the approach through the Gulf of Aqaba and refusing to allow Israeli traffic through the Canal. To a realist historian Nasser's unilateral action by force justified Anglo-Franco-Israeli resistance to it. Israel was ready for it, to break the strangle-hold upon her; so too France, engaged in a mortal struggle in Algeria, Nasser instigating Arabs everywhere. Britain, as usual, dithered and attempted a compromise; though Eden undoubtedly saw Nasser as another Hitler-Mussolini type fatal to appease.

The United States prevailed on Britain to withdraw military action against Nasser's unilateral seizure of the Canal and confiscation of her property. Hammarskjöld, a friend of Nasser's Foreign Minister, favoured internationalisation of the Canal. Eden was ready to put the issue to the United Nations, but now Dulles refused to join the appeal—no doubt with an *arrière pensée* about the Panama Canal, not wanting any comparable internationalisation there. In any case, Nasser rejected proposals for international control. What he wanted was a grand *coup* for Egyptian nationalism, a tighter stranglehold than ever on Israel, the most effective propaganda weapon to the Arab world, overthrowing the whole balance and stability in the area.

Israel was ready to march and showed its ability to deal with him effectively on their own. France prepared to back Israel and intervene; their ministers came over to persuade Eden, already a sick man, to join in. It is not generally known that Attlee, then retired as Labour leader, as elder statesman looked in at 10 Downing Street and advised Eden, not

to get caught out on a limb with the French. That was precisely what happened. Eden was toppled into action with and by the French. He was sick to death with Dulles's evasions and withdrawals all through that fateful summer, and evidently decided to act without his or Eisenhower's 'by your leave or with your leave.' This proved a mistake. the action was an affront to American high-mindedness.

But Britain itself was divided on the issue. High-mindedness in Britain also went into action against the harassed government. The Labour Opposition came out against taking action. There was a furore, like that over the Hoare-Laval Pact, which similarly defeated Baldwin before the Second German War. All the Left intellectuals had a grand time riding their high moral hobby-horse. I was alone among my Labour friends in supporting the government in the hour of crisis. Anthony Eden said to me, when he retired to Cornwall to recuperate that winter 'it would not have happened had Bevin been there.' He meant that Bevin would have rallied the Labour Party. I doubt it: attacking Britain was always too inviting, and easy game.

It was the United States that ruined the action, by putting economic pressure on Britain which she was too weak financially to resist. The French were in favour of continuing the conflict. Nasser took cover, hid and briefly withdrew. The forced withdrawal of Britain enabled him to emerge and claim complete victory, procured for him by the United States. Britain's position in the Middle East was ruined; the United States have been picking up the pieces ever since and trying to make some stable structure out of them. In vain.

The French drew the logical consequences, turned their back on the United States, and their front to Germany to found the European Union, the European Economic Community. Great Britain, however, with her position in the English-speaking world and with the Commonwealth to consider, could never and would not wish to draw apart from the United States. France did, and with the arrival of De Gaulle to power, even withdrew from NATO.

That same autumn, in October, there came the rising in Hungary against Communist tyranny, a small minority in power. I remember my high-minded Socialist friends hoping against hope that Hungary might win its freedom. When their mentor, Stuart Hampshire, asked me what the chances were, I assured him, not a hope of it. Allowing Hungary to go its own way to freedom would have loosened an avalanche in Eastern Europe. Soviet Russia would never allow it. The rising was put down by force, tanks and guns and troops closed in, the fighters for freedom fled or were suppressed, iron rule once more imposed. No high-minded humbug in that quarter.

Nevertheless, the Soviet representative, Bulganin, was put up to argue for international control of the Suez Canal — the Russians would have the Panama Canal eventually in mind. Hammarskjold was in his element all that summer, negotiating like mad, bringing about an improbable alliance of the United States, USSR and all the other lesser nations, to

condemn France and Britain. He was able to report that he had 'laid the foundations for an entirely new kind of international activity and set out principles and ideas that were to become the basis for United Nations peace-keeping operations'.

A forlorn hope! When he proposed to intervene in Hungary, not the slightest notice was taken by Soviet Russia, which was ready enough to combine with him in blackmailing Britain. Of course, considerations of power were all that mattered, the power game all that was open to play.

His admiring biographer concludes.

Did Hammarskjöld's work have lasting effects, or was he a brilliant phenomenon, a comet flashing through the sky and leaving little trace after it was gone? Was he ahead of his time? Or was he *above* his time in the sense that his personality and exceptional skill made an impression on his contemporaries out of all proportion to their lasting political or institutional value?

I should agree with 'Above' his head, with its inhumanly lofty brow, high up in the United Nations Building in the clouds. The real scene below on the murky streets below, the facts of power, as always, were the real forces at work in history. His 'infinitely ambitious' aims, as Prime Minister of the United Nations, ended in a mysterious plane crash in the Congo, when not a black cat mewed or missed him.

And where does the United Nations stand today?

Reference may be made to *International Leadership—The Legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld* by Sir Brian Urquart (Uppsala 1986)

[A. L. Rowse, Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and Fellow of the British Academy, holds the Benson Medal of the Royal Society of Literature. He has summed up 20 years' of work on Shakespeare, his identification of the Dark Lady and solution of the problems of the Sonnets, with his newly Revised Edition of *Shakespeare the Man* (Macmillan).]

The April issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Way to Independent Namibia* by Chakanyuka Karase, *The A C D of the EEC* by John Tomlinson MEP, *Home Dear Home The Current House Price Boom* by Nigel Healey and *Early Struggles of the Geto-Daciens* by Constantin Gheorghe.

ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

by Manfred R. Hamm

AFTER some last-minute bargaining over the fine-print of the INF Agreement on eliminating groundbased intermediate and short-range nuclear forces in Europe, the agreement was finally signed at the Washington summit on December 7, 1987. Although there is considerable dissension about its impact on NATO's military doctrine and European security, the accord is being hailed as an historic achievement.

For the first time ever, arms control negotiations have led to actual reductions of nuclear arms, in fact to the complete elimination of an entire class of delivery systems. But whether the agreement will turn out as an unmixed blessing will hinge not only on the kind of follow-on agreements already being discussed by NATO. Its impact on NATO threat assessment and force planning will be of even greater importance. Two crucial issues arise in this respect which, however, are basically two sides of the same coin. Will NATO take the steps needed to preserve the viability of flexible response by reinforcing its nuclear deterrent while also augmenting its conventional defence efforts.

The ongoing debate on extending NATO air defences to cover the emerging conventional tactical missile threat plays a key role in this respect. On the one hand, protecting NATO's nuclear assets in Europe will become more important as their overall size is being reduced. On the other hand, strengthening conventional defences implies more than merely fielding more capable forces. Their survivability and sustainability under wartime conditions must also be enhanced and tactical missile defences can make a critical contribution in both respects.

Yet the 'double-zero' accord wrongly fosters the expectation that tactical missile defences may no longer be necessary as the threat they were to counter is diminishing. Proponents of this view are incidentally the same who have argued that deployment of such defences would violate the ABM Treaty that prohibits the deployment by either superpower of defences against strategic missiles. They are thus trying now to back up their dubious legal case against a European TMD system by denying its requirement. To be sure, TMD needs will change as a result of 'double-zero' but missile defences will not become superfluous.

The forthcoming quintennial review conference of the ABM Treaty provides the backdrop for the legal arguments against a European TMD system. Critics of TBM deployment consider the ABM Treaty as the hallmark of successful arms control, the linchpin of the nuclear regime, and the last symbol of the golden age of detente. They tout a European TMD system as the 'Son of SDI', a regional derivative designed to extend the coverage of the US missile defence system to Europe. They dispute the military desirability, technological feasibility and affordability of strategic missile defences and thus reject *a priori* a complementary European TMD. Most importantly, the critics invoke the ABM Treaty designed

to enshrine the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as the immutable foundation of deterrence

The ABM Treaty prohibits the development and deployment of certain — not all — strategic defence systems and, thereby, is credited with preserving arms race and crisis stability. It does not expressly proscribe tactical missile defences, but opponents contend that TMD systems at a minimum contravene its spirit. They even try to construe a legal case against some configurations of TMD systems, ostensibly due to their residual ABM capability.

Admittedly, there are some problems with the ABM Treaty as regards TMD development and deployment. But these are either definitional in that the distinction between ABM and TMD systems is poorly defined or they relate to the general prohibition of transferring ABM technologies to third parties. For instance, ABM systems are designed to defend against 'strategic' missiles that were defined as ICBMs with a range in excess of 3,500 miles or sea-based SLBMs with a range of more than 1,800 miles. Since some land-based INF systems such as the SS-20s can fly 3,300 miles TMDs against them are technically allowed. But TMDs might be even more effective against SLBMs or similar range because their warheads re-enter and approach targets at a slower speed than SS-20s or comparable land-based systems. Ground-based TMD interceptors might also be given an ABM capability in much the same way that common air defence systems can be upgraded to perform TMD roles.

Another issue relates to the dispute over the broad versus the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty that has been raging since October 1985. At that time, the Reagan White House proposed for the first time that Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty did not prohibit the RDT&E of ABM systems using so-called 'exotic' technologies. But even if the US were prohibited by the ABM Treaty from pursuing these novel approaches, the use of directed energy technologies such as lasers or particle beams in TMDs would not be proscribed. There is widespread fear the US might seek to circumvent the ABM Treaty by developing both kinetic-kill and exotic technologies under the guise of TMD only to upgrade them later to serve ballistic missile defence purposes.

In the final analysis, the detection and tracking range of missile defence radars and sensors as well as the range and velocity of interceptors determines whether they can be used in an air defence, TMD, or ABM mode. Consequently, critics of both TMDs and ABM defences plead for qualitative limitations on these components to rule out the use of air defences for both purposes. A categorical ban on TMDs is their preferred objective but, if it cannot be negotiated, they urge such constraints to at least rule out an illicit upgrade of TMDs to preclude their use as crude ABM systems.

The proposition of imposing qualitative limits on TMDs to constrict them to a defence against conventionally armed theatre ballistic missiles might be debatable if they were effectively verifiable. Under present conditions, however, they are not. In addition, while the principal aim of

a European TMD is to defend against conventional missiles, it is not readily apparent why it ought to be desirable to constrain its growth potential. It is doubtful whether maintaining the total vulnerability of Western Europe to Soviet nuclear attack is a noble objective especially since the European NATO allies have no retaliatory capabilities of their own. British and French nuclear forces serve a different function

Even if MAD were uncontested, its contrived strategic logic is not readily applicable to the European theatre. At issue is 'extended deterrence' and efforts to shore it up by fielding US Pershing-IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) nearly foundered in the face of fierce domestic political opposition. In fact, the much acclaimed 'double-zero' agreement may well erode its credibility even further as various critics of the accord contend. An effective European TMD might serve to alleviate some European fears about Soviet nuclear blackmail or the reliability of the US pledge to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. Greater self-confidence on the part of the European allies may translate not only into greater alliance cohesion during East-West crises, it may also be a prerequisite for reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Arms control has thus far dealt with the least likely threat to our security. Few believe Moscow would launch a premeditated nuclear attack on either Europe or the US. Yet, at the same time, the threat of nuclear war underpins the political and military utility of conventional forces, especially in Europe where there is a vast imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, the strategic nuclear stalemate has prompted Moscow seriously to contemplate options for conventional war in Europe.

Since the mid-1970s, the Soviets have acquired all the accoutrements for a Blitzkrieg-type military assault on Western Europe: highly mobile, heavily armoured ground forces with enormous firepower, offensive air-power sufficient to contest NATO air supremacy, air defences to protect vital assets in the rear, a sophisticated electronic warfare capability and modern command, control, communications and intelligence system (C3I). However, one basic ingredient is still missing: the ability to deter NATO from escalating to the nuclear level. That is best achieved by eliminating the bulk of NATO's nuclear weapons before they can be used while creating a *fait accompli* on the battlefield that would deprive nuclear escalation by NATO of any military utility.

Conventionally armed theatre ballistic missiles, ground- and air-launched cruise-missiles, anti-radiation and other stand-off missiles are ideally suited for this purpose. They can be used very effectively to suppress NATO air defences, to shut-down at least temporarily NATO airfields, and to destroy nuclear weapons before they can be dispersed from their peacetime storage sites. The increasing accuracy of TBMs armed with advanced conventional munitions with effects of small nuclear warheads enables Moscow to carry out precursor attacks on time-critical NATO targets. They will create a window for subsequent offensive air operations to cripple NATO defences and to prevent expeditious mobilisation and

dispatch of units to their assigned defensive positions

The target array to be covered by the Warsaw Pact would be quite small, involving perhaps as few as 50 airbases, 20 nuclear storage sites and a similar number of C3I installations. If these targets were effectively disrupted by conventional missile attack at the outset of a war, Moscow could fully exploit the element of surprise and keep NATO off balance long enough to accomplish its military objectives. Although the timing and co-ordination of such an attack would be no easy task, it may soon be within the reach of Warsaw Pact TBMs and tactical airpower.

Contrary to the claims of western TBM opponents, the 'double-zero' agreement does not impact materially on this Soviet conventional attack option. After full implementation of the agreement, some 635 Frog-7 and 140 SS-21 launchers with a missile range between 70 and 120 km will remain in Europe. Their present accuracy of a 300m CEP may be insufficient to destroy hardened targets but, when armed with intelligent submunitions, they could be quite effective against soft targets such as NATO groundbased radar and C3I installations. In terms of military effectiveness, the 590 Scud-Bs with a range of 300 km and their successor, the SS-23s with a range of just less than 500 km, pose the most serious threat. Only some 10 SS-23 launchers have been deployed along the central front but their number will grow as older Scud-Bs are being retired. With their estimated CEP of 350m they may well be too inaccurate for missions requiring pin-point accuracy, but a 50-100m CEP may be attainable with terminal guidance. The Pershing-II boasts a 40m CEP. These launchers, including reloads, are not covered by the terms of the 'double-zero' agreement.

The conventional TBM threat to NATO is thus undiminished and is likely to grow as more SS-23s are being fielded and their accuracy is being improved. These missiles will have a free ride to their targets unless NATO deploys TBM defences. Critics contend that passive defences like hardening, dispersal, redundancy, will be as effective as TBM defences and will not trigger an open-ended offence defence arms race as NATO TMD deployment is purported to do. This begs the question of whether Moscow would sit still while passive defence measures by NATO are progressively eroding its conventional TBM option or, alternatively, whether NATO should renounce passive defences to keep the Soviets from increasing their TBM potential. The answer to both must be no.

The action/reaction paradigm is fallacious and rarely ever accounts for military procurement decisions. In this case, it surely does not explain why Moscow has aggressively pursued this emerging military option. Military doctrine and operational needs interact with technological progress and are a better guide to understanding weapons development and acquisition. Given its unremittingly offensive military concept, Moscow will persist in its quest for a conventional 'first-strike' posture that supports its overall operational plan for a military conflict in Europe.

Critics also argue that the SS-23 threat could be managed through arms control agreements that eliminated or, at least, curtailed the threat by

establishing ceilings low enough to deny Moscow a high-confidence conventional TBM capability while being still sufficient to maintain a minimal theatre nuclear deterrent on both sides. This proposal is riddled with problems: first, who is going to judge what Moscow considers a minimal requirement for a viable conventional TBM posture. Second, the Soviet TBM target set could be reconfigured in response to numerical constraints. Third, limits on TBM deployment are likely to accelerate the trend toward airbreathing systems such as cruise-missiles that can be as effective as TBMs against some targets despite subsonic speed. Fourth, operational plans could be adjusted to compensate for numerical limitations on these TBMs by assigning more tasks to other weapons systems or by exploiting the synergistic effects of employing combined arms.

Finally — perhaps most importantly — low ceilings on TBMs like the SS-23s could confound NATO defence efforts in two ways. On the one hand, they would deny NATO TBMs to carry out its own offensive counter-air (OCA) missions against targets protected by anti-aircraft missiles or to strike mobile TBM launchers before they can fire their reloads provided real-time reconnaissance, targeting and C3I problems can be resolved. On the other hand, such numerical limitations would prevent NATO from implementing its follow-on forces attack (FOFA) concept by denying it some of the means to attrite and slow-down echeloned forces. NATO thus needs to strike a balance between its desire to reduce the Soviet TBM threat and its own defence requirements.

Once again, arms control is not the panacea its proponents would like us to believe. Having failed to discredit 'extended air defence' as the illegitimate 'Son of SDI' and a violation of the sacrosanct ABM Treaty, they are now touting an arms control solution that is based on false premises and does not conform to NATO's military requirements. NATO will increasingly face this problem in trying to manage and constrain the military potentials that are dual-capable in terms of conventional and nuclear use while simultaneously being ambiguous as regards their offensive and defensive utility.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has been pressing for a follow-on agreement to reduce, if not eliminate, tactical missiles with a range below 500 km. This demand has met stiff resistance from other NATO members, especially the United Kingdom and France which prefer retaining a 'nuclear firewall' that would effectively prevent Moscow from gaining a conventional war fighting option in Europe. Political considerations, such as West German refusal to be singularly threatened by these short-range nuclear systems, complete with the military requirements for maintaining flexible response. Reconciling the political imperative of arms control with the military requirements for a viable defence posture will be the challenge ahead of us. At present, however, we have no choice but to go ahead with tactical missile defence research to be prepared to meet the threat when and if it materialises.

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LATIN-AMERICAN MARXISM: THE DILEMMA FOR LIBERALS

by Marvin Goldwert

THE Western liberal is rightfully wary of Latin American Marxism. While Marxist regimes, such as Castro's Cuba, may, in the initial stages, institute basic changes in the structures of their societies which uplift the masses, they do so at a high price: the destruction of the middle class, the one-party state, the seizure of private property, the abolition of human rights and the end of all hopes for pluralistic democracy. The liberal intellectual is the first to be forced into exile or even incarceration under a Marxist regime. Yet, Latin American Marxism still presents the Western liberal with a dilemma.

Unlike the United States and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe, Marxism is not peripheral to Latin American intellectual life. Indeed, the universities of that region have always been hotbeds of Marxist ideology. Herein, the Western liberal must, to a degree, empathise with his Marxist counterparts in Latin American intellectual life. For the sensitive Latin American intellectual and student, who is moved by the grinding poverty of the masses in many Latin American countries, economic determinism and class struggle may, in some misguided way, make sense. He may confound violent Marxist revolution with idealistic compassion, even though such currents usually exact a terrible toll in post-revolutionary authoritarianism. Furthermore, since violence, including military coups and pressure on civilian regimes is and has been an option for both Latin American armies and their civilian cohorts, the Marxist intellectual often comes to believe that mass force is the correct reply to elitist force.

Since Marxism is a part of the mainstream of Latin American intellectual life, many 'popular' coalitions in that region will accept the participation of Marxists. Often in Latin America such coalitions, be they revolutionary or a part of popular protest, are activated in a period of polarized political strife. That is, aligned on the right are the landed oligarchy, rich middle-sector technocrats and powerful factions of the military. Inherent in this polar right-wing coalition is force, wealth and a stake in an unsatisfactory status quo. On the left in this polarized political situation are social democrats, sometimes Christian Democrats, the Church, frustrated labour leaders and, alas, Marxist intellectuals and leaders.

Sometimes 'popular' coalitions in Latin America are so amorphous that leadership and power within them gravitates to those who are well-knit ideologically and organisationally. The foregoing scenario describes the situation-of-flux in which the cohesive Marxist elements are able to mould popular programmes and even seize power within broadly-based revolutionary movements. At the pole on the revolutionary left the well-organised Marxist factions are usually poised to co-opt power and often

define post-revolutionary change.

As a case-study, contemporary El Salvador demonstrates the foregoing revolutionary dynamic. Driven by the intransigence of the landed oligarchy, the hard-line military and allied technocrats, all of whom will brook no social compromise, some Christian Democrats, leftist union leaders, social democrats and land-hungry peasants have been impelled toward an alliance with Marxists. Herein lies the dilemma for Western liberals. Whom are we to support? A right-wing coalition which offers little to nations in which land-hunger and a population explosion have driven the peasant and working masses to desperation? Or, a Marxist-influenced leftist polar coalition which promises some kind of land reform and, implicitly, may mean the end of the human rights so cherished by Western liberals?

The liberal dilemma has also stymied the United States which, allegedly, seeks to find a middle-ground of moderate reform and democratic evolution. As an example, let us look at the two moderates, Cerezo of Guatemala and Duarte of El Salvador, whom the United States today supports. They are well-meaning moderates, but in a situation of polarised revolutionary flux they have become virtually tools and front-men for the armies of their nations, for they both lack a popular base of support and cannot seem to develop much needed reform programmes for a region bursting with landless peasants and uprooted urban masses.

Even if the Contadora Plan for peace and negotiations in a war-weary Central America works, and I pray it will, some permanent solution must be found for the land-hunger and grinding poverty of the region. Peace and reform are the twin aspirations of the Western liberal as he confronts both Central and South America. However, often in the see-saw of the two poles, the Western liberal still faces a continued right-wing intransigence which forcefully opposes all reform; or far-left Marxist-dominated coalitions with their intellectual appeal to revolutionary romance and post-revolutionary nightmare

[Dr. Marvin Goldwert, Professor of History at the New York Institute of Technology, is the author of numerous books and articles on Latin America and the history of psychoanalysis]

DEMANDS ON EDUCATION

by W. H. Petty

THE Education Service has not responded to the demands made on it.' Or so it is said, and indeed this is one of the assumptions behind Mr. Kenneth Baker's proposals for a national curriculum drawn up by 'the best minds in the country' — a chilling phrase if ever there was one. There is, however, a good case for arguing that the history of the Education Service is one of responding only too well to the demands made on it. Such demands are not, of course, necessarily the same as national needs.

The trouble started, we are told, in the nineteenth century, when the public schools, led by short-sighted headmasters such as Thomas Arnold, devoted themselves to turning the sons of manufacturers into landed gentry and colonial servants instead of into better manufacturers. This precedent was followed later by the grammar schools, which saw their role as one of producing lawyers, doctors and teachers — and certainly not businessmen. And the technical schools (as distinct from the technical colleges), which were established by many local education authorities in the 1940s and 1950s and of which much was expected, had disappeared by the 1980s.

Did not the schools and the education authorities, however, provide precisely what the parents wanted? Manufacturers wanted their children to become landed gentry or colonial servants. Businessmen wanted their children to enter the professions. Certainly the technical schools, almost all of which were selective schools, were gravely weakened because parents preferred their children to attend grammar schools. All the technical schools in Kent, for example, an authority which had particularly fostered them, became grammar schools as a result of parental pressure. Indeed, powerful voices were saying that the newly developing comprehensive schools must be 'like grammar schools'.

And so far as the multifarious additions made to the curriculum in recent years, such as social skills, road safety, anti-racism and anti-drug-drink and smoking education are concerned, they were the result of developments and pressures from outside the Education Service to which it had to respond.

The Education Service indeed tends to respond quickly to demands made on it. It has been criticised particularly, in more recent years, for producing too many teachers, some of whom were said to be of unsatisfactory quality. It has been criticised, too, for the growth of sociology departments, created by the universities and polytechnics and fed by the co-operating schools.

There were not too many teachers at the time when large numbers of them were being produced, however. The size of the school population was growing rapidly and, on top of this natural growth, the Government of the day imposed the further growth produced by a raising of the school

leaving age. What should excite comment is how the Education Service in general, and the local education authorities in particular, managed to deal with these externally created demands without collapsing and how much more difficult it will be to deal with any similar crisis in the future, if Mr. Kenneth Baker succeeds in his other current proposal to remove their higher education institutions from the local education authorities.

Similarly, the growth in numbers of students of sociology was closely linked with the growth of social service departments in local authorities. Those who watched this growth will remember the spectacle of Sir Keith Joseph, then responsible for social services at national level, calling on local authorities to build up their social services departments at enormous speed. The staff required to do this did not, of course, exist. The Education Service obliged Sir Keith both by training the necessary staff and by guiding young people into what Central Government clearly intended to be a major growth area in employment.

Things are now, as they say, different. The world of work, links with wealth-producing industry and commerce, vocational and pre-vocational courses — these are the new priorities of Central Government. And, once again, the Education Service is responding. The Certificate of Pre-vocational Education, the Technical Vocational Education Initiative, the Youth Training Scheme and the unfortunately named Work-related Non-Advanced Further Education are all national initiatives which have been worked out and are being developed with local education authorities and their colleges and schools, along with industry and commerce. The Education Service has its well publicised problems, and concentration on these has led to far less publicity being given to the changes in emphasis and direction in the Service which are currently taking place despite these problems.

There are three main lessons to be learned from a study of demands on the Education Service, apart from the recognition that the Service does respond.

The first is not to blame the Service for responding to demands which it has not been able to ignore, even if it might have disagreed with them. Was it a real option for the Service not to exert every effort to provide teachers to meet a Central Government decision to raise the school leaving age? Was it a real option to let the new social services departments collapse? To have done so might well have been a salutary lesson to Central Government, but it would have been at the expense of those who depended on the services.

The second lesson is that there is a need to ascertain where the demands on the Education Service have come from before blame or praise is apportioned and before action is taken on the basis of such an apportionment. The two cases mentioned above are now part of history, but the issue itself is very much a live one. Mr. Kenneth Baker and his predecessor, Sir Keith Joseph, have weakened the position of the local education authorities in the education system in various ways. One major reason for this action appears to have been the 'failure' of the local education

authorities to intervene effectively in such matters as the curriculum. But the real position has been one of Central Government, through legislation, pressure and advice, making it very clear over the years until comparatively recently that this was not a field for activity by local education authorities. Indeed, the main demands on the curriculum, at least in secondary schools, have come from examination boards and from the pressures (including, of course, pressure from Central Government) for more and more children to take more and more examinations

The third lesson to be drawn from a study of demands on the Education Service comes from the other two. It is true that demands have come from various sources — parents, examination boards, industry and commerce, Government departments other than the Department of Education and Science. But behind much of what is now criticised in the Education Service lie the past demands and pressures of previous Secretaries of State for Education and Science, men and women who were just as confident that they were right then as Mr Baker is confident that he is right today. Is not the basic lesson that there are great dangers, not merely for the Education Service but for the country as a whole, in political powers in education being increasingly placed in the hands of Secretaries of State, individuals who, in the memorable words of Sir Robin Day to Sir John Nott, are 'here today, gone tomorrow'?

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HOW A BRIDGE IS BUILT

by Andrzej Zurowski

IT sometimes happens that my friends, who have no professional connection with the theatre, ask me how I can see so many performances of plays acted in languages unknown to me and if it is possible for me to understand them. I answer, half joking, that I like such performances because they do not destroy for me the pleasure of viewing the pure theatrical art. Of course, the answer is only half true, as the problem genuinely exists. At the same time, bearing in mind the difference between a professional and lay audience, no doubt the language barrier is far more crucial for the latter, while the professional, even when he knows the language used by the actors, pays attention simply to the theatrical elements of a spectacle which exists beyond mere words. Only in relation to these elements will he attempt to assimilate the director's interpretation

In attempting to answer sensibly the question of theatre as a universal language, let us begin with the text. For the sake of argument, we could agree to classic differences between literary and extra-literary theatre. In literary theatre, an international audience concentrates on the professionalism and aesthetic excellence of a play as well as the perfection of certain conventions. Such is the situation when Molière is performed by the French Theatre of Comedy, Tchechov by the Moscow Art Theatre or Brecht by the *Berliner Ensemble*. I refer to the productions of plays which are linked inseparably with particular authors, those scenes with which the authors are closely involved. However, the situation is similar even when a director of contemporary theatre goes back to a masterpiece from the world's dramatic literature. Then, we go to Bouffes du Nord in Paris to see how Peter Brook interprets Tchechov; to the Royal Dramatic Theatre in Stockholm to see what Ingmar Bergman wants to say about and through Shakespeare; or to the Stry Theatre in Cracow to meet Andrzej Wajda interpreting Dostoyevsky. These are communications with the theatre through literature.

Partial, or sometimes even total avoidance of getting through to theatre by means of a literary work began in our present time and developed with the tide of so called 'New Theatre' in the 1960's. Alongside the conception of 'collective creation' or 'writing on the stage' the reduction of words was one of the basic elements of this theatrical formula or, going even further, the outlook of theatre which aimed at maximum contact between actor and spectator.

The work of authors from this particular generation fulfilled its role and died out in its initial form. The Laboratory Theatre, directed by Jerzy Grotowski, Living Theatre or Open Theatre belong to the past. However, the idea itself, while undergoing many changes, has survived until now, although in many different forms, such as Eugenio Barba's Odin Teatret as one example and Włodzimierz Staniewski's Theatrical

Association Gardzienice as another. Both the metaphysical theatrical covens of young Poles and the masterly demonstrations of Barba's actors emanating from Grotowski's technique, attempt to make direct contact between actor and spectator by touching the most intimate spheres, using words only partly as an instrument of communication. A man stands face to face with another man, and what is human becomes more important than what is theatrical.

In a different category, among the scenes which touch the imagination and sensibility of the international audience over and above words, may be included a type of performance called 'artist's theatre'. Let us examine two diametrically opposed examples. One is Józef Szajna's Studio Theatre in Warsaw with his famous performances *Replika*, *Dante* and *Cervantes*, the other, Tadeusz Kantor's Cracow theatre called *Cricot 2*. Apart from the obvious differences of these two theatres, Szajna and Kantor meet on one common ground: intellectual dialogue and emotional union with the spectator.

All these experiments with extra-verbal theatre suit our epoch perfectly. They contrive to break through the language barriers of an international audience. An example is *Grand Prix* of the Theatre of Nations at Nancy for Janusz Wisniewski's *Panopticum a'la Madame Tussaud*, *The End of Europe* in 1984 and in Baltimore for Ivan Marko's *Miraculous Mandarin* in 1986. The work of other authors also provides much interest at these and other festivals and on tours abroad. Among them are an excellent young Belgian, Jan Fabre, Mike Figgis from England, a Finn, Jorma Uotinen and a Belgian group, *Epigonenteater*. Their dissimilarity — aesthetical, ideological, intellectual — stresses the advance in international theatre and manifests the creative potency of succeeding generations and inheritors of the 'New Theatre'.

A different situation, of great value and importance, concerns theatre which is in the middle of the two opposing institutions — the literary and the extra-verbal theatre. Arianne Mnouchkine in Théâtre du Soleil plays Shakespeare using the tradition of *Commedia dell'arte* and scenic conventions of the Far East. Tadashi Suzuki in Theatre of Toga creates *Klytemnestra* according to Aeschylus' myth utilizing the classic order of Japanese theatre and the aesthetics and problems of the West. Peter Brook presents *Mahabharata* with a group of international actors. All these works are extremely relevant to our age.

A difficult problem is to reconcile the national theatre, with its sources in national and cultural tradition, to world theatre. We may omit cases when a performance charms the audience by its exoticism or grace. The relationship with such a spectacle is purely perfunctory. The real responses of an international audience are possible only through performances of the highest quality.

These cases are not isolated examples. In the 60's a Polish stage director, Kazimierz Dejmek, achieved an international success and not only at the Theatre of Nations in Paris. Dejmek transfers the Polish theatre of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, based on the Old Polish dramaturgy,

preserving sentimentality and humour. The British audience, in most cases knowing only the summary of Mickiewicz's *Forefather's Eve*, accepted Konrad Swinarski's setting of the play from the Sary Theatre in Cracow during the World Theatre Season in London in the 70's. Swinarski managed to convey the atmosphere and meaning of the poetical, romantic masterpiece in his 'total theatre'. The Scottish Theatre Company performing *Ane Satyre of the Three Estaites* by David Lyndsay, managed to win over the audience in Warsaw. The staging of Giorgio Strehler's *The Servant of two Masters* or *Il campiello* by Goldoni, drawn from the sources of Italian *Commedia dell'arte*, have entered the theatrical canons of the countries where the *Piccolo Teatro di Milano* is performed. Of course, the problems of language and national style in international theatrical communication exist and will continue to exist. None-the-less, the above examples prove that the barriers are not impassable.

It must be stressed — and it is the primary aesthetical and critical consequence of the present entanglement of national theatres with the world's stage — that for the international audience in Hungarian, American or Japanese theatres the strongest impact is likely to be made by what is purely theatrical. Moreover, this proves that in our era of civilisation in which so much is visual, theatre is an art which carries a particular role in building non-linguistic bridges for understanding among people and nations.

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THE NET BOOK AGREEMENT

by Alec Samuels

GENERALLY the manufacturer cannot fix the price at which the wholesaler and retailer sells a product (though he may try by means of a recommended retail price — RRP). In a free market resale price maintenance Book Price maintenance (RPM) has no place. Competition and the play of market forces gives the consumer the benefit of choice in quality, service, price — whatever is of importance to him. Hypermarket, discount house, departmental store, corner shop — the choice is his. But not for books. Under the Net Book Agreement (NBA), dating from 1899 upheld by the Restrictive Practices Court in 1962, the publisher may fix the price of the book, and does. The bookseller has to sell at that price. Is this in the public interest?

The grumbles of the consumer, or would-be consumer, are well-known. The book is very expensive. It will not be reduced in price for the foreseeable future, if ever. A 'sale' is rare. So he does not buy. Perhaps there will be a paperback edition later? By then his interests may have changed. So he does not buy. Apparently the trade would rather not sell it than sell it at a reduced or competitive price. Or the book is not in stock, despite the Sunday reviews and the television series and the radio discussions. The ordered book takes seemingly ages to arrive. Modern technology seems to have had little, if any, discernible effect. The buying impulse goes. The consumer does not buy.

The publisher even increases the price of some books, which greatly irritates the public. The bookseller even increases the price in such cases on existing stock, not only future stock.

The potential market for books must be enormous. Many people do not buy books at all. Many people do not go into bookshops, or rarely. Many people find the lack of knowledge and lack of helpfulness on the part of the staff in bookshops disappointing. Books are perceived as expensive, luxury, elite, up-market.

The book trade has its troubles, many self-inflicted; old-fashioned methods of production and advertising and distribution and absurdly high wages for printers, limited runs, high prices, limited sales.

The big booksellers, the nationals, the multiples, get a 45 per cent discount from the publishers because of bulk buying, whereas the small booksellers get 35 per cent, and the big booksellers keep the extra profit. It cannot be passed on to the consumer.

The trade itself tries to get round the NBA. There is the annual national book sale, with many books at half price. The bookseller will treat a new book as second-hand if it has lain on the shelf for some time and become slightly 'shop-soiled', in order not to lose a customer. The publisher will remainder a book when he printed too many, it is moving very slowly, and it is not of very good quality.

The justifications for upholding NBA in 1962 were that in a free market

there would be price-cutting, fewer booksellers, worse service, fewer titles, booksellers and libraries obtaining bigger discounts, authors obtaining bigger royalties, everything combining to lead to higher prices

These were the kinds of arguments used when resale price maintenance was abolished in 1964. The doom and gloom then prophesied for the business world and the consumer has not come to pass. Certainly, there have been changes but on balance the consumer has benefitted from competition and choice.

The advantages of a free market in books would be very considerable.

Prices would soon find their level. The public quickly make it apparent how much they are prepared to pay. The trade would become much more price-sensitive. A larger turnover on a smaller profit margin nearly always yields better gross and net profits than a smaller turnover on a large margin.

Cross-subsidisation would go, but why should one consumer be compelled to subsidise another?

Booksellers could develop adventurous marketing policies. Publishers could give incentive discounts. People love bargains. They would be attracted to a particular shop. They would buy additional books whilst they were there. Books could be attractively produced and presented and marketed. The energetic and efficient bookseller would have incentive and would benefit from increased turnover and economies of scale.

The small specialist bookseller would survive. His customer is likely to be knowledgeable and loyal and not too much influenced by price. The small specialist bookseller tends to be up-market, to concentrate upon specialist books, and anyway to rely to a considerable degree on back stock, i.e. second-hand stock. It would be in the interests of the publishers to keep open as many outlets as possible, because a lot of book-buying is opportunity and impulse.

If the public want the small specialist bookseller they will say so by their actions, and they will have to pay the going rate. If the public do not want the small specialist bookseller, then so be it.

The public would make their likes and dislikes known. There might be fewer titles, which might be no bad thing. There might be more titles, and there would be more titles if more people wanted books and responded to bargain offers.

Libraries would use their buying power to obtain bigger discounts, which would enable them to buy more books, which would benefit the public. Availability of a book in a library not infrequently leads the reader to buy his own copy.

We live in a competitive economy. It is the key to survival, regeneration, success and prosperity and advantage for the consumer. Books do have unique characteristics; but they are not all that different. They are market commodities. Let us get rid of the Net Book Agreement.

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ANTHONY POWELL: A DANCE TO MOZART'S MUSIC OF TIME

by Donald Williams Bruce

ONE might suppose that one's last sight of the *femme fatale* as a literary type is when Zuleika Dobson, having eliminated the undergraduates of Oxford, looks up the times of the trains to Cambridge¹ Not long before his death Max Beerbohm wrote to assure me that the invention of Zuleika was only a frolic of his.

I am less literary than you suppose. The idea of Zuleika occurred to me without thought of Dolores or Salomé I had merely heard of some woman of whom, in the Second Empire, it is reputed that no fewer than four men had committed suicide on her account I thought, frivolously, 'Why only four?'²

In spite of Max Beerbohm's prolonged jest, the *femme fatale* survived, to re-emerge in the fiction of a writer akin to Beerbohm in his choiceness of language, his mischief and his love of protracted anecdote Anthony Powell Powell's Pamela Flitton is more sinister than Zuleika Dobson, who wipes out the youth of Oxford with such quaint simplicity She is almost a Websterian figure Constant Lambert, the original of Moreland in *The Music of Time*, was, in Powell's own words, 'a great fan of Webster, Tourneur et al' and 'perhaps had an influence on my first reading them'³

Pamela Flitton surfaces in *The Music of Time*, from what former impudicities we do not know, to spread disaster among her casual lovers during the last war⁴ A Polish major is disgraced Two officers of the Royal Air Force are court-martialled A senior Civil Servant is demoted. She nearly precipitates a strike in the docks (*The Military Philosophers* 72-4) She taunts Peter Templar into volunteering for an escapade in the Balkans during which he is killed (M P 77 & 82; *Books Do Furnish a Room* 85) She hazards the life of Szymanski on a similar venture, although he is wily enough to extricate himself (M P 189). The narrator, Nick Jenkins, comments on her smile as she maliciously enquires about Szymanski 'it was possible to guess at some of her powers should she decide to make a victim of a man' (M P. 126) She smiles, as it happens, at the thought of Szymanski's peril.

The roll-call of Pamela's lovers is unfurled like Leperello's account of those of Don Giovanni, whose domain she contests. Before the war ends there are three more whose names are known Bob Duport, twenty-one years or so older than Pamela, says, 'I only stuffed her once, against a shed in the back parts of Cairo airport, but eventually I could see she might drive you round the bend, if she really decided to . . . That girl gets a hold on people' (M P. 190) Milton Wisebite, her step-cousin, boasts of enjoying with her 'a brief moment of intimacy . . . the high peak of romance in his life' (M P. 71-2). If he is let off lightly, it is because his uncle, Harrison Wisebite, has taken the place of Pamela's hated father. Pamela parts with Odo Stevens when she slaps his face before walking out into an air-raid 'She's cross all the time', Stevens remarks 'Bloody cross. Chronic state. Thrives on it.' Nick Jenkins wonders if Stevens is

making light of his perception that Pamela 'was a woman whose sexual disposition was vested in rage and perversity' (M.P. 128)

Her private hostilities do not cease with the war. She deserts her husband, Kenneth Widmerpool, for the author Xavier Trapnel, whose novel, upon which he has staked his future, she then destroys. Having returned to her husband, she makes him wait outside while she couples with a senior pupil at his old school (B D F R. 237-8). From what one learns later one surmises that Widmerpool would have been less downcast if he had been able to witness the encounter.

Ever in pursuit of the *Zeitgeist*, Pamela becomes the mistress, in swift succession, of 'an ambitious journalist', 'a fashionable don', two senior officers at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a diplomat in the Far East, a delegate to the Trade Unions' Congress and a Spanish bullfighter' again causing as much dissension as she can. The military commanders quarrel; the embassy is turned upside-down; the Trade Unions' Congress is disrupted, Ada Quiggin is publicly slandered for telling stories about the bullfighter and his successor, a 'basket-ball player twice his size' (*Temporary Kings* 37 & 165). Pamela recruits all these and other lovers, plus a husband, by her late thirties. Such a record of licentiousness would have been remarkable, even for a man, during that decorous period when, as Nick's elderly fellow-officer Borrit ponders, 'I've never had a free poke in my life. Subject doesn't seem to arise when you're talking to a respectable woman' (M.P. 34). Pamela openly accuses Widmerpool of voyeurism, sexual perversion and spying for the Russians (T.K. 262-3). As Dicky Umfraville puts it, 'Giving men hell is what Miss Flitton likes' (M.P. 74). In a recent letter Anthony Powell amusingly described Pamela as 'a professional hell-raiser'⁵.

Her principal method of 'giving men hell' is to attract them by a challenging display of sexuality in appearance and speech, only to induce impotence in them by her disconcertingly frigid demeanour once she is, readily enough, intimate with them: intimate, that is, if they can bear her 'unvarying technique of silence, followed by violence' (M.P. 74). Nick Jenkins is puzzled by her:

One of the paradoxes about Pamela was a sexuality, in one sense almost laughably ostentatious, the first thing you noticed about her, in another, something equally connected with sex that seemed reluctant, extorted, a possession she herself utterly refused to share with anyone (T.K. 81).

Her physical provocation is stressed

White trousers, thin as gauze, stretched skintight across elegantly compact small haunches, challengingly exhibited, yet neatly formed, hard, pointed breasts, no less contentious and small compassed, under a shirt patterned in crimson and peacock blue, stuck out like delicately shaped bosses of a shield (T.K. 82).

Mrs Erdleigh, the astrologer in whose utterances Nick Jenkins at least half-believes, discerns Pamela's 'unwillingness to give herself'. Odo Stevens agrees with Mrs Erdleigh. 'I understand her unwillingness to give herself. In fact, I'm quite an expert on the subject' (M.P. 136).

Like Spenser's enchantress Acrasia, 'she thrild/Fraile harts, yet quenched not'⁶. Pamela taunts her lovers into feeling ashamed of the impotence she has induced. She tells Odo Stevens, 'You're pathetic as a

lover No good at all You ought to see a doctor' (M P 135) During a quarrel with Stevens at a night-club, she calls out to the people at the next table that he is impotent (T K 259). As the womanising artist Ralph Barnby — next to Moreland, Nick Jenkins's chief mentor — reflects, there is 'a boomerang effect' in such an accusation (T K. 259) Xavier Trapnel complains, 'Not every man can stand what's entailed... It's when you have her She wants it all the time, yet doesn't want it. She goes rigid like a corpse. Every grind's a nightmare It's all the time, and always the same' (B D F R 225) He adds that Widmerpool 'only tried a couple of times Gave it up as a bad job' (B D F R 226). By the same means she makes Peter Templar feel 'he was no good any more' (M.P 82) Of the French Marxist politician, Léon-Joseph Ferrand-Sénéschal, Pamela herself remarks, 'Léon-Joseph croaked in bed with me... a blubber-lipped Frenchman, who couldn't do it, then popped off' (T K 261-2) Coarsely she expresses her jealousy of the novelist Ada Quiggin's success with Pamela's former lover, the American film-producer, Louis Globor 'Did he take Ada back to screw her — if he can still manage that, or can't she face a man any longer?' (T.K 165)

Russell Gwinnett, Trapnel's biographer, twice refers to Pamela, before he has met her, as 'the castrating girl' (T K 27 & 36) Gwinnett becomes Pamela's last lover although, fore-warned by Trapnel's experiences, he resists her blunt advances, even to the extent of turning her out naked from the bedroom he rents in the house of Trapnel's friend, Lindsay Bagshaw (T K 192-4) Gwinnett's final coition with Pamela, in a squalid hotel frequented by Trapnel near St Pancras Station, has all the *sfumato*, all the blurriness around the edges, of central incidents in the novels of E M Forster: the landslip near Florence in *A Room with a View*; Helen Schlegel's seduction in *Howard's End*, the panic in the Malabar Caves in *A Passage to India* Nick Jenkins merely alludes to the 'down-at-heel hostelry in the St Pancras neighbourhood' where Gwinnett 'had spent the night — her last — with Pamela Widmerpool' (*Hearing Secret Harmonies* 100).

Gibson Delavacquerie, the advertising agent who eventually marries Jean Templar's daughter, makes the hideous suggestion that Pamela killed herself there to be 'available to the necrophilic professor', Gwinnett, who is certainly a Websterian figure (H S H 75) Nick Jenkins clearly states that Pamela took a separate room in the same hotel as Gwinnett, although this does not preclude the possibility that Gwinnett briefly and reluctantly admitted her to his own room and bed before she returned to her own room (H S H 41) Hilary Spurling, in her exact and helpful *Handbook to Anthony Powell's Music of Time*, states that Pamela died in bed with Gwinnett at his hotel⁷. I wondered if, for once, Hilary Spurling had gone wrong In answer to my enquiry, Anthony Powell pointed out that Nick Jenkins, as narrator, is not omniscient, and relies on information provided by Widmerpool and the press⁸

Readers of Anthony Powell's autobiography, *To Keep the Ball Rolling*, will have noticed many correspondences between his career and that of

Nick Jenkins, although I do not suggest that Anthony Powell ever encountered a Pamela Flitton. It may be surmised that, like Evelyn Waugh, Powell often used his own experiences as what Zola called a spring-board for a starry leap, although Waugh's characters are less kindly developed. They subsist on Waugh's harsh wit and seldom matched satirical force. Powell's characters, more everyday, have the 'roundness' E. M. Forster found so desirable.⁹ Powell's characters are life-studies, not only in inception, but through and through. Pamela's depravities have a more distinct psychological impetus than those of Lady Metroland or Brenda Last. Yet, even if we identify Anthony Powell as author of *A Dance to the Music of Time* with its narrator, Nick Jenkins, we must accept the same limitations. An author, in his speculations on his own experiences, is as little omniscient, is as reliant on hearsay, as his fictitious narrator. Anthony Powell explains:

Pamela Flitton and Gwinnett took separate rooms in the hotel for their relationship to be consummated. Exactly why that was I cannot recall, but I do remember giving some thought to this at the time. I suspect that, if they had actually been in the same room and bed, the scandal would have been appreciably greater. As it was, he might have visited her, then she had taken an overdose later, as if by accident, just to get to sleep. This seems to be adequate explanation, but I could not swear to it.¹⁰

Pamela, then, would not have died in Gwinnett's arms. Louis Globber had been supplying her with narcotics (T.K. 165). Miserable in her triumph, since Gwinnett appears to be the only man she has ever fully responded to, she takes too many of them, either by accident or by intention. Gwinnett has long resisted her and will soon be on his chilly way. As Xavier Trapnel's biographer who has carefully relived Trapnel's experiences, he is Trapnel's stony ghost, the Commendatore with his female Don Giovanni — his Donna Giovanna — in an icy hand.

There may, in the beginning, be expedient reasons why Pamela pursues Gwinnett. Ada Quiggin asserts that Pamela longs for fame. 'Nobody's ever heard of her. She doesn't care for that' (T.K. 150). She promises to marry Louis Globber if he makes a film based on her version of Trapnel's novel, which she destroyed after Trapnel resisted the changes in it she wished him to make (T.K. 149-150, B.D.F.R. 212-3). She also is to play, without acting experience, the leading part in the film (T.K. 149). Especially after Globber abandons both the film and herself, it becomes important to take the centre of the stage in Gwinnett's biography of Trapnel. There is, no doubt, an admixture of vanity in her throwing herself at Gwinnett. In the end she achieves a piteous notoriety rather than fame.

For Gwinnett she makes an exception in her taste for lovers far older than she. Duport, Templer, Widmerpool, Ferrand-Sénéchal and Globber all belong to Nick's generation, about twenty years earlier than Pamela's. Stevens and Trapnel appear to be her seniors by ten years or so. Her un-named lovers are mostly middle-aged. Norah Tolland discerns that Pamela needs 'a father-figure', but does not understand that it is in order to punish him (M.P. 199). Pamela prefers older men, 'possibly because of their potentiality of deeper suffering' — once pinioned, the middle-aged could be made to writhe almost indefinitely' (M.P. 74).

She relishes Widmerpool's sufferings after she has deserted him for Trapnel, and eagerly asks Nick for every detail of them 'there could be no doubt she derived some sort of sensual satisfaction in dwelling on what had happened' (B D F.R. 195) Widmerpool, as her husband, is most exposed to her tantalising and chilling demeanour (her 'blend of frigidity and insatiable desire', as Trapnel puts it) and simply gives up trying to satisfy her (T.K. 37) Widmerpool is apportioned a large measure of her sullenness, 'outward expression, no doubt, of an inner sexual condition' and of her violence, particularly of her violence, both before and after marriage (T.K. 78; M P 209 *et seq.*, T.K. 109-11).

In Widmerpool — arrogant in power, slavish in defeat — Pamela finds a ready victim, since his own nature allows her to crush him His benignity when, as Chancellor of one of the new Universities of the 1960s, he has paint hurled at him by the Quiggin twins harks back more than forty years to when, as a schoolboy, he accidentally receives, with humility and even pleasure, a rotten banana, thrown by the Captain of the Eleven, in his face (H S H 46 & *A Question of Upbringing* 11-12) Nick Jenkins suggests that such occasions were 'possibly always sexually gratifying' to Widmerpool (H S H 47). His seeking out Pamela and Trapnel when they have run away together may be regarded as a piece of self-laceration (B D F.R. 194 ff) During his final prase as a middle-aged member of a pseudo-mystical cult run by youngsters (which is in itself an act of prostration on his part) he seeks humiliation As his former subordinate, the drunken Bithel, who has joined the same cult, exclaims, 'Never knew such a man for penances' (H S H 268) One of Widmerpool's penances is to crouch at the feet of Sir Bertram Akworth, whose expulsion from their old school he had, many years previously, secured by spying on Akworth's pederastic approaches to Peter Templar (H S H. 229-30) Spying on people who are enjoying themselves according to their own bent, or preparing to do so, when the spy has neither the actuality nor the prospect of such enjoyment, may be regarded as a form of self-punishment and even of self-abasement, since the spy is not a participant but a shame-faced witness an unwanted appendage to what is taking place

During his estrangement from Pamela, Widmerpool spends a night in a Parisian brothel with his Stalinist crony, Ferrand- Sénéschal. Lindsay Bagshaw, who has been told about Ferrand-Sénéschal's sexual tastes, but pretends to be above remembering them in detail, speculates on their indulgences there: masochistic rituals, perhaps, and peering through two-way mirrors 'He may have given Kenneth some ideas' (T K 14) If Ferrand-Sénéschal gave Widmerpool some ideas, Widmerpool certainly carried them further Pamela takes up the tale as the guests depart from a charity performance of Mozart's *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (an opera appropriate to Powell's story, since so many of the women in *The Music of Time* are abducted or elope from their seraglios)

Already vexed by Globber, who has rejected her (and her prospect of fame in the film of Trapnel's novel), she irrationally rounds on Widmerpool She accuses him of watching behind the curtains as Ferrand-

Sénéschal died in bed with her.

You might think that was enough. Watching your wife being screwed. Naturally it wasn't the first time. It was just the first time with a blubber-lipped Frenchman, who couldn't do it, then popped off. Of course he had arranged it all with Léon-Joseph beforehand—except the popping-off—and in some ways it made things easier to have two of us to explain to the hotel people that Monsieur Ferrand-Sénéschal had just passed away while we were visiting him (T K 261-2)

Widmerpool was watching to see whether Ferrand-Sénéschal would have an effect on Pamela's coldness, but Ferrand-Sénéschal also failed, before succumbing to a heart-attack.

In *Don Giovanni* the three women the Don has most recently betrayed—Elvira, Anna and Zerlina—join in an outcry against the perfidy and fickleness of the male sex, as represented by himself. They have to wait for the ghost of the Commendatore to avenge them. The women of *The Music of Time* are less constrained. Pamela Flitton, Priscilla Tolland and Jean Templer revenge themselves upon male promiscuity by usurping the Don's part themselves. Commenting on Priscilla's treatment of her adulterous lover, Odo Stevens, Nick asks himself, 'Was her need—the need of certain women—to make men unhappy? There was something of the kind in her face' (*The Soldier's Art* 146). Jean Templer has the same vengeful promiscuity as Pamela Flitton, except that it is directed against a libertine husband rather than a libertine father.

Jean has all Pamela's abruptness, abandon and inner antagonism to men. She spitefully chooses to tell her husband (at that time, Bob Duport) and her lover, Nick Jenkins himself, of her liaisons (with Stripling and Brent) when she is in bed with them or just out of it (*The Acceptance World* 132 & K O 179). Nick later considers Jean Templer's intrigue with him appropriate to the chapter on the deceits and treacheries of women in his uncle's copy of *The Perfumed Garden*, which he presents to Bob Duport (*The Kindly Ones* 181-2). He consoles himself for Brent's success with Jean by recalling a saying by Moreland about 'the attraction exercised over women by men to whom they can feel complete superiority' (K O. 172). How Pamela Flitton seeks this 'superiority' has already been seen.

Jean Templer's adultery with Stripling is over by the time of her adultery with Nick Jenkins, but she has already begun a third adultery with Brent. Nick only shares her. She tells him about Stripling but not about Brent: in fact, goes out of her way to hide from Nick her first meeting with Brent (*The Valley of Bones* 129). When Jean welcomes Nick to her flat at Rutland Gate, after considerable delay, there is the grim possibility that she is naked because Nick's rival has just left her, not through the front door (A W 137). In answer to this speculation, Anthony Powell replied that he saw it as 'an interesting possibility', but improbable. He added with characteristic diffidence that, 'with the passing of the years, *Dance* seems more than ever a book written by someone else, and I can't always remember details about the narrative'. He warned me that, as in the account of Pamela Flitton's death, 'the Narrator is as fallible as anyone else in what he thinks happens in life'.¹¹ The narrator's

fallibility, of course, adds a further subtlety to *A Dance to the Music of Time*. As Anthony Powell wrote in a later letter, 'the Narrator knew no more than what appeared in public'.¹²

Pamela Flitton's depravities are more inherent than those of, say, Wilde's Salomé, Wedekind's Lulu (both creatures of transient impulses) or Beerbohm's absurd Zuleika. Pamela is too contemptuous of others to make use of Jean's 'deceit and treachery'. She merely destroys those who, after her usually rude and harsh defiance, closely approach her. Early in the sequence the narrator refers to her 'usual look of hatred and despair' (M P 65). Only once does she pursue a man — Gwinnett — and she does so with a clumsiness that repels him and so drives her to a final self-destructive gesture of disdain.

Pamela's father, Captain Cosmo Flitton, is a drunken colonial gambler, reputedly dishonest in his commercial dealings with men and certainly faithless in his treatment of women (V B 146 & M.P. 58). He is described as 'a one-armed criminal' by Peter Templar, 'a real swine' by Dicky Umfraville and, more gently, as 'that not very nice man with one arm' by Lady Warminster (Q U 69, B D F R. 92 & *Casanova's Chinese Restaurant* 87). He left his wife, Flavia, when Pamela was 'not much more than a baby', deserting Flavia for Lord Vowchurch's daughter, whom he later deserted too (M.P. 58). The neurasthenic Flavia soon married another drunkard, Harrison Wisebite, before becoming the mistress of Robert Tolland, far younger than herself (V B. 146).

Pamela, the only child of divorced parents indifferent to her, and unprotected by divorced grandparents equally preoccupied with their own amatory concerns, becomes, in her mother's words, 'utterly wilful'. One person, her uncle, Charles Stringham, takes an interest in her. Flavia continues, in her deplorable jargon:

When she was a little girl she fell madly in love with Charles — you know the way children do — at the time he was drinking too much. The amount he was drinking in those days was terrible. Pam didn't often see him because of that. Still, Charles was always fond of her, very nice to her, whenever he came to see us, which wasn't often (H S H 204).

Pamela tells Nick Jenkins that she and Charles Stringham 'were close when I was quite a child' (M P 59). Stringham, her surrogate father, is taken away from her by his marriage to Lady Peggy Stepney, at which, aged about seven, she is obliged to act as bridesmaid. She vomits into the font. Some nearby busybody comments, 'That child's a fiend' (*A Buyer's Market* 227).

At the end of a career of alcoholic waste, Stringham dies in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp after the fall of Singapore in 1942 (M P 204). About eighteen years after Stringham's marriage, Pamela is present at the funeral of Alfred Tolland, the Socialist Earl of Warminster, and brother of her mother's former lover, at Thrubworth Church. One does not suppose Pamela to have been a regular church-goer. She is herself in no way connected with the Earl of Warminster and has only been brought to the funeral by her husband, Widmerpool, who is attending it out of self-interest. Her nausea in the unfamiliar environment of the

church may be accounted for by its reminder of the shocking experience she underwent, in another church, when she lost sight of her substitute father, Stringham. That a funeral is taking place in surroundings already distressing to her reminds her of her utter loss of Stringham by his death. Her feelings are compounded by her disgusted knowledge that Widmerpool, regarding her uncle as a dispensable weakling, sent him to his death in the Far East (S.A. 215). Once again Pamela vomits, this time into a pseudo-Chinese vase at Thruworth Park (B.D.F.R. 85).

Stringham has left her all his possessions, including his South African Gold shares and his drawing by Modigliani. Upon Pamela's death they become Widmerpool's property. The drawing by Modigliani falls into even baser hands: those of Leslie ('Scorpio') Murtlock, a petty but vicious criminal who later runs the weird cult which Widmerpool joins. After Widmerpool's own death the drawing is procured by Barnaby Henderson, dealer in works of art and Murtlock's erstwhile catamite (H.S.H. 270). Pamela, in spite of her many coitions with different men, never becomes pregnant¹³. Her life leaves no mark, except in the memory of Nick Jenkins.

'Webster is always a favourite of mine', says Hugh Moreland (C.C.R. 40). One suspects he is a favourite of Anthony Powell himself, John Webster and his fellow Senecan Cyril Tourneur (T.K. 67, H.S.H. 71, 76, 167 & 240). Pamela, like Vittoria Corombona, is as fatal to herself as to others: from her first appearance in *The Music of Time*, raven-haired, with 'a dead white complexion' in her early twenties to her self-induced end; already grey-haired in her late thirties.

Emotional warmth in her was directed only towards the dead, men who had played some part in her life, but were no more there to do so (T.K. 102).

Her successes become her desolating regrets.

NOTES

- 1 Max Beerbohm *Zuleika Dobson*, London, 1947, p.252
- 2 Max Beerbohm Letter to the author, 19 November 1954. Extract published in *The Cornhill Magazine*, No. 1,025 (Centenary Issue), Autumn 1960, p.359
- 3 Anthony Powell Letter to the author, 24 July 1987. The letter confirms that 'Moreland is modelled on Constant Lambert', one of Powell's closest friends, who arranged the music for Powell's wedding to Lady Violet Pakenham. Although *A Dance to the Music of Time* is more than a *roman à clef*, its links with Powell's autobiography, *To Keep the Ball Rolling*, suggest that at least some of the characters in *The Music of Time* were derived from the novelist's acquaintance. Lindsay Bagshaw, for example, may be, in part, a portrait of Malcolm Muggeridge. Powell expresses a slight and justified irritation at the guess that the Tollands are the Pakenhams (Anthony Powell *To Keep the Ball Rolling*, London, 1976-82, vol. III, p.13). On the other hand, he concedes that 'in Isobel Tolland faint nuances (of which I am myself probably unaware), identify her with Lady Violet, (*ibid.*, vol. III, p.14). Powell acknowledges that he has drawn three Field-Marshal's from life in the military chapters of *The Music of Time*. Slim, Alanbrooke and Montgomery (*ibid.*, vol. III, p.172). With 'some liberties' taken, J. Maclaren-Ross, a novelist of Scottish-Cuban descent, contributed to the characterisation of X. Trapnel (*ibid.*, vol. IV, p.6). Charles Stringham is akin in personality and appearance to Alfred Duggan, prankster and 'spectacular drunk', the stepson of Lord Curzon. He describes both Stringham and Duggan as resembling Alexander the Great in a painting by Veronese in the National Gallery (*ibid.*, vol. I, p.164). Adrian Daintrey, who sketched Powell several times without flattery and even with derision, served,

like Barnby, as a camouflage artist during the last war. Also like Barnby, he was 'a notable admirer of women in their many forms of attraction'.

There may be a trace of Maurice Bowra in Sillery. Unlike his fellows, Bowra entertained undergraduates, although more lavishly than Sillery, with dinners and champagne rather than rock-buns. Sillery is more discreet than the often foul-mouthed but hypersensitive homosexual, Bowra—second Baron de Charlus—but both regard 'as absolutely natural, open snobbishness, success worship, personal vendettas, unprovoked malice' despite their political divergences (*ibid.*, vol. I, p. 180). The revelation all Powell's admirers wait for is that of the original of Widmerpool, but the major characters in *The Music of Time*, if not wholly imaginary, are likely to be intricate amalgamations of several people.

- 4 Anthony Powell *A Dance to the Music of Time*, London, 1951-75

i *A Question of Upbringing* (Q U), 1951

ii *A Buyer's Market* (B M), 1952.

iii *The Acceptance World* (A W), 1955

iv *At Lady Molly's* (L M), 1957

v *Casanova's Chinese Restaurant* (C C R), 1960.

vi *The Kindly Ones* (K O), 1962

vii *The Valley of Bones* (V B), 1964

viii *The Soldier's Art* (S A), 1966

ix *The Military Philosophers* (M P), 1968.

x *Books Do Furnish a Room* (B D F R), 1971

xi *Temporary Kings* (T K), 1973

xii *Hearing Secret Harmonies* (H S H), 1975

References in the text of this article are given by abbreviation and page-number to the editions cited above

- 5 Anthony Powell Letter to the author, 24 July 1987. Borrit's lamentation is aligned to a passage in Powell's autobiography 'One heard stories of debts who could be got to bed, but I should have thought such emancipation belonged, in general, to a somewhat later period. Dances were not an easy jumping-off point for closer intimacies' (*To Keep the Ball Rolling*, vol. II, p. 35).
- 6 Edmund Spenser *The Faerie Queene*, ed. A. C. Hamilton, London, 1977, p. 296
- 7 Hilary Spurling *Handbook to Powell's 'Music of Time'*, London, 1977, p. 66
- 8 Anthony Powell Letter to the author, 24 July 1987.
- 9 E. M. Forster *Aspects of the Novel*, ed. Oliver Stallybrass, London, 1974, pp. 50 ff.
- 10 Anthony Powell Letter to the author, 24 July 1987
- 11 *ibid.*
- 12 Anthony Powell Letter to the author, 15 August 1987
13. Nick Jenkins mysteriously comments that 'Gwinnett did not disclose whether he had 'known' Pamela's condition before she came to the hotel. The fact is, Gwinnett must have known. Otherwise there would have been no point in Pamela's making a sacrifice of herself' (T K 269). Her physical condition could have been that she was pregnant by Gwinnett, her only lover, so far as Nick knows, during her last year. Her 'sacrifice' of herself and Gwinnett's unborn child would have suited his unpleasant obsession with the sacrifice of Agamemnon's child, Iphigenia, in the picture by Veronese at Dogdene, but Anthony Powell himself discourages any such speculation about Pamela's pregnancy — 'That was not in my mind, merely Pamela Flitton's general state, perhaps the possibility that she had suicide planned. Again I fall back on the fact that the Narrator knew no more than appeared in public. In the same way Pamela might just have taken too many sleeping pills, which happened to bring about her end. It was just a curious concatenation of circumstances which suggested that Pamela, knowing of Gwinnett's necrophil tastes, had made herself available as a final act of love and death. It is extremely difficult to reconstruct exactly what was the picture I conceived step by step more than a dozen years ago, but it all seemed to fall into place, and certainly no one knew precisely what had happened (Anthony Powell Letter to the author 15 August 1987).

CORRESPONDENCE

SOUTH AFRICA — THE NEW REALITIES

Dear Madam.

It is interesting for an active Liberal like myself to read what Alan Beith, our Deputy Leader, said about South Africa in his article in April 1987 (Vol 250, No. 1455) and to see how things have worked out since then

It seems to me that the prospects for a peaceful settlement which will leave SA's powerful economy intact have improved whilst the chances for success of the African National Congress's combination of violence plus punitive sanctions have diminished

On the 'peace front', President Botha has released the veteran ANC leader, Govan Mbeki, in a move widely seen as a trial run for the release later of Messrs. Sisulu and Mandela. Though he may have disappointed some people by failing to abolish the Group Areas Act, under which black South Africans were excluded from so called 'white residential areas', he has softened the application of the Act by allowing 'grey areas', in which all races reside, to continue and by permitting Local Authorities to declare themselves 'grey' if they wish. The President has also met the Zulu Leader Mangasuthu Buthelezi and allowed a small start to be made in black/white co-operation in Natal/Kwazulu. Lastly Mr Botha has continued to call for black leaders to join his National Council and discuss the shape of a future South Africa in which power will be shared at the highest levels. So one could say that there is even less reason than there was in April to belittle Mr Botha's reforms or to doubt his determination to continue them.

When we look at the 'war front' things have not gone very well lately for the ANC and its friends. Not only have Front Line States like Zimbabwe and Zambia decided that it would be economic suicide for them to impose Sanctions against SA, they have been compelled to ask for South African help in keeping their railways going. Over in Angola and Namibia, though SA's legal and moral standing may be questionable, the fact is that UNITA and the SADF have defeated a powerful offensive by SWAPO and the Angolan Army, which was heavily supported by Cuba and Russia. Inside SA itself there is fairly convincing evidence that the 'comrades' have lost control of most of the black cities, whilst the ANC freedom fighters raiding into SA from the north appear to be having scant success.

What lessons are to be learnt from this turnabout in the fortunes of the two sides? Surely they are that, however heroically they may fight and however morally justified they may be in their struggle, the ANC cannot expect to overthrow the Pretoria Government by force for several decades; and also that black South Africans really do now have an opportunity to negotiate a New Deal in SA, which will provide an end to white domination, genuine power-sharing and still leave the SA economy,

so essential in maintaining living standards throughout Southern Africa, undamaged.

There are signs that the ANC leaders themselves are becoming disenchanted with their 'armed struggle' and the damage it could do to SA's mines, factories and farms. Oliver Tambo himself is reported to have said that the ANC does not want 'to inherit a desert'

So it seems to me that the time has come to rethink the attitude of those of us in the political Centre to the whole situation in Southern Africa. We should start by accepting that South Africa is the economic giant of the whole region and a giant which is not going to go away; that if food shortages and economic decline amongst SA's neighbours is to be halted, SA is the economic engine through which this can be achieved; and that it is illogical to try to weaken that engine through Sanctions.

Then we need to face the facts about Sanctions and shed our illusions. Sanctions will not force the South African President to hand control of the country to the ANC. Firstly, because General Magnus Malan's forces control SA fairly easily; secondly, because of the risk that a precipitate handover might result in the same massive white exodus that took place in Angola and Mozambique; and thirdly, because economic war always hits the (black) workers harder and sooner than the (mostly white) managers. It is interesting, too, that black South Africans are starting to recognise that Sanctions will take away their jobs, lower their living standards and may even cause starvation. As a result of this realisation Gallup Polls in SA are showing a majority of blacks against Sanctions. In April last year a survey of 4,500 blacks, 500 Coloureds and 500 Indians found that 75% of blacks 70% of Coloureds and 90% of Indians were against both disinvestment and the boycotting of SA goods.

Alan Berth in his article rightly said that there should be a negotiated solution with concessions by both sides. Surely, now is the time for Liberals and Social Democrats to play the role of the wise and candid friend by telling their friends in the ANC that they should give up a war they cannot win and sit down instead with President Botha to negotiate a power-sharing deal. Not only would such a wise change of policy save lives within SA it would also open the door to peaceful (and profitable) reconciliation between SA and the Front Line States

Yours faithfully,

Dulverton, Somerset

HOWARD FRY

Literary Supplement

THE TREACHERY OF GEORGE BLAKE

George Blake, Superspy H. Montgomery Hyde Constable £12 95

George Blake — a name he did not take until he was 22 — seemed destined by origins and upbringing for more than one allegiance. His father, Albert Behar, was a Sephardic Jew born in Cairo to a rich trading family, who was a naturalized British citizen because Egypt was then under British protection. His mother was Dutch and Lutheran, and he was brought up in Rotterdam, with long family interludes in Egypt. His uncle there was a founder of the Egyptian Communist Party (and was to be assassinated in Paris in 1982 by right-wing extremists).

Thus Behar or Blake spoke English, French, German and Dutch, and had some knowledge of Arabic. As a young man he worked for the Dutch resistance, was with SHAEF as a German interpreter, was trained in Russian at Cambridge, and from 1948 was an Intelligence officer in the Foreign Service. In that year, aged 26, he was posted as a Vice-Consul to Seoul, in a then-still-united Korea. From 1950 to 1953 he was a POW of the Russians and North Koreans. It would come out at his trial in 1961 that his work as a Russian spy began during, and presumably because of, his indoctrination by the Russians from 1951 to 1953. From 1955 to 1959 he was an Intelligence officer in West Germany, and as further evidence of his linguistic skills, he had ten months (1960-61) on a shortened course in Arabic, at the Middle East College for Arabic Studies at Shemlan, in the hills above Beirut. It was during this idyllic interlude that he was summoned home, cross-examined, and arrested on admitting his treason.

It emerged at his trial that over six years or longer he had given the KGB the names of some forty-two agents working for Britain abroad, and photographs of every secret document that crossed his desk. Some of the information he passed on was also deliberately fake. Blake was a double agent. But a number of Russian defectors and potential defectors, themselves traitors, were themselves betrayed to Moscow by Blake. He was given a forty-two year sentence.

Montgomery Hyde's account of Blake's treachery is vividly done, strong in detail, and meticulously researched. He makes of it a tale that has the grip of fiction. He is especially impressive in his description of Blake's imprisonment in Wormwood Scrubs, and of his escape. From this section alone disturbing conclusions can be drawn: far too much freedom to Blake to move around, and too easy contact permitted with like-minded fellow prisoners like Vassall, De Courcy and especially Sean Bourke, who was his main ally in organising the escape, which was funded and abetted by too many CND-ers. Oddly enough, Blake's main problem on reaching Berlin, hidden in a dormobile, was to convince the Russians that he *was* Blake, since they had not organised his escape, they were suspicious that he was yet another agent being planted in their midst. There is no mention here of Vanessa Redgrave's role in the escape but abundant evidence of the number of sympathisers Blake had in

London The Labour Government, and in particular Home Secretary Roy Jenkins come out of this story as appallingly casual and incompetent We have paid a high price for the liberal permissiveness of this noble lord

The conclusion? George Blake, now 65, lives comfortably in Moscow and sees Kim Philby frequently Each, as is the fashion, has a Russian wife who acts as keeper of the house, and of the man George Blake, in his languages and experience, was equipped to be a first-class field operator there were quite a few, similarly gifted, at work in the field in World War II But the penalty he and they paid for their linguistic gifts and cosmopolitan background was that he and they lacked loyalty, since they had never had the luck to acquire it In war, or in any of the crises of decision-making, family and local allegiance, the old school or the honour of the regiment, 'the little local platoon we belong to' are more important in the scales than ability to speak the patois of the streets In war, hot or cold, it is loyalty that counts So that at the top, as 'C', in the vocabulary of the Service, it is wiser to have a less brilliant, less-linguistically-torn, simpler but totally reliable chief In our tortured world, trust not brilliance is the quality that counts, it seems to be as rare nowadays as it is precious

ESMOND WRIGHT

A NOTABLE CHRISTIAN PARTNERSHIP

Better Together Christian Partnership in a Hurt City David Sheppard and Derek Worlock Hodder & Stoughton £12 95.

In the mid-seventies David Sheppard and Derek Worlock were appointed Anglican Bishop and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool respectively Both had come originally from what is often considered as the more comfortable South, but both had worked in the East End of London Since then, they have worked on Merseyside with its City in decline and have addressed themselves to its spiritual and social problems In inner city areas the clergy are the only professional people permanently resident, and so they know the problems from the inside The fact that they worked together is one of the encouraging features of this book It is all so different from the suspicion and tetchiness which characterised the relationship of the two hierarchies even forty years ago These feelings, I think, were more pronounced with the clergy than the laity, and it is possible that the laity will be impatient with the formal steps towards ecumenism which occupy some pages in the early part of the book The theology of baptism became a unifying source, but progress quickened when it was seen that ecumenism was not only about traditional belief and practice, but about the Christian response to the problems of human life Churches have more influence than is often thought and the more united they are, the more effective their witness

Liverpool is an extreme example of a large deprived city No longer is it a transatlantic liner port, it does not face Europe, Britain's biggest trading partner, and the head offices of many well known firms have moved away The result has been large scale unemployment and a run down housing stock The authors have pointed to these problems, which in the tradition of the eighth century prophets it is their duty to do When Bishops draw attention to social grievances they are usually thought to be left wing Neither author is tied to

any political party and they can be equally critical of the Militant Tendency and Conservative Ministers. They speak for groups with little power. 'Getting on one's bike' will not solve the unemployment problem. There are too many community and family loyalties, though many do commute by train to London and the South East. It is development that is required and this is not easy. Disastrous housing policies have compounded problems. Inner city groups have been broken up by sending people to new green field estates with poor maintenance and mistaken allocation policies. Substantial public funding is essential to attract private investment.

David Sheppard and Derek Worlock lead the reader through these problems with clarity and authority. They have broken with the tradition of bitter politics between the Irish immigrants and militant protestantism. There is much splinter group loyalty and an alienated black population, but the situation is not as bad as sometimes described. Religion and football can be unifying as well as occasions of violence. The Liverpool Rates Crisis is described in detail.

The problem of inner cities is a complex one. The book describes Liverpool as the town with a hole in the heart. There is the problem of land values in city centres with the multiplicity of titles. Commuting is now an established but wasteful social practice, which leaves town centres dead at night or lively in the wrong sort of way. No two towns have the same problem but this book has drawn attention to one notable example. It deserves to be widely read.

Towards the end of the book the Bishop and Archbishop speak movingly of their personal lives with their different traditions. David Sheppard speaks of his marriage, and Derek Worlock of the celibacy which gives him a special relationship with the people he is called to serve. This is true but it means too that a Roman Catholic priest cannot know at first hand the responsibility and pain of parenthood.

LAURENCE TANNER

A CLASSIC LIBERAL

Gilbert Murray OM 1866-1957 Duncan Wilson Oxford University Press £25

The two great intellectual changes that divide modern society from the centuries that preceded it are the decline of Christianity and the even more precipitous collapse of the Classics. At one time the study of the Classics formed the outlook of the statesmen, writers, and clergymen who dominated British life. It is well known that Mr Gladstone took refuge from political turmoil in writing about the Greeks and in his attempt to dress up Homer as a proto-Christian. It is less well known that another Victorian Prime Minister, the Tory Lord Derby, would occasionally abandon his love of sport, to work on his translation of Homer.

Gilbert Murray appeared on the scene at the end of this tradition. He was born in Australia where his father, Sir Terrence Murray, had gained both wealth and position. The young Murray was brought to England at the age of eleven by his widowed mother. He achieved great success in his studies at Oxford and became Professor of Greek at Glasgow at the astonishingly early age of 23.

For almost seven decades, Murray's life was dominated by two topics, education and politics. In his study of the Classics Murray saw how much the pedantry of Victorian schoolmasters had done to destroy any appetite for the languages of Greece and Rome. He constantly reminded his students that their true study was not Greek but Greece.

In politics Gilbert Murray remained throughout his life a devoted Liberal. His marriage to Lady Mary Howard, daughter of the Earl of Carlisle, brought him into close contact with what was left of the old Whig tradition. His mother-in-law was a formidable campaigner for a variety of causes. Her first question to him was 'Mr Murray are you a teetotaler?' He was both a teetotaler and a vegetarian. He was a friend of Herbert Asquith (perhaps the last Prime Minister to be devoted to the Classics if not to Teetotalism) and Sir Edward Grey. After the war Murray became prominent in rallying support for the League of Nations. He was Chairman of the League of Nations Union and after the Second World War, which the League had been powerless to prevent, he became a devoted supporter of the United Nations.

One of the most interesting aspects of this biography is the account of how Murray adapted to the decline of Liberalism in the twentieth century. He did not share the attitude of 'guilt' that has done so much to undermine genuine liberalism. When he listened to his son-in-law, Arnold Toynbee's Reith lecture he was 'shocked' because 'He willfully ignored that our Western or Christian Civilization is better than that of Asia or Africa'. By the 1950s he had come to the view that the best way to promote Liberalism was to vote Conservative. 'Nearly all the educated people I meet are Liberal, but vote Conservative'. He concluded with great sadness, 'Rum how right the Liberals are and how extinct'.

The author of this biography, Sir Duncan Wilson, was both a distinguished diplomat and scholar. He was Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. After his death, his wife finished the book. Perhaps it is this joint authorship that makes the portrait of Murray's marriage among the most memorable aspects of this well-written and scholarly biography.

J B B MUNSON

A BORN HISTORIAN

History and Hope The Collected Essays of C V Wedgwood Collins £17.50

Dame Veronica Wedgwood is one of the best known historians of this century. She is also one of the three women who have been awarded the Order of Merit.

Most of the essays in this collection originally appeared in two earlier collections *Velvet Studies* (1946) and *Truth and Opinion* (1960). There are, however, a few later works including one of the best, 'Shakespeare between two Civil Wars' a lecture given in that remarkable institution, the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington in 1964.

The essays in general reflect her two great interests. England in the Seventeenth Century and the role of history in the Twentieth Century. She is perhaps the last in that long line of eloquent historians who have set out to tell a story about the national past and to commemorate great men and heroic deeds. She is, of course, best known for those two delightful volumes *The King's War* and *The King's Peace* which are still the best and certainly the most enjoyable introduction to the English Civil Wars.

'If I was not born a historian' she tells us in a 1946 essay called 'The Velvet Study', 'I was an aspirant at six and a practitioner at twelve'. She quite rightly views the current state or 'grey meanness' of history with concern. 'Fewer and fewer historians' she writes in the Introduction 'seem willing to summarise

for the ordinary reader, who is kept at arm's length or embraced only by the historical novelist or romantic biographer' 'Scholarship' she concludes with a mordant wit, 'digs deep and mines much gold, but very little is put on display to the public' Dame Veronica is far too polite to point out that much of what passes for the results of historical scholarship is nothing but dross dished out to support some current day fad such as 'feminism' or 'anti-racism'

Some of the essays here are quite useful introductions to the causes and consequences of the English Civil Wars, the first of that series of revolutions that have done so much to mould the modern world. One of the persistent themes of her writing is the connection between cultural and political history. In particular she often uses the great poets and dramatists to explain the events of the seventeenth century. She does this with a happy skill at selecting just the right quote to bring a person or idea to life.

There are also some amusing essays on those little by-ways in history that form so much of the charm of the past. For instance, she includes an account of two rather quixotic Quakeresses who set out to convert Egypt in 1659 but landed in Malta and proceeded to preach their new creed. A few essays also reflect her own life and experiences. There is a moving account of her first visit to Paris after the war. Even here she has the ability to present a challenging idea to the reader when she warns that English viewers are too apt to take the 'trappings' of France as the real France whereas she sees a strong sense of Puritanism in the life of that country.

The only complaint with this collection is that some of the essays are really too short. Three pages on Cardinal Richelieu, for example, can undermine the strength of the important essays. This is, however, but a minor quibble about an elegant and instructive book.

RICHARD MULLEN

HORACE WALPOLE'S REPUTATION

Horace Walpole The Critical Heritage Edited by Peter Sabor. Routledge & Kegan Paul £25.00

The categories of Walpoliana are not yet closed, and the stream of his contribution to posterity runs deeper and wider than probably any of Horace Walpole's contemporaries recognised. That is to say, the Yale Edition of the political memoirs—an 'encyclopaedic guide to his times' (Peter Sabor)—is still *in medias res*, although the Yale Edition of the Correspondence was finally completed in 1983. Not all the poetry, either, has been published. Walpole's contemporaries were deprived of access to his most important works, namely, the letters, and the memoirs, for the posthumous publication of which he himself provided. Although quirkily shy of publicity, and not altogether averse to being considered an amateur or a dilettante, (even if vulnerable to such criticism) he knew his own worth better than he affected. Thus, those contemporaries had only a partial view of Walpole, and judged him as the author of just five enduring works: *A Catalogue of Royal and Noble Authors*, *Anecdotes of Painting*, *The Castle of Otranto*, *Historic Doubts on Richard III*, and *The Mysterious Mother*.

For some reason, perhaps because his output was so various, or because his covertness confused, critical reception was, from the beginning, strikingly polarized, Walpole was either shallow, trivial, a sphinx without a secret, or

profound, witty and elegant. A special peculiarity is, even now, that those who best love Walpole are prone to fits of ambivalence: none has admired him more than W. S. Lewis, the great Walpole scholar, but he experienced a brief period of frank revulsion. Professor Peter Sabor charts the paradoxes and the ambiguities in a particularly instructive and valuable Introduction, right up amongst the best in the *Critical Heritage* series. He shows how Macaulay's influential essay is, in fact, derivative from the earliest criticism, and from Scott and Hazlitt. In Europe, especially France, Walpole was received with interest and respect. Here the Chatterton affair caused him considerable damage. The editor's selection of extracts illustrates the saga of the unfair blaming of Walpole for Chatterton's suicide after Walpole had broken off correspondence with him, when he decided that the 'Rowley' poems were not genuine. Chatterton's poem of bitter invective, *Walpole! I thought not I should ever see/So mean a heart as thine has proved to be*, is included. Some of the descriptions of Strawberry Hill are recondite and vivid.

In Victorian England, Professor Sabor indicates, the turning point in Walpole's reputation came with the publication of Leslie Stephen's essay in 1872, which began with the hyperbolic statement, 'The History of England, throughout a very large part of the eighteenth century, is simply a synonym for the works of Horace Walpole'. Following on, Virginia Woolf 'used often to discuss Horace and his queer character' with Lytton Strachey, and their review articles of the Toynbees', and later the Yale edition of Walpole's letters stimulated enthusiasm. It is obvious that Virginia Woolf would enjoy the correspondence. 'It is, finally, on his letters that Walpole's reputation must stand, and (Professor Sabor concludes) these letters are being lauded by the major critics of our time'.

MOLLY TIBBS

THE TROUBLED LIFE AND VERSE OF SYLVIA PLATH

Sylvia Plath: a Biography Linda Wagner-Martin Chatto & Windus £12.95

Many legends have grown up around the life and early death of the poet Sylvia Plath. Particularly, she has been regarded by many as one who described 'the contemporary predicament', and latterly as a liberator of women, of oppressed minorities such as Jews and of all who have been tortured or massacred. This greatly exaggerated view of her importance as a poet is not one which the author of the present biography holds. Rather does she present a clear, straightforward account of the events of Plath's life in America and England, showing her as a sensitive, highly gifted young woman whose talent brought her early success in the literary world of Boston and London. Her later disappointments and final tragic suicide could have been the result of a life passed at too hectic a pace and at too intense a level for so delicate a talent and temperament.

When the author of this volume tries to match the poems and novels Plath wrote with certain periods and events in the poet's life she does so with a depth of insight which precludes any mistakes that could easily have been made in such an attempt. The dates of some poems are indication enough of the happenings to which they refer, as in 'Burning the Letters', a long poem describing the bonfire she made when destroying the papers of her husband on discovering his intention of leaving her. But that and other poems are clear pointers to the

often disturbed state of her mind when, to most observers, she was at her most contented and balanced Dr Linda Wagner-Martin has arrived at an interpretation unclouded by psychological theorising and, at the same time, full of useful pointers to a permanently troubled state of mind

Sylvia Plath was born in Boston and died in London At the end of her life, when her marriage to Ted Hughes had broken up, her whole existence became, on its surface, poetry She had had a nervous breakdown in America in 1951 when she had tried to commit suicide *The Bell Jar*, first published under the pseudonym Victoria Lucas in 1963, tells of this time of her life In London, in 1963, she was alone except for the care of her two children, had no-one to turn to and finally gassed herself She had published *The Colossus* in 1960 but it is generally thought to be the poems in the posthumous *Ariel* that are her most significant It is probably true that all her poetry was written at white heat (one critic calls her 'a minor poet of great intensity') but, far from the subject matter being the ills of the age or of womankind, as feminists tend now to assert, it was entirely concerned with her personal predicament It could show euphoria as well as depression but it in no way 'defines the age'

So fashionable criticism has been wrong in emphasising the universal nature of her poems They do, however, tell us much about herself and the type of illness she suffered Thus they are a valuable record in a particularly vivid mellifluous form The author of the book has done full justice to this aspect of Sylvia Plath's work without making the extravagant claims others have sometimes made for what are essentially brilliant minor poems and novels Her account should be read by all who wish to understand how close to her life Plath's poetry was.

BETTY ABEL



SHORTER REVIEWS

The Hunting of the Whale: a Tragedy that must End (The Bodley Head £12.95) This study comes at an appropriate moment when the campaign for preservation is receiving more publicity Mr Jeremy Cherfas has produced a valuable volume, which is stimulating, informative and challenging He describes the biology of the different types of whales, and their commercial exploitation since the eleventh century Today they are

mainly confined to the North Atlantic at the mercy of Icelandic and Norwegian commercial interests, and in the Far East and the Antarctic exploited by the Japanese and others It is a sad and tragic story The author refers to the 1960s 'when it became apparent that the whalers were over exploiting their final stocks' In 1982, the International Whaling Commission voted for a temporary moratorium in commercial whaling to start

in 1985. Even so, since then over 11,000 whales have been killed. It has been conservation that has enabled the whaling to continue. Enforcement is impossible to any major degree. Mr Cherfas argues, controversially, that had conservationists done nothing in the 1960s and thereafter, 'I believe that the industry would then have collapsed under its own economic weight very quickly'. Mr David Day, in his *Save the Whale* story agrees. The economic costs of searching and killing a few whales is enormous and unprofitable. It is not essential to the economies of the countries concerned. If whaling must continue, then Mr Cherfas supports Mr Colin Clarke's proposals to set up a World Whaling Authority, under the auspices of the United Nations. This new body would have vested in it the world's stocks of whales. The authority would 'sell annual quotas to the highest bidders', thereby conserving the necessary stocks. This is a book which needs careful reading and digestion.

The Fourth World (The Bodley Head £12.95) 'The heritage of the Arctic and of its destruction' is the subject of Mr Sam Hall's informative, well-written survey of this ice bound area. He outlines the natural characteristics of the Arctic, the changes in seasons, the fauna and flora, and particularly of its people. He is not principally concerned with the area within national boundaries, such as Greenland, Iceland and Norway. He writes a very sympathetic account of the Inuit or Eskimos, their historical background and way of life, their culture and its erosion under the impact of settlements and economic pressures from the warm South, and alien cultures. The Inuit appear in need of more economic and social protection from the commercial outside interests which dominate their lives. The volume is well illustrated.

I Know My Own Heart (Virago £7.95) Helena Whitbread has edited some seven years of the diary of Anne Lister, 1791-1840, namely 1817-1824. On the face of it, Anne Lister was a conventional member of the landed upper-class in Yorkshire. Unmarried, she lived mainly at Shibden Hall, a landed property which she inherited from her uncle. These diaries show her socially amid the local gentry. She was, however, much more than a socialite. A highly sophisticated intellectual, she enjoyed the classics and indulged in mathematics. She was too a traveller. Unfortunately she was an unashamed lesbian, and the diary extracts here published pay much attention to her love affairs with her own sex. Much of which is squalid. Later in life she made a lengthy journey to Russia and died in the Caucasus. Her diaries of this period could be of greater interest.

Ethan Grome (Penguin Books Paperback £2.95) Doris Grumbach has contributed a useful Introduction to Edith Wharton's celebrated and probably most controversial novel, published in 1911. It is now re-issued in the Penguin Classics series. It is the tragic story of an estranged couple, with a resident servant maid. The latter and the husband fall in love, not an unusual theme. Brilliantly written and drawn from the peasants of her native Massachusetts, tragedy proceeds inexorably to the final climax when the three are obliged to live together in great unhappiness for the last twenty years. The couple are not even allowed a successful suicide bid. As Doris Grumbach, points out, 'its tone is austere, bleak and shocking'. Nonetheless, the novel has been acclaimed a classic, and its re-issue is welcome. Fortunately perhaps, the story is so dated that the final depth of prolonged despair is unreal in our modern society.

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A LINE-UP OF POWER IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by Stephen Chan

IT is interesting to analyse a year of international relations in the South Pacific, ending in October 1987, and follow on from the general survey I made of the region in 1986, after having spent some months there.¹ The beginning and end of this 1986-7 period were marked by contrasting developments. On the one hand, major regional powers were considering their roles in the region, and assuming that they would be unchallenged as principal actors; on the other hand, developments in small island states suggested the possibility of exactly such a challenge.

At the end of February 1987, the Australian Minister of Defence announced that his country was to increase its military activity in the South Pacific, giving that region equal priority in defence planning with South East Asia. This was an important recasting of Australian strategic interests, and was clearly a precaution against increasing Soviet activity in the South Pacific. At about the same time, the New Zealand Government published a defence white paper which de-emphasised global considerations. It guaranteed the withdrawal of New Zealand interest in South East Asia — its defence force in Singapore was already to be recalled — and, while it spoke of a New Zealand in a South Pacific context, many commentators questioned whether the white paper was in fact an instrument for introspection, and the South Pacific context was a nominal one.

The scaling-down of both the New Zealand world and regional view was, in retrospect, an inevitable consequence of a party policy that stressed anti-nuclearism. When David Lange's Labour Party came to power, its foreign policy was awkwardly placed. Firstly, its anti-nuclear plank was unaccompanied by a strategy of implementation or compromise. Secondly, anti-nuclearism was the result of a bargain between government factions. The right-wing monopolised economic policy, and set about inverting the credos of any labour party. The simmering left-wing revolt was kept to a controllable temperature by leaving foreign policy in its domain. Domestic balance meant that anti-nuclearism stood as a fundamental policy. US warships, as a result, no longer entered New Zealand harbours.

The dispute that arose between New Zealand and the US was couched in terms of geographical defence and, particularly, the defence obligations of the tripartite — Australia, New Zealand, US — ANZUS treaty. Within New Zealand, the US lobbied hard but discreetly as to the value of the

treaty² ANZUS was portrayed as a counterpart of NATO, despite the fact that, unlike NATO, no enemy territory existed within the ANZUS area, nor any sizeable enemy fleet near it. In the far more strategically vital waters around the Cape of Good Hope, off South Africa, the US and its allies had consistently discouraged any South African hopes of auxiliary membership of NATO, or full membership of a possible SATO,³ despite the fact that 30,000 vessels round the Cape each year, carrying 65% of Western Europe's oil, 28% of US imported oil, and 70% of the strategic raw materials used by NATO.⁴ US warships, furthermore, have not been allowed to dock in South Africa since 1967, and this has not hindered the protection of US strategic interests in the area, notwithstanding the nearness of the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet

Again, unlike NATO, the ANZUS treaty was a brief and general document. It certainly did not specify that any member country was obliged to host the warships, let alone the nuclear warships, of any other member. T. B. Millar has written, however, that the ANZUS treaty, signed on 1st September 1951, was one in which 'two small stable states are partners to a superpower, supplicants for possible future protection for which they are prepared to pay in repeated instalments that which the superpower finds useful for its diplomacy and global strategic capacity'⁵ It was not so much a matter of ship visits being vital to South Pacific security, as a matter of a lapse in an instalment payments plan which involved the disposition and deployment of politically significant symbols of support for the US. As long ago as 1968, Hedley Bull had written that Australia (still less New Zealand) did not have the protective advantages within ANZUS that European nations had within NATO. That is, there were no major powers to side with, or shield behind, in the event of an argument with the US. Australia, he suggested, might as a result be happier in a treaty with the US that also included Japan.⁶ In the absence of powers that could offset that of the US, the New Zealand position was always going to be precarious.

Accordingly, the US exerted its power as hegemon in an ostensibly equal partnership. Pulling the Australians in tow, the US suspended New Zealand from the treaty on 11th August 1986; in the words of George Shultz, 'because of New Zealand's decision to renege on an essential element of its ANZUS participation, it has become impossible for the US to sustain its security obligations to New Zealand.'

In the meantime, US lobbying within New Zealand, and stress on an exaggerated role for ANZUS (thus giving membership an exaggerated value), had helped consolidate distinct factions within the government machinery. On 21st August 1986, a Defence Committee of Inquiry report, meant only to sample public opinion, was released with a preface that could only be taken as a challenge of government policy, and a more than oblique criticism of the government for having let the country be suspended from ANZUS. It was an embarrassing period for the Labour Government, having to defend itself from both external and internal criticisms, and Prime Minister Lange found himself drawn immediately

to rebut the comments of his own Committee of Inquiry. From that time on, September/October 1986, the government tightened its control over the defence review, the Director of the Prime Minister's own Advisory Group chaired it, and the white paper released at the end of February 1987 reflects accurately its thinking. This time, the publicity surrounding publication was carefully prepared, and the white paper was described as a breaking of 'defence shackles'. It rejected the view that New Zealand security is dependent on an alliance role that has global considerations to the fore. Simultaneously, the white paper stressed the importance of Australia to New Zealand — now that there had been a diminution of US military assistance — and located New Zealand defence interests firmly in the South Pacific.

The major problem of this new stance was, in fact, the transferral of weight of alliance from the US to Australia. Although the white paper denied any sense of crude replacement, it did underscore Australia's new role in the South Pacific region — something which the Australians officially recognised in their announcement a few days earlier.

Under ANZUS, the formality of power in the South Pacific was meant to be perceived as divided among three. With New Zealand suspended, the formality of power could now be perceived as the property of two. Of these two, the US had a global sense with a regional application, but Australia had a deliberately and methodically developing sense of region. This sense of region, and of power within a region, began early in the first Hawke Government. The Australians' own defence review avoided the divisions that bedevilled the New Zealand exercise. Instead of a public review, the Australians appointed a review consultant who would, within broad lines, reflect government predispositions, and this resulted in the Dibb Report, a statement of Australian individualism both within the South Pacific and South East Asia and — here the difference of approach to the New Zealanders — within the western alliance. The Australians were not antipathetic to US nuclear arms or a nuclear-anchored ANZUS. Within this allowance, the Dibb Report looked for Australian defence planning that grew slowly but steadily more autonomous, less dependent on US support, and, as a result, looked to the matter of alliance as one that became an equal exchange between two powers, rather than one in which the US was an inescapable hegemon. It was, altogether, a more sophisticated approach than the New Zealand one. It did not satisfy the Australian anti-nuclear lobby, but it established the beginning of a regional assertion, a peculiarly Australian voice in international affairs; whereas the New Zealand white paper effectively forecast a diminution of New Zealand effectiveness and interest in the world at large.

In New Zealand there had been little alternative policy-planning of a substantial nature during the Labour Party's years in opposition. Whether in opposition or power, the Labour Party had no comparable figure to Paul Dibb to call upon. This was not a fault of the party, but an essential feature of a sparse society. The lament of the New Zealand poet, the late James Baxter, of a refugee from the world who 'hears beyond sparse

fields/ On reef and cave the sea's hexameter beating', seemed now true to life

There is, however, a distinct irony in what has happened to the New Zealand international stand, and it reveals the lack of thought both in the Labour Government and the Labour left. Anti-nuclearism was meant to express the right of small states in key strategic matters. The upshot of this policy has meant that South Pacific island states, who might once have looked to a balancing act between Australian and New Zealand interests to afford themselves some room for manoeuvre — looking for the spaces where the two larger nations balanced each other out — now face a stronger Australia; an Australia with a new declared interest in the South Pacific, and a New Zealand that must also look to Australia for some of its own defence cover. The formal and real disposition of power in the South Pacific lies now much more with Australia

Within this context, it will be Australia that leads the campaign against French interests in the South Pacific and, indeed, it was Australia that initiated and drafted the final wording of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This document was noteworthy for its exceptions. It allowed every exception to US interests in the transit and docking of nuclear ships, and included in its geographical reach only the French testing site of Muroroa, not US territories on the other side of the Equator used for nuclear weapons storage (Guam), former nuclear testing (Bikini), or current testing of SDI technology (Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands) ⁷ The Australians' is, therefore, a selective anti-nuclearism; but it is one New Zealand can no longer play. After the gallant resistance to French pressures in the early days of the Rainbow Warrior sabotage issue, New Zealand collapsed to those pressures, returning to France the French agents responsible, and lost much face in the process. Moral leadership against the French having been sacrificed, the campaign against them will now be led from the basis of Australia's increased sense of regional power. In this campaign, and under this leadership, what choices have the South Pacific island states?

There is a growing interest of many South Pacific states in their own international relations, and this is not a naive interest. It is, rather, one which is increasingly based on the establishment of equitable distance between the two superpowers. The growth of Australian power is important to them, since it suggests the possibility of a strong regional intermediary between the two. This importance has strict limits however, since Australia remains firmly pro-western. Moreover, the complicating factor for Australia and the US is that the island states, in order to approach greater equidistance between the two superpowers, must first move farther away from the US. It is the process of exploratory moves away from the US that alarms western observers — not to mention the fact that the Soviet Union, as if very much aware of such movements and the thought behind them, has taken a very real interest in the South Pacific. In a pronounced sense, the Soviets come with clean credentials — having never colonised, slave-traded, arms-dealt, or nuclear bomb-tested

in the South Pacific.⁸ The US by comparison, still has South Pacific territories under its control, and military bases on them. The Soviets can claim the moral purity which the New Zealanders, for instance, never had the strength to sustain.

All of this is, at the moment, merely in the field of skirmishing and exploration. Facilities for fishing fleets are not a competitive challenge for regional power. For the island states, there is also a process of exploration. Firstly, there is the exploration of how to negotiate for higher payments in return for fishing licences. With this comes the undoubted pleasure to a small state of being able to say 'no' to a large state. Secondly, there is the exploration of the vocabulary and concepts of international relations—such as non-alignment. In serious terms, nothing has been undertaken here; but, in terms of having responses to assess, certain South Pacific states are clearly enjoying a new-found sense of importance, a sense of being courted, and a sense of being international actors which independence, by itself, never gave them. It seems, to them, to be some achievement of the fact and role of independence, rather than just the name. In this exploration, the island state of Vanuatu, under the leadership of Walter Lini, has been the subject of much interest and speculation. Lini has launched some explorations in New Zealand's direction as well, having always maintained that New Zealand's anti-nuclearism was only a pale shadow of Vanuatu's.⁹ This was true because Vanuatu had far less to lose than New Zealand did. Having lost it, however, and having muted its own international involvement, New Zealand does not appear as an active ally in the explorations of the island states.

The interesting thing to watch within the South Pacific community is whether, in exploring the actions possible in independence, the island states arrange themselves into radical, centrist, and moderate categories; and whether, amongst these categories, they can achieve their own regional balance, unaffected by the impositions of great powers. They certainly have an interest in doing so, and the exercises in vocabulary are part of this. For the west, however, the problems of such exercises in exploration are that, firstly as noted above, the Soviet Union can parade clean credentials; secondly, the west has always pursued divided and, often, barely restrained exploitations of the South Pacific. The US and France have separate military bases in the region; the French test nuclear bombs in the region, both the US and France retain separate colonies and trust territories, denying full independence, in the region; the Japanese are seen as trade predators in the region. One of the very interesting aspects of the South Pacific's own regional analyses, emanating from for instance its intellectual centre at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji, has been a deep distrust of the intentions and roles of the major powers: Australia and New Zealand have been suspected as front-line agents of US policy;¹⁰ Japan has been regarded as a predatory trading shark among fish.¹¹ For the South Pacific island states, Hedley Bull's notion of an ANZUS that included Japan, to give Australia cover, would hold little attraction. Nothing covers them from Japan. In their view of

the region, the island states feel they have much to redress, and it is in this light that events culminating in the resignation of Fiji's Governor-General, and the effective establishment of a Fijian republic, should be seen

Both Australia and New Zealand were extremely wary of developments in Fiji leading to the October resignation. Both states spoke of sanctions and New Zealand was, in the wake of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver, extremely swift to impose them. Notwithstanding the rise of Australia as the region's dominant power, New Zealand felt compelled to act in an area long regarded as a sphere of its influence. The New Zealand reaction can be read in various ways. Firstly, it could be a re-assertion of its own regional role, having licked its wounds received from the US and France, and alarmed at the determination of Australia to command and lead the region. Secondly, it could be a public acknowledgement that New Zealand does indeed recognise what a strategic position in the South Pacific actually is, that Fiji occupies such a position, and that New Zealand intends to condition the new republic towards a pro-western policy, thus ingratiating New Zealand back somewhat into a place of utility in the western partnership. Thirdly, it could be a foreign policy tied directly to a domestic consideration. When the New Zealand Defence Committee of Inquiry sat, it received submissions from Maori groups who advocated a Pacific culture and identity as a basis for an independent and non-nuclear foreign policy.¹² These submissions were politely recorded, then dismissed. But the idea of an independence centred on a unique identity means, at the least, difficulties of interpretation for the west and, at most, a base for genuinely new domestic and foreign policies.

It is unlikely that New Zealand has the means or desire to challenge an Australian determination to assert itself in the region, particularly when New Zealand must now look to Australia for some of its own defence cover. Nor is it likely that New Zealand, through Fiji, could convince the US of its essentially western (if deviant) orientation. Nothing has actually happened in Fijian foreign policy to suggest an overhaul or repudiation of its own pro-western outlook. What could happen, over time, is the restructuring of the basis for this outlook.

The problem in Fiji is that the search for an autochthonous constitution comes directly up against the question of race. Fiji is a Pacific nation; it has a Melanesian history and, with its neighbours, is part of an international Melanesian culture. Its Indian population is comparatively recent, is a product of colonial movements, and has not enriched Melanesian culture so much as provided an alternative or competitor to it. Moreover, this alternative has had certain economic manifestations, and Melanesian Fijians feared it would now also mean political domination. The problem has been around for years, gently simmering.¹³ If the new Melanesian ascendancy is maintained, is expressed as a particular nationalism, and has intellectual weight placed behind it, then what the New Zealanders might be perceiving is the danger of an international

policy of radicalism similar to the domestic radicalism of its own Maori population. In short, in the name of an objection to racialism, New Zealand's actions might be more concerned with the possibilities of this radicalism

At the end of October 1987, this was still speculation. The recent crop of South Pacific independences, however, have all been occasions for the use of Pacific mythology and cultural symbols. Independence demands new symbols or old ones to be refurbished. Walter Lini's independence address to Vanuatu made great use of traditional metaphor.¹⁴ The infiltration of this metaphor into policy, particularly foreign policy, can give concern to the west, as in Vanuatu's own case. Add to that Fiji's condition of occupying a more strategic space than Vanuatu's, having major harbour and airport capacities, having a standing army which, though small, has had some consequence in repeated participation in international peace-keeping missions, and having a volatile, racially-divided population — one part of which controls much of the nation's economy, the welfare of this same part being of no passing interest to India, a power previously unimplicated in the South Pacific — and there is ample scope for close attention to be paid to Fiji. Whether the New Zealanders are going about it the right way is another question; for, of course, there is a limit to cultural analysis, and there is another to be made on the basis of power distribution within the Melanesian Fijian elite, and here, notwithstanding some university radicalism (other segments of the university swung solidly behind the short-lived Bavandra Government on the basis of an enlightened non-racialism) which supports domestic and foreign policy reform on as autochthonous a basis as possible, there is a determinedly upheld class or caste system among the ethnic Fijians and the weight of this system is behind a chauvinism certainly, but emanates from a most conservative as opposed to radical set of considerations. It is doubtful whether Fijian foreign policy will change, but its rationale and roots might be given a far more traditional set of reference points.

The exclusion of Fiji from Commonwealth membership was a high price for the republic. It ended the sentimentality of a tie to the Queen rather than an indispensable association of nations. The Commonwealth's own constitutional structure is largely premised on an anti-racialism, which was intended against South Africa but cannot fail to be applied against Fijian membership.¹⁵ Fiji remains however, a member of the 13-nation South Pacific Forum, and will no doubt wait and negotiate for a change of New Zealand heart towards its form of republicanism — which, at the time of writing, has still not been finally determined. But the Fijian case does illustrate how a disposition of power drawn up among traditionally powerful regional actors can, over the space of a few months, have questions raised against it by the assertion of other traditions. The South Pacific cannot easily be the settled backyard of Australia and New Zealand, and 1988 may well become a landmark year for the region.

NOTES

1. Stephen Chan, 'Small Pacific Island States and the Superpowers', *Contemporary Review*, Vol 250, No 1453, 1987.
2. For a full description of the US view, see Dora Alves, 'New Zealand and ANZUS—An American View', *The Round Table*, 302, 1987.
3. See Christopher Coker, 'South Africa and the Western Alliance 1949-81 a history of illusions', *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defence Studies*, 127 2, 1982.
4. For a discussion of US ambivalence, see Larry Bowman, 'The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis', in Olajide Aluko & Timothy M Shaw (eds), *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, London: Allen & Unwin 1985.
5. T B Millar, 'Alliances in the 1970s and 1980s. Problems of Cohesion and Effectiveness', in Robert O'Neill and D M Horner (eds.), *New Directions in Strategic Thinking*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981, p.121.
6. Hedley Bull, 'Australia, New Zealand, and Nuclear Weapons', in T B. Millar (ed), *Australian-New Zealand Defence Co-operation*, Canberra: ANU Press, 1968, p 87.
7. For a good, concise description of the treaty, see Malcolm McIntosh, 'The nuclear not-so-free zone', *The Guardian*, 10 April 1987.
8. This was the approach of Daniel Tumarkin, 'USSR the unknown northern neighbour', in Ron Crocombe and Ahmed Ali (eds), *Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics*, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific, 1983.
9. See Gavin McGuire, 'The view from Port-Vila—An interview with Vanuatu's Prime Minister Father Lini', *New Zealand International Review*, XI: 4, 1986.
10. Sione Tupouniua, 'Political Independence: An Opportunity to Create', in Sione Tupouniua, Ron Crocombe and Claire Slatter (eds), *The Pacific Way—Social Issues in National Development*, Suva: South Pacific Social Sciences Assn, 1975, pp239-40.
11. Anthony Haas, 'The Shark and the Little Fish: Japan's Relations with the Pacific Islands', *ibid*.
12. *Defence and Security What New Zealanders Want—Report of the Defence Committee of Inquiry July 1986*, Wellington: Government Printer, 1986, p 59.
13. For an analysis, see Robert Norton, *Race and Politics in Fiji*, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977.
14. Father Walter Lini, *Beyond Pandemonium—From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu*, Wellington: Asia Pacific Books, 1980, p 62.
15. The basis of the Commonwealth stand against any form of racialism is found in the 1971 Singapore *Declaration of Commonwealth Principles*, and the specialist 1979 *Lusaka Declaration* on racialism and apartheid. These declarations from Commonwealth Heads of Government impart to the Commonwealth a developing constitutional structure, since it has no foundation charter.

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THE WAY TO INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA

by Chakanyuka Karase

FOLLOWING South Africa's dismal failure to fulfil the terms of the League of Nations mandate to prepare Namibia for eventual self-determination, the United Nations General Assembly, successor to the League of Nations, terminated South Africa's oppressive rule over Namibia in 1966. Namibia became the direct responsibility of the United Nations and to this end the United Nations established a special Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence. This termination of South Africa's mandate was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, the International Court of Justice sitting in the Hague.

The International Court of Justice specifically declared the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa illegal and a violation of International Law. Since 1966, the UN, the Security Council and other UN agencies have passed scores of resolutions calling upon South Africa to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. One of these is Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 which envisages a final plan for Namibia's transition to independence, a date for the cessation of hostilities and the stationing of United Nations forces to supervise general and free elections. But South Africa has ignored all these calls and continues, through the use of a massive military force, to frustrate the Namibian people under the leadership of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in their struggle for self-determination and independence. With total disregard for all norms of International Law, the South African regime has used Namibia as a springboard for aggression against the African frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho.

Twenty years after the termination of South Africa's mandate over Namibia, the Namibian problem still remains. How is it that South Africa has been able to defy international opinion for the past twenty years?

It should be remembered that the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, calls for international collective measures including the use of force against a state which threatens peace and commits wilful provocation. The apartheid regime of South Africa represents one of the greatest threats to international peace and security today. In spite of its continued occupation of Namibia and provocation against African frontline states, South Africa has been immune from international collective measures because of the protection it enjoys from the United States and Britain in the Security Council. The apartheid regime of South Africa could not have defied international public opinion for the last twenty years had it not been for the extensive political, economic and military support that it received not only from the United States and Britain but also from other Western European states.

It is no secret that the economy of South Africa would crumble

tomorrow if Western multi-national companies and banks withdrew their support. One of the key areas of collaboration between South Africa and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance is in the form of continued supply of weapons, spares, components and ammunition to the South African army. Despite the existence of an international arms embargo against South Africa, the regime still receives its military supplies from the NATO states, and NATO has land and naval bases in South Africa. This close working relationship thrives because NATO considers South Africa to be strategically and militarily essential to Western interests of hegemony in the South Atlantic. Again, while the oil-producing states have imposed an oil embargo, Pretoria still gets all its oil requirements largely through Western European oil companies and the owners of tanker fleets.

While the International community has sought to isolate the South African regime, the United States has, through a policy of constructive engagement, given legitimacy to South Africa's domestic and expansionist policies. The Reagan administration has sought to turn the question of Namibia's independence into a regional security problem tied to the East-West conflict. Thus, the United States' arming of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has served to encourage South Africa's policy of aggression against SWAPO.

One of the most ridiculous obstacles to Namibian independence imposed by the United States/South African alliance is the insistence on linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-requisite for the solution of the Namibian independence issue. In line with this linkage doctrine, the sovereign state of Angola is not supposed to conduct its own foreign policy or seek defence assistance from Cuba. By making the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola a pre-condition in the negotiation process, the United States and the Republic of South Africa have attempted to transfer the moral responsibility for Namibia's independence to Angola.

Given these external obstacles to Namibia's independence, the question remains, what is to be done? Appealing to the United States and British Governments has not been very productive in the past twenty years. Such appeals would be even more futile now, given the general disregard by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Efforts by the international community should be geared to appealing directly to the American and British people who, as the events of the last year or so indicate, are clearly against the system of apartheid.

It was therefore proposed and re-iterated in a recent conference organised by the Front Line States, that the international community should condemn the apartheid regime of South Africa. Also that the Council for Namibia should double its efforts in disseminating information on Namibia, more especially in North America and Western Europe.

WILL THE CENTRE EVER HOLD?

by Paul Rose

IT is in the nature of politics, both domestic and international, that in times of crisis the most dangerous position is in the middle ground. Like the Light Brigade it is no use riding boldly and well if the end result is predictable. Cannon volleying from right and thundering from left is a powerful and unnerving experience and no-one should underestimate the courage of Robert MacLennan and David Steel, even while asking the reason why they produced that dreadful non-Liberal and non-Social Democratic initial document. Clearly the motive must have been to outdo the wayward Doctor whose obdurate stance is more reminiscent of the Trotskyist far-left.

There are too few thoughtful, humane, liberal or radical minded democrats committed to the two converging strands for the Rosie Barneses and Michael Meadowcrofts to allow themselves the luxury of defying the big battalions single-handed. The great traditions of liberalism — individual liberty, Home Rule, the concept of a Welfare State — must combine with not dissimilar values among Social Democrats concerned at the growing chasms in our society and the need for public and private enterprise and services to create a humane, caring but not over centralised society.

As democrats one would have expected the minority factions to respect the majorities in their parties. There is an overlap that makes many Social Democrats closer to the radical Liberals and some Liberals closer to the right of the SDP. There are Liberals with a small 'l' in both major parties and some Social Democrats remain committed to the lumbering outmoded structure of the Labour Party which between 1945 and '51 and under the Home Secretaryship of Roy Jenkins put many liberal concepts into practice.

Whether this wedding of the Centre-left will hold remains to be seen. For those who deplore the market place approach of Thatcherism and the over-centralised bureaucratic power that disfigured Labour there will be goodwill, but as I write the future remains uncertain.

The perils of the moderate in politics have begun to scream at me from every page of the press. The scenes of violence and butchery to which we are now accustomed on television occur in every corner of the globe. Even twenty miles away across the Channel the spectacle of Le Pen's popularity reminds us that no-one is immune. Indeed, we in the UK have lived with that sort of fanaticism that holds no regard for life or limb on both sides of the tribal war in Ulster.

Wherever the Empire has receded we have seen conflicts which either predated the British presence or resulted from it. As Australia celebrates, it is easy to gloss over the inhumanity of the penal colonies and the fact that the original inhabitants have little to applaud. It is the White Man's celebration. In the Indian subcontinent the horrors of partition followed

by the subsequent repatriation of Pakistan and the more recent horrific events in Sri Lanka are mirrored by a partitioned Cyprus with a line almost as obscene as the Berlin Wall. Above all, the results of post-mandate Palestine have focussed world attention on the rival claims of Jews and Arabs. The most persecuted people on our imperfect planet use the traditional methods of all frightened occupying powers — the gun and the truncheon.

To attribute such ills to the legacy of Empire alone would be ludicrous. In Argentina a tenuous democracy struggles to survive against the traditional enemies of human rights in the military. It is almost a mirror image of post Marcos Philippines without the Communist guerillas stabbing the new democracy in the back. As Muslims use mustard gas and every other non-nuclear weapon in the ghastly war of attrition between Iraq and Iran, the current scenes in Ghaza and the West Bank may be seen in perspective.

Rightly preoccupied with the evils of apartheid in South Africa, the famine, greed and corruption that abound in black Africa, with some oases where the wind of change once blew, merely illustrate the universal nature of man's predilection towards power, whether based on ideology, race, colour, nation or class. Those caught up and tossed aside in these struggles are usually the innocent and the helpless

We in Europe can hardly stand in judgement, having harnessed technology to genocide under a paranoid psychopath and having all but destroyed two generations of young men in the two world wars that erupted in our continent. However, if Alsace Lorraine is now an historical quarrel and the seat of Western European unity, there has to be hope. If the name of Bukharin is being printed in the Soviet Press a generation after the death of another paranoid psychopath and Ronald Reagan is showing enthusiasm for arms limitation on a scale hitherto undreamed of, there must be hope for those who have always abhorred the excesses of any ideology or nationalism when it ceases to be tolerant of others. That surely is the essence of the liberal and social democratic ethic shared with other democrats in a tradition too often swamped by jingoism and fanaticism at times of economic and social stress.

Having unbottled the thoughts that have depressed me as 1988 has emerged, there is that shred of hope which causes us not to abandon our species and retire to some uninhabited island in a warm climate. Somehow, the middle ground must endure crossfire. So I turn to what has undoubtedly been the focus of much media attention even if it involves a tiny area of the globe and a few million Jews and Arabs who have had their ups and downs since David slew Goliath and Samson brought the whole place rattling down.

Three great religions were spawned at the centre of that struggle to say nothing of smaller groups like the Bahai whose Temple adorns Mount Carmel. Romans, Crusaders, Ottomans and every passing army failed to subdue this cauldron on the Eastern Mediterranean and the British were there with the unfortunate legacy of history before scuttling in despair.

I have to declare an interest as one whom Hitler would have exterminated even if I regard the Chief Rabbi in less esteem than the Archbishop of Canterbury. I supported Israel forthrightly in the six day war and equally fervently opposed the Suez venture, thereby being thrown actively into a political scene that led me to Parliament at the age of 29 and out of it at 44 before most aspirants get their chance. At that time I had no idea that the SDP was to provide a possible home and decided to opt out — an example of the Centre not holding for which I apologise to Robert MacLennan and David Steel alike. However, there are times when 'young cynics' must speak up. How can one criticise the silence of the German people under terror if one does not raise one's voice for fear of offending fools and fanatics?

Israel is wrong. The methods and fact of occupation are wrong, insensitive and brutal. The refusal of its Prime Minister to talk with 'terrorists' is as stupid as those who refused to speak to Jewish, Cypriot, Kenyan and Irish 'terrorists', who today are leaders of their countries. Israel has few friends and is in danger of losing those she had. The Massada mentality did not involve beating unarmed Romans. The spirit of the Warsaw Ghetto did not involve shooting unarmed SS men.

By the same token those who distort history, as in a recent *Guardian* article, ignoring the original invasion of Israel and Arab rejection of partition and the refusal to recognise Israel's right to exist within secure frontiers, do the Palestinian cause no good. Both peoples, linked by history and language, could become an example to the world if they rejected the fundamentalists, the obscurantists and extreme nationalists who are mirror images and lead their peoples to even more suffering.

This is no time for scoring points, as Mr Michael Adams does in his capacity as a professional exponent of the Arab cause, or for excusing the inexcusable as Israel's police chief did in extolling what he calls euphemistically 'reasonable force'.

I first visited Israel as the Six-Day War was ending. I saw then conditions in the Gaza Strip that have have not changed. However, what is tolerable from one's fellow Arabs becomes intolerable when accompanied by the affront of occupation and the use of one's labour without the right to participate in the political process, as Arabs in Israel have done — one fundamental difference from the counter-productive hyperbole of comparisons with Apartheid — I mixed freely with West Bank Arabs visiting relatives inside Israel for the first time in 20 years. It was a moving experience. However, one result of Israel's recent counter-productive policy is to politicise Israeli Arabs, many of whom in the past gave their votes to the Religious Party which is a curse inflicted upon 90% of Israelis by this over-powerful 10% lobby. Another product of the policy is the destruction of those very liberal and social democratic values which once dominated Zionism before the heirs of the Irgun, the Right Wing Expansionists or Revisionists came to power.

Indeed, one of the terrible fallacies of that *Guardian* article was that the newer Israelis from Arab countries have more in common with the

Arabs In fact, it is they who are most hostile since they suffered minority status and persecution They do not have that European tradition that built the Kibbutzim and at one time favoured a bi-national State—rejected by the majority of Jews and Arabs alike It is they who put the 'Likud Party' in power. They are like the 'poor whites' in the Deep South

I well remember in the wake of the 'Six Day War' the almost universal agreement that the occupied territories should be returned in exchange for peace I had the uneasy feeling that the longer that occupation went on the less that would appeal, and occupation would in turn brutalise the occupiers. The vast demonstration against the ill-conceived incursion into the Lebanon shows that 400,000 people were willing to march against their own Government and a repetition of that revulsion is needed now without the spur of dead soldiers in Israel's mini-Vietnam Another irony is that the fanatical Shi-ites, whose massacres and terror had contained the Palestinians in the Lebanese camps, have now lifted the siege and made common cause Indeed, fundamentalists and nationalists have made common cause in Gaza also, whereas they fight to the death further north and east in a divided Arab world

Israel's policies and the obscurantism of those who talk about the 'Biblical land' have alienated Israel's friends and many progressive Zionists abroad 'Biblical land' at what period? one may ask What about the Canaanites and Philistines? Should the United States give Nevada, New Mexico and California back to Mexico or the Red Indians? The fact is that Israel exists that two million Palestinians outside Israel have become Palestinian 'Zionists' and they have rights and aspirations to a homeland. They are not just Jordanians They have a sense of national identity It is not unreasonable to ask that in a future Palestinian State, Jews, who for religious reasons prefer to live on the West Bank, should enjoy civil rights commensurate with those of Arabs in Israel It is unreasonable for them to be allowed to settle at will under the protection of the Israeli State on land which by any criteria is Arab land occupied by Israel.

Thoughtful Arabs have commented on the failure of the rejectionist policies of El Fatah and the Arab World which sought to extinguish Israel at birth After that war Israel was larger than the area accepted by it following the UN partition. After the Six Day War it occupied an even greater area.

I was convinced that the Golan Heights could not return to Syria so long as enmity existed and that whatever its status Jerusalem should never again be divided like Berlin or Nicosia. Such divisions are an obscenity and an affront to civilisation However, with adjustments for security and agreement on military free zones I see no reason why the West Bank and Gaza providing an outlet to the sea should not form a Palestinian State. Open frontiers would provide the promise of co-operation, commerce and greater understanding.

The problem was, and this is not a political point at the expense of justified Palestinian claims, the PLO decided on no recognition, no peace and no negotiations Now the boot is on the other foot since there can be

no peace without recognition of the fact that the PLO is a party to the peace talks along with neighbouring states, with Jordan and Egypt perhaps holding the key.

It needs Soviet pressure on Syria and US pressure on Israel to see that there is no future in bloodletting. Whereas in the past there was inexcusable terrorism by El Fatah and before that by the Irgun and the Nazi sympathiser, the Mufti of Jerusalem, the voices for peace must be heard in Israel. No-one more than Jews should know what it is like to be in a ghetto like Gaza, occupied by troops armed and hardly benevolent. To compare this situation with the Nazis who exterminated systematically, or South Africa where no black may vote or sit in Parliament, is the kind of hyperbole that does Palestinians no good and polarises otherwise undecided Israelis. 'Whatever we do they will criticise because they are at heart anti-semitic' was the refrain of many I met on later visits. Already attitudes had hardened and there was a visible shift to unreasoned nationalism. To hear a Jew saying 'Arabs are not human' was a shattering blow, for that was Hitler's justification for ridding the world of *Untermenchen*. But then, Jews are no different from any other people, given the status of a nation, and how often have we heard the racialism that is directed at Asians or West Indians on the streets of London?

No doubt what I write will excite the ire of blind protagonists of the Palestinian cause and Right Wing Zionists alike. To be for peace and see the faults on both sides in a situation where two peoples are the victims of their history is never easy. Stand in the middle of Belfast and shout 'peace now' — or in Colombo, Baghdad, Tehran, Amritsar or in Kabul. Scream about swords and ploughshares or that the best security is to live in peace with one's neighbours — a lesson learned after two devastating wars in Europe. Remind every Israeli of David's lament: 'How are the mighty fallen and the weapons of war perished'. Remind every Palestinian of the results of rejectionism and remind both that they live in and share the same tiny corner of the globe.

I suppose it is as futile as telling Dr. Owen and Michael Meadowcroft that for the Centre to hold against the 'passionate intensity' of the extremists good men and women must stand together. The comparisons may sound grotesque and obscure but they have been ringing in my head throughout the first few months of 1988.

HOME, DEAR HOME: THE CURRENT HOUSE PRICE BOOM

by Nigel Healey

ALTHOUGH modest in comparison with the previous booms of 1973 and 1979, the current surge in UK house prices shows little sign of slowing down. While the recent stock market collapse may have dented confidence in the value of paper assets, there remains a deep-rooted conviction that investment in the tangible assets of bricks and mortar is inherently sound. One important difference between the present and earlier housing booms, however, is that today's national average figure of 19% rises per annum disguises enormous regional differences. In Greater London and East Anglia, prices are rising at 29% pa; in sharp contrast, prices in Scotland are static, while in Northern Ireland they are actually falling. This article examines the implications of the growing disparities in regional house prices for the so-called 'North-South Divide' and argues that the Government should try to solve the problem.

Table 1 shows that, in marked contrast to the performance of stock markets over the same period, absolute house prices have risen in every year since 1970. It also shows that in real terms (i.e. after allowing for the relatively low levels of inflation now being experienced), the present boom has already exceeded the peaks reached in 1979. The current pressure on housing markets is due to a complex mix of factors: real incomes, the main driving force behind house prices, are growing strongly; increasing competition between banks and building societies has made borrowing easier (once limited to 2½ times a borrower's income, ratios of up to 3½ times income are now common with many lenders prepared to offer 100% mortgages); and falling nominal interest rates mean a borrower can afford a larger mortgage (£30,000 at 10% translates into the same monthly repayment as £20,000 at 15%).

These underlying economic factors have been reinforced by two other trends. One is a behavioural change on the part of home-owners. Buyers increasingly perceive house purchase as a financial investment rather than simply a means to a roof over their heads — with good reason: the Nationwide Anglia Building Society estimates that buying a house on a mortgage fifteen years ago generated an average return of 25% on the buyer's investment. Expectations of easy capital gains have also encouraged many, especially in the south, to trade up so creating bullish market conditions. The second factor is that the last generation of so-called 'baby-boomers', born in the early 1960s, are now pouring into the housing market. In 1986, first-time buyers accounted for 53% of all mortgages granted by building societies. Nor is there good reason to suspect that the boom has yet peaked. Historically, the ratio of average house prices to annual earnings has fluctuated about a long-term trend value of around 3.50. At present, the ratio is slightly above this figure, but in previous booms it has soared as high as 4.95 (1973). This suggests that prices could rise a

lot further yet; although the strongly-negative real interest rates which fuelled the 1973 explosion are missing from the 1988 equation, most commentators agree that the trend is unlikely to be reversed.

As noted above, the most worrying feature of the present boom is its extreme patchiness. The 19% rise in house prices for the UK as a whole disguises the fact that in Scotland, Northern Ireland and North England, house prices have been outstripped by inflation; in contrast, the south of the country has seen an explosion in prices. Even more disturbingly, this is not a recent phenomenon. Greatly differing rates of increase between the different regions have persisted in recent years (see Table 2), opening up huge gaps in the price of housing between north and south. The average price of a detached house in Yorkshire is now £47,000, compared with £130,000 in London.

Looking at the figures another way offers one possible answer. It follows that the house price/income ratio is much higher in Greater London (4.4:1) and the south generally than it is in the north (e.g. 2.9:1 for Yorkshire and Humberside). In other words, Londoners typically take on much heavier mortgage commitments relative to their income than their counterparts north of the Watford Gap. The reason is presumably that the relatively higher levels of unemployment in the depressed north make both borrowers and lenders (banks and building societies) more cautious about the size of mortgage commitments relative to present income. The sharp rise in the number of homes being repossessed (up 44% on last year) suggests this caution is not entirely misplaced; the Building Societies' Association's figures also show over 67,000 mortgages now more than six months in arrears.

The implications of these enormous, and still growing, gulfs between house prices in north and south are of more than simply academic interest. The UK is rapidly becoming two nations, with differences in house prices working to cement the economic isolation of the poorer north by creating an insurmountable barrier to the geographic mobility of businesses and workers. Higher unemployment rates and lower earnings in the north (average earnings are rising by 12% pa in Greater London, only 3% pa in North England) should theoretically combine to drive workers south and businesses north. But people need somewhere to live, whether they be turners and fitters from Leeds seeking the good life in London, or senior executives from Surrey setting up regional operations for their company in Dewsbury.

A brief survey of Britain's housing market reveals the importance of owner-occupied housing in providing a roof over the heads of migrating individuals. There are essentially three sources of housing: the owner-occupier sector; the council housing sector; and the private rented sector (including 'tied' accommodation and Britain's 2,600 housing associations). Governments of all political persuasions have traditionally sought to encourage owner-occupation. Interest payments on mortgages (up to a limit of £30,000) are deductible for income tax purposes, a subsidy currently worth an average of £500 pa to those eligible. Capital gains on first

homes are similarly exempt, as is the net imputed rental income from owner-occupation (to be as well-off as an owner-occupier, a tenant would need higher earnings to cover the cost of rent; in this sense, owner-occupation might be said to produce an 'income' equal to the rent saved). Since 1980, one million council houses have been sold to their tenants at deep discounts. Not surprisingly, this impressive array of perks for owner-occupiers has boosted this sector's share of the total housing stock from 29% in 1950 to 62% today, a trend which is still strongly upwards.

Council housing, which once guaranteed access to low-cost, public sector accommodation for migrating labour, is now stretched to breaking point. Although it still accounts for 27% of all housing, the privatisation of council houses through the 'Right to Buy' scheme and capital expenditure controls on new local authority building have increased waiting lists to over 1.2m families. With the average length of wait now twenty years, and allocation determined by 'points' systems which are often unrelated to employment considerations, this sector offers cold comfort to the individual seeking work outside his or her own locality. The remaining 11% of the housing stock is provided by private landlords, its share declining rapidly over the post-war years from 53% in 1950. This sector is now dominated by low-quality accommodation, inhabited by the country's poorest households.

The inescapable conclusion is that as a result of deliberate government policy the owner-occupier sector now provides the vast bulk of the UK's housing and, more importantly given the present state of the (public and private) rented sector, the only means of finding long-term accommodation in another region for most people. Yet the enormous gulfs between house prices in different regions make moving within the former sector virtually impossible for many people, so preventing workers following companies to areas of highest profitability.

It is not difficult to see how this labour immobility cramps economic development. Most companies recruit nationally to fill many positions requiring specialist skills: many larger firms have nationwide networks of branches and divisions, between which the transfer of employees is (or should be) commonplace, commercial pressures may require relocating all or part of their business in other parts of the country from time to time. Since all these activities involve the individuals concerned moving from one region to another, and so selling property in one regional housing market and buying in another, marked differences in housing costs seriously limit their ability and willingness to do so.

Consider, for example, the position of a home-owner in Leeds contemplating a job-related move to London. At £77,000, the average price of a terraced house in London is over three times the average Leeds' price of £21,000. This acts as an enormous disincentive to move. In almost all cases, the higher earnings and allowances obtainable in London will be inadequate to finance the larger mortgage needed to buy a comparable property. Although a Londoner faced with the reverse move north, say to his firm's regional headquarters in Leeds, appears to be well-off at first

sight (selling up in London and buying a very much cheaper property in Leeds means a dramatically lower mortgage and possibly no mortgage with equity to spare), the value of the Leeds property will increase far less quickly than houses in London and the interest earned from investing any unspent equity will be dwarfed by London house price inflation. Returning home to the south may become increasingly difficult over time, a prospect which may well deter many potential movers

The net result is a complete log-jam: northern workers are excluded from buoyant southern labour markets by the 'Berlin Wall' of prohibitively-high house prices; labour-starved southern firms cannot relocate in the north because their key staff refuse to step off the housing ladder long enough for new regional operations to become established. There is no shortage of suggestions for overcoming this impasse. One is to make it easier for home-owners who make temporary job-related moves to avoid having to sell their original properties at all. If each family lets its own home and then rents a similar property for the duration of its stay in pastures new, the problem of differential house price inflation between north and south can be neatly side-stepped. At present, the parlous state of the rented sector makes this solution unviable, but the Government believes that by dismantling the plethora of rent controls which now exist, it can make letting and renting houses a realistic alternative to selling and buying. But two major stumbling blocks will still remain: one is that rents reflect house prices, so that northerners are likely to find themselves paying rent on their temporary London accommodation far in excess of that which their own homes command, the other is that rental income is subject to income tax at the tax payer's marginal rate, which further reduces the attractiveness of letting.

A second possible solution is for building societies to establish 'housing investment funds'. Such a fund would acquire part of the equity in the houses bought by northerners in the south, the returns would then be generated by the share of the capital gains realised. Deposits could be taken from southerners moving north, but as a high-interest investment from a variety of other sources as well. Consider the following blue-print for such a housing investment fund: the fund offers depositors a rate of return related to the rate of house price inflation in a given geographical area (e.g. Greater London), the precise return will depend, of course, on the portfolio of properties actually acquired by the fund. As competing funds establish a track record, those fund managers investing most wisely will achieve a higher rate of return (and hence increase their market share), in just the same way that unit trusts currently do today. Like a unit trust, the fund effectively sells 'units' of its portfolio to depositors; when a depositor withdraws his units, he therefore takes his return in the form of a capital gain.

Potential borrowers contemplating a house purchase within the geographical area covered by the fund then apply for an 'equity-share plan'. The fund inspects the property in the normal way and, if the plan is agreed, buys a share of the equity, acting as an agent to arrange a con-

ventional mortgage with its parent society for the remaining balance. During the time that the borrower lives in the property, he services the mortgage; when the property is sold, the sale price is divided between fund and borrower in exactly the proportion of the original equity shares.

Whether the Government continues to concentrate its efforts on revitalising the rented sector, which it could arguably do more effectively by redirecting expenditure into council house building rather than by simply tinkering with rent legislation, or seeks more imaginative solutions like the one outlined above, it is clear that positive action is urgently needed. Unless something can be done to bridge the widening gulf in regional house prices, the 'North-South Divide' may become a permanent scar on the UK map. Given the Government's new concern about regional inequalities and the millions being pumped into regional policy, it is about time Ministers recognised that housing lies at the heart of the problem.

TABLE 1 — UK House Price Inflation 1970-87

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
nominal %	6.2	11.7	34.0	36.3	8.3	5.8	8.8	7.6	15.8	29.5
real %	-0.2	2.1	25.0	25.0	-6.4	-14.8	-6.9	-7.1	6.8	14.1
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987		
nominal %	21.1	5.6	2.4	10.9	10.1	8.5	12.6	19.0 (est)		
real %	2.8	-5.5	-5.7	6.0	4.9	2.2	9.5	14.5 (est)		

Note: real price rises = nominal (ie actual) prices rises less inflation.

Sources BSA Bulletin, CSO Economic Trends, Nationwide Anglia Building Society.

TABLE 2 — Regional House Prices 1980-87

	% Increase (1987)	% Increase (1980-86)	Average House Price (1987)
The 'South' —			
Greater London	29	72	£77,690
South East England	25	62	£59,800
South West England	17	52	£48,640
East Anglia	29	64	£51,790
The 'North' —			
East Midlands	13	50	£34,780
West Midlands	22	35	£37,860
Yorkshire and Humberside	12	47	£30,520
North England	3	40	£29,010
North West England	8	42	£32,250
Wales	7	42	£32,030
Scotland	0	49	£33,830
Northern Ireland	-1	26	£28,140

Sources BSA Bulletin, Halifax Building Society, Nationwide Anglia Building Society.

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POEMS

VISITING THE CATHEDRAL

We are visiting the cathedral
of Limburg, newly repainted
the colour of flesh, a dark
sun-burned flesh that contrasts
sharply with the skeleton inside.

Here is its authentic age:
along the quiet nave footfall
and voice are long hushed,
the bare bones are blanched,
their texture is of sudden dust.

In this colonnade of limbs
the femurs and the girded thighs
stride the huge ribbed edifice
aloft amid this world of wars,
and through the resurrected sky.

But this is not the cathedral
visited by Rodin in respites
from the city of stone and bronze:
Rodin's cathedral was the living
flesh, mysteriously sanctified.

CANALS

They do not flow like rivers,
fill like lakes and overspill;
these captive waters live
on different levels governed
not by nature but by locks.

They build the narrow boats
adrift along the inland coasts,
beguiling crew with shifting scenes,
the things that live and breathe
beside the static streams.

People living out their dream
of freedom remain captive in
their tideless ebb and flow;
beyond the narrow gate canals
have nowhere in this world to go.

J. D. MALLINSON

THE A, C, D, OF THE EEC

by John Tomlinson, MEP

ANYONE wishing to examine the current problems and possible future developments within the European Community could do worse than study three documents which are called by the names of the Commissioners who produced them — Andriessen, Cockfield and Delors. The full titles are *Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy* (COM (85) 333 final) dated July 1985; *Completing the Internal Market White Paper from the Commission to the European Council* dated June 1985 and *Report by the Commission to the Council and Parliament on the Financing of the Community Budget* (COM (87) 101 final) dated February 1987.

To take Andriessen first, his is a useful and thoughtful document which attempts to evaluate the CAP in terms of both its successes and failures and to suggest options for the future. However, it is abundantly clear that Andriessen, like others before him, is impaled on the dilemma of the political and social demands of the Common Agricultural Policy on the one hand and its manifest economic failures on the other.

Very early in the document he states 'The CAP was and remains part of the "marriage contract" of the European Community' (part II). A little later he writes that 'the obligations of the CAP as laid down in Art. 39 of the EEC Treaty remain as valid today as when the Treaty was signed in 1957' (page 1). Those objectives of course were both economic and social. Andriessen goes on to quote the very important Declaration of the Conference at Stresa in 1958:

A close correlation should be established between the policy for adapting structures and the policy for markets. Structural adaptation should help to bring about a convergence of costs of production and a rational orientation of production. Market policy should be conducted so as to encourage the improvement of productivity. A balance should be sought between production and the possibilities for outlets, taking account of the exports and imports which can be made, and of the specialisation appropriate to the economic structures and natural conditions of the Community. The effort thus made to increase productivity should allow the application of a price policy which avoids excess production and allows agriculture to remain or become competitive.

Given the importance of the family structure in European agriculture, and the unanimous desire to preserve its family character, every means should be employed to increase the economic and competitive capacity of family farms.

Unfortunately, the Declaration of Stresa was thrown out of the window years ago and the reason is quite simple, namely, that the mechanisms used to operate the CAP were and are basically flawed.

Andriessen virtually admits this on page 3 of his document 'The old model of agricultural policy in which increase in income could be obtained by increases in the volume of production at ever higher guaranteed prices, and prices guaranteed moreover from unlimited quantity of production, can no longer be reconciled with the economic and financial realities'. Now this is putting it modestly! The mind boggles at what might have

happened if way back in 1957 or 1958 the original Six had told the car makers of Western Europe that they could produce as many cars as they wished and that the Community would guarantee to buy every one of them, whether there was any market for them or not, and that they need not be produced at anything approaching the general level of world prices.

He also recognises that the wild career of the CAP has now hit two buffers — the availability of money to finance the mounting surpluses and stocks and heavily subsidised exports, and the revolt of the world agricultural producers against the unscrupulous dumping of EEC surpluses in their markets. Nor has the CAP been conspicuously successful so far as social policy is concerned. It is true that the small family farm continues to be the dominant type of agricultural holding in terms of labour employed if not in terms of output. Nevertheless employment in agriculture decreased by 60% between 1960 and 1983. The Economic and Social Committee of the EEC, commenting on Andriessen, points out that 'there has not been that levelling up of disadvantaged regions and farms which the Ministers hoped. On the contrary the gap between the prosperous and poor regions has widened; and the problems of the poor regions will be exacerbated by enlargement'. Between 1970 and 1980 in the Community of Nine over a quarter of a million paid agricultural workers jobs were lost.

Andriessen expresses an anxiety about the risk of renationalisation of the CAP. This would be a catastrophic political blow to the EEC since it would represent the failure of the one genuinely 'supranational' instrument of EEC economic policy. He produces some cogent arguments against renationalisation which would clearly take the form of *national* aids to agriculture. Such aids would be more easily afforded by the richer member States, which could actually have smaller agricultural populations and might easily encourage self-defence measures at national frontiers for the protection of national agricultural markets which could set in train an irreversible process of disintegration of the Common Market. Andriessen points out that in the course of the 1980s measures have been introduced to eliminate the more grotesque anomalies of the CAP, more restrictive pricing policies, guarantee thresholds, levies on the producers themselves to finance surpluses or exports, quotas, limitations on intervention, etc.

All of this, however, has not prevented the financial demands of the CAP bursting through all attempts at budget constraint or budgetary discipline and creating a grotesque distortion within the Community Budget in terms of expenditure on agriculture as compared with expenditure on industry, science, technology and social and regional development — not to mention Overseas Aid.

What are the options for the future?

Andriessen recognises with alarm that the accession of Spain and Portugal has seriously complicated his problems bringing in 35% more agricultural workers and a 13% increase in the total agricultural product of the Community. The accession of Portugal, Spain and Greece, com-

bined with the existing productive capacity of Italy and Southern France has tilted the overall balance of production towards the Mediterranean. The range of techniques which he suggests include more rigorous price controls, guarantee thresholds for intervention buying, seasonal limitations on intervention buying, co-responsibility levies on producers, quotas (as already in place for milk products), taking land out of agricultural production altogether (set-aside), the encouragement of alternative agricultural crops like oilseeds, proteins and trees, in addition the non-food use of starch and sugar crops for industrial production of bio-ethanol is suggested though its limitations are recognised

As regards exports Andriessen suggests that producers themselves must take over some of the export risks and that the Community could restrict its subsidies to specified quantities, excess production being exported at *world* prices; a levy might be paid by the producer to cover export refund costs, in the longer term support prices should be fixed at a level closer to those of other exporting countries. The economic consequences of these measures for the poorer farmers and family farms would be mitigated by direct income aids to the farmers themselves either at national or Community level or both. He asks for 'political courage and realism' in order to bring the Common Agricultural Policy under control. Unfortunately there is no evidence that any such political courage and realism is likely to be forthcoming. We have recently had the extraordinary spectacle of Ministers from the Federal Republic of Germany rabidly defending unreasonably high prices for German farmers to satisfy domestic political requirements.

Andriessen takes cognisance of the environmental impact of the CAP and all the problems that have arisen with pesticides, over use of fertilisers, intensive livestock production, the damage to ecosystems by drainage of wetlands and the need for replacement of trees, stone walls, hedges, ponds etc. . . He suggests 'ecological corridors' to make good some of the damage done, though he admits that part of it is irreversible. At the same time, many of his suggestions are being slowly built into agricultural policy and we have a new word, 'stabilisers', to add to the vocabulary of the CAP. With the help of these stabilisers the system will no doubt stagger along more or less incompetently for a few more years; but the political courage and realism for which Andriessen calls are nowhere visible.

If Andriessen is thoughtful and even introspective there is no such inhibition on the part of the Cockfield document. It is a brash, self-confident, crude paean to the paramount need to create a vast unfettered free enterprise capitalist Community from Athens to Wick — and to do it all at breakneck speed. Physical, technical and fiscal barriers which may hamper progress towards this utopia are to be swept away within five years (seven years from the date of the White Paper) by 1992.

'Unifying this market (of 320 million) presupposes that Member States will agree on the abolition of barriers of all kinds, harmonisation of rules, approximation of legislation and tax structures, strengthening of monetary

co-operation and the necessary flanking measures to encourage European firms to work together', trumpets Cockfield confidently. His White Paper purports to set out a detailed programme with a specific timetable to achieve all this

Dealing with the problem of 'physical barriers' within the Community, that is, frontier checks and controls by police and customs, Cockfield seems oddly indifferent to the point that the majority of frontiers of the EEC are simultaneously internal *and* external. The thousands of miles of coastline of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, France and the United Kingdom are both internal and external frontiers for the EEC depending on who or what is coming from where. A Greek family entering Naples is crossing an internal EEC frontier; an American family doing the same thing is crossing an external EEC barrier. He agrees that the control of terrorism, drugs, arms, immigration, health and veterinary checks poses problems but seems to assume that Community legislation on these subjects will resolve the difficulties; a highly simplistic approach to problems of enormous complexity Cockfield talks of 'strengthening external frontiers of the Community' but as I have pointed out there is for the most part no physical difference between 'internal' and 'external' frontiers. And this applies to every international airport within the EEC.

There is also the difficulty of achieving a common approach within the Twelve on visas, political asylum and refugees

On the abolition of technical barriers Cockfield is more pragmatic. He lays down as a principle that 'if a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State there is no reason why it should not be sold freely throughout the Community'. He draws a distinction between what is essential to harmonise and what may be left to mutual recognition of national regulations and standards. European legislation should be limited to health and safety and environmental issues. Some years ago the Community abandoned attempts to harmonise technical specifications and now leaves it, very properly, to bodies such as CEN and CENELEC. Nuclear industry is regarded as a special case.

Cockfield sees restrictions on the public procurement of goods and services as 'one of the most evident barriers to the achievement of a real internal market'. It is a sensitive political area. Cockfield wants rapid progress in energy, water, transport and telecommunications and claims that liberalisation in the whole field is vital to the future of the Community economy. It is not self-evident why this should be so, apart from an ideological obsession with the principle of competition.

Cockfield considers it crucial that obstacles which still exist within the Community to the free movement for the self-employed and employees should be removed by 1992. He seems oblivious to the idea that the quickest way to achieve this would be the restoration of full employment in the Twelve which is nowhere in sight (and apparently of no interest to Cockfield). 'Trade in services is as important for an economy as trade in goods'... He asks for a total free enterprise system for financial services and capital movements without enquiring what this will do to

the 'periphery' of the Market — countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Scotland, Greece, and regions like the Mezzogiorno. In fact, he appears to be totally blind to what happens within a 'free market', for example the United Kingdom. In the South-East we have house prices double the level of the north and scarcity of skilled labour because of this, while elsewhere there is 20% or more male unemployment — multiply this kind of problem across the whole of Western Europe and what sort of a Community have we then? He goes on to deal with industry, new technology, intellectual and industrial property, information technology, marketing and distribution, freedom of information regardless of frontiers (Spycatcher?) electronic banking, common technical standards for the telecom network, 'a single community wide broadcasting area' and so forth.

There is absolutely no recognition in this section of all the social, cultural, political, historical, or sheer *human* dimensions of this breath-taking demolition of frontiers. The magic ingredient throughout is 'competition', a strong competition policy will play a fundamental role in maintaining and strengthening the internal market, and 'discipline on state aids will be rigorously enforced' — oh, will it?

Finally, Cockfield comes to the problems of taxation. For the first time there is recognition that harmonising VAT rates and excise duties will create *political* difficulties. 'it may be necessary to provide for derogations... these are areas of considerable political sensitivity which may have to be accommodated in this way' (para 218, p 54). However, lest it be thought that by paragraph 218, page 54 Cockfield is weakening or out of breath, he adds magisterially 'Nevertheless, it is in the general interests of the Community that such derogations should be kept to the minimum'.

The tabulation of rates of VAT and excise duties on pages 49 and 50 of the Report show how formidable the task is. Rates of VAT vary from 2% to 38%, some countries have four rates, some one only and the coverage varies greatly from one Member State to another. VAT accounts for nearly 10% of Denmark's GDP but only just over 5% in the UK. Even more startling differences are apparent in the excise duty table; Ireland levies 38 times more duty on beer than France and 24 times the rate on wine. The social consequences of trying to harmonise these rates up or down, or even average them out, will be alarming.

Cockfield finishes as briskly as he began 'Customs Union had to precede Economic Integration, so Economic Integration has to precede European Unity'. Completing the Internal Market is an essential step on this road — to do less would offer the people of Europe 'a less rewarding, less secure, less prosperous future than they could otherwise enjoy'. This is to make bold claims for the significance of market forces in the social, political, and cultural life of Western Europe. That these forces are significant is indisputable — that they have to override all other considerations is, to say the least, open to question.

Delors is a great deal less brash than Cockfield and not so introspective as Andriessen but he is still in a considerable hurry to achieve a drastic

overhaul of the EEC's finances. That they need a drastic overhaul is not in doubt. The Common Market is 'on the brink of bankruptcy'; there is a 'morass of budgetary malpractices' and the 'own resources system has proved increasingly inadequate'. The EEC is ill-equipped with the necessary means to adapt policies to the desired expenditure scenarios and the financial system has not been adapted to the more fundamental developments in the Community. This is a damning verdict on the management of the Community's finances so far but I believe that most commentators would agree with it.

Delors sets himself five objectives. First, a period of 'budgetary security', in other words a period of years in which there will not be endemic internecine strife between member states about finding the money for the policies on which they are agreed. Secondly, that the burden of financing the Community should be arranged in such a way as to take account of the relative prosperity of the various member states — an important principle in the light of the enormous disparities between the wealth of West Germany and Portugal, Denmark and Greece. Thirdly, the need to ensure compliance with 'budgetary discipline' and reconcile the constraints of a strict allocation of resources with the need to develop common policies. Fourth, the need to change not only the actual rules which govern the preparation and execution of the Budget but a general attitude towards these rules so as to manage the Budget sensibly and impose an effective control over expenditure; and fifth to continue to provide some compensation to correct the lack of balance in the nett contributions between member states, allowing for the principle of relative prosperity enunciated in point two.

These are not objectives with which one could seriously quarrel but Delors is, I believe, more sanguine that they can be achieved (within five years) than past history of these matters would indicate. He makes a truly coherent case for setting 1992 as the target for his financial reform programme, it is the date set by Cockfield for the completion of the internal market, it is the date by which most of the transition arrangements for Spain and Portugal will have been completed. It is also the date by which some of the major Community programmes should be finalised, i.e. the research framework, the five year allocation for agricultural guidance funds, the European Development Fund allocation and the Integrated Mediterranean Programme. Nevertheless, although this adds up to a good pragmatic case for carrying through a programme of the kind envisaged by Delors, the time span in political terms is fearfully compressed and Delors is making the same mistake as Cockfield in supposing that far-reaching economic and social changes can be achieved in such a short period.

Delors assumes that the various techniques, some already adopted, which he proposes to bring agricultural spending under control will in fact work — restrictive pricing, systems of quotas, levies and production thresholds. 'Agriculture rules will be applied or amended in such a way as to ensure that predetermined budget allocations are respected'. Yet

there is no evidence on past history that this will in fact happen. Delors assumes that the agricultural guarantee expenditure will increase from around £18 billion in 1987 to a little over £20 billion in 1992 at constant prices. And he claims that this will reduce agriculture expenditure from 60% to 50% of the total budget by 1992. This claim is something of a sleight of hand. The Budget for 1992 is intended to include the European Development Fund (overseas aid under the Lomé Convention) which is not included in the 1987 figures. It therefore follows automatically that agriculture — even on increased expenditure will show a smaller share. In fact, if the agricultural guidance expenditure is included under Delors's heading for 'structural operations' then the real percentage of agriculture in the Budget will not be 50% but something much more approaching 55% in 1992. To be sure, this is an improvement but it is an absurdity that the huge industrial market which the Twelve now constitutes should devote more than half its common spending to agriculture and Delors does not really tackle this problem at all. He suggests the doubling of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, provides a margin for new policies, and aims to ensure some form of contingency reserve to give flexibility to the Budget. In total he envisages Community spending increasing from around £30 billion in 1987 to something approaching £40 billion by 1992. This means an increase in the total Budget of 5.8% year on year in real terms until 1992.

The most intriguing of Delors's innovations, however, comes on the income side. He is suggesting that customs duties, agricultural levies and 1% of the VAT base should continue to flow into the Community coffers as hitherto and that Member States forego their 10% refund on the cost of collecting certain dues. He also proposes to set a budgetary ceiling of 1.4% of GNP of the member states and insofar as the yields of the other resources fall short of this there would be a call in of funds from the member states to make up the difference between the notional GNP contribution and the yield of VAT. It is not intended that the Budget should hit the 1.4% ceiling forthwith. On the contrary, according to Delors' calculations set out in the document, even by 1992 the call in rate would not exceed 1.28% of GNP leaving an unused margin of around 5 billion ECU, about £3.5 billion.

The objective of this concept is clear — contributions would be related to the capacity to pay, and it is hard to quarrel with this proposition in terms of fairness.

The weakness of the Delors proposals is that they simply do not deal with the agricultural problem. There is no case for allowing agriculture to continue to gobble up more than half the budget of the Community and rise year on year by 2.5% in real terms, moreover Delors seems to be optimistic, while Andriessen is not, that all the various 'stabilisers' will in fact be introduced and will work. No-one, on the past history of the EEC, could seriously believe this.

Politically, it is probably true that many members of the Community would be prepared to see Community resources expand from £30 to £40

billion over the period envisaged by Delors but there would be ferocious squabbles as to who should benefit. France and Germany would probably back Delors in his plans for a steady increase in agricultural expenditure even though at the same time they would almost certainly resist the various techniques for keeping it under control. Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal — even if they were willing to see an increase of this magnitude in the total budget — would almost certainly fight vigorously for much greater allocations to the Mediterranean for agriculture and in terms of regional and social spending. The United Kingdom, under the present government, would fiercely resist any attempt to increase the size of the Community budget on this scale and oppose the continuation of a situation in which agriculture swallowed up at least a half — in real terms probably well over half of it.

All in all, Delors probably lies somewhere between the cautious introspection of Andriessen and the self-assurance of Cockfield and it is not a badly thought out attempt to grapple with a set of very contentious issues. But basically Delors does back away from the agricultural problem and tries to solve it, not by meeting it head on, but by pretending that if the totality of spending is substantially expanded and the share of agriculture thereby diminished then the objections to the CAP will melt away. He also seems to assume that his various proposals for 'budgetary discipline' will in fact work; this is a big assumption.

Whatever one thinks of the substance of the findings, proposals and recommendations of Andriessen, Cockfield and Delors the three documents between them undoubtedly set out the tapestry which will pre-occupy the minds of Ministers and Heads of Governments within the EEC for the next five years. Andriessen and Delors both attempt seriously to come to grips with some of the consequences of the policies in their particular fields. Andriessen accepts some of the social consequences of his thoughts on reform of the CAP and Delors in a significant paragraph realises that the achievement of the Internal Market could cause very serious stresses and strains as a result of a shift of economic activity towards 'the more dynamic regions'. He hopes that his enlarged allocation to 'structural funds' will deal with this problem but this is an optimistic view. Cockfield is the least satisfactory of the three documents; he seems totally oblivious of the social implications of what he is proposing and apparently cares little about them.

It is important to remember that the Andriessen and Cockfield documents are already two years old and Delors has been on the table since February 1987. Quite a number of moves have been made in the directions suggested by these documents and it will be interesting to see whether the recent Brussels summit represents a move forward along the lines they suggest or resolves itself once more into a prolonged, fruitless acrimonious wrangle.

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THE END OF THE ABSURD?

by John Elsom

THE Absurd in its theatrical sense has had a long and complicated history, and we will not know whether it has come to an end until April 23/24 at the Young Vic theatre, where the International Association of Theatre Critics are debating the subject. And even then, to be honest, the pronouncement may not be definitive. Even if the assembled multitudes of critics, actors and directors give a unanimous thumbs-down to the Absurd, it is quite possible that certain heretical sects will linger on being as absurd as they like, without showing that due deference to authority that form and good manners expect.

The subject is nonetheless worth discussing, and at this time, when much has happened to cast the old uncertainties into doubt and while this conference may not seem to have the life-and-death appeal of an AIDS seminar or one on Third World debts, it may still influence habits of mind which could lead to decisions which have weighty consequences. Only someone like Mrs. Thatcher can afford to be so dismissive of other people's cultural backgrounds. The rest of us have to live in the real world, and the controversy over the Absurd has moulded several generations of believers and disbelievers.

The French-Algerian writer, Albert Camus, first brought the word Absurd in its modern sense into general use in the West, where it was picked up by, among others, Martin Esslin, who incorporated it into the title of his book, *The Theatre of the Absurd* (1961), influential throughout the 1960s and still is today. But Camus and Esslin were writing within different contexts. Camus was a member of the French Resistance during the war, during which he wrote *The Outsider* and *The Myth of Sisyphus*, two of his best known works, which were published in English in 1946 and 1955. The war background lent an immediacy to his philosophical speculations which were, in themselves, far from new.

Camus began by puzzling over the question as to whether or not we could believe in a benevolent God, who could nevertheless tolerate the suffering of innocents, and from there he was drawn into the conclusion that there could be no such God and that therefore the world was for all human purposes without meaning or order, hence Absurd. The question then arose as to how man should conduct himself in an Absurd world. Was he (or she) therefore free to do anything, to behave as he liked or could get away with? His play *Caligula*, is the portrait of an absolute ruler who tests the limits of his free will.

Hovering in the background, or rather in the foreground but in Paris, was Jean-Paul Sartre, who accepted the view that the universe was Absurd, but concluded from this that the individual person had to decide the rights and wrongs of his or her behaviour, and by that means determine what sort of person he or she should become. 'Existence precedes essence' — the primary assumption of existentialism.

Of course, as Camus would have been the first to admit, the question as to whether the universe contains within it a moral order or not, is one which is impossible to answer. There may be such an order but one imperceptible to man; and from a human point of view, the difference between a universe without order and one with an order which we cannot see or understand is negligible. You can perhaps pretend there is an order — which is how humanists might describe Christian faith — but in that case you can never be sure that you have pretended the right order. Different religions have different faiths, and it is largely a matter of social upbringing as to which moral order one perceives in the universe. Dean Inge once defined faith as 'reason acting beyond the boundaries of proved certainty'. Camus in wartime might well have retorted that faith was the vain hope that someone, somewhere, might be able to impose reason on chaos.

But the Second World War was not the only, or even the dominant, context within which this debate took place. The scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century had been so illuminating that by the 1880s scientists were confidently predicting that in time they would be able to discover and control the secrets of the universe. It was the overweening pride from which the twentieth century suffered its downfall. Not least among the scientific pretensions was the belief that evolution itself could be controlled, including the evolution of man. There were two leading theories as to how this could be done. One involved selective breeding or (as we might describe it) genetic engineering — which provided some intellectual justification in the 1920s and 1930s for master races and the elimination of those who were not destined to be masters and could thus corrupt the stock. The other concerned the control of the environment, particularly the social environment. Behind Marxism, as it came to be understood, lay not just a random Utopian theory but a programme for the betterment of mankind, which rested on the belief that human evolution could itself be controlled and more rapidly developed.

Confronted by the twin evils of Nazism and Stalinism, Camus came to the conclusion that the belief in a universal order that man could comprehend through science or mystically grasp through religious faith was itself a folly, but not to believe in such an order posed its own problems. While the horrors of the Second World War and its aftermath brought such speculations about the Absurd to a high pitch, Camus (as he realised) was taking part in a protracted European debate which had run on for nearly a century. In *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (1883), Nietzsche had pronounced God dead, leaving man in charge of the world as we didn't then know it.

The churches, of course, opposed such outright atheism, but by the end of the nineteenth century they were prepared to come to terms with scientism. The battles with Darwin and Russell over evolution had left scars, but the scientific discoveries at least seemed to prove what religion had argued all along — that the universe had an order to it, and if so, there had to be an ordering principle. God to these newly enlightened

clergy was the great watchmaker. But many philosophers, and with them many artists, were not so easily satisfied. The fact that patterns were, or seemed to be, discernible in the world did not necessarily mean that these patterns had a purpose. You can have patterns without order or an ordering principle. You can observe the processes of change within the animal kingdom without leaping to the conclusion that the survival of the fittest necessarily means the elimination of the bad and the furthering of the good. The evolution of the species might not coincide with progress.

By the 1890s, artists were prepared to confront what they regarded as the facile optimism of science. In Paris, that cheeky schoolboy, Alfred Jarry, was inventing the mock science of Pataphysics and writing plays like *Ubu Roi*, where world domination is achieved by a pear-shaped megalomaniac in a pin-striped suit, who keeps his conscience in a briefcase. Tristan Tzara in Zurich in 1916 responded to the destruction of Europe in the First World War by questioning the organising principles on which his civilisation had been based. It was not just a childish game to cut up a Shakespearean sonnet into individual words, putting them afterwards into a hat and withdrawing them at random. The chance associations of Dadaism as often as not seemed to make sense, if not logic in the conventional meaning of the word, then with a dream-like puzzle logic. Whatever else the Dadaists may have proved or illustrated, they demonstrated the persistent human desire to make sense of the non-sensical. But they achieved more than this for, altogether elsewhere in Vienna, Freud was offering his theories about the significance of dreams, as a guide to the workings of the unconscious mind, a very nineteenth century process, that, to offer explanations of the totally hidden; and the Dadaists, who specialised in the random, gradually found that their non-sequiturs were taken seriously, as illustrations of how the unconscious mind operates.

Hence Dadaism became surrealism, and surrealism became the common language of the visual arts, poetry and the theatre of the Absurd. Martin Esslin, writing in the late 1950s and early 1960s, extended the meaning of the word Absurd to cover all those anti-science manifestations — from Jarry to Antonin Artaud, the half-mad theorist (though nobody would say *which* half) of dramatic sensationalism and cruelty — which had appeared in the theatre from the late nineteenth century onwards. Samuel Beckett, of course, was included, as was Harold Pinter and Eugene Ionesco, but so too were Lewis Carroll, the Goon Show, Jean Genet and Arthur Adamov, writers who from a distance must seem as remote from one another as can be devised.

But why should it be proposed that the Absurd *is* coming to an end? Has existence in the interim become more meaningful or less meaningful? The session topics reveal the scope of the conference — 'Is God a watchmaker?', 'Is anarchy better than socialism?', 'Is nonsense the death of wit?', 'Is logic a male conspiracy?', 'Are nightmares better forgotten?', 'Is madness a higher form of sanity?'. And it ends with the ominous matter of 'Black Holes', which in this case mean those giant gaps in

knowledge which we cannot perceive but only speculate about their existence. A full weekend, one presumes, enough questions perhaps for a few more days.

And yet, in one way, the conference has to end with a 'Yes'. The particular targets of the old Absurdists — the over-mechanistic interpretation of science and over-devout Christians — no longer have such a tyrannical hold over our European societies. A bland conference resolution to the effect that there is much that we still do not know would unite the scientists, the theologians, the politicians, the psychiatrists and the artists. No longer are dreams held to offer a hotline to the unconscious, no longer do Marxists talk about utopia, no longer do priests insist on total obedience, no longer are the battles for sexual freedom worth fighting. No longer are the Absurdists in Europe fighting humbug, hypocrisy and the kind of false optimism which leads straight to the prison camps and gas chambers.

And yet — in Britain, there is a revival of Victorian values, as significant in its own way as *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. There is an attempt to bring back the old certainties, where John Selwyn Gummer lectures the Anglican church for failing to provide a strong enough lead (where?) and for taking the side of permissiveness too often. The born-again Christians in the States are making a bid for the White House. The scientists may be more modest in their theoretical claims, but only because perhaps their practical results, from genetic engineering to the conquest of space, are more startling than their former dreams. The Absurdists may still have a role to play, protesting their agnosticism and their freedom of choice, when all about them are lining up for Armageddon.

FROM GUTENBERG TO NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

by W. Norman McDonald

CURRENTLY, expressions such as 'hi-tech', 'direct input' and 'information revolution' are being thrown around by the sort of people who, since they are uniquely unfit to do much else in this technological century, the rest of us allow to run our societies, governments and sometimes our lives. Such expressions pre-suppose that what is happening currently is so revolutionary as to be frightening. This, of course, is pure nonsense.

The fact is, we have been there before, and the effect was thoroughly beneficial, even for the non-technical. It is useful to recall that earlier period, at once technological, artistic and literary, all embodied in one man — Johann Gensfleisch Gutenberg (1397-1468). To understand Gutenberg's achievement, one must also understand how immeasurably slow was the pace of life prior to the fifteenth century. It took some four hundred years and more for such fundamentally important devices as the heavy plough, the watermill, the horseshoe and the three-field system of crop rotation to spread throughout Europe, precisely because there was no truly effective communicative medium. True, there existed what could be called technical communicators, but their experience tended to be narrow, and was stunted by the absence of an effective numerical system.

One of the earliest of these monastic communicators was an eleventh century German called Theophilus. In one of his essays, he describes the founding of bells, an account studded with such expressions as '... beyond the shape to the length of one palm, that a hollow be made two fingers wide'.¹ Yet another limitation on technology and its further advance was the alarming cost of what Theophilus and his brethren produced. In ninth century Spain, for example, the price of a book was almost exactly that for two cows, and matters would not improve until Gutenberg's achievement.

Indeed, in Lombardy in the middle years of the fifteenth century, a medical treatise cost what would keep the average human being for three months. Legal textbooks were even more prohibitively expensive, the most basic one, for example, swallowing up one person's living expenses for the best part of eighteen months. Little wonder that literacy was the scarcest of all European commodities! Gutenberg's development was important on three levels; firstly, the technological; secondly, the artistic and thirdly the chemical. To begin with, he developed a method of type-casting which would produce any number of standardised types. To shape these, he used a copper matrix in which the letter was struck by a steel letter-punch, cut in relief. Artistically, he adapted the letter-forms then in use to the requirements of the metal craftsman and his material, thereby doing more to standardise the European alphabet than anyone before him. Thirdly, he developed an oil-based ink for use with his metallic type, printing double-faced on the linen paper then in use. The changes

this achievement brought about were rapid, culminative and profound. In the thirty-five years between 1445 and 1480 printing with movable type became firmly established in thirty-seven European cities ranging from Oxford in the north to Palermo and Messina in the south; from Cracow and Budapest in the east to Valencia in the west. European book production was to reach the level of one thousand titles a year by the close of the fifteenth century.

Nor was this initiative simply a matter of printing. The artists of the period continued their experimentation with both colour and form and so illustrations — whether they were drawings, woodcuts, paintings or etchings — came to change the nature of book production, and with it that of education and learning in general. Throughout the opening decades of the sixteenth century, a considerable number of technical essays, tracts and manuals appeared, among which was the earliest of all European theoretical treatises on geography, and one of the first books on English agriculture; and when the German metallurgist George Bauer pointed out that he had gone to the trouble of hiring technical artists ‘...lest the descriptions which are conveyed by words should either not be understood by men of our own times or should cause difficulty to posterity’,² he little realised that he had created one of the first true technical manuals. Yet the opposition to printing was already gathering momentum, and from all the expected quarters such as the wealthy, the self-appointed experts in a variety of lucrative fields who had rarely been questioned as to the soundness of their knowledge and, of course, the church.

The wealthy feared that what they had formerly paid a fortune for would now be worthless, and the so-called experts feared for their hitherto unchallenged livelihoods. The church’s objections on the other hand were more complex. Whilst medieval prelates and other churchmen had been largely responsible for the easing of scientific and engineering concepts, ideas and explanatory literature into European life and thought, by the time of the renaissance the church could not, or would not concede the need for a change towards the secular, the more especially, it seemed, when such an idea was advocated via the new technology. What it could not control the church decided to ignore, and so change went ahead without it. There steadily emerged an increasingly technological Europe in which the church had no place, and indeed still does not. Yet it soon became obvious that the church had stood tall against phantom fears and wild imaginings, simply because so few of its servants had a basic technological understanding or even the desire to acquire one.

Had either of these conditions existed, on however moderate a scale, the church would have rapidly realised that there was nothing tremendously new about Gutenberg’s development, and therefore little if anything to fear from it. Printing with wood blocks had been known in Europe since the late thirteenth century, and woodblock illustrations had been used by European artists for equally as long, if not longer.

Movable type rapidly increased the pace of discovery, and with it the spread of knowledge and what education was then available. No longer

would experience, observation and word of mouth be the sole methods of learning, or human memory the only device remotely approaching a source of reference. The printed book and tract would free the minds of men everywhere from a form of confinement dominant since time began, the stout stockade of parochialism. As movable type opened up European minds, so the full-rigged sailing ship opened up huge new geographical vistas, ushering in the epoch of world history, an achievement equally as dependent on the printing press.

Ship-handling and weaponry — firearms especially — require a precise and accurately-executed drill, the effectiveness of which depended entirely 'upon the officers and sergeants learning the manual backwards. From Sergeant-Major or Boatswain upwards, they had to be literate,'³ and such literacy was one of the great achievements of movable type. Throughout Asia and elsewhere at this time '... these two classes of officer... did not exist. Nor were they easily created, for the Indian caste system and the Chinese ideogram tended to keep learning and war in separate compartments'⁴ Nor did these societies have the printing press on anything like the European scale, if indeed some of them were aware of it at all. Possessing a technology, therefore, was of little significance if its users attempted to operate it with illiterate, untrained people, or without precise, easily-understood instructions and commands, both of which were the product of that 'democracy of the intellect... the printed book',⁵ the harbinger of the scientific, technological and increasingly pragmatic centuries to come.

Another achievement of movable type was the increasing opportunities for upward mobility among those who were literate, some of the best examples of which come from this great age of European discovery.

At present we too are experiencing a period of fundamental questioning of what has gone before, as well as experiencing a broadening of horizons at once upward, outward and inward, towards the most microscopically fundamental in our own world, and the unbelievably distant among our galactic neighbours.

We are therefore in the midst of both a knowledge and information explosion in almost every discipline and sphere of human activity, all of whose questioning, sceptical origins can — however tenuously — be traced back to Gutenberg and the earliest printed books. By way of illustration, Europe alone currently publishes close to one hundred and thirty thousand book titles per year, among which is a massive body of technological literature, indeed some sixty to seventy million pages annually.

Moreover, upward mobility is no longer simply wondered at but accepted as a perfectly normal phenomenon, which is as it should be. The present century alone has seen an incredible amount of upward mobility world-wide, all of which has been the result of the further development of Gutenberg's original press. Therefore, whilst the present developments in information handling, processing and dissemination are equally as technological, artistic and literary — for example the standardisation of letter-forms for computer operations and the illustrative

beauty of computer graphics — as that which Gutenberg initiated, they differ in two distinct ways. Firstly, they are embodied not in a single person but many thousands, male and female, world-wide, and secondly they are — as the present century demands — infinitely faster.

Yet another facet of Gutenberg's time that has not changed one whit is the cast of mind of the technologically ignorant. Like their predecessors, they have not taken the trouble to acquire as much as a nodding acquaintance with the worlds of science and technology. Had they done so, they would have realised that what is happening presently is a perfectly normal, indeed natural development of the previous generation of concepts, ideas and machines. They — in turn — were the result of the advance of the transistor and its myriad derivatives. Indeed, the transistor too was labelled 'new', 'revolutionary', and several other adjectives besides by the same sort of people on its original appearance. Yet the theory behind it had been developed as early as 1923.

The ultimate sadness is that today's technologically ignorant are in equally as great a danger of shadow-boxing themselves into the same dark, dank cloister as the church counterpunched its way into so unnecessarily almost five centuries ago. This last brought about an initial tremor in the European intellect that would result in the fracture of the 'two cultures', an abyss of the mind that is still with us.

Yet history tends to show that scientific technology and its theories and machines have united more than they have broken apart, freed more than they have enslaved. The current information technology and its successors will liberate equally as much as Gutenberg's did, and from yet another form of parochial cant — nationalism. Moreover, no machine will ever enjoy such an ascendancy that it will be able to replace or even destroy the very considerable body of human skill, built up over centuries of craftsmanship, as a few of the technologically ignorant have been attempting to claim. So let us hear no more of 'revolutionary-this', or 'hi-that'. If the glib, the technologically ignorant and the wordy are at a loss as to how to confront, as they would put it, what they cannot take the trouble to understand, then the world has lost nothing. They, on the other hand, have lost more than they know; more than they will ever know.

NOTES

- 1 *A History of Western Technology* Friedrich Klemm George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1959, p 67
 - 2 *A Social History of Engineering* W H G Armytage Faber & Faber, London, 1976, p 62.
 - 3 *East and West* C Northcote Parkinson John Murray, London, 1963, p 210
 - 4 *Ibid* (3), p.210
 - 5 *The Ascent of Man* J Bronowski BBC Publications, 1981, p 429
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CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

AS regular readers of *Contemporary Review* will be aware, I'm confronted every November with an absurdity called the London Film Festival. For the last couple of years the publicity has stressed how much it has grown since the first festival, thirty-one years ago, when 'a mere fifteen films' were shown. We're supposed to ignore the fact that all of them were worth seeing, whereas these days maybe ten per cent of the 150-odd on view might just deserve programming in the festival. According to Sheila Whitaker, who now runs it, it's a question of 'bringing the best of world cinema—the cream of the last twelve-month's production' to the NFT. I can authoritatively say that there are a great many movies currently around which fit into those categories (it's been an excellent season—see my next column), presumably not selected for or invited to the festival, while I can pronounce on only a handful or so.

'An excellent choice' says Ms Whitaker of *Predator*, 'to broaden the base of a festival perceived as "highbrow" for far too long'—but this is cinema for morons. Yes, I know there is a market for action adventures, and this one is—apparently—very well done. The first thirty minutes consist of Arnold Schwarzenegger leading a party of parachutists into the jungle to find some missing VIPs, the next ten showed an unmotivated battle between them and some natives, with countless bodies being blown up or burnt alive—quite graphically, of course. I couldn't tell you what happened after that, but the air outside was wonderfully refreshing. That was the only real dud, so at least I'm managing to reduce the proportion of those that I see, but I ask you, what is *Way Upstream* doing among 'the best of world cinema'? Ah, I see that as a play it was produced at the National Theatre. It was written by Alan Ayckbourn, and I have noticed that his plays tend to be rapturously received by the brethren of Fleet Street. I've actually seen some of them myself. Since I suffered (it's not pleasant to sit stoney-faced while all around you people are laughing, albeit at feeble jokes, worse plotting and only the mildest, tritest comment on the way people behave) I've tried the less painful way of judging Ayckbourn's work when it has turned up on television. This, in fact, was made for the BBC. It tells of two ill-assorted couples on a boat trip and, for a while, because of the river views, it's a beguiling entertainment. There arrives a Zorba-Magus figure, played convincingly by Stuart Wilson as a drifter of dangerous charm. He learns that one of the wives was a member of a dance troupe called 'The Ginger Nuts', so that is what he calls her. It's the sort of thing this writer thinks is funny. Humour needs plausibility and I'm afraid that in the context of young ladies 'Ginger Nuts' has connotations which would have made them risible before they ever got on stage. In the end, we're up to our necks in *Deliverance*-like carnage (only we're not—it all turns out to be a dream). I suppose it's what happens when writers of puny talent respond to critics' demands to

do more than entertain. This may be the invention of the director, Terry Johnson, hitherto known only as a writer, since he claims to have done some reshaping, but the credits acknowledge only Ayckbourn as the sole begetter.

Two other pieces made for British television were vastly better. *The Vision*, later shown on the BBC's 'Screen Two' series, was said to be about the manipulative powers of the media, but it's really about the destruction of a man. He's a one-time television presenter (Dirk Bogarde), now reduced to collecting five hundred quid for opening bazaars. He's to be employed by a company planning to introduce American-style religious programmes, as run by Lee Remick — and no more than Sister Sharon (in *Elmer Gantry*) do we know whether she's sincere or not. Perhaps because they are often derivative the writer William Nicholson and the director Norman Stone do not always have the power of their convictions but much intelligence is shown by both. They do have something to say about the real and the self-inflated power of the media, and mostly they say it very well. But, as I said, it's basically the tale of a nice, weak man in the grip of monsters. Miss Remick never puts an inflection wrong, but it's not only because she's still a stunning looker that she takes the piece from Eileen Atkins — playing Bogarde's wife — one of the best emotional actresses we have. Bogarde, caught between two superior talents, does a lot of acting.

Closing Ranks — shown on ITV — is the first feature of the American-born documentary director, Roger Graef, who co-wrote it with Andy Smith. Graef is best-known for his series on the workings of the Thames Valley Police, and perhaps because of his experience he holds himself back here. His protagonist is a demoted CID man (Rob Spendlove), sent to a provincial town. He doesn't impress his new superintendent, nor do his foul mouth and fascist ways carry much weight with his new colleagues — though they neither stop him nor report him when he beats up a Greenham Common supporter. He ends discovered, disgraced and probably insane — not 'big' enough a climax for a cinema movie, yet as a portrait of Britain today I'd put this ahead of most that we've seen over the past few years.

Local talent also distinguished itself in two other features, both part-funded by Channel 4. *The Kitchen Toto* is set in Kenya in the Fifties, when the director Harry Hook was growing up there. His young hero is a boy of twelve, Mwangi (Edwin Mahinda), caught between the British family for whom he is working, and the Kikuyu tribe, who believe that extreme violence is the only means of recovering their homeland. Matters of plotting are complicated by the fact that the boy works for the Police Commissioner (Bob Peck), whose home becomes a target. Despite the ever-present violence and some revealing incidents — as when Mwangi is led into trouble by the son of the house, who has no intention of sharing the blame — the final effect is rather like Renoir's *The River*. That, you will recall, was a gentle film and yes, this is the best movie by far that we've had about the British in Africa. but it should have been — surely?

— closer to Costa-Gavras's films about terrorism

This is Mr Hook's first feature. *A Month in the Country* is the second one we have seen directed by Pat O'Connor and this one is set in Yorkshire in 1919 or 1920. Two war veterans have come to a small Yorkshire village — one (Kenneth Branagh) to excavate beyond the cemetery for the grave of a Crusader, and the other (Colin Firth) to uncover a medieval wall painting. There are some wonderful things in this picture, including the portrait of a time when religion was a factor in everyone's lives, when walking long distances was the only means of transport, when reading in the evening was done by oil lamp. And there are the two leading performances, of which Firth's is the harder and showier — but magnificently done. On the other hand, there is much clumsiness, as in the connection between the grave and the painting, the playing of secular music in church (unpermissible I think), not to mention the twin revelations that the Branagh character is both a hero and a homosexual. I might just accept that he carried his medal in his valise (I wouldn't), but I find it unlikely that a complete stranger should accost Firth in a nearby town with his allegations. I do not know whether J. L. Carr's novel was more subtle, but the screenwriter, Simon Gray, might have tried to be.

From Japan came *Actress*, which might merit inclusion, since it was directed by Kon Ichikawa, who once made movies of the order of *Tokyo Olympiad* and *Alone on the Pacific*. His late films have been the reverse, unadventurous in both form and content, and he's missed a thousand chances in this study of the actress Kinuyo Tanaka, who was remarkable for the depths she could reveal from behind a rather withdrawn, stubborn countenance. The lady playing her bears little resemblance, while the characters of the great directors Gosho and Mizoguchi are reduced respectively to a smiling nonentity and a lovable curmudgeon. In the end, the piece is less revealing than the least Hollywood biopic. Ermanno Olmi's *Lunga Vita Alla Signora!* (Long Live the Lady!) shows a partial return to form after the dismal *Cammuna Cammina*. And resemblance to fact, says a foreword, is entirely intentional, as we plunge into a study of teenage apprentices being taught to serve at a swanky dinner in a remote luxury hotel. As on past occasions Olmi concerns himself with allegory, and the gap between those who have and those who don't. Alas, the jokes at the expense of the diners are all pallid if affectionate (no mean feat, since Olmi clearly loathes them), and the text itself lacks body. The obvious comparison is with Buñuel, whose film on a dinner party was teeming with detail, not always scabrous. Another of the world's best directors, Andrzej Wajda, came up with something less than satisfactory. It's another of his 'time remembered' pieces, written with Tadeusz Konwicki, on whose novel it is based. The time is the summer of '39, and Wajda has said that there is not necessarily much truth in the film, since it's a picture of an idealised childhood. But like most teenage love affairs in movies we're never far from Andy Hardy — you know, the uppity girl whose interest in the boy waxes and wanes; also, as I suspected in the far superior *Young Ladies of Wilko*, Wajda doesn't really like women.

His compatriot, Krzysztof Kielowski, has done a brilliant piece of work on another adolescent, a misfit at the time of the Student Uprising in the late 60s. *Blind Chance* more deliberately (than Wajda's film) sets out to blur the lines between what is, what may be and what could be. Indeed, I'm not sure that I recognised them, but I haven't seen a movie as well-crafted or well-acted in years. Since David Mamet's *House of Games* is neither of these things, I had some initial trouble with it (I saw them on the same day). Although Joe Mantegna has acted in some of Mamet's plays I found him both amateurish and artificial — not to mention miscast (if I dare say so) as a master con-man. Mamet's wife, Lindsay Crouse, is much better — though not as good as she has been under other directors (this is Mamet's first film in that capacity). She plays a bestselling author, a psychologist and university professor who finds herself drawn into Mantegna's schemes, deeper and deeper — to the extent that it is she who takes revenge at the climax. At that point the twists peter out, but they had been till then splendidly entertaining.

That's an expression to use about *No Way Out*, almost certainly the best of the bumper '87 crop of thrillers. Kenneth Fearing's novel has been switched from the world of New York publishing to the Pentagon, where a young naval attaché (Kevin Costner) is assigned to investigate a murder in which he is the prime suspect. He knows that the victim (Sean Young) was sleeping with him and one of his superiors (Gene Hackman), but the situation is far more complex than that. The story was known in its previous incarnation as *The Big Clock*, which was fine when Ray Milland and Charles Laughton did it. It's even better now, coming up freshly scrubbed — yet, if you examine the plot of the earlier film, it's practically identical. Roger Donaldson directed. However, the movie I most enjoyed in the festival was *The Glass Menagerie*, despite being exposed to Tennessee Williams's play every other year for the past forty. Of course I like the play, but I've liked others of Williams which no longer seem so hot. This one is here in its entirety, still set in one apartment, but with no outside excursions as adapted and directed by Paul Newman. He did it in tribute to his wife, Joanne Woodward, who had played Amanda on stage. I didn't see Laurette Taylor, who created the role, but I've seen many others, including Shirley Booth, Helen Hayes and Katharine Hepburn. Miss Woodward is the best I've seen, full of humour and love and only hinting at the selfishness which is the core of the woman. John Malkovich, damp-eyed and of angular gestures, is so strong that the piece is no longer about a painfully shy girl with no prospect of marriage nor of a domineering mother dreaming of a happier past. It is, as Williams always intended, and which it seldom is, a drama about a young man yearning to escape a dismal home and a hypocritical mother.

CORRESPONDENCE

A DIFFERENT VIEW OF TIBET

Dear Madam,

An article in the November 1987 (Vol 251, No. 1,462) edition of *Contemporary Review* entitled 'Xizang — The Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China', written by Professor Thomas Stapleton, gives a rosy picture of conditions in Tibet today, and contrasts it with conditions in Tibet before the coming of the Chinese Communists in 1949, echoing Beijing's propaganda stance

Professor Stapleton's account is extraordinarily selective. For example, it has now been reliably established that since 1949 the Chinese have been responsible for the deaths of over one million Tibetans, including nearly 100,000 tortured to death, the extermination of an ancient and unique culture, together with racism verging on apartheid. These facts have been reliably established since about 1981 and have been compiled from eye-witness accounts, written testimonies and records compiled over many years, and the accounts of foreign observers visiting Tibet who have spoken with Tibetans and taken films of Tibet showing the cultural and ecological devastation caused in Tibet by Chinese policies. Three major presentations have been made to the Human Rights Commission, Geneva, drawing attention to the above facts and Third World delegates present were shocked at the dimensions of Chinese racism in Tibet, which Professor Stapleton does not even mention. Documentary proof is contained in a Report entitled *Tibet The Facts* which has been widely circulated to the media, both here and abroad, and among other things has drawn attention to a huge Chinese prison complex, located at Xining in Central China, in which numberless thousands of Tibetans perished during the 'Twenty Years War' and which, according to the testimony of two former prisoners, may contain as many as 10 million inmates.

Contrary to Professor Stapleton's account, an enormous amount of evidence strongly suggests that Tibetans are severely discriminated against in education, housing, work opportunities, hospital treatment, and that what is left of their culture is being eroded by a huge influx of Chinese settlers. Accounts of conditions in Tibet from accredited reporters drew attention to the legacy of Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet and the racial discrimination that is practised against Tibetans in virtually all spheres of life. Here are a few examples. Tibetan as a spoken and written language is slowly dying out and is being replaced by Chinese, and at a time of high unemployment those who do not speak Chinese find it virtually impossible to get work, when and if they do they are always subordinate to a Chinese supervisor and can be dismissed on the slightest pretext. Education for Tibetan children is minimal and is used as a vehicle for communist ideology and there are known cases where the science faculty in colleges is restricted entirely to Chinese. Tourists in Tibet have observed that new houses built are occupied either by the Chinese or by Tibetan communist cadres, very few ordinary Tibetans

benefit Hospital treatment, contrary to Professor Stapleton's robust assertions, is practically non-existent for Tibetans

Finally, without arguing for or against Tibetan independence, it is worth pointing out that Tibet was entirely independent from China from 1913-1950 and was occupied on the basis of claims made by ancient imperial and imperialist dynasties of which the Communists evidently approved Using similar 'logic' the present British government could occupy Southern Ireland on the basis of claims made by the English Plantagenet kings of the 13th century!

Yours faithfully,

The Secretary — *Optimus*, London, W.13

PAUL INGRAM

Dear Madam,

I was interested to read the article 'Xizang — the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China' by Professor Thomas Stapleton, in the November 1987 (Vol 251, No 1,462) issue of *Contemporary Review* I have recently undertaken research on Tibet for the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group and appreciate that it is a very controversial, thorny issue; to plot an impartial route is thwart with difficulties, and to produce a balanced account is no easy task

I was dismayed, however, to see that Professor Stapleton has made no attempt at impartiality He pays tribute to Chinese developments, particularly in health and education, but ignores the atrocities and abuses of human rights they have perpetrated in Tibet since 1950

For brevity's sake, I would like to raise just a couple of points of which Professor Stapleton makes no mention Firstly, the Tibet to which he refers — Xizang, or the Tibetan Autonomous Region — is only one third of the area recognised by the world as Tibet before the arrival of the Chinese in 1950

Secondly, in the last few years a vast amount of evidence and information has come out of Tibet revealing the effects of Chinese rule. Thus, ten years ago Professor Stapleton's selective reporting might have been acceptable, but today there is an overwhelming wealth of evidence on Tibet It is now clear that over one million Tibetans have died as a result of the Chinese presence, in battles and uprisings, and due to starvation, execution, torture and death in prison and labour camps. Whatever the modern developments induced by the Chinese one must question whether they justify this massive human sacrifice Professor Stapleton asks whether 'bringing an old society into the twentieth century' can be done without the use of force'. By omitting to answer this question he appears to condone all the appalling acts of 37 years of Chinese mis-rule

Unfortunately, many observers of China have taken comfort in technological development and adopted a colonial attitude that supports educational, health and agricultural 'reforms' being introduced regardless of the needs, interests or willingness of the indigenous population

The distorted nature of the article does a great dis-service to the Tibetan people Such bias reporting has enabled the Chinese to destroy a unique

centuries-old culture while the rest of the world has turned a blind eye. Although the author stresses the visible evidence of Buddhism in Tibet, he apparently fails to realise that the Tibetans' religion has been transformed from a science of the mind to a blind, ritualistic faith.

I offer two further examples. Professor Stapleton mentions 'improved agriculture', but ignores some basic facts. Until the arrival of the Chinese there were no reports of famine, starvation or hunger in Tibet. However, since 1950, time-honoured agricultural practices have been destroyed, mass immigration and the experiment of collectivisation have brought on widespread food shortages. Over 300,000 Tibetans have died from starvation in the last 37 years.

Professor Stapleton refers to the 'preservation of forests'. Deforestation has occurred to the extent that the Chinese have benefitted to the tune of £33 billion since 1959. The absence of a reforestation programme and the corresponding soil erosion have produced untold ecological devastation.

Cowley, Middlesex

Yours faithfully,

WILLIAM P. LEDGER

The May issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Africa and the Wider World* by David Birmingham, *Economic Gloom: The Light at the End of the Tunnel* by Mark Cook, *Regency Days: the Unpublished Diaries of Charlotte Grove* by Desmond Hawkins and *The Early Struggles of the Gato-Daciens* by Constantin Gheorghe (held over from the March issue)

Literary Supplement

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

As Time Goes By Hilary Bailey Constable £8 95 *A Far Cry from Kensington*. Muriel Spark Constable £9 95 *The Unicorn Sisters* Ursula Holden Methuen £9 95. *Trust Me* John Updyke Deutsch £9 95 *Sucking Sherbert Lemons* Michael Carson Gollancz £10 95 *Winter A Berlin Family 1899-1945* Len Deighton Hutchinson, £11.95

With so many exotic and glamorous themes crying out for attention, it is interesting to note that several of the most accomplished British novelists have elected to remain within home territory. If it can be claimed that the foremost task of the novelist is to convey the contemporary scene, *As Time Goes By* fulfils the requirement perfectly, for Hilary Bailey is deeply familiar with the situation in London's northern run-down fringes. The central character, Polly Kops, is a typical product of the hopeful and permissive sixties, now disillusioned, vague as to where her priorities should lie, yet doggedly determined to do her best for her children, neighbours and hangers-on. Her literary talents, sufficiently impressive to have won a commission to write an updated version of the classic film *Casablanca*, are all but submerged by the pressures of domesticity and the management of a modest street-market antiques' stall: yet work on the film script must continue for, if ever completed, the royalties might clear the most pressing of her debts. And these are formidable, although life in a decaying mansion, over-populated and in urgent need of basic repair, threatens to overwhelm the creative purpose.

Polly Kops also has to cope with a divorced husband, an ex-mother-in-law, a grandson, a former lover as well as an uncongenial neighbour. Next door, in a similar house which has been expensively modernised, live the Lombards, both profitably employed, but to suppose that Anna Lombard is better off than Polly is soon revealed as a total misconception. Childless, Anna longs for motherhood, only to suffer a miscarriage. Faithful, she constantly anticipates her husband's infidelity and resents his excessive concern for his first wife. Thus, both Anna and Polly are caught in traps not of their own devising, and the poignancy of *As Time Goes By* is their inability to escape from the limitations and responsibilities of marriage which once seemed infinitely desirable. No final solutions are offered in this rich tapestry of a novel, presented with an abundance of crisp, racy dialogue through which Anna Lombard's story is effectively conveyed in the form of a recurring monologue. Polly battles on gallantly against the prospect of selling her crumbling home and in the end does not need to do so for — surprisingly and indeed almost incredibly — the success of the *Casablanca* rewrite yields sufficient profit to pay her debts and renovate the house. Is it unduly cynical to question the plausibility of this sudden turnabout in Polly's fortunes? Perhaps, but it is not really important in view of the bubbling authenticity of all that preceded it.

Muriel Spark also remains strictly within the metropolis although the setting of *A Far Cry from Kensington* is, as the title implies, a 'far cry' from Hilary Bailey's down-at-heel North London scene. The period is the early fifties. The

house of bed-sitting rooms in a quiet cul-de-sac is clean, upper-class and generally well maintained under the careful administration of a conscientious landlady. One of the residents, Nancy Hawkins, serves as a mouthpiece for a nostalgic saga of those far-off days. Recollection and information are agreeably sifted through this engaging character. Unfortunately, although overweight, unfashionably attired, Mrs Hawkins (Nancy), makes valiant attempts at objectivity, she occasionally verges on the complacent, readily endorsing the illusion that her many genuinely kindly actions place her in a class apart. More satisfactory are Mrs Hawkins' accounts of her work as a publisher's editor at the doomed Ullswater Press and later the prestigious Mackintosh and Tooley. Here, the vagaries of office life, staff and authors are a delight. The temptation to attempt identification must be resisted; for Muriel Spark's thumbnail sketches are clearly composites born of observation and experience over many years. A persistent storyline concerning Mrs Hawkins' almost obsessional vendetta against a hack journalist, with whom she is only casually acquainted, straddles the sprightly record of life among the nineteen-fifties publishing fraternity. An equally jarring note is struck by the arbitrary introduction of an extra-sensory perception sub-plot and the homosexual punch-up at Mrs Hawkins' final place of work. Ungrateful, perhaps, to query these side issues in view of the abundant diversity of *A Far Cry from Kensington*, yet the reader may be forgiven for requesting nothing more than a further draught of Muriel Spark's witty and astringent reminiscences, undiluted by narrative complexities.

Ursula Holden looks back further in time for her tenth novel, *Unicorn Sisters*, which is in effect a sequel to the fascinating and original *Tin Toys*, a deceptively lightweight story which had deep undertones and dark currents swirling beneath the seemingly innocent games enjoyed by three young sisters and their baby brother, Bruno, accidentally 'killed' during a childish prank. The period of *Tin Toys* was immediately before World War II, and *Unicorn Sisters* takes the little girls up to the summer of 1939 when their mother, obsessed with her own theatrical and social aspirations, dumps the ill-prepared trio in a West Country 'school', owned by the Misses Gee, which serves as a convenient refuge for evacuees. Bonny, the oldest daughter, is to be 'substitute mother', but her problem, apart from coping with the little ones in a new environment, is to come to terms with her own inconveniently timed emergence into puberty. The lonely dilemma of a child who is also a woman has never been more honestly and explicitly handled. There is also Ula, the little devil, always certain to put a foot wrong, and Tor, perhaps the most distinguished and artistic of the three, finding the necessary adjustments particularly burdensome. However, there was no real cause for worry if the children, despite their expensive uniforms and newly issued gas masks, were unsuited to take part in boarding school routine, for very soon that way of life disintegrated. Staff left, meals were prepared by a horny-handed gardener and the arrival of evacuees from London set a seal on the general disorder. When, by running away, the three sisters contrived to return to their old home, only to find it occupied by army units, their absentee mother at last assumes some measure of responsibility and concern for her daughters, particularly the distraught Bonny, distancing herself, though temporarily, from the man she is determined to marry. These final passages are to some extent tantalising in their haste, possibly with the intention of developing the girls' relationship with their prospective stepfather in a later novel? Yet the turmoil of the formative years, when a school play can seem to be the most important event in the world, coupled with the indifference of adults unaware of their own omnipotence, emerges powerfully

enough, even if it is sometimes necessary to dig down through some very light-hearted and even farcical scenes to arrive at it

No such excavations are required to plumb the depths of youthful frustration in *Sucking Sherbert Lemons* by Michael Carson. He is described on the jacket as a 'funny' writer and, in an accompanying cyclostyled letter, Simon Callow refers to himself as 'howling with laughter' while reading the novel. Given that Michael Carson has the ability to describe people and scenes with a brevity and insight commendable in a first novel, it must be acknowledged that to many people this story of a bewildered adolescent is at times sad, even repellent. Superficially, young Benson is well-endowed. His father is a policeman, his mother a conscientious parent and housewife. Both are staunch Roman Catholics. The spiritual welfare of their only son is a matter of prime importance to them. Yet alas, how little they know of the torment endured by the over-plump lad, beset by sexual urgings enigmatically described by the local priest as 'irregular motions of the flesh', the evil consequences of which may be purged only by regular and routine visits to the confessional. Perhaps it would all have passed off in the natural course of such pubescent phases, Benson might have shed his puppy-fat, gained a university degree and settled down to a humdrum heterosexual way of life, had he not been so deeply involved in clandestine activities with other boys at the Rude Club and, even more seriously, become the object of desire for men not concerned with 'stable relationships' but squalid encounters in dark, secret places not even dreamed about by Benson's protective parents.

As a means of escape from it all, Benson agrees to enter a seminary with the hope of becoming a priest — yet he is too enterprising and intelligent to view the closed life of the monastery with enthusiasm, and it is ironic that even in that sequestered environment the old personal temptations re-occur, nor is he by any means protected from salacious overtures. Owing to one of these he is requested to leave, unjustly under a cloud, to resume a life of home, day-school and nocturnal assignations. The death of his mother coincides with his participation in an 'orgy' which marks the end of his apprenticeship as an adolescent, for we are given to understand that after this initiation he is to be accepted as a mature adult. The demise of the good-hearted though uncomprehending woman is unexpected, with the minimum preparation, yet it is seen to be merely a milestone on the road to Benson's recognition of himself as a homosexual. True, many of the scenes are conveyed with a robust humour: all is consistently lively and true to life, yet two lingering and over-riding impressions remain — the hypocrisy of some members of a church which should be offering honesty and understanding, and the self-inflicted wounds of the very young.

John Updyke is a prolific writer whose published works are consistently of the highest standard. *Roger's Version* and *The Witches of Eastwick* — recently filmed — have ensured for him a lasting fame. Thus, the publication of a new book from him is an important event. It would not be entirely fair to complain that *Trust Me*, described on the title pages as 'Stories', falls short of expectation; for the brief sketches are in no sense inadequate for what they have set out to achieve. Much of the fascination of John Updyke's writing lies in the slightly off-beat, and the short, randomly assembled pieces serve to illustrate his working methods. The first three stories, 'Trust Me', 'Killing' and 'Still of Some Use' resemble notes in an artist's sketchbook. 'Trust Me' is a strange little tale of inherited fear, 'Killing' tells of more fear and the sad occasion of a parent's death. In 'Still of Some Use' there are memories of a dead love, demonstrating the general aimlessness which can so easily pervade domestic

routine. Even the amusing 'One More Interview', which describes a jaded actor trapped into a publicity tour with an inept reporter, does little more than endorse a general sense of disillusionment. Only two of the stories, 'The Wallet' and 'The City', conform to the accepted technique of the short story, for they concentrate on a complete experience. 'The Wallet' is about a dread well-known to most people — of losing the pocket book which contains everything needed for life in a highly commercialised society, while 'The City', perhaps the best of the twenty-one stories, is again a study of anxiety and fear. A man suffering acute pain in a strange city is taken to hospital, operated on as an emergency, thus entering the closed world of patients, doctors, the paraphernalia of surgery and follow-on treatment. When he leaves the ward, cured though still convalescent, the door closes behind him on that world and soon — we may assume — it will be forgotten.

And finally, something altogether different — an entirely satisfying and absorbing novel which is likely to please readers with widely differing tastes. In *Winter A Berlin Family 1899-1945* Len Deighton has attempted a story of epic strength, tracing one family's involvement with the Nazi regime from beginnings altogether innocent of such a horrendous conclusion. In over 500 pages there is sufficient scope to trace in meticulous detail the development of immensely important personal and political issues and *Winter A Berlin Family 1899-1945* would seem to stand as a definitive analysis of Hitler's Germany.

Also Received

Murder in the Limelight Amy Myers Malvern Publishing Co £9 50

With her second detective novel *Murder in the Limelight*, Amy Myers explores the backstage world of the musical theatre towards the end of the last century. This proves to be a rewarding decision as the carefully researched background of a now defunct theatre just off the Strand, the Galaxy, proves interesting in itself as distinct from the murder of one of the 'Galaxy Girls'. As in Amy Myers' first novel, *Pugs Parlour*, Auguste Didier is the resident sleuth. With his keen eye and vantage point for observing the activities of the cast and others, he is well situated to solve the mystery which certainly has its grisly moments. An interesting side issue is the tentative linking of the Galaxy murder with a possible revival of the Ripper Scandal.

A Yellow Raft in Blue Water Michael Dorris. Hamish Hamilton £11 95

A Yellow Raft in Blue Water is long, slow, detailed and very American in style and concept. It may open up a new world to readers not familiar with life among Indians in the Montana Indian Reservation. It is, in the main, the story of a young girl, Rayona, and the influence of other members of her family on her development and future way of life and uses an original technique in which the narrative moves backwards. Many vivid and finely described scenes remain long in the memory, particularly relating to the final passages. This is Michael Dorris' first novel. An unusual situation is that Louise Erdrich, his wife, also a writer, is described in the publicity material as his collaborator. Whether the present novel is a joint effort of the couple or Michael Dorris' unaided offering is not clear, although the latter seems more likely.

The Exile William Kotzwinkle Bodley Head £10 95

William Kotzwinkle is a fast moving, audacious writer who gets straight to the heart of the matter in this send-up of Hollywood as it might be seen today through the eyes of an imaginative observer. Cleverly, *The Exile* swings back in time to reproduce the worst excesses of Hitler's Germany, relived in dreams.

NON FICTION REVIEWS

INSIDE THE REICH

In Hitler's Germany Bernt Engelmann Methuen £12 95 *The Burden of German History*, edited by Michael Laffan, Methuen £17 50

The first of these two studies is a remarkable portrayal of the complexities of life in the Third Reich, presented in near-autobiographical form. The former editor of *Der Spiegel* published his original German text in two volumes, one describing the home front, the other the years of war. This condensed and richly inter-woven one-volume edition recaptures the horrors and the tension of these appalling years with uncanny vividness. Its compactness and its kaleidoscopic treatment give it variety and impact. The autobiographical theme — of a Berliner born in 1921 in a liberal family who even as a boy was clandestinely in the resistance to the Nazis — is given depth by adding to it accounts of the experiences of his friends, based on post-war recollections, interviews and tape-recordings. When the war came Engelmann himself, then 18, became a radio-operator in the Luftwaffe, and used his relative freedom of operations — and his knowledge of the world outside — to aid and abet the escape of many Jews and opponents of the regime. In the end, in 1944, he was arrested by the Gestapo and was fortunate that the long probing into his activities took place only as the German front was collapsing, he was liberated only just in time and as almost a skeleton from Dachau in 1945.

What he gives us here is a gripping, and a cautionary, tale. Many Germans were horrified at the gradually-developing features of the Nazi regime, but many chose to live with it and to endure it, to keep quiet was — with luck — to survive *Sauve qui peut*. Some were true believers, some profiteers, some shameless opportunists. Engelmann changes names to hide identities, and by his episodic telling gives to ugly facts a fictional glossiness. He did survive, and afterwards he prospered. But, given what he was doing, he was lucky. Or — behind their daunting ruthlessness — maybe the Nazis were not quite as efficient as they said, and believed, they were? In any telling, these were years of horror.

The matching volume puts the Nazi regime in a historical context. The regime owed its origins to the feebleness — and the inflation and industrial depression — of the short-lived Weimar Republic, itself a product of the failure of the Kaiser's Germany in the *sturm und drang* of World War I. This theme — the continuity since Bismarck's day of German problems, and of their dreams — was discussed at a conference in University College, Dublin, in 1986, and the twelve essays by Irish and German scholars printed here were first presented as lectures then.

Although papers delivered at conferences are inevitably uneven in quality and range, these essays are stimulating and probing. The points that keep recurring are the distinction between the political weaknesses of the Weimar state (in part a relic of its many political parties), and its cultural richness and diversity, the problems that Brüning and Hindenburg found insoluble were the economic and political legacy less of Weimar than of the First Reich, and there was a distinct folk culture running through the Weimar and Nazi years. There are two specially arresting essays. Eda Sagarra's study (*Blut und Boden* fiction) and Peter Lobanyi's *Images of Fascism*, and despite the brevity of Peter

Hoffmann's survey of the German resistance to Hitler, it is a useful complement to Bernt Engelmann, and a reminder that, through the years of horror, there were many Germans who were brave and honourable men

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE STALKER CASE

Stalker John Stalker Harrap, London £12.95

One either accepts Mr Stalker's fascinating story as substantially correct, or one refuses to do so. I myself see no reason whatever for questioning it. It has been denounced, not surprisingly, by Sir John Hermon, Chief Constable of Northern Ireland, whom I know to be an honest man. But Sir John has not been able to point to factual errors. He picked on one alleged inaccuracy, but frankly I would consider that his memory must have been at fault.

When Mr Stalker began his investigation, Sir John asked him to lunch at a golf club (incidentally, there was a third person present). Stalker tells the story this way: 'During the meal, Hermon handed me a handwritten note, sketched on the back of a flattened-out cigarette packet. It outlined my family tree on my mother's side. She is Catholic, and her parents were born in the Irish Republic. No mention was made of my father, who is a Protestant from a Liverpool family. I was never able to fully fathom why the Chief Constable gave me that piece of flattened cardboard.'

It is inconceivable that Mr Stalker made that story up. On the face of it, it is an intimidatory gesture.

Once we accept the account given by Stalker, we must agree that he was abominably treated, though it is not easy to pin-point the main guilt. It is impossible not to believe that he was taken off his investigation because he was getting too near the truth. It is impossible not to believe that the allegations about his conduct were cooked up to provide an excuse for removing him.

His association with Mr Kevin Taylor in Manchester may or may not have been prudent, but it was perfectly well known before he was asked to undertake these investigations.

Mr Stalker is noticeably fair about Sir John Hermon's motivation. He recognises that he conceived his first duty to be to his police force and to the necessity of maintaining their morale in their appallingly difficult task. Looked at in that way, the story becomes a tragic conflict between two honourable men. As Stalker writes: 'The struggle between him and me was not just one between two equally determined men, it was between conflicting philosophies of balancing broad responsibilities in an imperfect world.' What remains so puzzling is the answer to the questions: Who really decided that the Stalker investigation should be set up? Who really decided to remove Stalker? Who must be blamed for never seeking to help him at any point during the inquiry, for leaving him very much in the lurch? Ministers do not come very much into this story. Perhaps one day we shall know what part they played.

Since this book was written, the government has announced that none of those whom Stalker and later the Chief Constable of Yorkshire considered should be indicted will be prosecuted. There have been more far-reaching errors in the painful story of Anglo-Irish relations, but none surely more foolish.

FRANK LONGFORD

A FULL BIOGRAPHY OF RODIN

Rodin A Biography Frederic V Grunfeld Hutchinson £30 00

For over a century Auguste Rodin has fascinated many people. Perhaps because there are so few great sculptors, they are given a near reverence denied to painters, musicians, or writers. Rodin's work is known to almost everyone. Indeed, some of his works, such as *The Thinker* or *The Kiss*, are too well known and have even been parodied in advertisements.

Over the years, Rodin has attracted many writers. Some of the books written about him by his disciples are remarkably bad. Even many of the better books suffer from the common fault that every view and every opinion of the *maitre* is treated as holy writ to be treasured and obeyed. The pity is that in so doing they obscure, rather than illumine, his true genius as a sculptor. In point of fact Rodin, in total contrast to that other great sculptor, Michaelangelo, was a man of remarkably few abilities or insights outside his chosen field.

In the last half century there have been numerous learned monographs and sumptuous picture books about Rodin but there has been no full scale biography. The American writer, Frederic Grunfeld, has sought to remedy that deficiency. His book is a very large work—the text runs to over 600 pages. It recounts the story of Rodin's life from his early days as an obscure carver of ornate façades to the most acclaimed portrayer of the human form.

It is, on the whole, a perfectly acceptable biography of Rodin for those who want a book packed with detail not only about the sculptor's own turbulent life but about the even more turbulent art world of his time. One reason for Rodin's great dominance of the Parisian art scene and much of Parisian society at the beginning of this century was the fact that he was seen as the incarnation of the peasant as artist. Perhaps the most valuable point in this book is that Mr Grunfeld clearly shows that Rodin came from a considerably higher social background than he liked to pretend. Rodin's father was an official in the Paris police and one of his duties was the suppression of prostitution, a cause not likely to endear his memory to his voluptuous son.

Rodin's personal life forms a large part of this book. For years he lived with his mistress, Rose Beuret, whom he only married shortly before they both died in 1917. In many ways she emerges as the most admirable person in the whole Rodin circle.

However Rodin was, by no means, faithful to his mistress. He seemed to regard every woman who came within his reach as ripe material for his sensual greed. Mr Grunfeld sees parts of this as a manifestation of Rodin's 'tactile sense'. Rodin's most famous affair was with the young sculptress, Camille Claudel. This book gives the best account so far of their unhappy relationship. Camille Claudel has lately become a favourite of various 'feminists' who proclaim her an example of their eternal theme that men always crush the life out of any talented woman. Mr Grunfeld shows that their story is far more complex than this. Incidentally he also shows that Camille's brother, the poet Paul Claudel, who did so much to blacken Rodin's reputation, owed his first diplomatic appointment to the sculptor's influence.

Any potential reader of this book should have a good picture book of Rodin's sculpture to hand, as the illustrations in this book do not bring out all the rich detail of these masterpieces. The eccentric manner of doing footnotes will also annoy the serious reader. Nevertheless this should long remain a valuable source for the life of the greatest sculptor since the Renaissance.

RICHARD MULLEN

(Dr Richard Mullen wrote the recent BBC Radio documentary on Rodin.)

WORDS WORDS WORDS

The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and Old Politics David Marquand
Jonathan Cape £18 00

I tend to suspect books with pretentious titles. The author in this case is David Marquand. I reviewed in 1977 and in this journal his first and admirable book, the definitive life of J Ramsay MacDonald, who after all was a pioneer and the first socialist Prime Minister. After leaving Oxford, Marquand became a historian and entered parliament as a socialist member, and when in 1978 he lost his seat, he became a founder member of the Alliance Party.

During this next period he resumed his academic life now as Professor of Politics at Salford University. Also during this period he saw the birth, blossoming and break-up of the Alliance Party. This must have been a shock to a sensitive mind, but it is no excuse for writing this ambitious book, which is disappointing because it attempts to prove too much; he has tried to be philosopher, moralist, post Keynesian economist, and above all the modern political theorist. Quotations at the beginning of chapters start with Tawney and include Aristotle, Mill, Dicey, Burke and all the worthies. Among the bibliography of over 200 books and 20 pages of notes, one finds not only Ghita Ionescu, Ian Gilmour, Judge Scarman, Sam Beer (Prince of American Political Scientists) but also some strange American and European authors with ideas which seem irrelevant to the British scene.

But enough about the author and the mechanics of the book. At a time when prominent journalists are writing careful books which try to interpret the phenomenon of Thatcherism, when Mr Biffen and Mr Brittan (both casualties of the present cabinet) are making constructive speeches, when Bryan Gould is putting the Labour case for closer working co-operation between government and industry and David Owen is holding his own on foreign policy, I find this book indifferent history, muddled economics and woolly political theory. Admittedly this is strong language, but if the Alliance Party is to break the mould of 'Old Politics', it must have a cutting edge and a political philosophy based on something more than collective experiments in 'mutual education'.

Moreover I take exception to the chapter headed 'Politics of Economic Decline', but still more to a succeeding one 'Club Government In Disarray'. Marquand's attack on what he calls the 'Westminster Model' is quite astonishing for one who has been an MP and served on important committees, without ever committing himself, as such, the author is using the word 'Club' when he really means 'Class'. He quotes eminent legal opinion to bolster up his own against the way parliament works. His alternative models for Lords and Commons would not gain much acceptance.

The book is about Government in Britain. I agree with most of his views on the European relationships, and welcome all he says about the European Community, but I feel that his 'Developmental State' of Britain and subsequent re-modelling of Westminster government will not improve European relations.

KENNETH LINDSAY

IN PRAISE OF SAINTS

Saints Lord Longford Hutchinson £12 95

The author needs no introduction. Francis Pakenham, the 7th Earl of Longford, is as well known as almost anyone in Britain. He has combined a busy public career with writing. Many of his books are on religious subjects. He is a Roman Catholic.

The present book is an engaging one. In our curious materialistic and anti-authoritarian world it is surprising but true that sacrifice commands high honour and the authority of holiness is respected. The reproduction of the Martyrs' Mosaic at Ravenna invites you to get on with it. That it is engaging does not mean that it is always an easy read or a speedy one. One has to pause with moral dilemmas and problems of conscience. There are times when you feel the author must be challenged at other times you yourself are challenged.

In his Introduction, Lord Longford begins with the question, 'What is a Saint?' St Paul in his Epistles refers to all members of the infant churches as saints, set apart, holy, but in popular usage it refers to those who can be regarded as examples to the rest. In early times in England saints were made by local acclamation. Saint Swithun is an example. Since the Reformation the Anglican Church has not made its great men saints, but the Liturgical Commission has produced in the calendar a list of men and women to be commemorated. Here the author gives the answer appropriate to his Church, 'a saint is a person now dead whom the Catholic Church allows to be publicly venerated'. The bulk of the book is concerned with men and women in this category. However, he does not confine sanctity to this definition. There is a chapter on Archbishop William Temple, and he had considered including men of other faiths, Mohammed, Gandhi and Moses Maimonides, the author of the Thirteen Principles of Judaism. In his final chapter he hopes the Catholic Church will extend the range of its saints beyond its own membership.

Popular ideas of sainthood can be quite unrealistic. Some think of saints as men and women of all round perfection and often reduced to a colourless parody of goodness. In this some forms of ecclesiastical art have not helped. The facts are very different. Lord Longford demonstrates the infinite variety. Both men established orders, but could any two in character be more different than Saint Francis and Saint Ignatius of Loyola? Could two people be more distinct than Joan of Arc and St John of the Cross? All of them are dealt with at length. The essay on the latter could do much to interest people in the fact of mysticism and allay some hesitation. At some stage all churches have been suspicious of mysticism, and especially in St John of the Cross's own country, Spain. It is impressive how practical some mystics have been, Catherine of Siena is given as an example.

The book makes clear that the saints had real problems of personality to deal with. We know from scripture that Saint Paul could be boastful, anxious to be approved and apt to take offence. Lord Longford describes Saint Peter's uncertainties and mistakes. However, one must suggest that his comment on page 17 'He humbly recognised his mistake' does not reflect the bitterness of Peter's quarrel with Paul after his failure to eat with Gentiles. To start the book with a study of Peter was clearly right. Perhaps this could have been followed by a study of Paul. What is preached today with the emphasis on crucifixion and resurrection is largely his creation, and it was he who did so much to establish the faith among the non-Jews.

This is a very personal book. One feels this especially when the author is dealing with the martyrs of this century. He accepts the 'glorious vision' of Martin Luther King but refers to his scandalous behaviour with women. I know nothing about this feature of his life, but it did cause me to pause and wonder how in eternity in the balance this would compare with the almost Gnostic asceticism of some saints. One felt strongly also the personal approach when Bonhoeffer is discussed. In his 'Letters from Prison' he shows contempt for prisoners unable to stand the strain. Could this not have been a reflection of

his own strain and was not Loyola at times also harsh? It is also mentioned that Bonhoeffer was involved in an assassination plot. Does it make a difference that his object was Hitler? Presumably this is the sort of question that Saint Simon the Zealot had to face. In sainthood are we looking to some aspect of our Lord's perfect life built up in a person through the Spirit into excellence, or something in addition? I have only met Mother Teresa once, but when I walked with her I did experience a certain awe. Was this because of what I read about her or was there an element more mysterious?

In the penultimate chapter on 'the Saint in Modern Literature', Lord Longford comments on aspects of sanctity overlooked by orthodoxy. For this he selects Dostoevsky, T. S. Eliot, Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh. The essay ends with some words of Evelyn Waugh from his life of Saint Helena. In part they could have been the theme around which this informative and thought-provoking book is written.

'What we can learn from Helena is something about the worship of God that He wants a different thing from each of us, laborious or easy, conspicuous or quite private. But something which only we can do and for which we were created.'

Our age desperately needs its heroes, and especially its spiritual ones. Here is a book which points to them. That these men and women should be respected and honoured is clear. In what way they should be venerated is outside the scope of this review.

LAURENCE TANNER

A ROMANTIC REVERIE

Romantic Affinities: Portraits from an Age 1780-1830 Rupert Christiansen
Bodley Head £16.00

To fashion his Romantic Reverie out of Romantic Adventure and Romantic Dream, powerfully to recreate an age, in a subtle and understated *tour de force*, Mr Christiansen has ranged across Europe as far as Russia, re-animated unfamiliar figures such as Chénier or Holderlin, and concentrated on unfamiliar aspects of familiar personages such as (particularly) Coleridge or Byron. The result is exhilarating. No reader of the book as a whole can come away without a significantly deepened understanding of the period.

Mr Christiansen's wide garnering of historical, political and cultural material effortlessly (for the reader) fills in the lacunae of the average English scholar, and that, in the long run, may well prove to be of more value than his expressed intent, as a jaded examiner, (to paraphrase) to put back the electricity, even the 'romance' into a literature rendered lifeless by critical stereotype. He is too modest in his disclaimer of having any aspirations to an original contribution to literary criticism or to history, his synthesis, and his interpretations are his alone. The chapter on 'Lovely Shapes and Sounds Intelligible', for example, with its range of allusion from Rousseau to Paganini, is sharply individual in its synaesthetic approach.

This is the new, young, lively voice of criticism which is not afraid to be readable and contemporary — 'Paris presented him (Gilbert Imlay) with plenty of opportunities for various shades of wheeling and dealing. Imlay was a man to grab at the main chance, ever ready to drop his scruples, he was probably a liar too. But he had rangy charms that Mary (Wollstonecraft) found very attractive'.

The topics of the chapter on 'Woman's Whole Existence', from which the above extract is taken, will serve to show the supple sinuosity of Mr Christian-

sen's cumulative method First, Byron's words are put into context they are spoken by a married woman, out of despair, not cynicism In the 1800s, 'it was only in the novel that women—as writers, readers, and fictionally represented characters. —in any sense dominated' Sentimentalism is explored. Jane Austen mocked it, Dorothy Wordsworth's *Journals* are probably its purest *exempla* Sentimental or Romantic love began in 1762 with Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* Early Women's Rights movements in Europe Madame Roland, and her farewell, 'O liberté, comme on t'a jouée!' A reference back to the poet, Chénier (guillotined in the opening chapter!) Mary Wollstonecraft and her daughter, Mary Godwin Mary's marriage to Shelley the bizarre honeymoon Madame de Stael and Benjamin Constant *Adolphe* — looks back to the psychology of Laclos and forward to Proust, Byron was one of its earliest admirers, and Pushkin was impressed Most of the writers whom we call Romantic felt Eros as a problem — unlike Pushkin Dorothy Wordsworth 'was one woman who might have agreed that love had been her whole existence' but it was not the love that Byron had in mind

Mr Christiansen is a splendid educator he reads Byron as easily as a modern newspaper, and his examinees should have that ideal in mind!

MOLLY TIBBS

PUTTING R.L. ESSAYS BACK INTO CIRCULATION

The Lantern-Bearers and Other Essays Robert Louis Stevenson Edited by Jeremy Treglown Chatto & Windus £16.95

Robert Louis Stevenson, says Jeremy Treglown, has paid the critical price of obvious popularity and apparent simplicity Just how deceptive is the apparent, is revealed by the cross-illuminated art of the story-teller's essays But Tuscitala's mastery of form and narrative handling is not the art which impels psychology-orientated, tone-fixated twentieth-century criticism While R L S lolls alongside Kipling outside the academy walls, his admirers, James and Conrad, are hoist at highbrow level across quad and court and campus on solid academic shoulders For this unhealthy state of affairs Mr Treglown has prescribed a physic a well-selected, nicely-compounded dosage of R L essays, to be injected into current circulation

R L S wrote well over a hundred essays, not all of which were published Some, such as 'Confessions of a Unionist' and 'Authors and Publishers', which has never before been seen in print, are made generally available here for the first time 'The Day After Tomorrow', casting the long shadow of Orwell before it, was previously published in *Contemporary Review* in April 1887, and 'Thomas Stevenson Civil Engineer' in *Contemporary Review* in June 1887 A third Stevenson essay, 'On Style in Literature Its Technical Elements', (not included in this selection) first appeared in *Contemporary Review* in April 1885 R L S used, more and more, the essay as a form of autobiography, and it is possible, even in this abbreviated series — between a quarter and a third of his output — to see adumbrated the sequelae of his life — adolescent Edinburghian bohemian, juvenescent traveller, love and languishment in France, the tempering in California, and cold steel climax of Samoa — although a firm line must needs be drawn in 1888 beneath the best of the essays As an essayist R L S slots superficially well into the non-fictional line he so admired — Hazlitt, Lamb, Browne, Montaigne — and to the practitioners of which he confessed playing the rôle of sedulous ape, but his virtuosity ensured that even at his most contrivedly imitative he was most triumphantly his own supreme self. Here is Tuscitala of

Treasure Island displaying the gentle Jekyll and innocuous Hyde of quill and well

In these times of gustatory darkness, Mr Treglown does, by this gathering of the, unjustly neglected, fragments, yeoman service as lantern-bearer himself.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Beerbohm Tree (Columbus Books £5 95) Hesketh Pearson's biography was first published in 1956 and is now republished in The Lively Arts series as a paperback Hesketh Pearson himself started as a young actor under Beerbohm Tree, and this experience gives this account of His Life and Laughter a particular intimacy and appreciation Sir Herbert Beerbohm Tree dominated the English stage for thirty years until his death in 1917 A brilliant director, he combined this off stage with a life of loose living Sir John Gielgud writes a brief Foreword to this edition in which he describes Tree as 'a deeply kind eccentric and creative artist of remarkable originality and enterprise'. 'What a good idea to republish this amusing and rewarding record'.

The Collected Poems of Sidney Keyes (Routledge. £4 95) The original volume of collected poems was published in 1945, some two years after he had been killed in action in the Second World War in Tunisia, at the age of twenty He was then recognised, and still is, as one of the outstanding poets of his time Perhaps he is best known as an imaginative pastoral poet and observer of nature Michael Meyer edited the first collection of his poetry and has also edited this new edition in paperback, adding twelve poems, making over one hundred in this collection He is also responsible for the short Memoir and Prefaces to both editions There is now also included a moving account by his army runner of how he met his death protecting his men against the German attack This new edition should be widely welcomed.

Berlin (Hamish Hamilton £14 95) Michael Simmons, the Eastern Europe correspondent of the *Guardian*, has produced a substantial and erudite study of the history of 'this dispossessed city', created by Bismark in 1871 as the capital of Greater Germany greatness thrust upon it, yet Berlin has never achieved greatness except in size Today the population exceeds three million but without a corporate sense 'Berlin is, as it has always been, dominated by incomers', refugees, intellectuals, industrial workers and drafts brought in by politically motivated governments In this volume, the main impact inevitably lies in the vivid account of political events which have dominated Berlin since the First World War. There are the political disturbances in the early twenties, followed by the horrific rise to power of Hitler and the Nazi regime until 1945 Then came the attempt by Stalin in 1948 to dominate the whole city by the economic blockade of the allied sectors This failed through the fantastic air-lift of the allies over 14 months In 462 days, it flew in more than 1.8 million tonnes of goods in no less than 277,264 flights Mr Simmons discusses the migration of East Germans moving West, reaching in 1960 alone nearly 200,000, more than half under 25 'In such a climate, the erection of the Berlin Wall of 1961 was inevitable' Indeed it is now welcomed by many West Berliners The author has brought together a vast quantity of facts, with great skill The text has no annotated references, but a very useful bibliography is included The index could be much improved

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PAYING FOR HEALTH

by Lord Stewart of Fulham

WHEN I wrote in *Contemporary Review* about a year ago (Vol 248, No. 1443) I dealt with what I called 'The Burden of Usury' and described its effects both in producing extreme poverty in this country and in saddling some of the poorest Third World countries with an impossible burden of debt, capable of negating anything that was done for them in the way of aid. I reached the apparently unbusinesslike conclusion that there are times when creditors must simply abandon their claims. I have therefore been interested to notice that in the last few weeks two of our leading banks have announced that their profits will be substantially less than expected because they felt obliged to regard large sums of money owed to them by poor countries as irrecoverable bad debts. I am encouraged, therefore, in the belief that what may appear unbusinesslike may in fact be unavoidable; and that the recognition of necessity may, in this field as in many other fields of politics and economics, be the beginning of wisdom.

Looking now at another problem which is attracting interest in this country I find myself being led to another unbusinesslike conclusion.

The problem, now so intensively discussed in Parliament, in conferences, in newspapers and on television is that of paying for the National Health Service. That there is a problem is not in dispute. In the forty years since the Service began new inventions have provided cures for ills which were previously thought incurable. The cures, moreover, are extremely expensive because of the demands they make for elaborate medicaments, complicated equipment and highly skilled scientists, technicians and doctors. Meanwhile, improvements in hygiene, social conditions, and medical knowledge have helped to prolong human life. Fewer and fewer people are ready to leave the stage when they have completed three score years and ten: they find that they can not only go on living, but go on enjoying life well beyond that limit, provided they can get the necessary medicines, drugs, and care. It looks, therefore, as if the cost of the National Health Service is likely to increase and go on increasing. No one has — as yet — suggested that we should stop looking for new cures and new conquests over disease, or that we should — as happens in some primitive communities — exercise social pressure on the elderly to remove themselves before they become too numerous.

One remedy, most favoured in some quarters, is that we should make

the National Health Service 'more efficient' This could mean sweeping away the 'vast bureaucracy' which is said to exist and replacing it by something simpler and cheaper. The trouble is that nobody has been able to prove that there is wasteful bureaucracy. Comparisons with other countries do not suggest that our administration is extravagant: and attempts made by Government, in the 1970s, to improve the administration of the Service did not yield the results which some had hoped for. Alternatively, greater efficiency may mean, for example, that hospitals put their laundering out to tender rather than doing it themselves. Well, if anything can be saved — without damage to the quality of the service — in this or similar ways, by all means let us practise them: but, so far, there has been no reason to suppose that massive savings will result.

We cannot, then, avoid the conclusion, that more money will need to be spent on the National Health Service. We are troubled, however, by the traditional belief that it is unbusinesslike — indeed feckless — to raise more money in taxes. Much thought, therefore, has been given to getting money from 'private sources' into the Health Service.

Various devices have been proposed — and practised — for tapping 'private sources'. The most familiar is the imposition of charges for prescriptions and for optical and dental care. In this case the 'private source' is the pockets of those people who are less fortunate in health than the general run of the population and who are not, for age or any other reason, exempt from charges. A good many people will feel that saving our own pockets at the expense of this, by definition, unfortunate group is mean — but perhaps we are entering into an epoch where considerations of this kind are brushed aside. A more down-to-earth objection is that we have already pushed charges up so much that we cannot go further without jeopardizing the national standard of health. We have already reached the point where people are likely to be discouraged or prevented from getting treatment which will save them from serious deterioration either of teeth or eyesight.

Another proposed device is to induce more people to take up private health insurance, and to do this by allowing them tax concessions on the premiums they will pay. But clearly people will not spend money in this way — even allowing for tax concessions — unless they believe that the service they get is better than that which is provided by the National Health Service — better, that is to say, either in the real quality of the medical care, or in comfort, or in the speed with which the service is provided. This, of course, is what happens now, but on a small scale. If private insurance is to be so expanded as to make a substantial contribution to the funding of the Health Service, the gap between what is provided to the insured and the uninsured will expand to such an extent that we may as well give up talking about a *National* Health Service, and accept that what we are doing is to provide various grades of service according to the incomes of the recipients. Those who could afford private insurance would be helped up to a superior standard of health care: those who could not would be pushed down, since the Health Service which provided for

them would be competing, for available medical resources and qualified persons, at a disadvantage in comparison with the private insurance systems.

Something like this seems to be part of the general philosophy of the present Government. In housing, for example, the policy of selling council houses was not accompanied, as it should have been, by an increase in Council house building on the contrary, Council house building was brought to a halt. In consequence, those Council tenants who were better off were helped up the economic ladder by being offered houses at bargain prices. poorer tenants found that rented accommodation was becoming even more difficult to get, and in consequence were driven steadily nearer to 'bed-and-breakfast' accommodation or to outright homelessness.

Yet another device has been proposed whereby the National Health Service would provide what is described as 'basic health care', and for anything beyond this one would have to rely on private insurances. Whereas the scheme previously discussed sought to persuade people into private insurance by tax concessions, this scheme apparently seeks to push them into private insurance by denying them anything but 'basic' care unless they insure. But what does 'basic' health care mean? One can only say with certainty that it means something less than will be available to those who can afford private insurance.

There is one feature which all these devices have in common — they plan to create two levels of service, to accentuate the difference in quality between one level and the other, and — particularly by means of tax concessions — to increase the number of people who could afford the superior level while ensuring that they remained a minority of the population. It should be noticed that the advantage conferred by access to the superior level of service would consist not so much in the quality of doctoring and care but in the ability to 'jump the queue' and to get treatment, particularly for the more rare and complicated kinds of disorder, in advance of those who could not afford the superior level.

If we object to this 'two-level' system we shall be asked to look back to the origins of the problem. Those origins were that longer life, the discovery of new cures and the fact that those cures are often expensive, keep pushing up the total cost of the service towards infinity. and since we cannot afford an infinitely costly service we must accept the concept of 'waiting lists' and since we do not want to argue whether one person's need for an operation, or for hospitalization, is more pressing than another's we must solve the problem by allowing those who have the larger incomes to go to the top of the list. The Government can, of course, proceed in this way if it wishes but it cannot at the same time assert 'The Health Service is safe in our hands' because it will in fact have abandoned the whole idea of a *National Health Service*.

Nevertheless, the impossibility of paying for an infinitely costly service remains. If we reject the idea of a two-level service, it remains necessary for hospitals and doctors to make the kind of decision which says 'we can provide this treatment for 'A' now 'B' will have to wait because his need

is less pressing' It is not a pleasant decision, but it is better to make such a decision than to find that while we weighed up the claims of 'A' and 'B', 'C' has stepped in in advance because he is better off Meanwhile we can make the need for such decisions less frequent and their nature less unpleasant by spending more on the whole service, we cannot catch up with infinite need, but we can make our deficiency less flagrant.

This, then, is what the whole argument is really about — what proportion of the national income are we prepared to spend on the Health Service? There is one school of thought which holds that we should always seek to reduce the proportion of the national income that is taken in taxation then, it is argued, people will be so encouraged that they will work harder, produce more wealth, increase the national income so that the amount received in taxation, though a smaller proportion of the national income will be a greater absolute amount. What is overlooked here is that if we reduce the proportion of the national income raised in taxation we must either reduce the number of public servants, (e.g. members of the Armed Forces, policemen, firemen, doctors, nurses, etc, etc) or pay these people less in comparison with other workers than we do at present The prospect is unattractive, and the other method of cutting taxation — i.e. privatising the public services — has its limits

There was a time in our history when one's chance of success in a law-suit depended largely on the number of armed retainers that one could take with one to the Court but King Henry VII wisely decided that this was not in the public interest. The truth, of course is that, as the total national income increases we can, and ought to, provide more efficient police forces, better stocked libraries, more attractive parks, better health services. as total wealth increases, let private incomes and public services both enjoy some part of the increase We know that the reverse is true: if a community is very poor not only will individual incomes be low but public services must suffer There have been communities who solved the problem of care of the elderly by requiring them, once a year, to scramble across a crocodile-infested stream: those who were not brisk enough ceased to be a burden on the community The progress from this method — and other less spectacular but hardly less brutal methods — to our present care for the elderly has been made possible not only by increase in the total amount of wealth, but by a rise in standards of humanity and a growing realisation of the debt which we all, in a civilised society, owe to each other

Further light is thrown on this problem if we consider the way in which countries decide how much to spend on defence I remember taking part in a debate in the House of Commons in which it was argued that it was the Government's duty to provide for defence against all the dangers which might threaten the country This is indeed an example of asking the nation to foot an infinite bill. What this country, and indeed every country, has to do is to consider what perils it ought to guard against; which of those are most pressing; how much can be afforded on Armed Forces if the nation is not to be prevented from developing its industries,

looking to its food supply, ensuring that its citizens are sufficiently healthy and well-educated to engage in national defence—and a host of other considerations, all reacting on each other. The decision, how much to spend on any public service, must depend on an elaborate calculation in which no one consideration—the need to keep down expenditure, the need to defend the country—can be regarded as having absolute priority but in which all the considerations must be weighed up against each other.

As regards the Health Service, we are now in a position in which nearly everybody thinks that a larger proportion of the total national wealth ought to be spent on it. This appears to be the opinion, not only of potential patients, but of doctors, nurses and persons of every occupation connected with the Service. The Government's reply is to point out how much it has spent already, whereas the real question is 'Is it spending enough?'—and 'enough' means 'Is it spending as much as it should in view of the needs of the Health Service, the needs of other services, and the general desire of taxpayers to keep money in their pockets?' One member of the Government has suggested that people who want more spent on their own health might achieve this result by deciding to have only one holiday each year. To those persons—and there are a good many of them—who do not at present run to more than one holiday a year, this is hardly an answer but we might find an answer by pushing the idea implied in their governmental reply a bit further. Suppose all of us who have a bit of income to spare agreed to have some of that bit spent, not necessarily on our own health needs, but on the Health Service in general. So far as one can judge from manifestation of public feeling, this seems to be what most people are prepared to do. For the Government to go on resisting this seems an unnecessary piece of obstinacy.

[Michael Stewart was member of Parliament first for East Fulham and then for Fulham (1945-79). He held junior posts in Clement Attlee's 1945-51 Government. In Harold Wilson's Government of 1964-70 he was Secretary of State for, successively, Education, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. In 1979 he entered the House of Lords as Lord Stewart of Fulham; he speaks on international affairs and education. Books include *The British Approach to Politics* and an autobiography, *Life and Labour*.]

TURKEY, GREECE AND THE BALKANS

by Fahir Armaoglu

TURKEY and Greece are neighbouring countries with direct contact to the coast along the Aegean Sea, a part of the Eastern Mediterranean, and on land with the Balkan Peninsula. Turkey's European territory is an integral part of the Balkans. Indeed, the Balkans play the role of a bridge allowing Turkey access into Europe. However, the neighbourhood relations between Turkey and Greece are mainly concentrated in the Aegean Sea which is, from a strategic point of view, an important part of the Eastern Mediterranean. That is why contemporary issues and conflicts in Turkish-Greek relations originate principally from the Aegean basin and the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The basic international document regulating Turkish-Greek relations is the Peace Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. Despite the fact that almost all the other treaties ending the First World War have been relatively short-lived, the Lausanne Peace Treaty has been very durable and is still in force. The reason for the treaty's long life lies in the fact that, while the other treaties concluded at the end of World War I have created ethnic and territorial imbalances imposed by the victors upon the vanquished, the Lausanne Treaty has been able to establish a just and reasonable balance 'among equals'. That the talks took as long as nine months to complete was due to the deep concern for establishing this balance on a sound and solid foundation.

In the provisions made by the Lausanne Treaty for Turkish-Greek relations, three main areas are noteworthy: Western Thrace, the Aegean Sea and the island of Cyprus.

The Lausanne Treaty has recognised among the Turks of Western Thrace—who remained within the boundaries of Greece numbering around 130,000 and owning 84% of the land in that region—every kind of minority right to maintain their national culture. In fact, Western Thracian Turks were accepted as a separate national community.

The most important element of the balance established, with regard to the Aegean Sea, comprises those provisions of the Lausanne Treaty which stipulate the de-militarization of islands very close to the Turkish Coast, such as Limnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria. Needless to say, these provisions of de-militarization were aimed at safeguarding Turkey's security.

The island of Cyprus, on which significantly large Turkish and Greek communities have been living for centuries, was—again by the Lausanne Treaty—ceded to Great Britain's sovereignty to prevent it from becoming a potential bone of contention between Turkey and Greece. To eliminate a subject of conflict between two countries is, intrinsically, a balance in its own right.

Although Greece has not been able to bring itself to accept with good grace the existence of a large Turkish minority in Western Thrace, this

portion of Greek territory did not turn into a 'dispute' between Turkey and Greece so long as the balances in the other two regions were not upset. This situation was maintained until the end of World War II.

The Italian Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947 opened up a new period in which Turkish-Greek relations have been steadily deteriorating. Italy's cession to Greece of the Dodecanese — which it had seized from Turkey earlier — under Article 14 of this peace treaty, has given an impetus to Greek expansionism. Immediately after taking possession of the Dodecanese, Greece began to lay claim to Cyprus. In this connection, it should be stressed that the Paris Peace Conference, when deciding to transfer the Dodecanese to Greece, attached so great importance to keeping the balance between Turkey and Greece that it provided for the de-militarization of these islands as in the case of the islands already in Greece's possession. The reason for this was that these islands were also lying within the geographical propinquity of the Turkish coast.

When Greece submitted the Cyprus question to the United Nations in the summer of 1954 the issue developed into a serious dispute between Turkey, Greece and Britain. By taking such an action Greece was destroying one of the three important pillars of the balance existing between herself and Turkey. Furthermore, by beginning concurrently to erode the treaty rights of the Western Thracian Turks and exerting pressure on Cyprus, Greece was also destabilizing the second pillar of the balance.

In the course of the crisis between 1955 and 1959, Turkey had two main complaints with regard to Greece's hostile policies: the attempts by Greek terrorists on the island of Cyprus to annihilate the Turkish community, and Greece's evasion of any dialogue with Turkey for the solution of the dispute. It was only through the Turkish-Greek consultations in the summer of 1958, thanks to NATO's mediation efforts, that the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the founding of an independent and non-aligned Cypriot Republic were achieved.

A careful scrutiny of the Cypriot Republic's Constitution reveals that the agreements which gave birth to the Republic have brought about a new and balanced structure for relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities on the island. Thus, the power vacuum left behind by the British withdrawal from the island was prevented from creating chaos.

However, the Greek Cypriots and Greece did not seem to be happy with the founding of this independent and non-aligned Republic of Cyprus. The fact is, they wanted to upset the balance by resorting to a policy of outright annexation (*Enosis*). In line with this policy, the Greek Cypriots began their attacks in December 1963 aimed at annihilating the Turkish community. This situation led to a series of crises in the Cyprus dispute which continued until 1974; the last of which was the *coup d'état* engineered by Greece against Archbishop Makarios on July 15, 1974 in an attempt to bring to an end the independent Republic of Cyprus. It was this action which forced Turkey to intervene as did the possibility that the

Greek Cypriots might carry out genocide against the Turkish community. Consequently, Turkey was exercising its rights and powers derived from the tripartite Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 — which had been duly registered with the United Nations — when it decided to take military action to restore peace and order on the island.

Today, the presence of Turkish troops on the island appears to be a matter for criticism; yet if one takes into consideration the fact that there has been no crisis or even tension in Cyprus since 1974, it would be reasonable to conclude that the role of the Turkish military forces on the island has been virtually that of a peace-keeping force. However, the emergence of the continental shelf problem in the Aegean after 1974 has been a new development which was to weaken the third and last pillar of the Turkish-Greek regional balance. Nevertheless, Turkey has continued to act with restraint on all issues with Greece, and has opted for a policy of dialogue since 1974. The Berne Agreement on the Aegean continental shelf signed in June 1976, and the agreement arrived at in Montreux in May 1978 at the meeting between Prime Ministers Ecevit and Karamanlis opened up a new phase of dialogue in Turkish-Greek relations.

With Pasok's ascent to power in Greece in October 1981, not only did the Turkish-Greek dialogue come to an end, but Turkish-Greek relations also entered their worst period as a result of the tensions created by the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, and his policy of open hostility towards Turkey. The pressure exerted on the Turkish community in Western Thrace increased noticeably after Pasok came to power. Various schemes were undertaken to deprive the Turkish minority of its lands and properties. The educational and cultural rights granted to the Turkish minority by the Treaty of Lausanne were also being curtailed. Turks of Greek citizenship going to Turkey for touristic purposes are still being dispossessed of their Greek citizenship and are denied permission to return to Greece. Even the freedom of worship of the Turks has been restricted. With his policies of doing away with the Turkish community in Western Thrace, Mr. Papandreou turned the Lausanne Treaty, which bears the signature of not only Greece and Turkey but other countries such as Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Yugoslavia, into a mere 'scrap of paper'.

In violation of the provisions of both the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Greece continues to remilitarise all the Aegean islands lying close to the Turkish coast. Despite the fact that the Lausanne Treaty restricts even the number of the *gendarmes* on these islands, conscripts from among the civilians on the islands have been organised under the slogan of 'New Defence Concept', probably within the so-called 'threat from the East' in mind.

Given the scale of these violations, it has become impossible for Greece to talk of the existence of the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty regarding the Aegean islands. Mr. Papandreou has destroyed, in the Turkish-Greek balance, an element considered to be vital for Turkey. Moreover, taking into consideration the priority Mr. Papandreou has given to

rearming, one can see Western Anatolia becoming a target for a potential Greek aggression.

As regards Cyprus, Mr. Papandreou is trying to overturn yet another balance. Greece seems to be willing to revive the situation which it had itself disrupted in the early 1960's. In other words, Greece is in pursuit of a balance which will be fully in line with its own interests whether in Western Thrace or the Aegean islands or in Cyprus. It would be a truism to say that balances are established by mutual agreements and conciliations. Any situation not based upon conciliation is but a unilateral imposition.

Turkey has no complaints as regards the *de facto* situation in Cyprus. However, Turkey has no great interest in maintaining the present situation. Despite this, both the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey have accepted the document which was prepared and presented by Mr. Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary General, on March 29, 1986. Although this document was prepared after long-drawn-out talks, Mr. Perez de Cuellar held with the Greek Cypriot community in order to take fully into account the Greek Cypriot views, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot administration and by Greece. The pity is that this document, based on the principle of complete equality of both communities on the island, was aimed at holding a balance not only between these two communities but also between Turkey and Greece.

Mr. Papandreou has reverted to warnings of the alleged 'Turkish threat'. By contrast, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's policy has been based upon the principles of co-operation. This course is valid not only for Greek-Turkish relations, but for Turkey's overall relations with every other country in Europe. The proposal made by the Yugoslav Government last April to other Balkan countries to hold a meeting on Balkan co-operation deserves full support. Particularly, the decision that the first meeting should be held with no pre-set agenda and that no communique should be issued indicates that the main concern is for a relaxed atmosphere among the participants. Turkey had, from the beginning, reacted favourably to this proposal; but Greece has been extremely reluctant to enter into a dialogue with Turkey and Bulgaria has taken a similar stand. Greece and Bulgaria have formed what can best be described as a 'front of hostility' towards Turkey. In these circumstances it is not easy to be optimistic about the outcome of the proposed conference although Turkey will continue to be an active participant.

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UNILATERAL DEVOLUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION

by Michael Ancram

LIKE it or not, the result of the 1987 General Election in Scotland has inevitably put the topic of Devolution firmly back on the Scottish political agenda. Prior to the election much had been made of the so-called 'Doomsday scenario', an election which resulted in a Conservative Government at Westminster but an overwhelming majority of Labour MPs in Scotland. The promoters of this scenario argued that such a situation would be intrinsically unstable and would lead naturally to a constitutional crisis, leading in turn inevitably to either devolution or independence according to the political taste of the proponent.

The basic props of the scenario duly appeared with the results of the General Election. Labour in Scotland secured 50 seats out of 72. The Conservatives, the only anti-devolution party, dropped from 21 to 10, and yet remained in charge of the reins of Government within the Scottish Office. The recipe for Doomsday was complete, but the predicted crisis in the constitution did not arise. It remained buried under the sands of Scottish apathy. What did resurrect was an ongoing debate on the whole question of Devolution and a Scottish Assembly.

As in the 1970s, when this issue was last debated in depth, much of the argument has been on an emotional plane. Recognise Scottish nationhood, restore Scotland's pride; give her back the right of self determination; let Scots have the power through an Assembly to decide their own spending priorities and the ability to finance them by raising their own taxation; and so on. There are many powerful arguments to be made both for and against these propositions, and they will undoubtedly take up many column inches in the months and years ahead.

The most fundamental argument of all is about the constitutional question. Would Devolution, the creation of a legislative Assembly for Scotland alone, be compatible with the basic structure of the United Kingdom, or would it inexorably lead to the break-up of this historic Union? And would it, in the end, be good for Scotland?

The proposition which requires to be studied is in fact the only form of devolution on offer. It can be termed the 'unilateral' stance and is to be found in the ill-fated Bill which Labour recently placed before Parliament and which was rejected. It remains, however, the stated policy and objective of that Party, and as such provides a sound and adequate premise from which the arguments can be taken forward and the constitutional implications and philosophy analysed.

The Labour Party's proposition allows such an analysis to start from a bald statement; that Unilateral Devolution would push us unwittingly and unintentionally down the path towards total separation because it is constitutionally unsustainable.

The reaction from the pro-devolution camp to such a statement is not

hard to imagine. Firstly they will say that it is simply a rehash of the arguments used by the 'No' campaign during the 1979 Referendum. They will go on to claim that the oil-related threat of the Scottish National Party which gave weight to it at that time has subsided and that even if the argument was relevant then, it is no longer. They will object also, as they have already done, to the use of the term 'unilateral' in this context and will proclaim it both emotive and irrelevant.

First, it is important to establish what is meant by 'unilateral' and 'multilateral' in the context of devolution. Terms must be defined, starting with devolution itself. In practical terms 'Devolution' means the transfer of power held by one set of institutions downward and outward to other lesser sets. It can be carried out either to meet national and regional aspirations or simply because the existing institutions can no longer cope with the pressures and complexities of modern government and need to delegate power or to transfer it.

Whichever the reason, and both have intrinsic validity, it would require to be spread evenly if it were to be achieved without unduly unbalancing the constitution. This even spreading can be termed 'multilateral devolution', the passing down of power in equal proportions to a lower tier of institution in all parts of the United Kingdom.

The alternative to this is, of course, to devolve power to a single institution in only one part of the country, inevitably creating a distinct and unique constitutional situation restricted to that one geographical area — 'unilateral devolution'. One-sided devolution of this sort is by no means impossible but it can only be achieved at substantial risk. On the one hand there is the danger that it would terminally unbalance the constitution to an extent which made break-up of the United Kingdom inevitable. On the other there is real risk of such devolution being counterbalanced by the residual institutions isolating the devolved geographical area within a constitutional ring fence in such a way as to neutralise it as an active part of the whole.

These alternatives are worth looking at more closely. Multilateral devolution has in its various forms some powerful exponents. The pre-election, pre-merger SDP proposed devolved legislative assemblies based on the ancient kingdoms of the UK including a number within England itself. The Liberals have long talked, if less than specifically, about federalism. Constitutionalists in the 1970s, including Lord Hailsham, have questioned the ability of the centralised Whitehall system to cope with the growing complexities and pressures of governing a modern society and have raised the possibility of devolving both administrative and executive power more locally. The multilateral route has, therefore, an intellectual pedigree which cannot and should not be ignored.

Certainly it does allow devolution to be achieved in a relatively balanced way where the effects, although differing from area to area according to local choice, would all stem from the same structure and same source of power throughout the UK. There could be no complaints either of unfairness or of discrimination.

It would satisfy the test of local responsibility, being the requirement for the new devolved institutions not only to take decisions for themselves but also to accept the blame when those decisions proved wrong. It is a significant weakness of the present local government structure, and would be a major weakness of any unilaterally devolved institution, that it can so easily pass the buck and the blame on to Whitehall and Westminster. That deficiency stems largely from the existence of the centrally provided portion of finance which the present local structure requires and which a devolved Scottish Assembly would require no less. It could however be avoided where power had multilaterally and universally been devolved. Granted that it might require a different system of tax raising, but foreign examples tend to suggest that such would be far from impossible or impracticable.

Therefore, while the inevitable influence of centrifugal force would make multilateral devolution inherently less stable than the present unitary system, it should be possible to sustain

In fact such a form of devolution has much to commend it. It has been embraced by a number of Scottish politicians, including the present Secretary of State for Scotland Malcolm Rifkind MP, who otherwise oppose Labour's devolution proposals. In terms, however, of practical politics it has one grave and for the moment fatal flaw; that no other part of mainland Britain either sees a need for it or wants it.

Of course this position may change. A climate favourable to multilateral devolution may occur, either through a growth in a sense of special identity and need among the regions of England or because the centralised system quite simply becomes overloaded. For the moment, however, neither criterion is evident and this option must remain largely academic. To accept this political reality is not to argue that multilateral devolution is a concept which should be rejected or lost sight of; rather it is to accept that for the time being it is a non-starter. Which, if for the purposes of this analysis we exclude the separatist road and the status quo, turns us back to the unilateral solution. At the risk of being over-blunt such a solution would in constitutional terms create a pig's breakfast.

Imagine it for a moment. One part of the UK where alone the writ of an otherwise sovereign Parliament did not run on matters which had been designated as devolved, but where at the same time that part's parliamentary representatives would expect, and under Labour's current proposals get, full voting rights over equivalent matters within the rest of the country. And so is resurrected the 'West Lothian Question' of the Devolution debates of the late 1970s, a question which was not answered then and has no more on this occasion been faced up to by the proponents of the unilateral route.

One part of the United Kingdom with the unique right to raise extra taxes over and above the ordinary fiscal burden with the potential to create massive and damaging economic implications for that area; or alternatively and even more anomalously one part where UK taxes did not apply. Indeed, Labour's present proposals in their own stated theory

could create an even stranger situation where Scotland could end up paying a lower rate of national taxation than the rest of the United Kingdom, subsidised by the taxpayers of England and Wales to do so. It is a matter for some wonderment that the architects of this policy actually believe that the English and Welsh would wear it.

On top of that there would be one part of Great Britain left with a disproportionately high level of parliamentary representation which, while justified by Scottish legislative requirements within the present unitary system, would create a constitutionally unfair balance within a post-devolution Westminster Parliament. And last but not least a situation would be created which would leave the Secretary of State, Scotland's voice in Cabinet on all matters of importance including defence and general economic policy, as a person with no departmental backing, no authority, no responsibility and consequentially no influence.

Naturally all this could and would be regarded by other parts of the UK as well as by many Scots as being unacceptable. If unilateral devolution was to proceed, these imbalances would require to be mitigated. It is worth considering how this might be done.

First, by stopping Scottish MPs from voting on the designated matters as they affect England and Wales, creating in the process yet another constitutional anomaly of two classes of MP within the Westminster Parliament. In such a situation Scottish MPs would be part-timers, not required for substantial areas and periods of parliamentary work. Would they be paid less? Would their rights and privileges be accordingly curtailed? These and many other questions would require to be answered and it can safely be assumed that the answers would be unlikely to favour the Scots.

Second, by allowing an Assembly to be financed only by block grant based on a strict formula with distinctly less political incentive in Whitehall to be generous to Scotland than there is at present. Not only would this be a recipe for Scottish resentment, but it would also allow a Scottish Assembly to blame all its own shortcomings on a mean and parsimonious Westminster. It would be grist to the mills of the cause of Separatism.

Third, by reducing the number of Scottish MPs from 72 to somewhere in the mid 50s. And lastly by abolishing the post of Scottish Secretary of State within the Cabinet on the view that it no longer served any useful executive or representative purpose. These readjustments could hardly be said to be to Scotland's advantage.

The sad truth is that in the present political landscape there are strong attractions for English Tories to promote precisely these developments. They would lessen Scotland's, and consequentially Labour's, influence over domestic English policy and would make it far easier to ignore Scottish interests in matters of United Kingdom policy. Overall it would impose on Scotland a provincial status something akin to the Northern Ireland experience before direct rule; no places in the great offices of State and no influence over the policies of major UK departments. Scotland would be left with the second tier status of a Province, and that to

the Scots would be totally unacceptable.

It is therefore hard to avoid drawing the conclusion that within an acceptable constitutional framework there are only three sustainable positions; the present unitary state with its administrative devolution to Scotland, the federal or multilateral devolution route, or total independence. It has to be conceded that, in terms of nationhood and self-determination, independence at least has a certain honesty and feasibility although the economic consequences of such a route would be devastating. Equally multilateral devolution has its attractions, and may in the longer term become practical if the English and Welsh can be won round to it. On the other hand the present system does actually work, and in fact in terms of resources works in Scotland's favour. It is therefore a matter of total bewilderment as to why the main Scottish opposition party should wish to rush madly into the least acceptable and most unstable solution of all — unilateral devolution.

It is hard to see the attractions in opting for the route of second rate status. It would achieve little in practice so far as promoting self-determination to decide priorities is concerned, while at the same time it would put at severe risk our current right to joint or shared determination on general United Kingdom matters.

It would threaten severe economic damage to Scotland by driving away the very businesses, investment and jobs on which her future prosperity depends. It is significant that Scottish industry is robust in opposing it.

Unilateral Devolution is not and should not be a realistic constitutional option. Its inherent instability would risk a slide into independence which was neither calculated or wanted. It would be the worst of all possible worlds.

In the emotional aftermath of last June's election results it might just have appeared to the Scots as a distant grail worth pursuing. As the real implications of it begin to dawn upon the Scottish people it is difficult to credit that they would willingly place their heads in this particular noose.

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AFRICA AND THE WIDER WORLD

by David Birmingham

BEING currently employed as a modern historian I propose to look at Africa and the wider world in a modern framework. Reluctantly I shall eschew some of my favourite subjects. I shall not address myself to the place of African Carthage in the rise of the Roman Empire; nor to the role of African cereals in the evolution of tropical neolithic farming in Asia, nor to the fascinating arrival of musical Indonesian xylophones in first-century Tanganyika — together with new food crops, new games and, I regret to say, new diseases and new weeds. I shall not even mention the export of live giraffes to the royal court of China, nor the lascivious appreciation of young black women in the inner courtyards of Baghdad. All of this belongs to an earlier age when Africa rode high in the Mediterranean and Asian worlds.

Instead I propose to confine myself to a five-hundred-year perspective and the theme I would like to explore is 'Creolisation in African Society'. Creole cultures have attracted far less attention than they merit. Historians of the 1960s — when African Studies became a pioneering and innovative academic industry with generous funding in America, France, and even Britain — turned from looking at alien activities in Africa to looking at African society itself. Preoccupation with the daring exploits of Livingstone and the thuggish banditry of Rhodes gave way to very subtle analyses of the merchant economy of Asante and the theocratic politics of Ethiopia. But squeezed between the indigenous societies of Africa and the influential wider world there emerged several important 'Creole' cultures which subtly blended African and alien experience. In some cases they blended racially diverse genes as well.

While historians devoted great energy to studying the predominantly white Creole cultures of El Dorado — the Golden One — in the Americas or to writing more ambivalently about brown Anglo-Indian society in Asia, Africa's black Creole traditions were by and large overlooked. The one exception to this neglect was in Upper Guinea. There, American Creoles in Liberia, English and Scottish Creoles in Freetown, Portuguese Creoles in Bissau and Cape Verde, and French Creoles on Gorée Island and at St Louis attracted considerable attention from their ideological progenitors. It would seem to me, however, that cultural blending in other parts of Africa is at least as interesting as in Upper Guinea. To take my own sphere of interest, Central Africa, the first part of the region is North-Central Africa which stretches from Lake Chad to the Nile headwaters, a region not currently accessible to itinerant researchers. Five hundred years ago North Central Africa lay on the farthest fringe of Africa's first modern colonial empire, the Ottoman empire in North Africa. The percolation of Turkish influence into North-Central Africa was slow, despite the relative facility of access afforded by the Sahara where obstacles to commerce were few. By the nineteenth century, how-

ever, local sultanates flourished along the northern tributaries of the Zaire river. Ivory and slave-hunters — sometimes led by European mercenaries known as 'Turks' — spilled over from the upper Nile. A political, religious and military culture evolved in fortified communities where the acculturation of local peoples was fast. Islam may have been especially adept at creating Creole clients among its adherents, the Arabisation of the Maghreb 1,000 years ago had been fast and permanent. In North-Central Africa cultural transformation led to new contrasts and conflicts which still affect the politics of the late twentieth century. The wider world began to sow seeds of discord five centuries ago. By 1986 warfare was the only industry that paid returns. War became a way of life, for many the only way of life. Whenever one faction in Chad lost a round of fighting it turned in search of a new champion from the wider world. Fresh resources then began to flow once more from a different paymaster. Ethnicity, false ethnicity, religion and alien 'Creole-type' identities jostled for control of, money, weapons and recognition.

The second external face of Central Africa looked eastward. Interaction with the world of the ocean seas occurred on two fronts, at two different time depths. Both sets of influence were carried by the great land and sea merchants of the Swahili city states. The island harbours of East Africa were certainly thriving by Roman times. It has been argued that the first guide book to East African navigation was commissioned for Nero who was deeply worried about his Indian Ocean balance of payments. But penetration of the interior was long delayed and the creolisation of inland societies awaited the discovery of the Zambezi delta and its navigable stretches of hinterland. This occurred about 1400 A.D. For a century or two the up-country trading fairs — which specialised in textiles, copper, ivory, personal ornaments, raw iron and pure gold — adopted Muslim styles of clothing, of accountancy, of jurisprudence and of worship.

The Zambezi trade was so successful that it undermined the old Shona trading empire of Great Zimbabwe which had relied on its overland route to the south Mozambique coast. Great Zimbabwe fell into disuse in about 1450, according to the evidence of a sudden decline in imported Chinese porcelains. Shona imperial power moved North to control the Zambezi traffic from the new royal court of the Mutapa kings. The success of the Zambezi trade drew in rivals and Christianity slowly replaced Islam as the dominant purveyor of culture to the Creole communities of South-Central Africa. European concepts of land-tenure were brought from the 'Mediterranean' lands of central Portugal where Christian landlords ruled over conquered and converted Muslim peasants. The Zambezi estates, called 'prazos', became some of the world's most interesting Creole crucibles.

The dynamic impact of the Indian Ocean on Central Africa was not confined to Zambezia. By the nineteenth century textile wholesalers, laden with American calico, were establishing Swahili markets in eastern Zaire. The 700-mile portage was repaid in ivory profits. On the banks of the

great river, the freemen — the *alungwana* — built leafy towns with streets, and squares, and civil order. The rustic people of the farms — the *washenzi* — aspired to new wealth and status among the townsmen, and the more fortunate gained protective colouring by adopting Swahili speech, Muslim clothing, and by building square town houses. The Creole Swahili communities of the Congo freemen underwent a curious transformation in the twentieth century. They became a kind of elite in the incipient proto-colony which Leopold of the Belgians and his mercenary entrepreneurs established on the high Congo. Although the relationship between Creoles and conquerors suffered several violent hiccoughs, Swahili eventually became the European language of command. The colonial army inherited its culture as much from the merchant towns which preceded the European intrusion as from the imperial spirit of the Berlin conference.

The largest Creole community in Africa — with the possible exception of Turkey's client peoples in the far north — lay, of course, in the deep South. The Dutch-speaking population of the Cape of Good Hope gradually evolved into two segments. The more numerous half, the Coloured people, are largely confined to the Cape Province of South Africa, and possess one of the most potentially interesting Creole cultures in all Africa. The non-Coloured segment of Dutch speaking society, now known as Afrikaners, has spread much further afield — even into South-Central Africa. It has spread both of its own volition and in association with British migrants and expatriates. Some Creole trekkers crossed the 'Thurstlands' of Namibia into Portuguese Angola.

The coloured and non-coloured segments of Dutch-speaking Creole society in South Africa began life in a close symbolic relationship. Their history, however, diverged gradually over three hundred years, and more radically over the last fifty years. Looking southwards, from Central Africa, it is the two million coloured Creoles who particularly fascinate me. Why were they segregated off from the mainstream of Dutch peasant culture? The rivalry of white Afrikaners and white Englishmen is understandable, as is the rivalry of white Afrikaners and black Africans; but the split between coloured Dutch-speakers and non-coloured Dutch-speakers, the emergence of a segregated Creole culture, is something I would like to study further. For the so-called 'coloured population' of South Africa — looked down upon by Whites, by Blacks, by foreigners, by Marxists, by Nationalists, by everyone — is one of the most striking manifestations of a culture from the wider world grafted on to African stock, much of it of the old Khoisan population from Africa's deep past.

May we now turn to the fourth world frontier of Central Africa and to the fourth and last case study of creolisation as a feature of interaction between Africa and the wider world. This is the Atlantic frontier. It was opened in the late fifteenth century by the Portuguese maritime pioneers.

The interaction of West-Central Africa and the wider world can be divided into a series of better- and lesser-known episodes, each highly distinctive. The first one centres on Christianity in the sixteenth century.

The not-so-old kingdom of Kongo was riven by armed factionalism. One of the smaller, and probably less legitimate, factions hit on the idea of incorporating a Christian deity and a host of angels into its pantheon. The royal pretender adopted the westernised name of Alfonso and in 1506 soundly routed his rivals. The process of westernisation proceeded apace. One royal black prince gained the papal style of a bishop. Immigrant merchants — many of them Portuguese Jews — established large families of slaves, clients, retainers, children and concubines. Black scribes corresponded with Rome. Close if competitive commercial relations were established with the off-shore sugar island of São Tomé where the whole system of slave plantations was perfected before transfer to Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Island Creoles and Kongo town-dwellers thrived at the expense of the rural peasantry. Then in 1569 the revolution broke out. The black *Sans-culottes* from the countryside rose up and swept away the first Afro-European proto-urban culture. The remnants, including the king, cowered in the fevered hippo islands of the Zaire estuary.

The second phase of creolisation in West-Central Africa had little to do with Christianity and much to do with match-locks, flint-locks, and other muzzle-loading fire-arms. The conquistadores which the united Hapsburg crown of Spain-and-Portugal sent to Africa were even fewer than those who ravaged Mexico and Peru. They were joined — in enmity, in rivalry, and most curiously in alliance — by conquistadores from the Netherlands. Being military men they came without their fiancées and married into the local Creole bourgeoisie. The ideal, for men and for women, was to marry as white as possible. But blackness soon outweighed whiteness. The old soldier Cadornega sighed in 1681 that his beloved Angola was a land where sons were swarthy, grandsons were dusky and all else was blackness. The black military class of seventeenth century Creoles did, however, survive — with greater or lesser military authority — until the present day. In 1977 the military commander who almost succeeded in overthrowing the then newly independent government of Angola was José van Dunem, scion of an old and long since black family of Dutch origin. I suspect that one of the loyalist officers who forestalled the coup was another van Dunem standing astride the gap between Africa and the wider world.

The eighteenth-century frontier between West-Central Africa and the wider world lay — most unusually — two hundred miles inland from the Atlantic coast. A string of border kingdoms mediated between the Creole caravaneers of the coastlands and the armed empires of the far interior. Literacy, diplomacy, mercantilism, all took root and survived. A century later David Livingstone stumbled on the inland remnants of a Creole civilisation, having walked up from Victoria Falls, 750 miles to the south-east.

Creole life in nineteenth-century West-Central Africa focussed as much on city life in the ports as on the great trade fairs of the interior. High society flourished as visitors to the governor's ball would testify. Capitalism began to challenge the cruder forms of armed extraction. Dona Ana

Joaquina, the *Grande Dame* of Luanda black society, caused great scandal to more conventional slave exporters by setting up her own plantations in Africa. She made her own trade rum, in preference to Brazilian firewater, and owned a small transatlantic sailing fleet which imported her horses from Uruguay.

The four hundred year old Iberian Creole civilisation of Angola, both urban and provincial, faced a rude shock with the rise of Darwin and the impact of the twentieth century. The first crunch came in 1910. A republican revolution in Portugal brought an influx of brash place-seekers to Angola in search of jobs, privileges, and preferential treatment for whites. The old society, black, mellow, Victorian and established, felt itself persecuted. Old Creole functionaries were banished to postings in inhospitable southern provinces. Lawyers found their houses stoned by young white thugs. The wider world came to mean aggressive carpet-baggers. A second crunch came in 1930. The world depression suddenly deprived Portugal of the postal orders remitted home by several million migrants in Brazil. The bankrupt régime of the accountant-dictator called Salazar had to compensate by extracting wealth as best it could from Angola. White enterprise in sugar, coffee, mining, marketing, and transport drove the old Creole communities out of business much as the 1910 republicans had driven them out of administration. The third crunch came in 1961. The post-war boom in coffee-drinking made coffee the world's most traded food commodity and Angola became its fourth largest grower. A quarter of a million whites thrived on the spin-off, while blacks who did the actual work grew stridently, if justifiably, restive. As more whites poured in black opportunities plummeted and revolution broke out. The old Creoles at last saw the prospect of restoring their status and capturing the initiative.

The survival of the old families of Angola had taken place partly under the aegis of the American Methodist Church which had been allotted the Luanda corridor in the Protestant partition of Africa. Methodist lay-preachers took a key rôle in trying to form a Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). They aimed to capture the revolution and restore influence to the old Creole élite together with any new radical allies they picked up *en route*. It took the Popular Movement thirteen years to gain power. In so doing, it collected an amazing assortment of allies from the wider world. They included Portuguese dissident democrats, the Soviet government who joined them, left them, and joined them again, and a Texan oil company or two who helped in the last stages of the war to the fury of the United States administration. But the most interesting support of all was obtained from another great Iberian Creole society, Cuba, which eventually supplied 20,000 teachers, engineers, administrators, economists, strategists and soldiers.

The wider world also supplied Angola with numerous enemies. The military régime of neighbouring Zaire — oddly fearful of the radical rhetoric of the Popular Movement — tried to destabilize the new government. China, which then preferred a more rural-based party to one which

merely mouthed recognition of peasant supremacy, lined up against its Soviet rival South Africa, which feared any black régime which might prove politically viable invaded and came close to capturing the Creole city and power centre in Luanda. The USA also lined up against the new government but soon lost face and held a grudge it could never forget. So, civil war persisted and the wider world fanned the flames for another thirteen years. By 1986 the Creole and army families controlled the government, the oil and the towns. Anarchy controlled the countryside.

How then does the wider world look from Africa's point of view? Rather an unhappy place — aggressive, military and warlike. Which is not to say that old Africa was a peaceful Eden. But from a Central African perspective — balanced on the Equator — the wider world looks like a place of outer darkness which specialises in the export of warfare. The Northern legacy is endemic civil war in Chad. The Eastern legacy is the culture of the ruling Zaïre army. The Southern legacy is the armed and expansionist state of South Africa. The Western legacy is the rumbling anarchy of Angola. May peace soon descend!

The above article is based on a lecture given to the African Studies Association at the 1986 conference.

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WHY PARENTS WORRY

by Stanley Ellison

NORMAL, healthy parents know what they want their children to become — normal healthy parents. They do not need experts to tell them that, and most know that children require both a father and a mother, most effectively supplied by a stable, happy marriage, where the interaction between the parents can be observed and studied by the developing children.

However, if the parents find that their child is in some way not normal then the best expert advice available must be obtained. In the medical field this is obvious; the early recognition of a congenital abnormality, an assessment of its significance, and then the appropriate treatment to limit the ill effects. Technological medicine at its best discovers the child with a hearing problem or a vision problem, or any disorder affecting a function and attempts to put it right. This process is applied throughout childhood.

Parents do not have to be particularly intelligent to know that inadequate clothing, bad housing, squalid living conditions and poor diet can all affect and damage normal child development. It has become part of their own education and is now revealed wisdom. Most parents have no difficulty in appreciating that children can learn habits — good habits and bad habits. They can be taught acceptable behaviour or they can be untamed or wild. There is an element of parental choice and here one enters the area concerned with teaching. Parents know that they do not wish to have children who play truant from school, cheat, lie, steal or become drug abusers. They may not consciously understand what factors lead to such behaviour in their children, but they do know it is not a desirable thing, and if they could avoid it happening they would play their part. Their problems become greater as the children grow older. On the one hand they wish to protect their offspring; on the other, the children are exposed to more and more influences over which the parents have little control. There are their children's friends, the parents of their children's friends, other relatives, school teachers, TV programmes, all entertainers, and even strangers in the street. I used to say to my children, 'The jungle starts at our front door — you may not find a tiger or a snake but it is still a jungle!'. The parent tries to prepare the child for the traumas of everyday life. The human tiger and the human snake exist.

Apart from the physical danger of motor cars, home accidents, sports injuries and the like, the outstanding fear is of the human predator on young children. Parents do not know the medical jargon describing such people. They may know little or nothing about the subject; but they do know that there is a risk for their child from which they wish to be protected.

Eventually, puberty is reached and the developing sexuality manifests

itself in male and female role play. A time of tension for many, with parents feeling threatened, not clear about what line to take, either fearing loss of control or over-responding to situations. But the 'normal healthy parent' can remember his or her own experience and its resolution

Into this stage of psycho-sexual development has, of recent years, come a new force — a militant group of homosexuals who seek public acceptance of their life-style. The concept that consenting adults can, in private, practise the sexual behaviour of their choice in no way implies that the promotion of such behaviour or the suggestion that it is normal or healthy can be considered legally acceptable. In other words, only in the most special circumstances can homosexual behaviour between consenting adults be acceptable to society. It is the duty of society through its laws to protect the minor from being seduced into a homosexual life-style. Just as we see the real dangers from drug abuse, from a life of crime, or from alcohol abuse so we appreciate the ultimate risks for those who become practising homosexuals. This has been highlighted by the recent incidence of AIDS but all sexually transmitted diseases increase in number if promiscuity is rife.

It can be claimed that the high incidence of AIDS amongst homosexuals is the result of HIV infection acquired several years ago, and that the practising homosexual of today and the future will be safe with a condom. There is no evidence to prove that condom sex is 'safe sex'. Certainly, the condom cannot be relied on as a totally safe contraceptive for it has a known failure rate. Can we honestly say to our children that homosexual practices using a condom are a sure way to prevent infection? If not, then we are misleading them. Is it a risk we would wish them to take?

Experimentation in the young and immature is a well-known phenomenon. Who has not tried cigarettes, alcohol or the occasional soft drug? One hopes that the habits are not acquired for the long-term dangers are considerable. But AIDS is different. The acquisition of the HIV infection poses a threat to health of a totally different dimension. Having a taste of excitement in one's youth is one thing but to dice with death is not to be recommended. Children need to know the true facts and if necessary made fearful of taking the risk.

But there are other hazards of the homosexual life-style. Perhaps not life-threatening in the same way but nonetheless potentially destructive. The latent homosexual may well function satisfactorily without experiencing stress, but once an overt life-style has developed, frequently associated with promiscuity, the psychological consequences can be devastating. No achievement in work or position can compensate for the problems in interpersonal relationships. There is no need to enlarge on the psychopathology of the practising homosexual; sufficient evidence is available to support the belief that the handicap is severe and intractable. Whilst in expert hands remedial treatment is available, as it is for those dependent on alcohol, tobacco or other drugs, prevention is preferable to treatment. The conflicts that the homosexual life-style create can never

be satisfactorily resolved. Whether one calls it an illness, a developmental abnormality or retardation, there seems no doubt that it is an acquired form of behaviour which can be learned and transmitted to others.

It is this fact which is at the core of the debate concerning Clause 28 — which would forbid local authorities to promote homosexuality. Perhaps it is difficult to believe that local authorities would ever consider promoting homosexuality? This possibility has been studied in considerable detail by Rachel Tingle in her booklet *Gay Lessons — How public funds are used to promote homosexuality among children and young people* (Pickwick Books 1986). In it, she shows how teachers are being encouraged to use publications by the London Gay Teenage Group, and to recommend books and videos which present homosexual behaviour as loving, caring and fun. These resources are also being advertised by the National Youth Bureau for use within youth clubs throughout the country.

All this is an attempt to promote the ideology of the gay movement. Claiming as it does that the homosexual life-style is normal, that it is not a matter of choice, it is not changeable and is not an 'illness'. Furthermore, the suggestion that homosexuals are an oppressed minority has led to a revolutionary movement with clear political objectives. The analysis of this has been clearly defined by Roger J. Magnuson in his book *Are 'Gay Rights' Right?* (Straitgate Press 1985). Whilst the focus of attention in recent months has been on the risks and dangers of sex abuse in childhood we must not forget the equally important protection that needs to be given to children passing through each phase in psychosexual development where harmful influences can just as easily be transmitted.

Clause 28 is one attempt to reduce the harmful effects on children. It needs support to help normal, healthy parents feel confident that they may be able to see their children become normal healthy parents.

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ECONOMIC GLOOM: THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

by Mark Cook

PESSIMISTS would have us believe that the world economy and in particular the UK economy cannot continue to grow at the current pace. It might be argued that the greater the number of people they can persuade to their 'banner' the more likely such views will be self-fulfilling.

The UK growth rate may be at variance with those in the rest of the world in the short term but it will be interlinked by what is happening in the rest of the world over the long-run. The days of completely 'go it alone' policies are over. France and the UK should have learnt their lessons here. This does not mean that governments are powerless with regard to world forces. The major industrial nations attempt to 'set' economic policy and each government then steers its own boat within the economic current, but at the same time paying regard to the various 'hazards' on the journey. For example, the UK's pattern of growth in 1988 will be influenced by a number of major industrial areas like the EEC, Japan and the United States. Changes in policy within the United States, for instance, the raising or lowering of interest rates in that country or the imposition (or even threats) of trade restrictions will affect world confidence and thereby confidence in the UK economy.

How, therefore, is the UK economy performing currently and what are the predictions of how the economy is expected to behave in the future with regard to the major economic indicators in the UK and in view of the March Budget (1988)?

The balance of payments, a major thorn in the side of many previous periods of industrial expansion, was in surplus for the first seven months of 1987 at around £37 million, though by the out-turn of 1987 had deteriorated to a £1.5 billion deficit. The estimate for 1988 and 1989 given in the budget was £4 billion due mainly to the anticipated decline in the oil surplus. With the UK forecast to grow at a faster rate than most other industrial countries, this adds fuel to the balance of payments problem.

Balance of trade figures obviously have an impact on the pound's exchange rate. In a freely fluctuating exchange rate system the pound's value relative to other currencies would oscillate along with world market forces. Today, however, we have opposite signals, a trade deficit but an expansionary UK economy. Furthermore we have a government, or perhaps a chancellor, which is trying to keep the pound undervalued using a managed float system so that British industry does not lose its competitiveness. We may now be entering a different game — once business people perceive that there is consistency in Government policy toward the exchange rate, one which has not existed before in 'boom' periods, then this may give them the incentive to invest which in the longer term could lead to greater productivity and competitiveness. Trade

figures, in the aggregate, hide much more interesting micro changes over time. The recent trade figures for the UK indicate that capital goods imports, necessary for the future competitiveness of British Industry, have fallen back whilst imports of consumer goods continue to rise. This last fact may simply be an indication that whilst the UK economy is growing much faster than its major rivals, foreign exporters are eager to search for the most expansionary market and currently that is the UK's. It may indicate, however, an increasing desire for imported goods on the part of UK consumers, a fact that may be exacerbated by the tax cuts in March's budget.

Linked closely to the trade figures, and an instrument which can have much effect on our overall Balance of Payments, is the interest rate. Currently the interest rate in the UK looks very attractive when compared with that of our foreign competitors. There is also little indication that this will fall dramatically in the future after its rise in the middle of last year. The question as to why it was increased then may be linked to a general re-alignment of interest rates following the rises in Germany and Japan earlier. The Bank of England saw it as a 'brake pedal' being applied to the UK economy since they feared it was over-heating. There are a number of other factors about which the Bank of England felt concern if the UK economy was to continue to be buoyant—higher UK wage costs compared with our major competitors, the hardening of prices of oil and other internationally traded products, the increase in house prices which may lead to increasing inflationary expectations, and the rapid growth in credit and the supply of broad money.

The raising of interest rates also had further effects. Firstly, it increased the costs to industry and consumers, perhaps causing a downward shift in the momentum of spending by these two groups. Secondly it helped the balance of payments. The rise in UK interest rates normally causes the pound to be stabilised on the foreign exchange markets. In fact, if the pound rises it will help to reduce import inflation. This higher interest rate is unlikely to hit industry's spending plans to a great extent since currently profits are sufficiently high to absorb any small rise in interest rates.

On the labour front, a measure often used as an indicator of the future competitiveness of the UK economy, is the level of unit labour costs. These rose by 1.7% in September 1987 suggesting that the inflation rate will fall from 4.4% to under 4% by the end of the year, although there is still an underlying growth in average earnings of around 7½%. On the employment front, generally, there are indications that the economy is well placed. Long term unemployment figures indicate their lowest level for three years with the Chancellor noting that in 1987 'unemployment fell faster than in any other year since the war, in every region of the country, and more than in any other major nation'. Yet there is some doubt as to what these figures indicate. Michael Meacher, the chief opposition spokesman on unemployment, suggested that 'the Restart Programme is now removing the long term unemployed in droves from the

registers, but only a tiny number of them are actually getting jobs'. He cites a survey on Merseyside which found that for every 10 people lost to the jobless register, only one person actually found work

The general unemployment figures, nevertheless, do show a downward trend. Other positive indicators are a rise in the number of vacancies, increased overtime and short-time working at its lowest level since statistics were first collected. More importantly, the Department of Employment points to the revival in manufacturing employment. Manufacturing jobs rose 10,000 in June 1987. Productivity was also high in this sector, with output per head 6.5-7% above the level of a year earlier. Furthermore, manufacturing output rose in the quarter to June by 1.5%, with unit labour costs in manufacturing not rising at all because a 7% rise in productivity entirely offset the rise in earnings.

The one problem with rising employment, however, is the increased bargaining strength of unions. When a market is more buoyant then the fear of unemployment becomes less and although productivity may remain high most of this gain may be lost with higher wage demands. It is perhaps Trade Union reaction which offers a certain amount of uncertainty for the future. Although higher levels of unemployment have seen a fall in trade union membership — some 2.5 million in eight years — the figures hide the fact that there has been progress in unionisation among public sector white-collar workers and there is still a great deal of opposition to single union agreements, as indicated by the recent negotiations in Dundee. Furthermore, Britain still retains one of the most highly unionised workforces in the industrial world and the proportion is higher than our major competitors.

Unions, therefore, may be responsible for some of the real increase in wages over the last few years. In the short run this has not been to our detriment since productivity has also increased — but can this continue indefinitely? In the future we may see a return to a situation like the 1970s with pay rises not so strongly linked to productivity increases. This problem of high wage agreements may be another reason why interest rates were increased mid-year 1987. Employers who agree substantial pay rises for their employees may on the one hand be able to pass the increased wage costs on to domestic consumers in terms of price increases, but if their goods are exported the higher cost may make them less competitive.

The worsening of the balance of trade figures that follows could see the pound falling in value thereby restoring UK exporters competitiveness. The exporter appears to be in a no loss situation. However, one reason suggested as to why the Government is keeping interest rates up was that it would lead to no fall in the exchange rate of the pound and so would cause employers to bear some of the burden of any excessive pay agreements. I have suggested that individual economies are heavily dependent on one another. This implies that actions taken in one country, if it is sufficiently large in world terms will affect all other economies to some degree. Therefore, what is happening in the US is important for the UK economy. For example, the US budget deficit continues in the \$150

billion range and according to the White House, the President's proposals will see a deficit of \$146.7 billion in the fiscal year ending September 30th 1988 and \$129.5 billion the following year. Is this important?

If foreign investors now perceive that the UK is a much stronger haven for their money this could lead to the pound strengthening in value and thereby losing some of the competitiveness for the UK's revived manufacturing sector. If we go further and say that there is a rapid downturn in US fortunes then UK exporters along with other industrial nations will see a major export market reduced. It is not surprising, therefore, that the growing US deficit, not only in budget but also in trade, has led to increased calls for protectionism, via quotas, in the US. None has been as loud as the US textile industry's voice who have noted that textile imports into the US have reached over \$24.7 billion.

The major problem with protectionism is that of retaliation by competitors leading inexorably to trade wars and a general slow-down in world growth. This would obviously have a major effect on a trading nation like the UK. One aspect of the UK economy which has received much 'press' attention is the UK's manufacturing sector. Britain's manufacturing sector is much more competitive now than at any time for the last decade or so. In September 1987 it was growing at an annual rate of 5.5%, with manufacturing productivity up by 7.2% over last year. The Institute for Employment Research estimates that manufacturing productivity will rise by approximately 4.5% per year until at least 1995. This follows from the 'streamlining' of British Industry. These figures may be at odds with other forecasts which suggests that rising demand is more likely to be satisfied by foreign imports rather than home production. On the industrial level September 1987 saw UK industrial output reaching the level it had attained in 1979 when the Conservatives came into office. More importantly, over the last few months output has been increasing due to the manufacturing sector rather than relying on North Sea oil output.

Although inflation was expected to fall to under 4% by the end of the year, and indeed did so, for the longer term outlook we must look towards the new wage round, commodity prices, money supply growth and the pace of productivity rises. The recent high productivity growth has meant that an 8% earning increase in manufacturing can be funded by a rise in unit wage costs of approximately 1.5% over the year. This productivity rise coupled with a general growth in the economy of around 3% a year since 1983, a slow down in the rate of growth of M₀ — indicating a reduction in the fears of an over fast credit expansion — and a reduced (increased) Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (Public Sector Debt Repayment) suggest that the growth rate experienced by the UK economy will continue, but not as fast as it has been. The fears of 'overheating' may, therefore, be overstated. Nevertheless, M₃ is up by 20% on a year ago, and bank lending up by 21% on the year — though this last figure overestimates the true level because of the inclusion of certain credit card balances which are transactions driven — the balance of trade is deteriorat-

ing and there are high underlying wage costs

It would appear that generally the omens look good in the short term for the UK economy, but what of the longer term?

On the positive side, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research viewed the UK economy in an optimistic light in its *Review* August 1987. Firstly they suggested that the current period is not a 'boom' as we know it. There is no excess demand for labour causing pay rises to be pushed upwards but it is a period of real pay increases financed by productivity growth. They do forecast, however, a deterioration in the UK trade figures and in the inflation rate. Growth is forecast at 2.2% this year and unemployment is predicted to fall to 2.7 million before levelling-off. The problem is the fall in US growth in the future. The NIESR suggest that a stronger Europe and Japan will take the US's place. But this is only a prediction. If this does not occur then a stronger pound — as one scenario suggests — with a static or slow growing world economy, will not be fortuitous for the UK economy.

Others suggest that Britain's growth rate could be 4% per year for the rest of the century, not quite emulating the rapid growth of Japan in the 1950's and 60's but at the same time not constrained by the balance of payments crises of 1946 and 1976. Why? The reason again is North Sea oil. It is not that we have used this mainly for investment in UK infrastructure but that the money on the whole has helped towards the purchase of foreign assets which in turn has led to increased foreign exchange earnings to pay for our seemingly insatiable desire for manufactured imports. There may be other good omens too. The Thatcher Government's drive to reduce union power means that when we do have growth it may not be extinguished by 'dominant' union power; furthermore, there is an eager pool of unemployment on which to draw. Would not high underlying wage increases cause the UK to lose its competitiveness? Relative inflation rates may be a problem, however. The problem of our higher inflation is partially offset by our rapid growth in productivity. But much of our growth, particularly with regard to exports, may be due to an undervalued pound. Our sustained growth pattern in the long term may not be possible if the pound is allowed to return to its 'natural' level.

The question we need to broach is that of whether the UK economic expansion will be thwarted as it was in the late 60's and early 70's. We may be more efficient but supply side constraints, for all the efforts of the Government, still abound. Such a situation is seen with the report by the National Computing Centre who noted that the lack of skilled people was one of the biggest obstacles to the use of information technology in Britain and therefore to future competitiveness. This is partly due to a lack of training by Government sponsored schemes, but also to a fear by firms that once they have trained an individual then that person will be poached by a competitor.

Further doubt as to the future prosperity of the UK economy has been noted by the Confederation of British Industry. They suggest that

the current account shows no sign of improvement over the next few months and they couple this with falling growth and possible rising unemployment. In the short run the indicators may show that demand is buoyant and that supply conditions are fairly good but in the long term the growth rate is expected to slow down to 2.2% in 1988, with a slight rise in unemployment along with a higher inflation rate

This CBI report agreed with a recent MORI opinion poll, that is — the optimism which people had for the UK economy is beginning to decline. Perhaps more importantly, however, is that a survey of manufacturing firms, although believing that the home market for manufactured goods was very buoyant felt that there was growing concern that exports were slipping back. The MORI poll, however, also indicated that there was some decline in capacity utilisation and there was considerable uncertainty in the currency markets

The OECD also have doubts over the UK economy, suggesting that the high level of pay settlements would inevitably undermine industry's competitiveness and put a brake on growth though how much credence we should give to their forecast is open to question since they have consistently, over the last few years, underestimated the UK's growth. In fact the OECD have given contradictory signals with their latest forecast that the UK will be one of the few economies to experience a fall in its unemployment rate next year.

A similar picture has emerged from Professor Rose. He suggests that the upturn in economic growth between 1983-86 has been weaker than the 1976-1980 upturn. The main problem is the fall in OECD exports to the developing countries. This is due mainly to the developing countries huge debt problems. Coupling this with inhibited domestic demand growth in the developed nations and the possibility of the US cutting her budget deficit, he suggests that if Germany and Japan do not replace the US in world markets then deflationary conditions will become more of a certainty. What we need is for world interest rates to fall as the US budget deficit is reduced. If not, the prospect for a rate of world economic expansion sufficient to reduce unemployment is not good.

In conclusion, therefore, predicting the future of the UK's economy is a hazardous occupation, no more so when the Government's role on the economy shows no sign of wavering. We might think that this would make predictions easier but, in history, previous governments often responded to changing world conditions — the familiar 'U-Turn' — whereas the Thatcher Administration seems set on a consistent approach. We therefore cannot rely on what happened in the past to predict the future. Predictions also are based on various scenarios. One of the easiest is to assume that future conditions will be the same as current conditions, but often the world is not like this — it tends to throw up rogue elements. For example, what happens if the US economy collapses under its balance of payments deficit? Will Germany and Japan respond and if so in what way? What happens if the Gulf War continues and spreads, causing an upheaval in world oil markets? The answer to these questions is difficult

to discover. What we can say, however, is that in the short term it appears that the UK economy will continue along its current path, on the whole outpacing many of its major competitors. In the long term, *ceteris paribus*, we may see inflation rising, unemployment bottoming-out and our balance of trade deteriorating but there are indications that the UK will continue to be strong so long as the Government are consistent in their actions and are able to allay any fears that investors, countries or 'the City' might have about the UK's economic performance and at the same time continue to control and inhibit trade unions. But there again in the long run nothing is certain

NOTES

- 1 World Economic Growth Causes of Disappointment, H. Rose, *Barclays Review*, August 1987.

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REGENCY DAYS: THE UNPUBLISHED DIARIES OF CHARLOTTE GROVE

by Desmond Hawkins

ON the flyleaf of her diary for the year 1811 Charlotte Grove noted three important events 'The beginning of this year', she wrote, 'our good King being ill the Prince of Wales was appointed Regent — and as he *ought* kept in his Father's Ministers'. Early in April she was 'sorry to hear Bysshe was expelled Oxford for writing to the Bishops on Atheism' And an undated entry recorded a bet — 'Laid a penny with H that we get into Fern next Sept'

'Bysshe' was her cousin Percy Bysshe Shelley, the poet his mother and hers being sisters. 'H' was her sister Harriet. 'Fern' was the long established seat of the Grove family in Donhead St Andrew in southwest Wiltshire A serious deterioration in the structure of the house in 1809 had necessitated demolition and rebuilding. At the beginning of 1811 the Groves were therefore occupying temporary accommodation in the adjacent village of Tollard Royal and watching the progress of their new mansion in the park at Fern

Charlotte's twenty-eighth birthday was approaching. Harriet was eight years younger Four of their five brothers were not yet married but their presence in the family circle was intermittent For much of the time the two sisters had to depend on each other for companionship and amusement. By day they liked to go for a walk If the weather kept them indoors they played chess and occasionally 'battledore and shuttlecock'. In the evenings they read aloud, in the company of their parents A box of books arrived periodically from London, bringing new novels to supplement their favourite classics, Shakespeare and Richardson. They made a dramatic duet of scenes from Shakespeare which they performed to the family circle. Among contemporary novelists Jane Austen was Charlotte's favourite.

Their opportunities for more exciting and elaborate pastimes came in two ways One was the exchange of visits with relatives, friends and neighbours, the other was the seasonal progression of public events in the calendars of the gentry — the race meetings, town balls, visits to Bath or London. Unlike their brothers they could not take an initiative. They had to contain themselves within the narrow framework of a monotonous daily round until some lucky chance brought a surprise invitation. Unable to make any plans of their own volition they lived in a sort of bubbling expectancy.

Their two local race-meetings were at Salisbury and Blandford. Aunt Philippa Grove lived at Netherhampton, within easy distance of Salisbury race-course, and in July 1811 Charlotte recorded that 'she ordered us to attend the Salisbury Races'. On July 24 'We came to Netherhampton & then went upon the race-course, Aunt Grove with us'; and the following day 'Harriet and I went on the race-course in Aunt Grove's carriage.

Enjoyed it much. Went to the ball — a very pleasant one'

The Blandford Races in August 1812 were the occasion for a family gathering at Lyttleton, a mansion beside the river Stour outside Blandford, which was the seat of the Farquharsons until Squire Farquharson built his new house at Langton Long, when Lyttleton became the dower house. The widowed mother lived there with her daughter Henrietta whom Charlotte's eldest brother, Tom Grove, married. As Tom was the heir to Fern he and his wife had a succession of temporary homes without settling anywhere. In 1812 they were at Lyttleton entertaining a house-party which included Charlotte, her mother and several of her brothers.

August 2 My mother and I went to Lyttleton. Old Mrs Farquharson gave us a very kind reception

August 3 My brothers came to Lyttleton. Mrs J Farquharson dined with us and we afterwards went upon the race-course in her barouche. Mr Kneller's horse lost. A ball — we danced till two in the morning.

August 4 In the morning we saw Moon the conjuror exhibit some very curious tricks. Went upon the race-course with Mrs J Farquharson. A ball — I danced till 6 o'clock. 18 couples ended with The Boulanger.

The dancing probably appealed more strongly than the races to Charlotte, who was no horsewoman. Her mother and sister Harriet occasionally rode on horseback, but Charlotte never speaks of doing so herself. Dancing, on the contrary, was one of her greatest pleasures. She was approaching sixty when she joined in the dancing at a Christmas party at Fern and her father remarked that she danced 'as well as ever'.

Much of her dancing would take place informally in private houses with a group of friends but there were also public balls in assembly rooms or the larger inns, particularly at Christmas and New Year. In Donhead St Andrew the Glove Inn at the foot of Whitesheet Hill was a stopping place for the mail coach. Letters and packages for Fern were delivered here and it was also the setting for a ball on Boxing Day 1811 —

Dec 26 It snowed. The singers sang all day in the hall. In the evening went to the Glove ball. We met a great many of our neighbours there. I danced every dance.

Dec 27 To Lyttleton. Went to the Blandford Ball.

Shaftesbury (Shaston) had a similar event annually, with varying success depending on the weather. Early January 1811 was not a good moment for it —

Jan 9 We went to Mrs Gordon's & over Ashcombe Hill in a *cart* were fearful the bottom of it would come out. Mrs Benett dined with us & accompanied us to the Shaston Ball, not many people & very freezing cold.

1828 was a better year —

— an excellent Shaston ball. Many families from Shroton. Sir Edward Baker the steward.

A year later, on New Year's Eve, Charlotte — now married to the rector of Berwick St John — had a strange mishap —

Dec 31 We went to the Shaftesbury Ball. A large party from Fern. My head caught fire against a lamp. One of the fiddlers very kindly put it out directly. Frost and snow. We ended the old year very *merrily indeed*.

Dancing in private houses might be quite impromptu or a planned ball to mark a special occasion. Celebrations of the New Year in 1811 included a dance given by brother Tom and his wife Henrietta at Lyttleton. Three other brothers, George, John and Charles had come home a

few days earlier and were hurriedly given lessons by their sisters in the proper way to dance the rigadon. Leaving their parents at home they set off on New Year's Day to Lyttleton in high spirits 'A Dutch concert the whole way' is Charlotte's description. At Lyttleton they found an assortment of young men, no less than five Miss Pleydells and other young women including Miss Tregonwell '*dressed like a bride*'. Recalling the more memorable moments Charlotte wrote in her diary — 'Harriet, George and myself danced a cotillon with the Miss Pleydells, dear charming friends of ours. Henrietta called a cousin of hers a goose'. The cotillon was a novelty as Harriet and Charlotte had learnt it only a fortnight before, and then taught George.

Later in January they were dancing at the house of their friends, the Gordons, with whom they had gone to the public ball in Shaftesbury the previous evening. After two nights with the Gordons Charlotte and her sister Harriet moved on to Pyt House, the home of John Benett in Tisbury, a palatial residence that had recently been enlarged by its politically ambitious owner — 'Gallon Loaf' Benett as Cobbett named him. Here a ball had attracted a large house-party, which included William Helyar of Sedgemoor. Charlotte, a determined match-maker, saw him as a promising suitor for her sister: he was a wealthy and cultured young man who would inherit Coker Court, near Yeovil. He came at a timely moment, following the termination of Harriet's romantic engagement to her cousin, Bysshe Shelley.

Jan 11 Went to Pythouse. Met a large party. A ball. George Benett dressed up as *Miss Easton* and deceived us completely. The Helyars there. I am in hopes from circumstances of what I have long wished taking place.

Jan 12 We staid at Pythouse. Mr Harry Helyar called. Played Dumb Crambo in the evening. Mr Benett practised twice on me the rhyme of *Miss*. We played chess with him.

Jan 13 With regret left the dear Benetts and Gordons. Arrived at Tollard in safety.

With the coming of summer there would be invitations to travel greater distances, perhaps to the Sussex home of the Shelley cousins or — as in 1811 — to visit their kinsfolk, the Long family, in north Wiltshire. Charlotte's grandmother was Philippa Long.

Having moved into the new house at Fern on September 21, thereby winning Charlotte's penny bet with Harriet, the Groves set off almost at once to visit Richard Godolphin Long M.P. at Rood Ashton near Chippenham. Travelling with their parents, Charlotte and Harriet had the agreeable company of their brother John whose house in London had been a temporary refuge for Bysshe Shelley when he was sent down from Oxford. John Grove, now 27 and a bachelor, had been disappointed in an earlier courtship, Charlotte inevitably was scenting romance in the air as they approached Chippenham. There were several daughters in the Long household and every prospect of dancing and general entertainment. From Charlotte's account it is easy to understand how keenly such a visit would be hoped for and anticipated in the quiet days of ordinary home-life.

Sept 24 We went to Rood Ashton. The Long family we found quite well.

introduced to Miss Ann & Diantia Long. Played at 'Commerce' in the evening. Miss Flora Long won the immense pool of 3/6d.

Sept 25 We went to Chippenham, 1st day of the races. Very wet. Lady Arundell & Miss Jones accompanied us in the barouche. We laughed & talked the whole time. A pleasant ball. I danced with Capt. Longham R.N., Mr. Walter Long & Lord Arundell.

Sept 26 All the young party went together. John contrived well in taking some money from Miss Flora Long. A concert & ball afterwards. Mr. Peach struck with Miss Flora Long as well as a friend of mine is.

Sept 27 Dined at Corsham — Mr. Methuen's — a fine house. In the morning we danced in the brewhouse of our lodgings.

Sept 28 Walked out with the Miss Longs. We had a little dance in the evening. Mr. Long and my father and mother joined the gay party.

Sept 29 John and Miss Flora jumped over the stiles very prettily together. (Good luck attend J.G. in Cupid's court).

Alas, John's luck was out and he had to wait seven more years for a wife. What was now stirring in 'Cupid's Court' involved sister Harriet. Immediately on their return John went off with their younger brother Charles to shoot at Sedgemoor as the guests of William Helyar. Next day the brothers brought William back to Fern with them, to dance in the evening and stay overnight.

Oct 2 My dear brother & sister Thomas Grove came, as also Mr. William Helyar returned from Sedgemoor with my two brothers. He danced with Harriet in the evening & I have hopes that what I wish may happen.

Oct 3 Our castles have a good foundation. Harriet checkmated by W.H. Mr. Helyar drove Harriet out in his curriole. We danced in the evening.

Oct 5 I like my future brother better every day.

The romantic dancing of Harriet with her future husband must have been the first dance in the new house at Fern, a propitious beginning. After the cramped conditions of their temporary accommodation at Tollard the Groves would have revelled in the spaciousness of Fern where large parties could gather for a ball, particularly during the Christmas season. Sometimes the music was provided by the 'Fern band' or a band from the neighbouring village of Berwick St John; at other times the household improvised, with one of the servants, Daniel Lampard, playing the violin while Charlotte's mother accompanied him on the tambourine. Reels, country dances and quadrilles were popular. When the servants held their own dance Charlotte went into the servants' hall with one of her nephews to join the dancing.

For the daughters of the landowning gentry in rural communities like Donhead St Andrew and Tollard Royal the most inviting prospect at any time would be a race-meeting, a ball or simply a neighbourly visit to dine on a haunch of venison or a turbot and pass the evening making music or playing parlour games. The really big event, and a rare one in many cases, was a visit in a fashionable month to London or Bath — particularly at a marriageable age. Charlotte made such visits, notably in the Spring of 1812 when Elizabeth Shelley, the eldest of the poet's sisters, came to Fern from Bath to stay for a month before taking Charlotte back to Bath with her. Elizabeth, who never married, and Charlotte who remained single until middle-age had much in common. Relations between them had been strained in 1810 when Elizabeth collaborated with her brother in a verse lampoon of Charlotte which they published in 'Original

Poetry of Victor & Cazire', but this was clearly banished from memory and forgiven two years later. In early March 1812 Charlotte was at Fern with her parents and a visiting friend, Letitia Popham, who departed on the 16th. On the 19th Charlotte's brother Charles came home 'being the Oxford vacation'; and four days later —

March 23 My cousin Elizabeth Shelley arrived from Bath, entertained us with her account of the 12 Apostles She is in the highest spirits

March 24 We were not able to walk out Played whist in the evening & taught Elizabeth

March 25 A snow I played battledore with my cousin

Next day the weather improved and Elizabeth 'rode on horseback with my brothers' Brother Tom and his wife had appeared at Fern, as had Harriet — making an unexpected visit while her husband went to London. On Sunday March 29 they all went to church —

where we received the sacrament A wet day again I am sorry to say Politicks our topic of conversation Elizabeth as usual permitted her tongue its full office.

The following weeks passed in the familiar pattern of daytime walks when the weather permitted, social calls and dinner parties, and evening pastimes that included whist and cribbage, dancing and music-making Elizabeth evidently enjoyed horseback riding with her cousin Charles or her aunt, though not with Charlotte who seems never to have mounted a horse. The volatile Shelley temperament took an unfortunate turn once when Charlotte noted 'Elizabeth not quite well before dinner She had an hysterical laugh'

On April 21st the Grove phaeton carried Charlotte and Elizabeth to Warminster where they transferred to Mrs Parker's carriage and proceeded to Bath. Mrs Parker was Elizabeth Shelley's hostess at Bath as Mrs Shelley, who frequented Bath on other occasions, was not there at this time. Charlotte stayed with her Aunt Chafin Grove, a sister of her father's who had married a kinsman, William Chafin Grove. During their stay of over three weeks Charlotte usually called for Elizabeth in the morning and they joined the fashionable round of visits to the Pump Room, balls, routs and walks in the public gardens. They saw the celebrated actor William Betty — 'the young Roscius' — making his return to the theatres as Orestes; and they rode in sedan chairs when a shower of rain caught them unsheltered. At last the time came for their departure —

May 15 I spent my morning with Elizabeth Took leave of my dear cousin with the greatest regret. Remained at home with my aunt, being the last evening

May 16 Left Bath about 10 o'clock and did not get home till 6 in the evening

She does not say how she made the homeward journey Aunt Chafin Grove lived at Zeals, near Mere, which was probably a convenient transfer point for Charlotte and her not inconsiderable baggage In her meticulous way she had prepared a list of the apparel and jewellery she took to Bath and added a supplement of the articles she bought there As an itemised inventory of a young woman of fashion it is perhaps worth putting on record —

6 shifts, 3 night shifts; 8 prs cotton stockings, 7 prs silk stockings; 2 prs stays, 6 cravats, 3 night caps, 3 under ditto, 1 dozen & half pocket handkerchiefs; 4 caps — 2 coloured, 1 bedgown — petticoats, 2 coloured morning gowns, 2 evening ditto, 6 white morning gowns, 4 white evening gowns, 1 satin dress; 2 slips, 6 cambrick petticoats, 2 dimity ditto, 2 flannell petticoats, 1 silk pelisse, 2 white cambrick ditto, 1 mantle, 1 velvet pelisse, 2 green veils, 2 tippets, 12

frills, 2 lace veils, 1 sattin bonnett, 1 beaver hat; 1 straw bonnett, 1 shawl, 1 tippet with fur, 1 fur tippet, 1 sattin body, 1 pr walking shoes, 1 pr black pumps, 2 prs 8d kid shoes, 2 prs white ditto, 1 pr grey pumps

JEWELLERY garnets, 2 chains & glasses, pearls, hair bracelets, red cornelian, white cornelian, gold ornaments

5 prs long cambrick gloves, 4 prs habit ditto, 5 prs coloured ditto

Additional items bought in Bath pink gown, yellow ditto, white sattin body & stomacher, 6 prs cotton stockings, pair Irish ditto, pr habit gloves, 2 prs black kid shoes, pr walking shoes, pr buff Grecian shoes, straw bonnett.

[Desmond Hawkins is the author of *Hardy's Wessex*, *Hardy, Novelist and Poet*, *The Tess Opera* and the Introduction to a forthcoming collected edition of Hardy's short stories. He is currently working on research on Shelley's relationship with his cousins, the Groves, based on unpublished diaries.]

The June issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Israel and the Arabs* by Ranko Petkovic, *Banking in Luxembourg* by B. Narpati, *The Reform of Local Government Finance* by Nigel Healey and *The World of Television* by P. G. Macdonald.

EARLY STRUGGLES OF THE GETO-DACIANS

by Constantin Gheorghe

The bravest and most righteous of all Thracians.

THUS concisely characterised by Herodotus 2,500 years ago, the Romanians' ancestors, the Geto-Dacians, went down in world history and in the political geography of south-eastern Europe as a people resolved to keep their land and wealth, to resist pressure and violence and to defeat in battle those who encroached upon their liberty. From that time on, the Geto-Dacians and then the Romanians kept guard against invasions from the East and thus preserved many values of the West. In a nutshell, it is what the distinguished French diplomat, Count of Saint-Aulaire, said in a speech of 1927; namely, that history and geography granted Romania 'the dangerous honour of being, in this part of Europe, the Thermopylae of peace and civilisation'.

The event to which we are referring is mentioned in Herodotus' history, in which the Greek historian gave an account of the 514 BC expedition of Darius I against the Scythians north of the Black Sea. 'Before reaching the Ister (the Danube), wrote Herodotus 'Darius first defeated the Getae,' stressing that all the people the Persian king met along the western coast of Pontus Euxinus submitted to him of their own free will. The Getae alone — 'the bravest and most righteous of all Thracians' as the ancient historian put it — gave in only after hard battles owing to the Persian army's superiority in number and organisation. The Geto-Dacians' first battles against the powerful Persian army, which were recorded by historians, are convincing evidence of the military organisation of the Geto-Dacian tribes and unions of tribes in the 6th-5th centuries BC.

Almost two centuries later, the same union of Getic tribes is mentioned again (Trogus Pompeius, *Historiae Philippicae*) in the battle to defend its territory and liberty. In 339 BC the Scythians, headed by Ateas, organised an inrush into Dobrudja, where they met the resistance of a *rex historianorum*, a Getic king of the Lower Danube.

In the spring of 335 BC, Alexander the Great began waging war against the Tribals, Illyrians and Getae north of the Haemus Mountains. Ptolemy, who eye-witnessed the events during Alexander the Great's expedition, tells that, when reaching the Danube, the Macedonian king decided to cross the river and attack the Getae, 'as he saw they had gathered in large numbers on the bank of the Ister'. The Getae who, according to Ptolemy, were approximately 4,000 cavalymen and 10,000 foot soldiers, were surprised at the Macedonian army's boldness in crossing the Ister and even penetrate into the north Danubian territory. Alexander the Great's demonstration of strength alarming for the entire Getic world, a warning of the need to organise better for future confrontations. The Geto-Dacians did not wish to make conquests, only to defend their own land and their right to live and work in peace.

About 300 BC the Getae were again attacked by a Macedonian king,

Lysimachus After rejecting this attack, the Getic King, Dromichaetes, tried to win peace by negotiation It was only after the Getae taught the Macedonian king a moral lesson (he had been taken prisoner together with his son, whom they freed first) that peace was to be negotiated, a situation that was also strengthened when the two kings became relatives.

The Romans' appearance at the Danube (2nd century BC) was a new danger to the Dacians, who never hesitated to form alliances with neighbouring populations whenever necessary. Thus, little by little, the conflicts began — the Daco-Roman wars of the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD, which astounded the ancient world by their duration and intensity. At that time, when having to face the increasing Roman danger, Burebista, 'the first and greatest king of all that ever reigned in Thracia' (the inscription of Acornion of Dionysopolis), achieved the grand feat of uniting the Geto-Dacians Through his economic and socio-political achievements, Burebista managed to change Dacia into one of the major powers of the ancient world. His work was to impress his contemporary Strabo, who characterised as follows the gains of the great Geto-Dacian king 'Coming to rule his nation, the Geta Burebista strengthened it by discipline and abstention from wine that in a few years' time he built a powerful state and subjected most of the neighbouring populations He even came to be feared by the Romans' The position of Burebista, (a ruler on both banks of the Danube to *Pontus Euxinus*) prompted the projected campaigns of one of Rome's greatest soldiers, Julius Caesar, although the death of the two famous figures of the ancient world prevented a direct Daco-Roman clash

The political division of the Geto-Dacian world after Burebista's death did not imply a halt in the resistance struggle against the Romans The defensive wars of his successors, Deceneus, Comosicus, Coryllus-Scorilo, Duras-Diurpaneus, Dicomus, Cotiso, Roles, Dapyx, Zyraxes, stood proof of it The strain of Daco-Roman relations reached the acme in the late 1st century AD, when the Romans aimed at penetrating deeper into Dacia Actually, the first confrontations stabilised the forces and were a prelude to the two great Daco-Roman wars Echoes of such clashes are often to be found in the work of Latin poets such as Horace, Ovid and Virgil who drew attention to the Geto-Dacian danger and to their political and spiritual power It was then that King Decebalus came to rule the Dacians who, as Dio Cassius (*Historia Romana*) describes him, was 'very shrewd in war plans and very skilful in carrying them out, being able to find the opportunity to attack the enemy and retreat when necessary Very good at laying traps, he was an excellent fighter and knew how to use a victory, but also to take advantage of a defeat. This is why he was a fearful enemy of the Romans for a time'

When the Romans began to attack consistently, Decebalus tried all means to stop their advance to central Dacia but, especially after the campaign headed by Tettius Julianus (AD 88), he had to ask for peace. The Dacian king was skilful enough to make the best use of the favourable conditions of the treaty. Now, it was clearer to him than ever before

that the Romans aimed not only at weakening Dacia, but also at conquering it for good. Consequently, Decebalus used all his energy and talents as a statesman for Dacia's general recovery. During the twelve years following the peace concluded with Domitian, he re-organised and strengthened the army and the entire defensive system of the kingdom. This calm period enabled him to rebuild and enlarge his system of fortification and to make economic and cultural progress. At approximately AD 100 the Dacian State was more comprehensively fortified than ever before.

The Roman campaign, led by Emperor Trajan himself at the head of an impressive army of 200,000 warriors threatened, after bitter battles, Sarmizegetusa, the Dacians' capital. Under such circumstances Decebalus was once again compelled to negotiate peace (AD 102), accepting disastrous terms. He was obliged to cede to the Romans part of his territories, weaponry, the Roman refugees and handcraftsmen, to pull down fortifications and abandon his policy of national independence.

Naturally, such humiliating terms could not be permanently accepted by the Dacian king, who used the respite provided by the conclusion of peace to rebuild his cities and strengthen the army. Trajan's second campaign was a war between two unequal forces. Following the bitter battles which were fought out in the capital city, and Decebalus' death in AD 106, the Roman rule over a large part of Dacia began. To the Romans, the victory was the solution to a financial crisis within the empire. According to some estimates the Romans deprived the conquered territory of about 165,000 kg gold, 331,000 kg silver and, of course, numerous other products. All this made possible the economic recovery of the Roman empire, but hindered the progress of the north Danubian territories.

The Dacian peoples' love of liberty did not waver despite subjection to the Romans and Dacia becoming a province of the empire. Numerous records attest to the permanent revolt of the Dacians in Roman Dacia, and to the frequent attacks by the Dacians outside the borders of the province — Dacians who never thought of themselves as being separated permanently from the rest of the Dacian world. After Aurelian's withdrawal from Dacia (AD 275) one discerns a new revival of the Dacian unity and gradually, in the 4th-5th centuries AD, the completion of the Daco-Roman synthesis. At a particularly hard time (the beginning of the barbarian migrations), the fundamental building of the Daco-Russian ethnic and the linguistic stock has to be regarded as a specific form of resistance and defence entity of the inhabitants of the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area. True, Romanian peoples' formation and progress suffered under the numerous invasions of the migratory populations, but the Romanian people stood their ground, defending their territory, language and culture.

This concise presentation of the Geto-Dacians' defensive wars prompts the question — if the Geto-Dacians' life had progressed quietly, if the mighty people — the Persians, the Macedonians, the Romans and so many others that followed — had not attempted to seize the riches of this land

and if the Dacians had not been obliged to wage war for so many years, what would the society have looked like at the beginning of the first millennium? Of course, completely different. The numerous archaeological proofs that keep coming to light, even today (the treasure of Baiceni, Craiova, Ilinova, Brad and so many others) demonstrate the great capability of the Geto-Dacian people to create the material and cultural values of a people peacefully creating an original civilisation. The Dacian treasure of Ilinova, for instance, which contains almost 1,000 gold pieces (ornaments and pure ingots weighing 4,995 kg), testifies to the great artistry of the native handcraftsmen. The ornamental motifs of these objects were those that had been used for ceramics in a very ancient, neolithic tradition and are perpetuated up to the present time by Romanian potters.

Ancient writings offer a clear image of the level of the economic life of the Romanians' forefathers. For instance, when describing Dacia, Ptolemy enumerates, 'over 40 cities with a population large enough'. The same sources reveal the great development of agriculture. The later works of Strabo and Appian, taken up by Ptolemy, speak of the vast expanse of corn fields. 'The quality of corn coming from Pontus Euxinus is better than anything we get from the other commercial harbours', said Demosthenes, as 'this region produces the largest quantity of corn'. The breeders of cattle (which were used as food as well as farm animals) in their trade with the ancient world also paid special attention to horses. The appearance and quality of the breed is mentioned in the *Iliad*, which speaks of the Thracian king's horses as more beautiful than any other. Numerous coin treasures, discovered during archaeological diggings, reveal the interest taken by the Roman merchants in the products they came to buy in the southern region of the state. There are positive proofs of a prosperous economy, a brisk activity of handcraftsmen, merchants and city builders. The furnaces used to reduce iron ores, which were discovered all over the Geto-Dacian territory, show that the native people had sound technological knowledge of iron extraction and processing.

These are only a few records demonstrating that the Geto-Dacians and subsequently their successors, the Romanians, would have been superior if they had lived in peace. The wars made the inhabitants of the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area slow down the development of their own civilisation. They would have needed peace, but as they were placed in the way of migratory populations and, later, at the crossways of great empires' lusts for new possessions, a peace-loving, hard-working people suffered because of wars during its entire history.

The Romanian peoples' history evinces its constant aspiration for peace, good understanding and co-operation with neighbours, its inflexible concern to ensure continuous progress, while ever coveting the riches and land belonging to other nations. Yet it was compelled to wage numerous wars against foreign invasions, to oppose encroachments in order to ensure continuous progress, while never coveting the riches to defend its land and independence. And yet they always found the neces-

sary power to unite when facing dangers in order to preserve their peace, home and future 'From the long and tumultuous history of the Romanian people', said Romania's President, Nicolae Caeausescu, recently, 'One can draw the more general conclusion that foreign domination and occupation — no matter how long they might last — cannot prevent the manifestation of the community of interests of a people, the preservation of its specifics, the building of the nation and of the unitary nation-state'

These lofty ideals of peace and fruitful international co-operation, which have always been the red thread of Romania's national history, even nowadays point to the necessity to strengthen friendship and alignment with other nations and to fight against domination and hostility. It is contemporary Romania's firm conviction, based on historical experience, that the implementation of peace is the supreme condition for a people's free assertion and development

[Constantin Gheorghe, historian and graduate of the University of Bucharest, is senior editor of *Romania—Pages of History*, a quarterly published by the Romanian Press Agency *Agerpres* — the Foreign Languages Press Group, *Romania*. Author of numerous articles published by *Romania—Pages of History*, *Romanian News*, *Lumea* (International issue), the *Archives' Review*, *History Annals*, etc., he is a participant in the International Congresses of History at Bucharest and Stuttgart.]

ATATURK ON MY MIND: A CHILDHOOD RECOLLECTION

by Azmi Guran

THIS year, 1988, we commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Ataturk. The man who founded Turkey, admired by all prominent world leaders, the successful fighter against European colonialism was at 35 years of age the youngest general of World War I and the hero of the Gallipoli campaign. Even today I remember how we Turks mourned him as though we had lost our fathers. There are not many of his contemporaries alive today, but there are some of my generation who actually saw him in their youth. I am one of them.

My encounter with Ataturk occurred in the elementary school I attended. The year was 1937 or 1938. News of his visit brought excitement to the school. Blackboards were re-painted and even inaccessible corners cleaned. The school administration distributed new history texts to each class. These texts were written by Afet Inan, a liberated woman historian whom Ataturk much admired. The students became impatient, while the teachers, overcome with emotion, wanted to be relieved of their classroom duties.

There were several descendents of famous personalities in the school. The administration took care to make the classrooms especially attractive. Ataturk duly appeared at the end of the week. We were studying Turkish history that day. We did not see him arrive but realised something was happening because of the commotion in the corridor. Every eye turned to the windows. Our teachers urged us not to lose our heads.

Meanwhile, Ataturk and his party had gathered in the corridor. Ataturk was in the middle, flanked by the senior school administrators. The remainder of the group followed at least two steps behind. Then the door opened wide and Ataturk entered with his entourage. We all stood to attention just like soldiers. Ataturk told our teacher to seat us, which he did. Our teacher then bowed, not extremely low, but at just the right height and introduced himself rather modestly as 'Your obedient teacher in history . . .' (Our teacher had fought in Ataturk's army during the war for independence 1920-22.) Since he was a member of the board of education as well, we were astounded that he referred to himself as merely a teacher. Perhaps Ataturk would have questioned him more diligently if he had known of the teacher's many other responsibilities. Ataturk asked him 'Do you teach from the book or from your own concept?' The principal and the teacher answered simultaneously 'From the book' as they tried to prevent him from asking 'From *which* book?'. From the book distributed recently because of his visit? 'Very nice' replied Ataturk, with a glance at the text book on the desk. Had he asked us about anything in the book, we would have been dumbfounded. The principal and the teachers explained the general curriculum in order to change the subject.

I had once seen a picture of Ataturk, posed with two fingers in his vest pocket, his head bent slightly forward. To look at him directly was difficult, to look in his eyes impossible. If you look at any more than his chin you will be dazzled by the reflections from his eyes and lose consciousness as though struck by lightning. This was common folk wisdom, so I didn't dare raise my head and look at his face. What I could see was his watch chain, vest, two fingers of his left hand in his pocket, his collar and part of his chin, but the devil made me suddenly glance higher. I saw no dazzle nor did lightning strike.

Dazzling reflections and lightning were exaggerations, but the stare from those eyes was certainly unusual. They stared into space; they seemed to focus on great distances and peer into wide chasms. Even a child could not fail to notice that nothing escaped those eyes. No one can deceive this man. He is unimpressed by bombast. Nobody is required to tell Ataturk what needs to be done. He knows almost everything and can assimilate the rest in an instant. Those who attempt to deceive him appear to be merely thoughtless, unseemly or presumptuous. That is why the principal and the teacher seemed so ridiculous in his presence. He did not require their briefing. Recently I read a 1941 publication about Ataturk's conversation with General MacArthur when MacArthur visited Istanbul in 1931. In his diary MacArthur noted that even before Hitler's rise to power in Germany Ataturk had prophesied that World War II would begin in Europe between 1941-1945. He also foresaw that the United States could not maintain its neutrality and that the first victor in Europe would be Bolshevik Russia rather than England, France or Germany.

Everything happened exactly as he had prophesied. He knew that teachers would give evasive answers, and that a newly introduced, unopened book would be presented to him as a traditional text.

To avoid embarrassing his hosts, he appeared to be listening to their presentations but he could not wipe the sardonic expression from his face. I noticed how his cold blue eyes, arched eyebrows and thin lips produced an expression that said: 'Tell me Mister, what kind of text book do you really use? I already know what district you're from; what your favourite flavour is, what kind of coffee you drink and whether you take it with cream or sugar.' I asked myself why Ataturk didn't reflect the sanctimoniousness of the selfish sycophants around him when he was able to look into the depths of their souls. Some time later I realized the answer. Ataturk was not deceived by the games they were playing. He was just toying with them.

After paying quick visits to other classes, Ataturk and his entourage visited the principal's office. Before he left for his residence at Bosphorus, Ataturk autographed a photograph of himself. No sooner had he departed when two blustering teaching assistants slipped in and lunged toward the cigarette butt Ataturk had left in an ashtray. They argued over who would smoke Ataturk's cigarette butt and finally agreed to share it in the hope that each could inhale some of Ataturk's ingenuity. I thought both

would now be on a fast track to a ministerial post! Alas, that was not to be. One became a customs officer and the other headed a small municipal office

As the teaching assistants fantasized about their future, Ataturk's departure was announced and we all rushed into the schoolyard. After conferring with his aides, Ataturk decided to mingle with the student body. He left his aides behind and plunged into the crowd. We all marched with him to the main entrance, which was used only on ceremonial occasions. The young students moved in every direction, some even creeping backwards like lobsters to look at his face. Ataturk was unperturbed and strode resolutely ahead.

Curious spectators appeared by the thousands at the school entrance. Police officers had great difficulty keeping the crowd from spilling into the street. Every window with a view was crammed with faces struggling for a glimpse. When Ataturk appeared on the street, the crowd began applauding. Exulted by the applause, he entered his automobile and was driven away, flanked by a motorized escort. His entourage followed as the swarming crowd impeded the passage of their vehicles.

That evening, the attendance list was checked. Two sly foxes were found to have exploited the occasion and skipped school that day. I don't remember if they were punished. I think missing that historic day was punishment enough.

[Azmi Guran, born in Turkey in 1930, was educated in Engineering Science in Germany and the USA, receiving a Ph D in Pennsylvania. He is the founder, partner and Licence holder of an Engineering Office in Philadelphia.]

CORRESPONDENCE

XIZANG (TIBET)

Dear Madam,

Could I please add a few comments and personal experiences to Professor Stapleton's valuable article on Tibet in your November 1987 number (Vol 251 No 1462)?

I was a teacher, with an Italian colleague, on a Training Course on Land Use and Land Potential Mapping Using Remote Sensing in Lhasa for four weeks in October-November, 1986, under the auspices of the Tibetan Provincial Government, and organized jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the *Accademia Sinica*. The emphasis was on instructing local Agriculture Department personnel in the use of satellite photography for interpreting soil, water, and vegetation resources and land uses as a basis for development. The size, inaccessible mountainous nature, and low population density of Tibet make this technology highly appropriate.

There were 24 students (22 men and 2 women), about half Tibetan and half Han, the oldest being 30 years old and the youngest 21. All but four had agricultural qualifications, including 10 from the Tibetan College of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry at Lhasa. The others included one forester, one geologist, one climatologist, and one lecturer in physical geography.

All instruction was in English which was efficiently interpreted into Chinese, the *lingua franca* of all the students, by *Accademia Sinica* members from Beijing. This inevitably halved lecturing speed. Despite recent Chinese-Tibetan tension, this was not at all evident in our group, who mixed easily in a friendly and unselfconscious way without showing any tendency to form cliques.

Two days were spent in the field, involving 100 km bus rides from Lhasa (at 12,000 feet), to the large Damxung plain at 15,000 feet, overlooked by the snow-capped peaks of the Nyainqentanglha Shan some 7,000 feet higher still. This is the only large, relatively level area within hundreds of kilometres of the city. It was chosen to illustrate the major development problems of Tibet: the extreme inaccessibility, stony soils, and low rainfall (barely 400 mm at Lhasa). Except for a little irrigation of barley and legumes in the valleys, land use is pastoral, mainly raising yaks, of which one sees hundreds. Development will depend on extension of irrigation and refinement of its methods, improvement and diversification of crop varieties, upgrading of pastures, and the development of forestry for timber and fuel. The mineral wealth of Tibet still awaits detailed investigation.

The climate can be very cold. Even in late October, although Lhasa lies on the same latitude and has the same light intensities as Cairo, it was freezing at night and not more than mildly warm in the midday sun. This poses severe energy problems in this arid climate. As there is no railway, all freight from the rest of China must come by air or face a

journey of more than a week over mountainous roads. Since there are almost no trees, most reliance has to be placed on burning dried dung and animal (mainly yak) oil, of which supplies are severely limited. The Government is striving to provide alternative energy, including geothermal heating from the Damxung Plain (with the aid of Italian specialists), and is publicly edvertising such energy savers as solar kettles. However, these measures can only go a short way towards answering the need.

Lhasa is at 12,000 feet and is surrounded by mountains some 6,000 feet higher. It has spread from a densely built core around the Potala Palace across the stony flood plain of Lhasa He River, so that today it has about 180,000 inhabitants, a substantial proportion of Tibet's total of about 3 million. The population is a mixture of Han and Tibetan. The Tibetans are devoutly observant Buddhists, and it certainly appeared true from brief approaches to my colleague and myself by a guide at the Potala Palace and a man in Lhasa market, that they strongly wish for the return of the Dalai Lama, viewing it in virtually apocalyptic terms (The latter actually asked my bespectacled and balding self if I were he). At the same time, I saw no evidence of any political activity in this sense, or of overt disharmony in the population. There are occasional mosques in the city but apparently no churches or other non-Buddhist places of worship. Signs are written in Tibetan and Chinese, and also occasionally in English in sites visited by tourists. The Lhasa Hotel, in which we stayed, is only one of several, but must have averaged a turnover of something like 100 Western tourists a day either coming by air from elsewhere in China or by road from Katmandu. Most visit the Potala Palace, local Buddhist monasteries, and Everest Base Camp. We saw no tourists from East Bloc countries. Food is both Chinese and Western, although the materials are Tibetan. Because the main local products are barley and yaks, both figure largely in the hotel diet, the latter being perforce the basis for everything from steaks to hamburgers and stews.

Altogether, the visit was a fascinating experience. The hospitality of our Chinese hosts was overwhelming, the people charming, and the environment unique.

Yours faithfully,

Honorary Fellow of Reading University

COLIN W MITCHELL

BACK TO THE ROPE?

Dear Madam,

May I enlarge upon Dr Lowenstein's suggestion (*Contemporary Review* January) that there may be arguments in favour of capital punishment? 'Most arguments', he writes, '... have been against capital punishment'. Perhaps, but I have failed to elicit them from abolitionist friends. Sometimes the response is 'Good God! do you want the rope back?' And long before I can protest that civilised, painless methods have replaced hanging, a slammed door has ended the 'argument'. Even friends presumed to be rational fall back on the contention that all 'civilised', 'enlightened', 'right-thinking' people are abolitionists. And my insistence that this begs

the question is again followed by hostility


One cannot help suspecting that some of those educated people who, Dr Lowenstein says, are against capital punishment have been bullied into this lobby by the fear of otherwise appearing unenlightened and unprogressive. *The Observer* (5.4 1987) provided an instance of such intimidation after last year's debate on the issue 'Lust for the noose' was said to be a 'national obsession' likely to replace homosexuality as 'the English disease'. Needless to say, supporters of Sir Ian Percival's motion had not favoured hanging 'the noose' was an invention to discredit them as perverts

Those who bludgeon and insult opponents, denying that any opinion other than their own is tenable, are properly called bigots; and to employ such tactics simply to silence reasoned opposition and argument is hardly less contemptible. We are arguing generally, not for hanging, nor for a mandatory death penalty for murder, but for a painless death for a small minority of particularly vicious and cruel killers.

If in the old days juries, convinced of the guilt of the accused but equally convinced that he did not deserve to die, would sometimes bring in a verdict of 'innocent', this was not the fault of the death sentence, but of the fact that it was *mandatory*. The result was indeed an injustice; for though the accused may have acted under provocation and may not have deserved death, he probably deserved *some* punishment; moreover the verdict might well have led to others being suspected, or even accused.

Total abolition, however, can lead to the reverse injustice that — assailed by circumstantial evidence and the rhetoric of the prosecution — judge and jury may be less scrupulous in assessing evidence for the defence ('Well, yes, there is doubt. But if he's innocent, he can always appeal!'). Recent events have brought worse misgivings, namely that police, frustrated by the probability that some murderer they have at last tracked down will, if caught and convicted, be out on parole within a few years, may shoot to kill. That is capital punishment *without* trial. With all the distrust of the law that would follow, it would be a horrendous price to pay for abolition.

True, capital punishment should be resorted to only when the guilt of the accused is 100% certain, when the crime has been exceptionally vicious and cruel and no mitigating circumstances can be found. Dr. Lowenstein mentions several such crimes; others have come to the courts since his article was published. The principle should be 'respect for life', a phrase which abolitionists have misappropriated. It cannot mean preserving the life of someone who has brutally and sexually assaulted and killed children, depriving them of all the joy and fulfilment that life means. When abolitionists withhold a quiet and painless exit from the Yorkshire Ripper and the Moors Murderers, while they sanction sending F111 planes to bomb civilians, and condone Britain's part in the arms trade and in the proliferation of nuclear weapons which, if ever used, will kill myriads of innocent people and cripple myriads more, their claim of 'respect for life' impresses only the brainless



Genuine respect for human life requires that it should not be devalued. The law must not declare one human life to be of less value than another human life, which is what happened when the death penalty was abolished and the killers' life unconditionally preserved

This is not an argument for 'an eye for an eye ...' *After* the killing it can be argued that the victim cannot be brought to life again, and mercy may be exercised, perhaps in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. But the death penalty should remain on the Statute Book.

Finally, what do I say to my impoverished neighbour, who dreads becoming a burden to his chronically-hard-up daughter, but comforts himself with the ironical thought that if he battered to death a small child or a helpless woman, he might earn for himself a carefree old age, clothed, fed and housed as a guest of Her Majesty? A macabre joke perhaps, yet this is merely what his compatriots, through their elected representatives in Parliament, are virtually inviting him to do.

Yours faithfully,

Child Okeford, Dorset

ROY MORRELL

NOT ENGLISH BIRDS

Dear Sir,

Cyril Fradan, in reviewing the exhibition 'The Age of Chivalry', (Vol 252, No 1465) makes special mention of the Pepysian Sketchbook from Magdalene College Cambridge and its birds, and says 'they must have been drawn from life'. This has often been said before, but not, I think, by anyone who knows much about birds or even about other birds in medieval manuscripts. Although some show birds in action they look as if they were drawn from posed skins. They should be contrasted with the much more natural and more accurately coloured birds in many more or less contemporary French manuscripts, of which the best is probably *Les Petites Heures de Jean de Berri* (Bibl Nat. Lat. 18014) where there are about 1350

Jonathan Alexander, in his note on the manuscript in the Royal Academy catalogue, after referring to Italian similarities in the birds, says 'an English origin is not in doubt'. This is not so; these birds are most unlikely to be English, and no one has ever given any reason for thinking that they are. Some of them (red legged partridge, water rail, buntings) are either foreign to this country or very rare. The only other bird drawings that they resemble in form are those in the sketchbook at Bergamo. They do not resemble those in the Sherborne Missal (Alnwick Castle, H G the Duke of Northumberland) at present on loan to the British Library and intermittently on show there.

The bird that Fradan calls a falcon is certainly not (its wings are too short, it has no moustachial stripe) but is probably intended for a goshawk, although it has a plain breast

Yours faithfully,

Barton Road, Cambridge.

BRUNSDON YAPP

Literary Supplement

APPROACHING DEATH

End of a Journey Philip Toynbee Bloomsbury. £25 00

This would be a remarkable book even if Philip Toynbee had not been dying of cancer during the later stages. Carried on, as it was, till shortly before his death it is surely a unique document. 'Death', writes Philip Toynbee, 'is the oldest topic in the world, but dying has not been much written about by those who are experiencing it'. Philip Toynbee's extraordinary gift for watching and describing his own states of mind comes fully into play up 'till the end. *End of a Journey* will bring consolation and strength and helpful guidance to all in semi-terminal hospitals or in extreme old age.

But the movement towards death is not the whole story. The struggle to achieve a coherent religious faith runs through everything. It is epitomised in the last two entries:

'Now whatever we sing in this place, whatever we sing, praise or rejoice here, that we shall glorify a hundred times when we are there .

And I am again being pushed and pulled into the world without words, neither dreaming nor awake, neither moving towards God nor away from him .

Very characteristic of Philip. A sense of joy awaiting him and then a quick reminder that he must not buoy himself up with false hopes.

Philip Toynbee made more impact on me and many others than any other undergraduate during the years 1932-39 when I was a Tutor at his College, Christ Church. He became the first Communist President of the Union (we were so much more open than Cambridge about that kind of thing). Well grown and active but neither heavy nor fast he played wing forward for Christ Church when they won the 'Cuppers'. His degree though not discreditable was hardly worthy of a Christ Church scholar, the son of Arnold Toynbee and the grandson of Gilbert Murray. When he 'went down' I appointed him Editor of a small Birmingham Labour Party paper *The Town Crier* in which I had invested a few thousands recently inherited. They soon vanished — through no fault of Philip's. During the Munich crisis he and I stood on the steps of the Birmingham Town Hall and told the world that Neville Chamberlain would never again be able to show his face in Birmingham.

No one was more conscious of his youthful follies than Philip and they were not all political. His alcoholism, though overcome before the end, was for many years a horrifying problem. One of the entries in these last diaries runs as follows:

'Without being fully aware of it, Sally (his adoring wife) might say something like this to herself. "Always *him*! First the Noisy Boozing; then the Community, then the Depression, then the Pious Withdrawal, then the Book, then the Cancer. Then the Death?"'

But theirs was by common consent a beautiful marriage. There is only room for one quotation:

'Now I know unless I love Sally, I love *nobody* truthfully and wholly. She is the gauge of my true love of all others.'

I remember a German pastor addressing us in Eton College Chapel 'Those splendid English subalterns of yours', he cried, 'could not teach us the way to fight for they did not know the way But they could teach us and they did teach us the way to die' The last phrase certainly applies to Philip but there is much to learn about life also for all engaged in spiritual seeking

FRANK LONGFORD

UNCONVENTIONAL WAR

Secret Armies James Adams Hutchinson £14 95

It used to be said that 'Diplomacy is War carried on by other means' Now it seems equally accurate to say that 'Peace is unconventional war conducted unseen' Some forty wars are being fought at this moment across the world, only one of which, the conflict between Iran and Iraq, can be described as 'conventional' Some former colonies owe their achievement of political independence to guerilla war, usually abetted, financed, and sometimes directed, from outside Kenya, Angola, Zaire, Algeria, Aden, to name a few Even where the guerillas were defeated — as in Malaya — it took ten years to do it, and for a while the counter-insurgency operation there was seen as model In the process of liberation, it is hard to recall any single ex-colony — except India? — that did not obtain support from Soviet Russia

The Defence Correspondent of *The Sunday Times* provides a handbook to these conflicts in what we mistakenly call 'the post-war world' It can be read at many levels There is material on the training of special forces the SAS, whose preparation is the longest in duration (some two years), the Russian spetsnaz in their base at Furstenburg in the centre of the East German plain (with its replicas of all NATO missiles, on which to practise attacks), and the two-hundred-square-mile American base at Fort Bragg in North Carolina The training usually includes parachuting, bridge-building, sabotage, and hand-to-hand fighting, sufficient to make the old pre-war training of British commandos and intelligence corps specialists seem totally old-hat In all its variety, the training is always nasty, brutish — and long

At another level, this is an account of each conflict, and of the part played in it by special forces It is a story of some anti-terrorist successes, notably Entebbe and Mogadishu, and of many failures, notably Malta, it is a story that becomes an indictment of the American over-insuring in Grenada, and of the farce-turned-tragedy at Desert One in Iran in 1980 It is also a story of British skill and courage in the Falklands and South Georgia, and of the little-known British adventure in the Gambia in 1981, in which three SAS officers by their skill and quick thinking averted a revolution It is also a vivid description of the actual methods whereby the Russians aborted Dubcek's liberalisation of the regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of their tactics in invading Afghanistan in 1979 — and since

Many conclusions can be drawn from this richly-detailed and challenging study Societies, like the Russian and the Cuban, where very few people have access to many of the facts for any length of time, have obvious advantages in conduct of under-cover war For societies like our own or the American, where savage publicity or constitutional law prevail, the use of special forces on special missions overseas, and keeping their operations under wraps, is much more difficult But, regardless of agreements made at Geneva on nuclear or conventional force reductions and the ballyhoo that goes with them, from now on every major power will have its special forces specially and ruthlessly

trained Some — the Russians — will act without warning Where they act in unison, as usually in NATO as recently in Gibraltar, and where they are thoroughly trained, they are an indispensable weapon against terrorism or sedition The operations of all of them, open or covert, are alarming When they act on their own, and are inadequately trained, like the Egyptians at Luqa in 1985, they certainly frighten me

ESMOND WRIGHT

SENSIBLE ADVICE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS

Member of Parliament, the Job of a Backbencher Lisanne Radice, Elizabeth Vallance and Virginia Willis MacMillan £9 95

This book is exactly what its title and sub-title suggests It is not about the British Constitution nor about government as such, nor about electoral reform It is about the job of an MP and more particularly about the job of a Backbencher If there are 600 MP's, there are 600 different ways of carrying out an MP's job

Assuming an MP wishes to be re-elected, there are of course one or two obligations A member must look after his constituency, answer letters and be present at debates, vote and above all be seen and account for himself But there is no specific training for the job and there is no prescribed way of carrying it out Until recently it was badly paid and the conditions of work were primitive One the other hand everything depends on the talents, background experience and education of the member, man or woman

The most interesting feature of this book is that it is written by three estimable ladies Two of them are university teachers of political science, one married to an active MP, while a third has worked in the House of Commons, and knows well the 'facilities' side of the general picture Moreover the book utilises some revealing facts from the survey material and actual diaries kept by four current members, Archie Kirkwood (Scottish Liberal), Angela Rumbold (now a Junior Minister to Kenneth Baker), Charles Wardle (Conservative, Sussex Area), Chris Smith (Labour, Islington and Finsbury) These diaries show immediately the quite different problems facing each MP — propinquity or distance of constituency, hours of work, post-bag, social engagements, committee work, absence from families etc etc Obviously each MP must decide how much time he can devote to pastoral or other work in his constituency and again on what subjects he wishes to specialise, social affairs, finance or foreign policy etc etc But when the MP has settled down and knows his way about the House and has mastered the procedure, he often feels lost with no real purpose or influence Most of us like recognition or even promotion, but nowadays especially with the power of television some yearn for publicity

With the advent of televising Parliament I can foresee more changes and not necessarily for the better But let me as an old Member be glad that questions of pay, pensions, secretarial help and accommodation are at least being seriously attacked I was elected in 1933, my salary was £400 a year Like other Members my fare was paid to my constituency, Kilmarnock in Scotland, but I had to pay the 'sleeper' On promotion to Under-Secretary as Civil Lord of the Admiralty, I received £1,200 a year and on being promoted to sole Education Minister in the House of Commons my salary was £1,500 a year and after 17 years no pension

I quote my personal case to illustrate in precise terms the primitive valuation of Parliamentary life only 50 years ago

Today the scale of an MP's duties has been broadened, the paper work

multiplied and calls from constituents sharply increased. There is a good case for a careful re-thinking of the whole purpose of representative parliamentary government, not as we studied it at the old universities, but as a vital part of the democratic process. This little book has made the case.

KENNETH LINDSAY

COMMUNITY MEDICINE

The Public Health Challenge Stephen Farrow Hutchinson £12.95

These are heady days for public health. From relative obscurity its renaissance is pending; soon for medicine it could become Sir Galahad's Holy Grail.

Community medicine, that changeling of the 1970s, has not succeeded in making a definite imprimatur. The public remain confused about it; where it was identified at all it was associated with boring and rather irritating administrative problems. But the era of Community Medicine was to be ephemeral. Early in 1988 Sir Donald Acheson's Committee of Enquiry produced *Public Health in England*. The new public health was to be *de rigueur* — the Community Medicine Specialist would gradually fade and in his place would arise the new Director of Public Health.

Coming at this time of change and challenge this book is particularly welcome. It is scholarly, factual and wide-ranging in approach. Early chapters, all written by recognised authorities, have a historical perspective discussing *inter alia* the origin of the public health service, the saga of public health laboratories and the role of that time-honoured figure, the Medical Officer of Health. A particularly interesting and provocative chapter is devoted to the development of venereal services. Here the approach — liberal, compassionate, totally lacking in bigotry and prejudice — is sweet music to the ear of the reviewer. The chapter has the advantage of being well updated considering AIDS along with more traditional venereal infections.

A word of caution must be sounded about the chapter on international health. This is basically a panegyric to the World Health Organisation with many favourable comments about their slogan 'Health for all by the Year 2000'. But it should always be remembered that all that glitters is not gold, that super-optimism and a high degree of unreality seem so far to have pervaded this area that, just like India's population policies and Soviet Five Year Plans, many of the goals and aims of 'Health for all' remain unfulfilled. Also it should be borne in mind that Primary Health Care, so lauded at the original launch of the programme at Alma Ata in 1978, is *not* a panacea for the world's ills and that humility rather than undue confidence about the successful management of disease should be the lynchpin of the programme.

This book deserves a wide readership. Not only will it appeal to doctors whether specialist or generalist but it should also be appreciated by health service administrators and other paramedical personnel.

JOHN A. LORRAINE

ROYALTY ON PARADE

Happy and Glorious! A Collins Anthology of Royalty Peter Vansittart (ed)
Collins £15.00, *Princess Louise, Queen Victoria's Unconventional Daughter*
Jehanne Wake Collins £17.50

These books represent the two extremes of 'royal' books. The anthology is an odd collection not very well put together. The entries are by subject, as

opposed to reign and sometimes the editor must have been stretched to find enough illustrations. Perhaps this is why he seldom seems to have checked his sources.

One example will suffice: he drags out the old chestnut where a Bishop supposedly said to Queen Victoria after Prince Albert's death, 'Henceforth, you must remember that Christ Himself will be your husband' to which the Queen allegedly replied, 'twaddle'. He attributes it to Randall Davidson whereas normally it is attributed to Samuel Walberforce. It is not true and when allegedly said, 1861 or 1862, Davidson was a boy of thirteen.

The second book, Jehanne Wake's *Princess Louise*, is a superb biography and one of the best examples of the new type of 'royal' biography where the same care and research are given as to any biography.

Princess Louise was Queen Victoria's fourth daughter who was talented and vivacious but also most troublesome to her mother. She was a gifted sculptress, an advocate for many good causes, a hard worker and something of a 'liberated' woman although with none of the ugly harshness of today's variety. She was the first royal child in centuries to marry a son of the British aristocracy, the Marquess of Lorne, heir to the Duke of Argyll.

This book is beautifully written and organised. The chapter dealing with the extraordinary scenes surrounding the death of the Princess's father-in-law read like something from Evelyn Waugh. The writer obviously has a great affection for her subject without which no biography is worth its salt. It is also extremely well researched. In addition to having access to the Argyll papers, which do a great deal to 'flesh out' the Princess' daily life, Mrs Wake did a round Britain tour to examine diaries and letters of those who knew Princess Louise. The list of manuscripts is daunting.

There is the occasional blunder. Just as Mr Vansittart has poor Randall Davidson acting as a boy bishop, Mrs Wake has him pronouncing 'the Aaron's blessing' over the dying Queen Victoria. It was the Aaronic blessing from the 'Visitation of the Sick'. Sometimes the author is tempted into historical generalisations which are wide of the mark: it is certainly misleading to say that until Home Rule emerged in 1886 backbenchers paid little role in debates. It was not in 1868 that both Commons' parties were first led by commoners Pitt and Fox did this in the 18th century.

One would also like to have had more information about the Princess' husband's literary work. Finally, there is a curious gap between Chapters XX and XXI whereby the years from 1887 to 1889 are not covered. But any book has mistakes. Because this book is so well researched, well written and well worth reading it deserves the odd correction.

JAMES MUNSON

A GUIDE TO OUR ROOTS

The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe edited by George Holmes
Oxford University Press £17.50

'Western civilization', Dr Holmes declares in his Foreword, 'was created in medieval Europe. The forms of thought and action which we take for granted were implanted in the mentalities of our ancestors in the struggles of the medieval centuries'. In this beautifully illustrated collection of essays the editor and his six collaborators present a picture of that civilization which is well written and well presented. The contributors are always aware that they are

writing for general readers, not fellow academics. With this in mind the editor has included a detailed list of Further Reading (though one wishes there was not such a rejection of still useful older books) and an eleven page Chronology. The illustrations carefully complement the essays.

For years, schoolboys were taught to look upon the 'middle ages' as the 'dark ages'. This term is little used now and people are more aware that there have seldom been any clear-cut demarcations in European history. Even so, we still use the term 'middle ages' or, in its latinized form, 'medieval' period, as if the centuries between 400 A.D. and 1500, only make sense as an interval between the far distant past and the 'real' beginnings of our own history.

So many of the hall-marks which still shape our attitudes are medieval in essence: our modern European languages, our church government, the foundation of our legal system and government (at least in England) and, until recently, our currency are medieval in origin. Indeed, even 'feudalism' with its view of society as a complex network of obligations can be said to have more to do with our view of society than that of nineteenth century individualism.

The medieval concept of the Christian Church as more than a local institution, as a virtual *republica christiana*, once again influences Churchmen today. The view of the nation state as centred round one government and sharing common virtues, race and language developed in this period. Finally, and balanced against this, is the vision of a united Europe. The view that one can be French, German or English as well as European dates not from the creation of the Common Market nor from the invention of metrification, but from the middle ages.

But we must not be led into seeing the 'Middle' ages as a static period. This was very far from the case: medieval civilisation was a frontier civilisation. It combated a natural wilderness and savage hordes, it withstood natural disasters like the Black Death and the growing threat from the Mohammedan East. The basic theme of this book is one familiar to the readers of the great Belgian historian Henri Pirenne: the shift of European civilisation from the Mediterranean to the Northern nations. However the essays here, particularly the first one, show that it is more complex than Pirenne said.

The editor well reminds us that European culture was based on a sound economy with 'diversity of a hundred centres of political and cultural aspiration competing for success. That untidy fragmentation was the ground for the extraordinary fertility of our cultural forebears.'

RICHARD MULLEN

A MANUAL OF OCCULT FIRST AID

A Priest and the Paranormal Jack Dover Wellman Churchman Publishing Ltd £5.95

The Reverend J. Dover Wellman has, over the span of the last forty years, exercised a distinctly unusual ministry in the Church of England. It is not that he does, or has done, anything that any custodial, soul-curing cleric would not try to do. It is simply that he has been called upon to do it, and done it, incredibly more often. The plain truth is that, at least in one aspect of his work, the Reverend Wellman is what in popular jargon has been called a ghost buster, for he has done valiant battle with the paranormal and the forces of the occult when they have seemed to him to be posing a threat to the peace and security of a human soul.

Following in the wake of his previous book, *A Priest's Psychic Diary* (SPCK), this new volume continues his story of a maintained struggle against dark powers. It is an exorcist's casebook. We witness the encounter of the priest and the poltergeist, hear of his dealings with possession, black magic, and the awful fascination of the ouija board. Revelatory dreams, visions, voices and hauntings are all encompassed within the author's experience, and encompassed, too, within the boundaries of his religious faith. What is perhaps surprising, is the apparent prevalence of paranormal happenings among ordinary, unexpected people. And the Reverend Wellman believes that it is, in fact, only reticence, the fear of ridicule, that prevents even more percipients and recipients of psychic episodes from making mention of them. From exorcism — the restoration of the sick soul — to spiritual healing — the restoration of the sick body — seems a natural, logical step or progression, and, indeed, the Reverend Wellman is perfectly sure that on a number of occasions he has been made the channel of healing. He has even been able to restore to health an ailing and much-loved pet cat. It is, incidentally, one of his most heartening beliefs that something of our own soul's immortality has, in the course of long time and association, rubbed off on to those animals, such as cats and dogs, who live closely and in emotional binding and bonding situations with us, and that death may not just snuff them out like artefacts of worn machinery.

This is, for everyone, an interesting book. For some, it could be an important one, because, with its calm, detached, religio-philosophical consideration — and sometimes explanation — of what to less balanced minds and personalities, to those of weaker faith, might seem unhinging torments, it could bring the relief, the peace, that comes with understanding. The Reverend Wellman, viewing a wide range of psychic (in both definitions of that term, spiritual and psychophysical) manifestations from the summit of a considerable amount of practical acquaintance with them, feels able to offer both counsel and reassurance. What is more, he sees it as the Church's plain duty to concern itself with the paranormal and to apply Christian therapeutics in cases where occult infringement is demonstrably destructive, of evil origin, intent and design. This may prove for many a valuable manual of occult first aid.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Secret Self (2) Short Stories by Women Chosen and introduced by Hermione Lee Dent £4.95

This excellently compiled volume of short stories follows Hermione Lee's *The Secret Self (1)* with a remarkable array of talent. Thirty-three stories are of such varied style and subject matter that it is difficult to make a choice of the best offered. Contributors to *The Secret Self (2)* include Katherine Mansfield and Virginia Woolf and coming nearer to our own times, Nadine Gordimer and Patricia Highsmith. The Introduction is by Hermione Lee and there is a useful section of biographical notes on the contributors. Whether there is any

special value in announcing that the contributors are all women remains an arguable point. But, no matter what the label, the collection is one of great value to all students of the Short Story



The English Language (Penguin Books £4.95) David Crystal has produced a very wide ranging and useful account of modern English usage throughout the world. There are at least three hundred million who speak it as their mother tongue and countless others who need it as a second language. In this study, the author in the main 'provides a systematic account of the most important characteristics of the English language, such as you would hope to receive from a professional guide'. These include the varieties of grammar, spelling, pronunciation and accent. There is also an historical section, which in some respects is disappointing. This may well be occasioned by pressure on space, for instance, in discussing the spelling background to some British American words, such as center and centre. In 1828, Noah Webster published his famous *American Dictionary of the English Language*. David Crystal states that Webster 'introduced several spelling reforms which resulted in such spellings as (inter alia) center'. Did Webster really introduce this change? For centuries from the late sixteenth century until the eighteenth century the common spelling in this country at least was 'center'. No doubt that it was also so spelt in the English American colonies. Perhaps Webster was defending the use of 'center' from the misguided change of spelling to 'centre' by Dr Johnson and others in England in the eighteenth century. In any event this is a very useful volume on current English practice.

The Financing of Terror (Hodder & Stoughton £3.95) This important

study by James Adams, first published in 1986, received the approbation, inter alios, of Professor Paul Wilkinson. He is recognised as a leading authority in the study of terrorism as well as being an Editorial Adviser to this journal. It is now republished in the paperback series, New English Library. Covering a wide field, with a great deal of detail, Mr Adams' basic theme is 'what is required is a two tier approach which stops the bombers while at the same time undercutting the economic base that feeds them'. He gives many examples of the economic strength of international terrorist groups through the successful exploitation, legally and illegally, of their ill gotten gains. He cites the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the most effective. 'The PLO have become the principal terrorist players on the international investment scene'. It is fair, of course, to state that the PLO has a perfectly legitimate political objective in freeing Palestine. He also cites the IRA whose financial activities, while not as widespread as those of the PLO, include 'protection rackets and money-laundering operations reminiscent of the Mafia'. As for money from America, Mr Adams argues that it 'actually makes a very small contribution to the IRA coffers'. He deals with other sources of terrorism, including the efforts of the Gaddafi regime, but not exhaustively. This is a study which deserves widespread assimilation. It should not be thought of course that all international or internal terrorism depend on large sums of money. The hi-jacking of aircraft, for example, can in some cases be comparatively cheap.

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THE AUSTRIAN SCENE

by Leo Muray

THE controversial record of President Kurt Waldheim has focused attention on Austria and has put a question mark against its international image. Austrian officials believe that the controversy will die down. There are questions about Waldheim's role as UN Secretary General and it was noticed that the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, praised his good work at the UN when asked about Waldheim at a recent luncheon in London. While Western governments have been keeping their distance from him, Arab governments, like those of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have invited him, demonstratively disregarding the so-called Waldheim affair. It was during his tenure at the UN that the PLO obtained its special privileged status as an Observer that has just given rise to an involved conflict between the UN and the US government.

Not too much attention is being paid to that in Austrian circles. It would only seriously hurt President Waldheim if real evidence emerged about a more responsible involvement in the execution of the six British commandoes or if he had done work for American intelligence immediately after the war. So far, nothing really relevant has been found.

The Waldheim image is important because the Austrian government has decided to make a major effort to join the Common Market. The Austrian Chancellor, Dr Vranitzky, made this impressively clear on a recent visit to Brussels. Very down to earth preparations and consultations have been started.

All member governments of the EEC are fully aware of Austrian intentions. But, for the moment, no formal application is intended until after the EEC internal free market has come into force in 1992 and until it is seen how the new system works. This applies especially to the complex practicalities of absorbing a new member. Austria's trade relations with the EEC are very close since the EEC concluded a treaty on free trade in industrial goods in 1972. What is more, EFTA, the European Free Trade Association of which Britain was once a leading member, and the EEC issued a statement in 1984 that, in theory at least, fore-shadowed the expansion, in due course, of the EEC 1992 market to EFTA members.

Austria's trade, commerce and cultural relations with Federal Germany have been close for years. The Austrian Schilling is firmly linked to the Deutschmark. Austrian standards and measurements are practically the same as the German ones and Austrian University diplomas are recognised at German universities. In the German view Austrian membership of

EEC is relatively easy and not a problem. Any enlargement is good as long as the new member is ready to work for a unified EEC. The Germans appreciate the uneasiness of Austria as well as Switzerland, two small Alpine countries that will be economically surrounded by the EEC of 1992. In German eyes the Application for membership by Turkey is a completely different matter.

Two thirds of Austria's exports are linked with Germany and the Austrian banks, especially, do not want to be left out of the process of financial integration after 1992. In the British view Austria has a fair economic record. Its inflation rate is 1.5%, expected to rise to 2.2%. Its growth rate a modest 1% but unemployment is under 6% and wage increases around 3%.

The Austrian government, according to official Austrian sources, has set up its own working group of all departments headed by Ministers. The Austrian National Bank, and Chambers of Industry and Commerce as well as representatives of the 9 Provinces or Lands with their own government are taking part. Now 14 sub-committees and 40 special teams under them have been set up to analyse and compare in detail the present EEC structures, as well as the over 300 proposals now being worked out and discussed in the EEC to create that 'truly united single market'. These groups are to work out recommendations for changes in the Austrian regulations, say on any testing methods, quality control and, most importantly, public procurement. So far the EEC has only agreed on 68 measures for their own members.

The Austrians have already gone some way towards streamlining their over-manned loss-making public sector enterprises.

They are pressing the EEC to be consulted actively throughout the whole procedure of setting up the 1992 Market so that they can adjust their own legislation and practice as things go along. They want Austrian integration to have gone some way before the actual membership issue is raised. They indicate that other EFTA members are doing the same since conditions, say in Finland or Sweden, are vastly different from those in Austria. They argue that the fact that Austria's trade with EEC countries represents 65% of the total while trade with Eastern Europe adds up to 7-8% and trade with EFTA countries 7.8% imports and 11.2% exports gives them a right to be consulted in the working out of the remaining 230 or so EEC integration measures.

They have succeeded in persuading the EEC Commission to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Vienna and the Austrian Chancellor in his welcome committed himself publicly to keep Austrian regulations in line with those now being worked out by the Commission for 1992. One of the critical issues to be settled is the Austrian demand for EEC aid, a special 'financial structure', for the maintenance of the Austrian road systems leading to Yugoslavia and Italy. These roads bear the enormous traffic between EEC countries, especially Germany, and Greece. The only land link between Greece and the EEC goes through Austria and Yugoslavia. Again, there is the extraordinary tourist traffic

of tens of thousands of Turkish workers in Germany going home through Austria. After 1992 the freedom of movement inside the EEC will increase traffic to Greece. It is, incidentally, hardly realised that 1992 will put enormous strains on road and rail traffic throughout the EEC.

A key political and strategic issue forms the background of support for maintaining the road through the Brenner Pass that links Germany and Italy through Austria. It bears all the road traffic between Italy's main industrial regions and Germany. It is hardly mentioned that the Soviet Union gave priority to the formal Austrian commitment to neutrality in the negotiations for the 1955 State Treaty because that commitment ensured that the key strategic road link between Bavaria and the Po valley would be broken. This made the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria — 200,000 men at first, less of a disadvantage. The proposed integration of the Austrian economy with that of the EEC will make it harder however to differentiate between civilian and military goods on that famous road.

The reaction by the Soviet Union to the so-called Transit Agreements now negotiated will show, it is expected, whether the Soviets will veto, when the time comes, agreements on the adjusting of the Austrian economy to the 1992 EEC Internal Free Market and eventual membership. Austrian neutrality is laid down in a constitutional amendment declaring 'Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all means at her disposal. . . will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on her territory . . .'

The Austrians believe that their commitment to neutrality does not prevent them from applying — and obtaining — full EEC membership after 1992. They point to the Irish Republic being a neutral member of EEC made up of members of the NATO alliance. The Austrians will ask for a special safeguard clause for their neutrality when the time comes. They maintain steadfastly that so far there are no indications from Moscow that the Kremlin objects to Austria's approaches. One reason, it is believed, is the growing assumption that the EEC is an independent economic world power often in conflict with the US. Another, that East European countries like Hungary, and even other members of COMECON, the East European economic association, will be able to establish easier trade and banking relations with EEC if Austria is a member.

The 1955 State Treaty also contains the provision that Austria 'shall not enter into political or economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever'. This, in the Austrian — and German — view presents no valid obstacle to joining the EEC either.

The ban on 'political or economic union with Germany' laid down in the 1955 State Treaty refers to one Germany. But there are two German states now, fully recognised. Moreover the EEC is an association of sovereign states and not a Union. Again, if Bonn were to accept it that

the State Treaty ban applied to Federal Germany it would imply that unification had been abandoned. The EEC Rome Treaty has an annexe that lays down that the East German territories 'are part of German internal trade' which means in theory that the German Democratic Republic would, in 1992, become part of that 'internal free market'. But the GDR, of course is part of the Soviet bloc and COMECON.

For Bonn Austrian EEC membership would be a parallel special relation — to that developing with the GDR. The leading role of Federal Germany in EEC is now emerging as it supports Austrian membership and the efforts of COMECON to get a firm trade and commerce treaty with EEC. This has to be seen against the EFTA members, and 'outsiders' like Yugoslavia and Turkey seeking ties as well.

Austria's carefully orchestrated bid for eventual EEC membership is the product of Austrian politics. The 1934 brief civil war between the Social Democrats and the authoritarian Dollfus regime, the murder of Dollfus by the Nazis, the Anschluss and the experiences in jail and concentration camps the leaders of both sides had during the war produced an understanding between these groups that had never existed in the inter-war Republic. The foundations were laid for a two party establishment that has more or less lasted until today.

The division of Austria in four zones of occupation and the danger of partition as witnessed in Germany forced the political parties to co-operate in one government. The old Christian Social Party and the near-authoritarian groups accepted Democracy and co-operation with the Social Democrats. They, in their turn, abandoned the cherished Class War stance and the inevitability of a future classless Socialist state. For 10 years, 1945 to 1955, under four power occupation, the new People's Party, the old Christian Socials and the Socialist Party formed a government with one or two token members of the rapidly diminishing Communist Party. From 1955 to 1966 the two Parties continued in a Coalition government. Then, for four years, there was a People's Party government and from 1970 to 1983 a Socialist government under the Dr. Kissinger of Austria, Bruno Kreisky. In 1983 the Socialists were forced to form a 'Small Coalition' with the Freedom Party and the elections in 1986 forced the two big parties to form once again the big coalition that had lasted so many years.

In that election, the Freedom Party nearly doubled its vote, gaining 18 seats of the 183 total with the Green Party, a newcomer, getting eight seats and nearly a quarter of a million votes. That shook the two old parties. The Freedom Party is a curious mixture of old and new German nationalists, anti-Marxist radicals and some Liberals while the more active and younger Liberals have thrown in their lot with the Greens. There is a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Austria and the building of a nuclear power station had to be dropped. The leader of the Freedom Party is a young Carinthian, Joerg (George) Haider, the former leader having become too embarrassed by his past. The post war experiences mean nothing to him.

Austria is made up of nine provinces or Lands. Of these Burgenland carved out of Hungary in 1919 is a new one with a small Croat minority. Vienna is both the federal capital and a land of its own.

Each of the others have a centuries old identity. Three, Tyrol, Styria and Carinthia have lost some of their Southern territory to Italy and Yugoslavia in the First World War. This accounts for much of the Nationalist underground feeling. The German speaking northern part of South Tyrol is still an issue between Italy and Austria. It remains an irritant and Italy is the only EEC member that has real reservations about Austria's future membership. Austria took the South Tyrol case to the UN. After years of argument agreement was reached in 1969 on an 'operational calendar' of safeguards for the German speakers. The Austrians regard this as an autonomy agreement and are to issue a statement once they think the Italians have implemented the so-called 'South Tyrol Package'. They show no signs of wanting to do that. In Carinthia, there are quarrels with the Slovene minority.

Of the nine lands six have a People's Party government and three, including Vienna, Socialist governments. They have elections at different times. The Freedom Party has a chance of defeating the ruling Socialists at the elections in Carinthia.

The coalition governments are based on an agreed, and perhaps unique system of patronage. If a Minister is a Socialist the deputy is a People's Party man and this goes down right through the administration. It makes for agreement but restricts the choice of action and measures. This system is sustained by what is called 'Social Partnership'. The accepted doctrine is that the organised representation of the various economic interests has special significance in a democratic and industrialised society. The Austrians credit that Social Partnership with having lost only 3.57 minutes per head in strikes in 1985.

The Austrian Trade Unions are non-party as an organisation with 60% of the work force, 1,670,000, being members. There are 15 separate unions in that body and these again are divided in workers and professional sections. There are also political party sections, the Socialists being the most numerous, the Union making the collective wage agreements.

There are Chambers of Labour in every Land and a Federal Council of Chambers of Labour. There are also nine Economic Chambers with a Federal Chamber. These are divided into six sections: industry, commerce, trade, finance and insurance, transport and tourism. There are Chambers of Agriculture with a 'Presidential' Conference and a Federation of Industrialists, like the CBI with 4,000 members. It too has its provincial sections and Committees dealing with taxation and foreign trade.

There is also the Parity Commission, a key body in forming policy and drafting legislation. It is a voluntary body with the Chancellor, the head of government, in the Chair. The Trade Unions, the Chambers mentioned above and the Ministries of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, and Social Administration are on that Commission; but only the Trade Unions and

the Chambers can vote and the vote must be unanimous. In practical terms it is the main policy-making body.

The Parity Commission cannot issue decrees but it can use its power and influence. The Commission decides on recommendations for any changes in wages or prices and then advises on the negotiations on proposed changes. Every plan for a change must be presented to the Commission. The Commission must hear and consider the justification on price rises. A special Advisory Committee then presents its recommendation to the government. These recommendations are usually accepted.

The Austrians regard this framework for consensual politics as unique and reasonably effective. Officials admit this will have to be changed fundamentally for there are no really parallel set-ups in EEC countries. The Austrian public is not fully aware of this yet. Officials hope that the EEC will agree to set up a joint Commission to work out what could be, as a first step an autonomous relationship with the 1992 Internal Free Market as distinct from later full membership. The Vienna government's priority is 'full participation in the substance of the internal free market'.

In the driving seat is the Socialist Chancellor Dr Franz Vranitzky. He is a tough lawyer and economist pursuing a careful policy of adjustment to the decline of 'smoke-stack' industries and finding markets for agricultural surpluses. He has managed control of the Trade Union body.

His partner, Dr Alois Mock, Foreign Minister and leader of the People's Party, is not doing so well. Several prominent members, like Mr Husek of Vienna are eager to replace him. Dr. Mock has all along given strong emotional support to President Waldheim. He would be more secure if the Waldheim affair were to fade away. Because that two-party establishment has been going on for so long there are the inevitable corruption affairs quite distinct from Dr. Waldheim.

But Waldheim is important because he represents that split Austrian personality of the inter-war years. German-Austrian or Austrian symbolised by anti-Nazis voting for the Anschluss, like Socialist Dr. Renner, first President of the post 1945 Republic. Full participation in the EEC is also an emotional compromise. This feeling has two sources. The People's Party, the old Christian Social Party, shares the views and instincts of the Bavarian Christian Social Union of Franz Josef Strauss. The Socialists are under their present leaders in tune with the present leadership of the German Social Democrats.

The other source is the (often subconscious) memory of the Hapsburg Empire. The Austrians feel they are exceptionally qualified to understand, and therefore to deal with their East European neighbours, countries whose leaders are now beginning to try to establish some type of new and genuine relationship with the EEC.

[Leo Muray was East European Correspondent of the then *Manchester Guardian* from 1947 to 1951. He later became Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Liverpool Daily Post* (1964-1985) and now contributes a weekly diplomatic column.]

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

by Ranko Petkovic

CAN Israel accept peace and co-existence with the Arabs as a lasting solution to the Middle East crisis and, if so, under what conditions? In contrast to the Arabs who describe Israel as an 'artificial creation', the Jews consider themselves to be on home ground in Israel. Four important circumstances constitute the basis for their conviction of the legitimacy of their state:

1. *Historical* — that they have built their new (they say 'reconstructed') state where the ancient state of Israel once stood
2. *Political* — that the United Nations General Assembly, interpreting the positions and interests of the international community, made an authoritative decision enabling the state of Israel to be founded in 1948.
3. *Humanitarian* — that they deserve a homeland of their own after centuries, and even millenia, of persecution and the disappearance in the flames of the Nazi holocaust of six million Jews out of a total of seven million in the occupied countries of Europe.
4. *Religious* — that they have fulfilled the Biblical prophecy of the return of the 'promised land' and are continuing life where it began long ago for the tribe of the Jews. In a condensed interpretation, all these circumstances reflect the maxim that Israel is the outcome of Herzl's visions, Ben-Gurion's pioneering for statehood and, last but not least, the self-sacrifice and efforts of Jews worldwide

If anyone, either among the Jews themselves, or even more likely among non-Jews, ever doubted the possibility of a state of Israel existing and consolidating on the searing sands of the Middle East, no one does so now. During the past four decades, the Jews of Israel have demonstrated their ability to create a functioning state and progressive society. In all the stories making the rounds of Israel today — and they invariably begin with the Golgotha of the *kibbutzim* and the Jewish state as they transformed the barren desert into flourishing plantations and end with a proud pointing out of Tel Aviv's development into a dynamic business and tourist centre — it cannot be denied that the State of Israel has become an irreversible historical fact. And yet, the moving legend of the Massada, the self-sacrifice of Jews in a fortress surrounded by Roman legions, present in the consciousness of Moses's descendants as a beacon lighting the way but also as a *memento mori*, has its contemporary equivalent in the feeling of threat from the Arabs encircling Israel on all sides.

Is this Arab threat a sado-masochistic obsession fathered by the appalling history of the pogroms and persecutions suffered by the Jewish people; is it an accusation that can be proved, or is it a justification for the forcible annexation of Arab lands?

First of all, most Jews in Israel consider it an irrefutable fact that the Arabs met the formation of their state with the utmost hostility and

would have pushed it into the sea if they had been in a position to do so. They were prevented by Israel's determination and ability to defend itself against all Arab attacks between 1948 and 1973, as well as those launched from the territory of the Lebanon up to the present day

Secondly, most Jews in Israel consider their country the object and victim of terrorist actions by extremist Arab circles, especially those around Abu Nidal, ranging from the slaughter at the Olympics in Munich in the early seventies to the present frequent incidents in Israel itself, attributed to the followers of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Thirdly, most Jews in Israel consider the threat to their country to be rooted in the unwillingness of the Arabs to live in peace with them, in the constant and unpredictable changes and confrontations occurring in the Arab world itself, the growing influence of different variants of Islamic fundamentalism; the large numbers of Arabs around and in Israel, in the mounting economic and military power of the Arab countries and the possible coincidence of interests between the Arab countries and the super powers

These arguments, whether right or wrong, have become part of the consciousness of the people in Israel and on them is based the conviction that, in contrast to the days when Jews meekly submitted to their fate, it is now up to them to decide their destiny themselves. And a decision enjoying consensus among Jews in Israel is that their state must, now and forever more, be a refuge and a safe homeland for Jews all over the world

How can this be achieved? Consensus among the Jews of Israel ceases to exist on this question, causing divisions and debates from the bottom to the top, from the man in the street to political groups in the Knesset

The first great parting of ways in the public mind and among political groups in Israel concerns the attitudes towards the Arab countries and the Arab world generally. Ignoring the various extremist positions, especially those held by religious fanatics, which means taking account only of attitudes that can have an impact on Israel's behaviour and stance towards the Arabs in the future, we may conclude the following: some think of peace and co-existence with all Arabs, including the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organisation as their sole legitimate representative, as possible and inevitable, others feel that peace and co-existence are possible and indispensable only with Arab countries and factors that, like Egypt and Jordan, have demonstrated they can maintain correct relations with Israel (this includes the Palestinians but excludes the Palestine Liberation Organisation as their sole legitimate representative); others again consider that the state of Israel can live side by side with the Arabs only if it dominates them with military might, as during the present crisis in the camps, and social superiority

For the moment, we might say that fundamentally the second viewpoint prevails in Israel. It is grounded in reality, since it has already been attained, either by treaty or co-existence with Egypt and Jordan and, in a manner of speaking, with the Palestinians with whom a joint life is shared

in the boundaries of Israel. From the standpoint of political dialectics, it would appear that in the offing now is an opening toward the first attitude which, at present, predominates in circles considering themselves peace-minded and progressive, although in political debates they are often accused of being, consciously or not, a Trojan horse of the PLO in Israel. The third stance, under the impact of present positive redeployments in the world and political ferment in Israel itself, is bereft of direct effect but could gain momentum in the event of any new and unfavourable turn of events in the Middle East crisis.

The second big parting of ways in the public mind and among political groups in Israel concerns the attitude towards territories occupied by Israel during wars with the Arab countries. The original territory of Israel, fixed by the decision of the General Assembly regarding its founding, amounted to 14 1 thousand square kilometers and grew, after the first war with the Arab countries in 1948-1949, by another 6 7 thousand square kilometers. After the third Arab-Israeli war in 1967, another 68,000 square kilometers of territory was added, having been taken from Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In the meantime, the occupied part of Sinai was returned to Egypt while the rest of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights remained within Israeli borders.

By annexing these territories, Israel established so-called strategic boundaries, reducing fears that Israel could be pushed into the sea. But new dilemmas appeared, characteristic of the present state of mind in that country.

The Likud and other political groups representing right-wing views consider that the occupied Arab territories, and in particular Judea and Samaria, 'are far more than war booty'. They are 'a part of the natural Jewish heritage assigned by the Lord to the home of the Israelites'. In this view, the territories occupied by Israel in wars with the Arabs have simply been restored to their 'original owners'. In line with this view, for the past twenty years Jews have been settling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has been estimated that living in new settlements there now are 60,000 Jews, as against one million Arabs. What this, in fact, means is that the attitude of the Likud and other rightist groups toward the occupied territories is part and parcel of their political philosophy, their concept of Zionism and, therefore, also of the legitimate rights of Israel. In their ideological perception, the so-called strategic boundaries of Israel coincide with its actual boundaries.

The Labour Party and an appreciable segment of Jewish public opinion regards more or less sceptically the possibility of Israel being able to keep forever and irrevocably the occupied Arab territories. As long as Israel possesses them, the Arabs will try in one way or another to get them back and Israel will be subjected to pressure from the international community and particularly from the United Nations. What right-wingers consider a 'lasting solution' is thought of as a 'provisional arrangement' by the segment described above, and a solution that in the long run is detrimental to Israel's interests. By the same token, the Labour Party and those

inclining towards it cannot reconcile the military administration of the occupied territories with the democratic system they wish to establish in Israel; how to explain the whys and wherefores of keeping a million Arabs in the occupied territories tortured and sometimes murdered by constant military and police control. On the lines of these conceptions, the Alon compromise plan emerged in 1972 according to which Arab towns and settlements were to be restored to the Arabs while the valley of the Jordan and certain other strategic territories were to be kept under Israeli administration.

The Communist Party of Israel and groups advocating peace between Israel and the Arabs are still alone in their demand that the occupied territories should be returned unconditionally to those from whom they were taken and the groundwork thus laid of a joint life for Jews and Arabs in Israel and beyond.

The third great parting of ways in the public mind and among political groups in Israel concerns the attitude toward the population problems now confronting the country. According to official statistics, Israel today numbers 4.2 million inhabitants, of which 3.5 million are Jews (83%) and 700,000 Arabs, Druze and other (17%). Arab sources claim the number of Arabs is much larger and amounts to nearly 40 percent of the population of Israel, on the West Bank 818,300, in the Gaza Strip 476,700 and in Israel itself 530,000.

In right wing circles, the demographic explosion of the Arab population does not give cause for concern since they feel that the Jews, thanks to their civilisation superiority, are capable of holding power and assuring the pursuit of Jewish values in Israeli society. An important corrective is seen by them to lie in an increased possibility for growing numbers of Jews to emigrate from the USSR and East European countries to Israel.

In all other milieus there is uneasiness owing to the constant and inevitable changes in Israel's population structure in favour of the Arabs. In this context, holding on to Arab territories is a double-edged sword because of the Arab population becoming, whether anyone wants it or not, an increasingly important political and social factor in the country's life. In some prognoses, if these territories are not returned, Israel could by the beginning of the next century be half Arab and half Jewish. The unfavourable demographic picture is worsened by the emigration of Jews from Israel. A growing number of them, especially young people, are leaving Israel mostly for the USA, where they remain. By some, this is considered an act of blasphemy and even a portent of national catastrophe. But there are more who regard it as normal emigration and the democratic right of every citizen of Israel to decide where he wants to live. Either in Israel where, after military service of three years (two for young women), he has to put up with a wartime psychosis, or in the USA where he will at the very least triple his income of from seven to eight hundred dollars a month. In any case, the following anecdote is symptomatic of the state of mind in Israel concerning the growing emigration of Jews: A notice has been put up in the Ben-Gurion airport in Tel Aviv — 'Whoever

is the last to leave will please switch off the light'¹

A minority regards demographic trends in Israel as only one of the factors leading to an unavoidable solution: the establishment of an Israeli-Palestine confederation or the co-existence of Israel with a Palestine-Jordan confederation or a Palestine state.

The fourth great parting of ways in the public mind and among political groups in Israel concerns the holding of an international conference on the Middle East to decide ways and means of tackling problems plaguing relations between Israel and the Arabs. Right wing groups, headed by the present Prime Minister, Mr Shamir and his Likud, oppose a Middle East conference for four key reasons


- (a) it could impose solutions incompatible with Israel's vital interests;
- (b) it would call into question territories Israel considers an inseparable part of its state,
- (c) it would give official support to the possibility of many states interceding on regional questions about Israel and its neighbours;
- (d) it would place on the agenda the question of recognising the PLO and by that very fact the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

In rejecting the possibility of holding an international conference on the Middle East, Prime Minister Shamir advocates bilateral negotiations with Jordan and, in general, bilateral talks with the Arab countries to regulate controversial issues, excluding participation by the PLO in any form

Foreign Minister Peres and his Labour Party, as well as some other sections of Israeli society, accept the holding of a Middle East conference, seeing in the presence and arbitration of the big powers a guarantee for the transcendence of regional divisions and a realistic and constructive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among the controversial procedural questions, undoubtedly also substantive in their significance, is the matter of who will participate in the conference and, in particular, the issue of Palestinian representation. Even in these circles there is still strong resistance to and suspicion of PLO participation although various diplomatic and political options remain open. Minority groups make their presence felt strongly with their cries of 'Peace Now!' Among them are very distinguished and influential personages; but they do not include a large number who would, in fact, be happy to see peace prevail so that they would not have to spend so much time in military service, live in a permanent state of emergency or in fear of fresh conflicts with the Arab states, witnessing daily the revolt of the Arab population, and feel obliged to participate in showdowns with them and pay excessive taxes.

Israel has shown that it can live and progress in war, but now the question arises whether it would be able to survive peace. To this question, many would reply: once peace is established Israel's real history will begin, commensurate with the spiritual and civilised values of the Jews who were not made to be cast in the role of occupiers and violent men.

[Dr Ranko Petrovic, Editor of the *Review Of International Affairs*, has recently returned from a tour of Israel and the Occupied Territories]



THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION: CAMPAIGN '88

by David N. Thomas

FOR the first time in twenty years Americans are holding a presidential election without an incumbent seeking another term. While common in the nineteenth century, when there were sixteen such contests, non-incumbency elections have occurred only six times since 1900. They included some of the most memorable events in American political history. Normally the prospect of two freshly chosen nominees battling it out for popular support generates public excitement. Strangely enough, the early rounds of Campaign '88 are causing little enthusiasm in spite of expansive media coverage. Reasons for the lack of concern are unclear. One possible explanation is the fact that the process for selecting the president has become overly complex and difficult to understand. With declining comprehension has come a falling off of popular interest.

The original method of presidential selection established in the American Constitution of 1787 was a fairly simple process. Electors chosen in the states every four years were authorized to select the president and vice-president by majority vote. Each state was assigned a number of electors equal to its congressional delegation consisting of two senators and one or more representatives depending on population. With the rise of political parties, slates of proposed electors were chosen in popular state elections. Beginning in 1832 the two major parties held national conventions of delegates from the states which selected presidential nominees. Throughout the nineteenth century national delegates were chosen by state party conventions.

As fully developed, the process consists of three stages. First come the two national party conventions in the summer of the presidential election year. Secondly, beginning in September, a campaign is waged between the two major party candidates. It ends in early November when voters in each state select by plurality slates of presidential electors. A third stage is reached in December when the electors meet in their respective states to choose the president and vice-president by majority vote. While free to vote for anyone, electors have almost always cast their votes for the candidates chosen in their respective party conventions. The last step, therefore, is pro forma because the winning candidate is always known after the general election in November. This understandable routine established by law has been maintained without significant alteration for over 150 years.

The confusing aspect of American presidential politics has been the rapidly changing, largely extra-legal method of selecting delegates to national conventions that evolved after 1900. Political reformers in various states called Progressives promoted new processes of delegate-selection called presidential preferential primaries in which voters replaced pro-

fessional politicians. A bewildering variety of arrangements in the various states began to appear every four years when it came time to choose delegates to national party conventions. No two states are ever the same in their systems of delegate-selection in spite of a requirement to comply with national party rules and, since 1974, with federal regulations. Thus, while the method of selecting the president in November has remained essentially unchanged since 1788, the process of nominating candidates changes with almost every presidential campaign.

The process begins about two years before the November elections when candidates for the Democratic and Republican nomination start identifying themselves. Candidacy for public office is generally born of political ambition, personal conviction, public interest, self-confidence and the persistent persuasion of friends and colleagues. In American presidential politics there is yet another element of increasing importance, the promise of massive financial support from a wide variety of sources. Before 1974 all money spent in presidential campaigns came from private donors. In that year the Federal Elections Reform Act provided for public support for presidential aspirants who could collect at least \$5,000 in donations of no more than \$250 from twenty or more supporters in at least twenty states. Compliance with that rather bizarre requirement entitles a candidate to federal matching funds to be used in the campaign for pledged delegates to the Republican and Democratic nominating conventions. Those matching funds are available so long as the candidate receives at least ten percent support in each of the state primaries. If one fails to get the requisite support in two consecutive primaries, matching federal funds are suspended thirty days after the second instance of falling below ten percent. Money for matching funds comes in part from those taxpayers who make one dollar contributions indicated each year on their income tax forms. Certification of compliance with the 1974 law is made by the Federal Elections Commission in January of the presidential campaign year. After three months in campaign '88 the FEC had given \$48.1 million to eight candidates. In 1988 each candidate is limited to \$27 million in the campaign for convention delegates.

During 1987 thirteen men, seven Democrats and six Republicans, registered as candidates for their parties' nomination with the Federal Election Commission. They would be legally eligible for federal matching funds pending adequate support from primary voters and caucus participants. Other aspirants announced interest in becoming official candidates but were unable to secure promises of adequate financial support. Two Democrats, Gary Hart and Joseph Biden, registered with the FEC but dropped out because of a sex scandal in the case of one and the act of plagiarising Neil Kinnock in the case of the other. Polls indicated that from the outset none of the registered candidates had a strong popular following and most of them were unknown to a large majority of voters. In the absence of viable candidates, especially among the Democrats, there were efforts to encourage better known personalities with promise of financial support to enter the campaign. The three most widely heralded

Democrats repeatedly urged to run for the presidency in 1988 were Senators Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, and Governor Mario Cuomo of New York. All three formally announced their decisions not to be candidates. Even a popular industrialist, Lee Iacocca, was repeatedly urged to become a candidate. Seldom has a presidential campaign got underway with so few candidates of national stature. However undistinguished, aspiring candidates for the presidency tend to grow in stature soon after the nomination process begins.

Before World War II few states held presidential preferential primaries and no major party candidate ever attributed his nomination to delegates won in these elections. Beginning in 1952 the New Hampshire primary attracted unusual attention when a Tennessee Senator, Estes Kefauver, defeated Harry Truman in that small New England state. At the same time General Dwight D. Eisenhower began his campaign for the Republican nomination by winning in New Hampshire.

The New Hampshire Legislature, now enjoying national publicity, passed a law providing that its quadrennial preferential primary must come first in the nation; however early it had to be. For presidential politics that law was to become an important development. Since 1952 every president has begun his campaign by winning the New Hampshire primary. Other states were encouraged to hold preferential primaries. The number grew from seventeen in 1968 to thirty-seven in 1980. They are now held over the course of four months from March to June in the campaign years. Most of the delegates in both national conventions are now selected in primary elections, about one-half of which are open to voters without regard to party registration. In the open primaries such as in Wisconsin, voters in one party may vote in the opposition's election. Sometimes they 'raid' the other primary in order to boost weak candidates. Some Republicans in Wisconsin, for example, are suspected of having crossed over this year and voting for Jesse Jackson because their own party had assured the nomination of Vice-President Bush. The rest of the states restrict participants to members of the party holding the primary election, thus guarding their candidates against being raided.

A minority of delegates to national nominating conventions are still chosen in state party conventions. Organisation of state conventions begins early in the campaign year with the holding of small meetings called caucuses. For two hundred years the term, 'caucus,' has been used to designate a gathering of politicians whatever its purpose. In states that select delegates in conventions, caucuses send representatives to county conventions which in turn choose delegates to Congressional District conventions.

The Congressional District Meeting then picks delegates to the state convention from which, finally, delegates are sent to the national nominating conventions. Some state parties like the Republicans in Georgia hold primaries and organise state conventions at the same time. While the Republican State Convention in Georgia actually chooses most of the delegates to the national convention, they are required by party rules to

cast their first votes for the candidates who have won the state-wide primary. The remainder of the Georgia Republican delegates this year will have been chosen by Congressional District conventions but again must cast their ballots in accordance with the earlier outcome of their respective Congressional District primary elections.

For a long time the caucus states were overshadowed by the publicity heaped upon the preferential primaries. In 1972, however, Senator George McGovern began an uphill campaign for the Democratic nomination by visiting the Iowa caucuses in January. When the precinct members attending those caucuses expressed their preference for the Senator over Edmund Muskie, the party's vice-presidential candidate four years earlier, the press took note of the event. Four years later an obscure former governor from Georgia, Jimmy Carter, won the Iowa caucus vote by a small plurality. That achievement was enough to make the Georgian a serious candidate. Although Ronald Reagan lost in the Iowa caucus vote in 1980 the press now began designating that state's precinct meetings as New Hampshire's equal in launching the campaign for the presidency. To enhance their importance, Iowans scheduled their precinct meetings in 1988 only one week before the New Hampshire primary.

One of the most important developments since 1945 has been the ending of the solid Democratic South in presidential politics which, except for 1928, had been maintained since the Civil War. The loss of the South as a dependable base of support has become for the Democratic Party its greatest problem in the quadrennial quest for the presidency. There is now general agreement that without substantial southern support Democratic chances for winning the White House are virtually lost. Nominating a candidate capable of winning the South, therefore, has come to be a principal concern in Campaign '88. With that in mind southern Democrats organised the nation's first regional primary calculated to blunt the unusual impact of the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. They scheduled fourteen southern and border state primaries on March 8, a day that soon became known as Super Tuesday when hundreds of delegates to the national party conventions of both parties were to be chosen. The hope was that before most of the states held their primaries and caucuses, the South would have assured the selection of a moderate as the Democratic Party nominee. The scheme soon went awry, falling victim to the rule of unintended consequences. First, southern Democrats were unable to persuade any of their leaders of national prominence to become a candidate while southern Blacks rallied around one of their heroes, the Civil Rights Leader, Jesse Jackson, who had gained prominence in Campaign '84. It was also soon apparent that enough white conservative southerners would vote in the Republican primaries to elevate the percentages of liberal Democratic candidates.

The delegate-selection process in Campaign '88 began on February 8 when about 200,000 Iowans of both parties met in some 2,500 precinct caucuses to choose delegates to their state's ninety-nine county conventions. By pre-arrangement the voters attending Republican caucuses

agreed to express their preferences from among the six candidates for their party's presidential nomination. Democratic caucuses were organised in such a way as to provide proportional votes for any of their seven candidates having support from fifteen percent or more of those attending each of the precinct meetings. While no national convention delegates were selected in either party, the candidates for presidential nomination would be able to get publicity and momentum by displaying support from Iowa voters among whom the aspirants had conducted enormously expensive campaigns for six months or longer. As expected the winners in both parties were members of Congress from nearby states, Senator Robert Dole for the Republicans and Representative Richard Gephardt for the Democrats. Unlike Jimmy Carter in 1976, neither winner would be able to turn an Iowa victory into a successful campaign for the presidential nomination. The only surprise was the strong second place finish among the Republicans by a nationally known televangelist, Pat Robertson, who headed a cable television network specialising in religious programmes. In spite of falling to third place in Iowa, Vice-President Bush remained the Republican front-runner with Dole as his principal rival.

The Robertson candidacy has been the most peculiar feature of a presidential campaign now regarded as one already breaking new ground in a variety of ways. Its hope for success rested on the prospect of a strong showing in the caucus states. Having an enthusiastic following of undetermined size, Robertson established a well-financed organisation capable of mobilizing supporters into what observers called a 'silent army'. It consisted of people traditionally uninvolved in politics who might be able to gain control of normally small precinct meetings. The former Baptist preacher who had defrocked himself for political purposes now emerged as a major contender in the Iowa caucuses because thousands of fundamentalist churchgoers flooded some of the caucuses. For a brief period after Iowa, observers were unsure over the potential turnout of Robertson supporters in primaries in which much larger numbers of people are involved. In New Hampshire, a state with few evangelical churches, the preacher fell far behind. It was now apparent that his silent army was no threat to the Republican establishment.

During his brief time as an apparent contender for the Republican nomination, Robertson made blunders which would have adversely affected even a genuine candidate. First, he stated without evidence that the Reagan Administration was promoting ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty which had not taken into account the presence of missiles in Cuba. For twenty-five years Americans had assumed that all missiles in that off-shore country had been removed. Next he claimed that his Cable Television news organisation had provided the State Department with information on the whereabouts of American hostages in the Near East. His own former associates quickly repudiated the claim. Finally, he made the preposterous charge that the Bush campaign had conspired to reveal details of a sex scandal involving a fellow televangelist in order to embarrass his candidacy. Just before Super Tuesday Robertson dropped

a libel suit against a former Republican United States Representative who had said that Robertson had used the influence of his father, a United States Senator in the 1950s, to avoid combat duty in the Korean War. The effect of those gaffes was the ending of all credibility of the Robertson candidacy. The big test for the Robertson campaign was Super Tuesday in the South where a large proportion of the population is religiously fundamental. Again he fell far behind in the primaries. It was soon apparent that the Baptist preacher from Virginia was just another shooting star of American presidential politics that shone brightly for only a moment and then faded quickly from view.

Robertson's principal impact on Campaign '88 was an unintended boost to the candidacy of another Baptist preacher, Jesse Jackson, who was one of the principal winners of Super Tuesday. By drawing white southerners into the Republican primaries, Robertson took away voters who would have normally voted for Democratic candidates other than Jackson, thus bringing down the percentage of the Civil Rights leader's support. With a large black turnout solidly behind him, Jackson was able to win significant pluralities in key southern states. Meanwhile, the black candidate was attracting white voters outside the South. He will be the first Negro in American history to play a dominant role in a national major party nominating convention. In spite of the race factor in American life, Jackson is a leading candidate for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Democrats are pondering the effect of Jackson's presidential or vice-presidential nomination.

The Bush-Dole rivalry is typical of the great intra-party struggles for nomination that have often marked the course of American presidential politics. It set an activist Vice-President in a popular administration against one of the most influential leaders in recent United States history. Because of his varied federal service in Congress, administration posts and diplomatic service, Vice-President Bush is one of the most politically experienced presidential candidates in American history. Reagan's principal Republican rival for the nomination in 1980, Bush as vice-presidential candidate was generally regarded as a significant factor in the landslide victory over Carter. The ensuing eight-year campaign for the 1988 nomination resulted in a strong Bush candidacy in spite of general perception of an unappealing personality. Because of Bush's lack of a good speaking style and the absence of an attractive presence, many observers believed that the Vice-President could have been overtaken by the charm and wit of the popular Republican leader in the United States Senate, Robert Dole, who has been a national personality for twenty years. Dole's principal claim to the prize rests on the contention that as a sitting Vice-President, Bush would be unable to mount a strong campaign in the fall. The Senator's victory in the Iowa caucuses might have been the event that made the difference. Some observers now believed that Dole had the momentum going into the first primary a week later in New Hampshire where polls indicated that he was pulling even with the Vice-President. A second loss by Bush in the early stages of the primary season

would probably have cleared the way for a Dole nomination in August.

The few days before the New Hampshire primary marked a critical turning point in Campaign '88. Television advertisements sponsored by the Bush campaign depicted Dole as indecisive on a number of important issues including the question of raising taxes, now becoming a litmus test for Republican orthodoxy. An absolute pledge not to raise taxes is required of all faithful Reagan supporters. Barry Goldwater, the former Senator from Arizona and the patron saint of American conservatives, suddenly appeared to endorse Bush before New Hampshire Republicans, perhaps the most right-wing voters in the nation. The weak Dole organisation seemed unprepared to respond to its greatest crisis. When the votes were counted, Bush was triumphant by 14,000 votes.

It was in the New Hampshire primary that the carefully crafted Bush campaign organisation passed its first important test. Among the important parts of that organisation were three key Republican governors whose state organisations were made available to the Bush campaign. The first was Governor John H. Sununu of New Hampshire who was credited with establishing an unbeatable campaign for the Vice President. The second important Bush operative was Governor Carroll B. Campbell, Jr. of South Carolina which held a Republican primary three days before Super Tuesday. According to the press, the winner was destined to have an advantage in the forthcoming balloting in the remainder of the South. Despite Dole's support from the state's venerable Senator, Strom Thurmond, Bush was again victorious by a sizeable margin. Once more he was the beneficiary of a strong gubernatorial organisation. In the South-wide balloting that soon followed, Bush was the inevitable winner by two to one margins in most of the states. Now the last hope for the Dole candidacy was the Illinois primary a week after Super Tuesday. But again it was that state's Republican Governor, James R. Thompson, who provided Bush with another impressive victory, making the Vice-President the unbeatable candidate for the Republican nomination in August.

After the Illinois primary in March, Bush's electability became the principal focus of campaign analyses. Aside from the disadvantages incurred by all recent sitting Vice Presidents, Bush is plagued by a public perception of a nice man with a limited capacity for leadership. Except for his election to the United States House of Representatives from a silk stocking district in Texas, Bush has no record of winning on his own. Some of Bush's advisers now fear that his victory over Dole was too easy, providing him with little opportunity for flexing his political muscle and developing strength for the autumn campaign. On the other hand, there is the problem of patching up differences with his original rivals for the party nomination.

One of the Vice President's biggest challenges will be the task of winning support of independent voters who according to polls are having serious misgivings about his candidacy. Perhaps his biggest problem will be a series of celebrated trials of Reagan aids to which Bush may be summoned as a witness. In the final analysis, Bush's chances for winning the

presidency will depend on the outcome of the Atlanta convention in July.

While Republicans came out of Super Tuesday virtually assured of their nominee, Democrats were as uncertain as ever over the identity of their standard bearer in 1988. Promoters of Super Tuesday, a group of moderate southern and border state Democrats, designed that event to assure the selection this year of a centrist candidate appealing to their section of the country. Instead they got a deadlock among three candidates, Michael Dukakis, a liberal governor of Massachusetts, Jesse Jackson, a radical Civil Rights leader and Albert Gore, a moderate border state Senator. None of them is expected to gain enough delegates outside of the South to win the nomination. Among the 4163 delegates at the Atlanta convention there will be 646 uncommitted 'super-delegates', public office holders on the national and state level who may hold the balance of power. Some observers now believe that the Democratic Party may have its first brokered convention in thirty-six years. In such a setting the delegates selected in primaries, caucuses and state conventions are bound to support their respective candidates on the first two ballots. Beginning with the third round of voting delegates are free agents who may vote as they choose. In fact they would be able to turn to party leaders who will not have participated in the arduous round of primaries and caucuses. Three names are suggested as prospects: Governor Mario Cuomo of New York, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and William Bradley of New Jersey. Their availability in case of a draft by the convention is uncertain. Bradley in fact has endorsed Dukakis. It is unclear whether the convention could choose a candidate from outside the new nomination process without disrupting the party. In any event, the Atlanta convention may become an extraordinary political spectacle.

The road to the White House has become a long winding trek marked by uncertainty and confusion. It is an expensive and time-consuming process that is tremendously influenced by television. Some of the country's most able leaders are unwilling to subject themselves to such an ordeal. Before the 1960s, national conventions were almost private affairs from which the public was largely excluded. During the upheavals of the sixties demands were made for popular participation in the nomination process. The rallying cry was participatory democracy. Responding to those demands both parties devised a sequence of political ordeals which aspiring candidates must endure at great sacrifice in time, money and physical energy. Thus Congress was stampeded into establishing a complicated system of public support for candidates tightly controlled by a federal agency.

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A PRIME MINISTER AND A PRESIDENT FOR THE 1990s

by Curtis A. Amlund

DEPICTING what was for him the quintessence of an eighty-year old Victorian gentleman in his *A Portrait*, John Galsworthy, whose own life traversed both the last and present centuries and ended in 1933, ascribed the following qualities to his octogenarian he was a man of action and of tenacity, he was a man of speculation and of impersonality. Underlying these plainly ascribed qualities was an essential and remaining trait of equanimity ' for there were two men in him — he of the chin and jaw, a man of action and tenacity, and he of the nose and brow, the man of speculation and impersonality, yet these two were so curiously balanced and blended that there was no harsh ungraceful conflict '1 If one were to give portraiture to the personal qualities of a British Prime Minister and of an American President for the later 1990's, one could do worse than to resurrect those described by Galsworthy

In reading even casually about the nineteenth century the reader becomes aware of a distinct emphasis given by British and American writers to the importance of tradition and continuity. In essence, this is a realisation of the bridgehead character of the 19th century; that is, this one-hundred year period serves as a half-way house between the seminal philosophical speculations of the eighteenth century and the hyperactive, sentient and emotive expressions of the twentieth with its recurrent economic depressions, recessions and two world wars

Even at the most superficial level the observer is reminded that the nineteenth century distanced itself from the turbulence of a major military conflict between 1815 and 1914. Within this peaceable environment it is not accidental that Galsworthy, reaching for literary success, found in his own century of birth the foundations for characterising an elderly gentleman of moderation, harmony and grace ' . with him there seems to me to have passed away a principle, a golden rule of life, nay more, a spirit — the soul of Balance.2'

As this aggressively active century nears its end, both Great Britain and America might look towards Prime Ministers and Presidents who exemplify in not immoderate degrees the qualities appreciated by Galsworthy in his Victorian. These were the steadying qualities of action, tenacity, speculation and impersonality

Webster's dictionary refers to action as the doing of something or the state of being in motion. Patently, it is one matter to be doing something, continually in motion both physically and psychically; another to do everything with deliberation and serenity of spirit. Perhaps it is not altogether inappropriate to indicate that during the nineteen-thirties Franklin Roosevelt insisted on going at slow speeds when making his extensive rail trips, as his object was to observe 'how the country was

doing' In the Great Depression stress was not on projecting the image of a fast-paced Executive, rather, there was a conscious effort on Roosevelt's part to slow down, while taking a long look at the passing scene

A searching question for recent presidential campaigns with their focus on jet travel is whether the party nominees actually see conditions when making what always appear to be hurried, press-accompanied and staff-assisted journeys around the country A quick trip can become the basis for an equally quick and possibly unwise decision That Galsworthy's Victorian gentleman with his commitment to tranquility would have understood such behaviour is doubtful.

Executives in both the US and UK now make hurried journeys in order to participate in conferences with leaders of other nation states at some near or distant location Some recent meetings, including the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences of this century, lasted for more than just a few hours.

It is not the appearance of being active that is important; it is rather the actual doing of something that is worth doing when done with a sense of proportion, or that sense of what is appropriate and inappropriate. If a Prime Minister or President realises that a given course is inappropriate for him, he does well not to approve it, whether undertaken by himself or by his personal staff The 1972 Watergate affair in Washington and the recent Iran arms' revelations come readily to mind

Both Parliament and Congress provide an increasingly large body of statutes which can specify in detail what a Prime Minister or President can or cannot do through its implementation by the bureaucracy But beyond this body in the American government there is a strong mandate in Article Two, Section Three of the United States Constitution, which calls upon the President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. While the United Kingdom has no single, formal document called a constitution, since each new law adds to the body of statutes to be adhered to by government officials and citizens alike, there are definite norms of constraint, including the concept of fairness, which infuse not only the Cabinet but the general polity as well

Another quality ascribed to the Victorian gentleman by John Galsworthy is tenacity; yet an Executive in either the UK or USA is likely to learn from experience that he cannot hold tenaciously to more than a comparatively few major policies and programmes during a five-year period in the United Kingdom and a four-year term in the United States. Avoiding the multiple approach to legislative initiatives, Franklin Roosevelt, employing more than ordinary acumen, would concentrate on just one large issue at a time when submitting proposals to Congress That he had more than ordinary success is attested to by the Americans' talking still about domestic reform issues, many of which were taken up in the New Deal of the nineteen-thirties Whether in the House of Commons or in Congress it is improbable that legislative progress will be assured if too much is expected too rapidly.

Galsworthy's octogenarian also was a man of speculation. What is useful to a political Executive in either country is a willingness to consider varied opinions about policies and programmes. While in the United States this openness is manifested through the circulation of Presidential ideas via the mass media and presentations to a joint session of Congress, in the United Kingdom this same readiness to listen gains focus in the Cabinet, and in the House of Commons.

Galsworthy's gentleman was also a man of perception. 'He perceived a joke quicker than most of us, he was never eccentric, yet fundamentally independent of other people's opinions.'³ A conscious detachment from the opinions of individuals around him is important for an Executive in either the British or American system. Such detachment is a characteristic not easily acquired; it enables the Prime Minister or President to retain his freedom of choice in devising policies and programmes.

For instance, Franklin Roosevelt had a cabinet of strong-minded secretaries who would periodically dispute with one another. The President knew that after all the gesturing and posturing the problem, if it had not already disappeared by the time it reached the White House, would eventually be resolved only through his personal intervention. This allowed F.D.R. to retain supervisory control over his own administration. During the nineteen-thirties Churchill, employing his own distinctive detachment, uncovered the existence of a German war machine that had potential to do immense harm not only to Great Britain but to the whole of Europe and even the world.

To use the term impersonality is not to suggest that an Executive should be indifferent to the effects on citizens of policies. In the British government the Prime Minister, together with the Cabinet, represents the ultimate arbiter in deciding on policy options for the Government of the day. When these options are submitted to the House of Commons for debate and vote, the assumption is that only those proposals having Government support in the chamber are likely to be enacted into law.

If one can broadly categorise the mood of the eighteenth century as speculative, the nineteenth as contemplative and the twentieth as active, it could be that by the close of the present century leaders in both countries might assimilate the finest features of three very different worlds. The ideal would be an executive identified with the qualities of action, tenacity and detachment, whose conduct and that of his government would be prompted by a true understanding of what is appropriate.

NOTES

1 John Galsworthy, 'A Portrait,' in *Selected Modern English Essays* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962), p.232.

2 *Ibid*, p 251.

3 *Ibid*, pp 232-233.

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THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: JUST ANOTHER 'LITTLE LOCAL DIFFICULTY'?

by Nigel Healey

ON 3 December 1987, following its controversial 1986 Green Paper *Paying for Local Government*, the Government published the *Local Government Finance Bill*. Although the provision to replace domestic rates with a poll tax predictably attracted most media attention, the so-called 'community charge' is only one of three radical changes embodied in the new legislation. If passed in its present form, April 1990 will also have seen the beginning of a switch away from a local to a national system of business rates and a complete reorganisation of the basis for central government grant aid to local authorities.

This article examines the likely impact of these measures and argues that their combined effect will swamp the redistributive consequences of the poll tax per se. Firstly, the shortcomings of the present *modus operandi* are briefly revisited to provide the background against which these reforms must be considered. Secondly, the new system of central government grants and the hybrid arrangement of a centrally-set business rate and a locally-set poll tax are outlined. Finally, the redistributive implications of the package as a whole are analysed.

Local government annually spends nearly £45bn, accounting for roughly one quarter of all UK public expenditure. Although local authorities charge for some of their services, notably council houses, most (e.g. education, personal social services, police and refuse collection) are provided 'free at the point of use'. Such services must therefore be financed from other sources, of which the three most important are currently central government grants, business rates and domestic rates.

Central government grants pay for approximately half of all local authority spending. The rationale for this is two-fold. The first is that many public services are more logically managed by local, rather than central, government. Having legislated for, say, a certain level of policing across the country, Parliament therefore pays local authorities to staff and run police forces on its behalf. The second reason is essentially redistributive. Many of the authorities in which the need for public services is greatest are also those whose residents could least afford to meet the cost of these services through the rates. Businesses also contribute to the rates but, like social need, the size of the industrial and commercial sector varies from authority to authority, so that an area with a disproportionately large number of disadvantaged residents might also have a disproportionately small business tax base. By giving councils a grant, which reflects both the estimated 'need' for its services and the 'taxable resources' (both household and business) at its disposal, central government can in principle iron out the disparities in service provision which would otherwise arise.

Central government support is calculated by the Department of the

Environment each year for each council, using a complicated formula to compute both needs and resources. It is by unilaterally withholding part of a council's entitlement to this so-called 'Rate Support Grant' that the Government has been able to 'fine' local authorities it regards as 'over-spending'.

The other two main sources of local authority finance, business (or 'non-domestic') and domestic (or household) rates are broadly similar in operation at present. All houses and business premises have a 'rateable value', which is the council's estimate of the annual rent the property could command. Rateable values in England and Wales have not been reviewed since 1973 (rateable values for newly-built properties are simply worked out using the rent assessment guides left over from 1973). Rates themselves are simply the tax levied by councils on a householder's or business's rateable value, the percentage due being expressed as a 'rate poundage' (e.g. 50% is a rate poundage of '50p in the £').

Each year, a council calculates what it needs to raise from the rates to meet expenditure uncovered by charges and central government grants, say £200m. If the rateable values of all properties in its area sum to £100m (its taxable resources — see above), it will need to 'set a rate' poundage of 200p in the £ to balance its books. Since the gap between what local authorities want to spend and the amount the Government is prepared to give them in grants has been growing ever-wider, and because annual reassessments of rateable values are not carried out, the rate poundages levied by councils have crept higher and higher each year.

There are two main flaws with this arrangement, one of which is a practical difficulty, the other an inherent shortcoming in any method of taxing wealth rather than income. The practical issue is simply that the tax base, the so-called 'valuation list' (of rateable values), is chronically out of date. Although there exists provision for rateable values to be reassessed every five years, the reviews scheduled for 1978 and 1983 were both cancelled by the Secretary of State for the Environment — ostensibly on grounds of cost, but probably for fear of popular hostility in the run-up to general elections. But repeatedly side-stepping electoral flak in years gone by has stored up increasing resentment amongst those who would have benefited from reassessment. Since 1973, the property market has been very dynamic. In the business sector, average rents in retailing have increased seven-fold, while those in the more depressed industrial sector have risen only three-fold; thus, factory-occupiers are currently paying much more, and shop-owners much less, than they ought to do were rateable values up to date. Similarly in the private housing market, property prices, and so rents, have also risen dramatically, making a nonsense of the 1973 estimates. To the extent that some areas within a council district (e.g. new suburbs) have experienced sharper rises than others (e.g. declining inner-city areas), the failure to up-date the valuation list again causes one group of rate-payers to unfairly benefit at the expense of another.

A more intractable problem is that the system of rates gives little

consideration to ability to pay. In the business sector, rates are effectively a fixed cost, so that while a firm which has had a bad trading year may pay no corporation tax, its rates liability is unchanged. In extreme circumstances, its rates bill may be sufficiently large to drive it to the wall. For domestic rate-payers, it is equally unclear that rateable values closely reflect the abilities to pay of different households. The classic example frequently used concerns an elderly widow on a fixed income living next door to a houseful of cohabiting 'yuppies'. Both households face identical rates bills, despite the huge differences in their incomes.

However, the Government's key concern is none of these things, but rather that the status quo encourages councils to over-spend. This is because a council is elected by all the adult residents in its district and these voters clearly benefit from the level of services provided for them. Yet it is only businesses (which have no vote) and 'heads of households' (of which the poorer and unemployed have their rates paid by the social security system) that are liable for the rates which fund these services. The result is that a large proportion of the electorate quite rationally votes for an expansion of council services from which it will benefit, but for which it will not directly pay.

Being completely disenfranchised, businesses can thus find swingeing rate increases imposed on them to finance new council schemes from which they will derive no benefit, and in many inner-city areas where a large proportion of householders is insulated from the rates by the social security system, a majority of the electorate may find itself able to vote for spending increases with impunity. The Government claims its reforms are therefore intended to 'protect' the business community from high-spending local councils, while at the same time promoting local accountability by making all adult residents share at least some part of the cost of the measures for which they vote. The 1986 Green Paper summed up their fundamental objective as being to 'reform local government finance to strengthen local democracy and accountability'.

In England, the Local Government Finance Bill provides for the new system to come into effect in April 1990, although the changes to business rates will be phased in over four years. In Scotland and Wales, similar systems are also to be introduced in 1989 and 1990 respectively, with the main difference being that the full business rates changes will be brought in straight away.

The reforms will involve major changes to each of the three main sources of local government finance outlined above. First, there will be a new, 'simplified' arrangement for distributing central government grant (renamed the 'revenue support grant') to local authorities. Each authority will receive a 'standard grant' (a flat rate of £x per adult resident in their area), plus a variable 'needs grant' calculated on the basis of various indices of its economic and social prosperity. The 'resources' element in the present rate support grant will therefore end, on the grounds that the 'taxable resources' of each authority will in future be evenly distributed — to the extent that both the proceeds from business rates and the poll tax

will be straightforward multiples of their total adult populations alone (see below)

Secondly, there will be a single, uniform business rate (UBR), set by central government and payable by all businesses regardless of location. Rateable values will be reassessed in 1990 and every five years thereafter. The UBR in 1990 will be fixed to ensure the same total receipts nationally from business rates as the present system would have yielded. It will then be indexed in subsequent years, although falling in inverse proportion to the rise in rateable values whenever the quinquennial reassessments take place. Crucially, the UBR will be collected locally, but pooled centrally and redistributed to authorities, like the standard grant, on a per capita basis. Finally, and most controversially, domestic rates will be abolished altogether and replaced by a new poll tax — the 'community charge' — which will be set by each authority individually and payable by all adult residents.

Tax reform on this scale is always politically risky. By its nature, it involves a redistribution of resources between different groups in society and, human nature being what it is, the howls of outrage from the losers invariably drown out the murmurs of approval from the gainers. In this case, the picture is particularly complicated, because there are a number of forces at work.

In the non-domestic sector, the switch from locally-set business rate poundages to the UBR will mean higher rate poundages for some and lower rate poundages for others. But at the same time, some businesses will gain and some lose from the reassessment of rateable values. The net impact on an individual business's rates bill is therefore complicated and depends on whether the two effects offset or reinforce each other — and if the former is the case, which of the two is the stronger.

In the household sector, much has been made of the fact that single person households and people living in houses with high rateable values will benefit from the introduction of the poll tax at the expense of multi-adult households and those in low rateable valued accommodation. But this presupposes that the only change is that local authorities are having to raise the same domestic rates revenue in a different way. In fact, the wider changes in central government grants and business rates means that many authorities will have to find more or less from their domestic residents than at present.

To examine this in more detail, take the business sector first. The UBR itself amounts to nothing more than replacing dozens of separate poundages with an average of them all. Hence, roughly half the businesses in England (those now paying rate poundages above the national average) will find themselves better off, while the other half (those now paying below-average rate poundages) will be correspondingly worse off. If no other changes in the system were envisaged, the UBR in England would be around 213p on 1986/87 figures, compared with business rate poundages that actually ranged from 117p to 321p. Table 1 illustrates the redistributive effects between regions if the introduction of the UBR were

the only change contemplated.

Revaluation also involves large scale redistribution of the rates burden between businesses. At today's prices, this exercise would raise rateable values in England by an average of approximately $5\frac{1}{2}$ times. However, for individual businesses, the actual rise in their rateable values depends on their geographical location (rateable values will tend to rise more in the economically-buoyant south than in the more depressed north) and the nature of their businesses (commercial rents have risen, and so rateable values will rise, by much more in retailing and offices than manufacturing and warehousing). Traditional industries in the north will therefore be unambiguous gainers from revaluation, large retailers in the south clear losers. For most companies, the effect of revaluation will depend whether the regional factor offsets or reinforces the sectoral factor.

Taken together, the UBR and revaluation make a complex picture, with the final impact on individual business rates bills depending on the rate poundage they currently pay, where in the country they are located and in which sector they are involved. Table 2 offers a selection of the predicted impacts.

The community charge is hardly less complex in its redistributive effects. Of itself, the switch from domestic rates to a poll tax will exert two independent forces on the individual household's local tax bill. The first results from replacing a tax based on the rateable value of the domestic residence to a flat rate charge. Clearly, all other things equal, those households whose rateable value is currently lower than the average in their area will lose by this change, while those in higher-rated properties will gain — a result universally agreed to be highly regressive and unfair.

Secondly, there is the broadening of the tax base from main householders to all adults to consider. It follows that households which have an above-average number of adult residents will lose from this change, while smaller households will gain. The net result depends upon whether the two forces reinforce or offset one another.

However, overlying this is the fact that the amount which individual authorities will need to raise from the poll tax will, once the reforms are fully implemented, not necessarily be the same as they currently raise from the domestic rates. This is because councils will only receive a per capita share of the national UBR proceeds, rather than the rates actually paid by their local business communities. Clearly, councils with a large business sector will suffer a sharp drop in business rates revenue, while rural, shire county councils with little industry will find themselves correspondingly better off.

Counteracting this is the fact that, at present, the rate support grant works to provide rural councils with a larger top-up than their urban counterparts, on the grounds that the (business) taxable resources at their disposal are lower. In the new system, the resources element in the central government grant is to go, so that although rural councils will benefit from the UBR, they will get a smaller share of the central government grant — and vice versa for urban authorities.

But there is no presumption that these two opposing factors will precisely cancel out each other. This is because different councils with the same size business sector currently choose to charge them very different rate poundages (as Table 1 above shows). Urban (rural) councils which presently levy above-average business rate poundages will typically lose more (gain less) revenue under the switch to the UBR than they get (lose) from central government in higher (lower) grant, hence the amount that they need to raise from domestic residents to maintain present spending levels will accordingly be higher, and vice versa for councils presently favouring their business communities with below-average rate poundages.

With no change in central government grant or business rates revenue, the average community charge per household should equal the present average rates bill per household (individual households therefore benefit only to the extent that they have either a higher current rateable value than average or a smaller number of adult residents, so that their total community charge bill will be lower). But as Table 3 shows, in many authorities there are marked differences between the two reflecting the extent to which councils' grant and business rates revenue will be affected by changes. Table 3 ranks authorities by the proportionate change in local tax bill household (assuming expenditure maintained at 1987/88 levels), from the most adversely affected, Wandsworth (a 115% increase) to the most favourably affected, South Bucks (a 47% decrease).

In conclusion, the effect of the proposed reforms to local government finance will be a massive redistribution of income. In some instances, the redistribution will be equitable and will right past wrongs: depressed northern businesses will benefit at the expense of their more profitable southern counterparts; declining manufacturing industries will cease to cross-subsidise the growth service sectors, in particular retailing and offices. It is notable that the Government has made great play of this, claiming that the reform of business rates will greatly assist the more depressed regions and sectors of British industry.

But outside the business community, the redistribution is arbitrary and harshly regressive: from poor households to rich; from multi-adult households to one and two adult households, from domestic residents in urban, inner city areas to those in more affluent, rural districts. Most attention has, perhaps understandably, focussed on the basic argument that a poll tax is a more regressive way of raising revenue than a property tax, often analysing the issues in purely abstract terms. Yet this review of the overall package of measures shows that the effect of this change may be swamped in many areas by the knock-on effects of the new revenue support grant and the UBR. As the wider implications of the Local Government Finance Bill become more generally understood, it could prove the more controversial issue of Mrs. Thatcher's third term.

Table 1 — Effect of UBR Without Revaluation

	Average Business Rates Poundages (1986/87)	Hypothetical UBR (1986/87)	Change in Total Rates Bills
Greater London	184p	213p	+£369m
Rest of South-East	200p	213p	+£93m
East Anglia	205p	213p	+£10m
South West	213p	213p	—
East Midlands	231p	213p	—£44m
West Midlands	215p	213p	—£6m
Yorks/Humberside	261p	213p	—£137m
North West	253p	213p	—£19m
North	281p	213p	—£24m
Net Change			—

Source. Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy

Table 2 — Percentage Change in Average Rates Bills (at 1987/88 prices)
by Sector, Resulting from the UBR and Revaluation

Retailing		Offices		Warehouses	
Kensington & Chelsea	+82%	Barnet	+(25+)%	Reading	+89%
Croydon	+40%	Cardiff	+(10-24)%	Croydon	+64%
Bromley	+39%	Southampton	0%	Crawley	+62%
Liverpool	—31%	Birmingham	0%	Portsmouth	+4%
Sheffield	—25%	West-		Camden	—9%
Newcastle	—40%	minster	—(10-24)%	Birmingham	—27%
		Bradford	—(25+)%	Manchester	—38%
		Leeds	—(25+)%		

Source. Centre for Local Economic Strategies

Table 3 — Rates Bills and Community Charges (1987/88 Figures)

	Average Rates Bill per Household	Average Community Bill per Household	Community Charge per Head
Wandsworth	£399	£887	£435
Tower Hamlets	£548	£1304	£639
Greenwich	£495	£1241	£608
Southwark	£499	£1163	£570
Hackney	£765	£1410	£691
Burnley	£254	£488	£239
Barnsley	£328	£539	£264
Wear Valley	£285	£504	£247
Isles of Scilly	£293	£190	£93
Hove	£428	£355	£174
Brentwood	£721	£692	£339
Windsor	£542	£335	£164
Chiltern	£818	£431	£211
South Bucks	£825	£420	£206

Source. Local Government Information Unit

Useful addresses for further information on the changes to local government finance:

Policy Research Unit
Department of Economics and Public Policy
Leeds Polytechnic
LEEDS LS2 8BW
0532-462719

Centre for Local Economic Strategies
Heron House
Brazennose Street
MANCHESTER M2 5HD
061-834 7036

Local Government Information Unit
1-5 Bath Street
LONDON EC1V 9QQ
01-608 1051

ANOTHER SOURCE OF AIDS INFECTION

by Thomas Land

IN the continuing and urgent search for origins and cures for heterosexual HIV transmission, no possibility, no matter how unpalatable and indeed deeply repugnant, can be left unexplored. A recently published and closely argued study by an American anthropologist reaches the distressing conclusion that the outbreaks of Africa's AIDS epidemic consistently hits regions where female circumcision is practised. This conclusion, confirmed by subsequent research, may have identified the world's greatest source of heterosexual HIV transmission.

Female circumcision, a bloody, unhygienic and very dangerous operation commonly practised by village midwives in many African countries, has emerged as a likely link responsible for the spread of AIDS in vast heterosexual populations. The hypothesis linking the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) with the routine sexual mutilation of young girls is to be explored by medical and social scientists as well as public health administrators during this year devoted to global co-operation to confront the AIDS epidemic.

The operation, usually carried out by means of kitchen knives, old razor blades and pieces of broken glass, causes permanent disability and risks infection and death. Up to 74 million women today have been subjected to it, according to the latest United Nations estimate.

Various forms of the operation are routinely carried out in more than 30 African countries and in the Middle East and parts of Asia. It is an ancient practice and delicate subject in many cultures, shrouded by powerful taboos and moral precepts.

Governmental authorities tend to ignore it. Despite its commendable concern with maternal and child care in the poorest regions, even the UN's World Health Organisation (WHO) has resisted pressure over the years to seek legislative action against the practice.

All this may change, however, after a world conference on AIDS prevention held recently in London with a declaration endorsed by 148 countries committing themselves to urgent action to prevent the spread of HIV.

Significantly, the conference called for national policies backed by a wide range of non-governmental organizations and interest groups to promote 'informed and responsible behaviour' which it described as the only remedy against the deadly epidemic in the absence of a medical cure for AIDS.

This has created a welcome platform for a group of African women to draw attention to the link between HIV transmission and female circumcision.

The common factor in the transmission of the diseases is the exchange of contaminated body fluids, mostly blood. The majority of AIDS victims in Europe, North America and Australasia still comprise members of two

high-risk groups male homosexuals and intravenous drug users sharing dirty needles. But in Africa, the major factors of HIV spread are heterosexual and mother-to-child transmission, and an estimated three-quarters of AIDS victims are women in regions where female circumcision is widely practised.

A recent study issued by the WHO describes the following three main types of female circumcision:

- *Circumcision proper*, known in Muslim countries as *sunna* (traditional), is the mildest and rarest form, limited to the removal of the clitoral prepuce.
- *Excision* is the amputation of the whole of the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora.
- *Infibulation*, also known as *Pharaonic circumcision*, involves the amputation of the clitoris, the whole of the labia minora and at least the anterior two-thirds and often the whole of the medial part of the labia majora. The two sides of the vulva are then stitched together with silk, catgut or thorns, and a tiny sliver of wood or reed is inserted to preserve an opening for urine and menstrual blood. The girl's legs are usually bound together from ankle to knee until the wound has healed, up to 40 days.

Sexual intercourse can be excruciating as a result of the operation if a neuroma has formed at the point section of the dorsal nerve of the clitoris. The consummation of marriage often necessitates the opening up of the scar by the husband, using his fingers, a razor or knife. Penetration often remains difficult for a long time, making anal intercourse a frequent alternative.

Most aspects of this practice invite HIV transmission. The campaign to draw global attention to the health hazards of female circumcision is spearheaded by the Nigerian Women's Centre, an influential non-governmental organization.

Its programme is focused on a closely argued study published by the anthropologist Uli Linke of the University of California. The study concludes that the outbreaks of Africa's AIDS epidemic consistently hit regions where female circumcision is practised. This is confirmed by a series of subsequent studies carried out by the Nigerian centre.

The centre has already asked several African governments to outlaw female circumcision; only one, the Sudan, has so far responded positively, although Kenya earlier took vigorous steps to discourage its practice.

But in the present climate of global concern, such an enormous public health risk cannot be ignored. While the WHO prepares for the first 'World Day' on AIDS to be held on December 1, 1988, the Nigerian centre hopes to publish a series of new scientific reports exploring what may well be the world's greatest source of heterosexual HIV transmission.

[Thomas Land is an author and foreign correspondent who writes on global affairs.]

CHANGING FRAMES

by John Elsom

THESE may be a little unnerving at first,' said the optician, as he handed me my new pair of long-distance spectacles. They were What had previously been a flat floor now had a sharp downhill slope, while the door, off-centre from the direct line of vision, bent inwards alarmingly. They'll have to fix that door, I thought.

The cars in the street outside, however, loomed with unnatural clarity. I could see the set lines to a young driver's jaw as he fretted in the traffic, while his companion rummaged through her handbag. Beyond the first two rows of nearly stationary vehicles, there were cars whizzing past in the opposite direction, deadly as bullets; while on the other side of the road, too close, too close, a mother wheeled a pram with one hand while clutching a toddler with the other. There was a greengrocery shop with two pensioners counting the cost of potatoes. I could see the spots on the spuds.

'You'll soon get used to them,' said the optician, as he demonstrated the little elastic clip to the arms of the spectacles, which kept them on in high winds. 'For sportsmen,' he explained, 'No trouble when yachting.' But do I want to get used to them? I thought. A world where the floor is flat, the door rectangular and you can't see the bullets for the blur outside, seems a much safer place, and it was only the cost of the frames and the lenses, and the memory of the awful headaches to which my old glasses may have contributed, which prevented me from handing the spectacles back to him with a polite excuse, such as 'Sorry, no, excellent lenses, superb elastic clip, how do they think of these things? but, sorry, no. The old world was quite difficult enough to handle. I don't want to know about the other side of the road.'

There was also the matter of my mirror image. Having a kind of nondescript face, I have come to rely on my spectacles to add distinction to what would otherwise be a smudged list of features, a nose that does not know where to stop, a mouth too slack and a complexion of granulated plastic. There is a mole to one side of my nose which I once thought of cultivating into a beauty spot, until it grew enormous and hairy and kept getting sliced by the razor, but, with that exception, there is nothing which, in the words of the eighteenth century landscape gardener, 'lends enchantment to the view'.

Nothing, that is, except my spectacles. My old hornrimmed frames had the merit of covering quite a lot of my face with academic distinction. My new ones, on the other hand, have square metal frames, with a worry bar spanning the bridge, with thinner arms at the end of which, as the optician explained, lies this curious elastic extension for high winds. They are Thatcherite glasses, for junior executives who jog and abseil in between clinching forward-looking deals in the Yemen.

My new spectacles, in short, not only alter my vision of the outside

world, but the image of me in the eyes of my beholders; and that, to slide from the particular to the general, is the characteristic of frames. Reality may not change at all, except perhaps in its quietly flowing, evolutionary way, punctuated by cataclysms, but our perceptions of it change sharply, as we shift from frame to frame. Already, I have become accustomed to my new spectacles, and when I put on my old ones, the world becomes blurred and distorted, unrecognisable in fact, just as I can now startle others by donning the hornrims.

In April, UNESCO held a meeting of its affiliated non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Paris, 528 of them, listed in three categories, 'A', 'B' and 'C'. I was there, representing the International Association of Theatre Critics (Category B), and found myself in the roles of being both the optician and his myopic patient. I had, for example, two very misleading mental images of UNESCO — one as a high-powered international bureaucracy and the other as a fairly corrupt, inefficient, do-gooding, talk shop, which aimed to set the world to rights while misdirecting phone calls. As it happened, I had doubts about some of the definitions (which returns us to 'frames'), but few about the worthiness of the causes or the dedication of those who were championing them. Far from being a moral mafia, the UNESCO NGOs reminded me of those hardworking village committees who organise fêtes and whist drives to raise money to repair the church spire.

In their cases, however, the problems were of overwhelming scale and urgency. Forty thousand children die every day, remarked one delegate from the World Health Organisation, of starvation or diseases relating to malnutrition. One thousand children die in Mexico alone. Every day. Our newspapers were full of news from Lanark airport, where a hi-jacked plane from Kuwait Airlines had temporarily landed, with its fifty passengers on board held to ransom. The theatrical quality of the drama at Lanark quite eclipsed all the other news of the day, the breathless appeals from the passengers on the plane, the threats of the hooded bandits, calm in the justice of their cause, the speculations about how the plane could be stormed, and nowhere, not even in the most enlightened papers, was there a word about the forty thousand new corpses unnecessarily littering the planet.

And, of course, as a practising journalist, I could easily appreciate that the Lanark hi-jack was 'news' but the infant mortality statistics were not. We have fallen into the habit of believing that our news programmes are factual, precise and represent a reasonable response to world events; whereas they are, in fact, theatre, and not very sophisticated theatre at that. I am not blaming the editors, the journalists or the broadcasting authorities; but I do blame critics for the limpid and casual assessment of their own roles, which deters them from considering those theatrical frames which do not proclaim themselves as theatre.

When I assert that news broadcasts are theatre, I do not wish to denigrate them, only to describe them more precisely. My friends in the News and Talks and Documentary departments of the BBC might

instantly object that theatre is fiction, whereas news broadcasts are fact. Isn't that a fundamental difference between them? Not so fundamental, I would have thought, and even at a superficial level, only up to a point. Lord Copper Plays are often based on fact as well; and all plays, even the most light-hearted and entertaining comedy, are based on somebody's perception of reality. They are, however, carefully labelled as fiction, and if we miss the credits at the beginning, there are all kinds of signs which we can quickly interpret to mean that this event is not actually happening now but is a model of what could happen.

News broadcasts on the other hand insist that what we are seeing is fact, is what is actually happening or has happened; and in that sense, they try to defeat that scepticism which may query what is on offer. The signature tune is particularly urgent and the image of the world — all news programmes seem to start with the world floating in space, but with lines tracing to London, Paris, Moscow or New York, as if to suggest that nothing of importance exists without finally arriving at Broadcasting House — stresses the global preoccupations of the newscast team, who sit with solemn objectivity at a desk. Meanwhile, the facts have been selected, to fit the three minute slots available or whatever length is considered best to match the public's span of attention. Naturally, to retain the interest of audience, and to keep up the ratings, these items have to be mixed, adventure stories with further reports from the boxing ring of politics, human interest stories, sport, art and quirky anecdotes about elephants giving birth or the sale of five metres of salami.

This global chit-chat has the fascination of a soap opera, which also never ends, and it can occasionally be useful; but it should never be confused with anything other than what it is, a framework within which certain facts can be displayed — and an artificial framework, that is, one which we can alter. Within this frame, facts are selected for their dramatic values — but these values have been derived from an old-fashioned concept of theatre, in which deaths, marriages and similar battles for victory or defeat loom large. If we change the frame by, for example, lengthening the newscast and concentrating on one topic, then we have 'in-depth' documentaries, the equivalent in theatrical terms of switching from a variety bill to a short play; and most documentaries retain a play-like structure, in which arguments and facts are set out dialectically, with some kind of conclusion and denouement at the end.

The difference between plays and newscasts or documentaries is that plays are essentially concerned with the frames through which we perceive the world, using facts where necessary to justify the new frame, whereas newscasts accept the frame which they have been given and use it, like a pair of spectacles, to identify those facts that they can see. If you change the frames, you can see different facts or the same facts in a different perspective, which is why, at the UNESCO meeting of NGOs, we had to discuss frames before talking about anything else.

There were, for example, several NGOs concerned with human rights, and several for women's rights, and some for youth, and others for family,

and some for education and others for literacy, and a few for political freedom (anti-West) and one or two for political freedom (pro-West), and some for the free flow of information, and a handful for anti-racism and anti-sexism, and a thimbleful for ecology, and a smidgeon for economic development, and a scooner for raising cultural profiles, and a smattering for amnesty, and a snickering for religious tolerance, and all of these admirable organisations had enormous and genuine troubles on their hands which required world action and world money to tackle even partially, and 99% of the NGOs believed that the only answer was to raise the consciousness of the world to their particular troubles, which meant of course, changing frames, so that we could see the other side of the road, and all the time I was aware, as a theatre critic, of the limitations of those theatrical frames which we have interited and failed to change to meet our new necessities — which is, of course, a direct damning of our inflexible, ancestor-bound cultures and the old, off-the-counter spectacles through which we blink and dimly perceive the blur of bullets, the clutch of a toddler's hand, the totting-ups of the nonogenarians.

Altogether elsewhere, in Moscow, things got to such a pretty pass during the years of stagnation, as one ageing leader after another went to renew acquaintance with Lenin, that the frame, political, cultural and economic, simply had to be broken. A braver, more determined attempt to change frames than *glasnost* I have yet to find. But we all need *glasnost*, we all need to change frames, however unnerving it may be to do so, and we are all in a pretty pass, whether we know it or not.

The July number of *Contemporary Review* includes *Britain and the Birth of Israel* by Avi Schlaim, *France: Civil Liberties on the Agenda* by James Shields, *The New Sound of Lyric Poetry* by Park Honan and *The World of Television* by P. G. Macdonald (held over from the June issue). *Banking in Luxembourg* is kept back for a future date.

KANAKS, CALDOCHES AND METIS — WHO ARE THE TRUE CALEDONIANS?

by Adrian Smith

AS a nation, we scarcely had any idea where and how our rulers were flying the flag on the other side of the world. Our colonial servants, it appeared, had guarded and administered their island paradises with suitable aplomb, before seeing off the Japanese, and a little later seeing themselves off. The locals always seemed happy, particularly when in London for state occasions, and even today we take pleasure in our Queen's enthusiastic receptions as their Queen. During 1987 the events in Fiji belatedly exposed us to the fact that Britain's colonial history in the Pacific runs far deeper than fostering good relations with tribal chiefs, or introducing rugby football and Christian fundamentalism.

The Fijian sugar planters' recruitment of cheap Indian labour created, a century later, liberal democracy's most quintessential dilemma: how to reconcile the freely-arrived at decision of a new majority ethnic group with the genuine fears, and the self-perceived threat to traditional rights and lifestyles, of an outnumbered and outvoted indigenous community (I appreciate that many Melanesians supported Dr. Bavadra's coalition, but its constituent parties were clearly dominated by Indians). Britain cannot escape ultimate responsibility for creating those conditions conducive to just such a dilemma, but the Government conveniently — and with some justification — denied any obligation to secure its solution. Fiji had for 18 years enjoyed the status of an independent sovereign nation within the Commonwealth. It demanded the right to govern its own destiny.

In sharp contrast to the British, postwar France has rarely had the opportunity to indulge in a blissful ignorance of distant 'possessions'. Her stormy relations with past and surviving colonies constitutes an unhappy history of intransigence and miscalculation. No other imperial power so relentlessly pursued a universal programme of cultural assimilation with *la patrie*, and nowhere was the contrast with the British experience so vivid as in the Pacific. The District Officer had the Home Counties to retire to, but the third and fourth generations *colons* are still asking, '*Où irais-je?*' if the tricolour comes down. Permanent settlements has ensured a long, bloody, and continuing process of adjustment to the realities of a post-Occupation, post imperialist world. The recent history of New Caledonia highlights the problems of endeavouring to temper indigenous separatist aspirations, reassure suspicious loyalists and defend France's legitimate right to a major strategic presence 12,400 miles from home.

The archipelago shares Fiji's phenomenon of a minority Melanesian population, largely loyal to the separatist Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS). But New Caledonia is an 'overseas territory' of metropolitan France, and the expressed wish of the current majority is for it to remain so. Not only the Europeans, but other more recent immigrant ethnic groups, fear the consequences of independence; together

they constitute a clear majority of the roughly 146,000 islanders. A similar dilemma of liberal democracy pertains as in Fiji, except that, unlike Britain, France cannot abnegate responsibility for its solution.

New Caledonia is surrounded by independent members of a distinctly Anglophone Commonwealth. France argues that such young nations can scarcely recognise the subtleties and constraints of a skilfully moulded constitution in which all overseas territories are integral parts of the Fifth Republic. Thus a predominantly hostile South Pacific Forum fails to appreciate the difficulty in decolonising 'à l'anglaise' when the original colonising was 'à la française'. In the case of New Caledonia, the argument concludes, this difficulty is academic anyway—the people have freely indicated their desire to remain citizens of France. The fact that 41 per cent of the Caledonian people chose to boycott the 1987 referendum is, presumably, also academic.

Successive governments have insisted that France's presence in the Pacific constitutes a genuine force for stability throughout an increasingly unstable region; crises such as that in Fiji are interpreted as confirmation of the need to remain. Located astride two major sea lanes to the Far East, New Caledonia may have a key role in protecting the West's economic and political interests. Washington's reluctance to criticise French policy tacitly acknowledges this.

Nouméa, the capital, is a typical French colonial town: bustling, prosperous, and characteristically Mediterranean. Comparison with Algiers prior to independence is reinforced by the very visible presence in Nouméa of *pieds noirs*, most of whom remain as racist, chauvinist, and generally unattractive as when they arrived in 1962. Adamant that defeat shall never again destroy their way of life, they follow their fellow *ex-colons* around Marseilles in actively supporting Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front (FN). Under local leader Guy Georges, the FN has proved a vociferous and brutal defender of French interests.

The *pieds noirs* make up only a very small proportion of the post-war settlers or *les metros*, many enticed by the nickel boom of the late 1960s. Extensive development of the western coastal strip, and the southern hinterland around Nouméa left over 70 per cent of the residents European, principally Francophone, compared with around 40 per cent of the overall population. Most Europeans (nearly 30,000) are concentrated on the western half of La Grande Terre, the long and thin mainland. Although first named by Captain Cook, New Caledonia was later annexed by the French. Between 1853 and 1899 it was principally a penal colony. Europeans are nicknamed the *caldoches*, after the transported criminals and exiled Paris *communards*. Their descendants, and those of the first genuine settlers, are often the poorer whites of the hill farms or the more isolated coastal towns.

Les metros almost overwhelmingly support the ostensibly Gaullist, Rally for New Caledonia in the Republic (RPCR). Currently, the RPCR espouses the virtues of a '*capitalisme populaire*' with a distinctly New Right hue. Thus, Nouméa is seen to labour under a '*capitalisme dépassé*',

unduly dependent on seasonal Japanese honeymooners and the like. This enthusiasm for attracting fresh investment out of Europe and the Far East cannot be divorced from the many commercial dealings of party leader Jacques Lafleur, one of the two RPCR Deputies in the National Assembly. Prior to the September 1987 referendum on self-determination the RPCR-controlled territorial government openly abused its powers of financial patronage. While Nouméa prospered, the predominantly Melanesian regions in the east and on the Iles Loyauté faced delays in necessary financial assistance. Complaints attracted scant media attention in the Francophone community, where the Paris press tycoon Robert Hersant owns the only newspaper, *Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes*. Only days before polling, an FLNKS radio station was sabotaged, with four investigating journalists later arrested. An ad hoc official commission strictly controlled broadcast coverage of the campaign. Reporters on the one television channel, Antenne 2, were subject to racist abuse.

The most recent arrivals in Nouméa are the gendarmes and the CRS riot police drafted in for the referendum and the spring elections. Like the 147 supreme court judges who accompanied them from Paris, they remain for the foreseeable future. In all, over 2,000 reinforcements arrived during 1987, and another 720 in March 1988. 8,500 security personnel have so far been deployed since the violent protest of late 1984. Their high profile and intimidatory manner is of course deliberate. This contrasts visibly with French Polynesia, where indigenous support for self-determination is no less entrenched. Despite the riots in Papeete in October 1987, Tahiti's security forces still carry out normal policing duties. In New Caledonia, troops take a central role in maintaining counter-insurgency operations, most especially in the rural hinterland and jungle highlands, as well as the FLNKS-controlled towns on the eastern seaboard. While the DGSE and other intelligence agencies cultivate a growing network of local informers, the *Paras* man elaborate and intimidating road-blocks. Further up-country, large army camps shadow most villages of any size or importance. As in Algeria de facto martial law is tempered by a 'hearts and minds' programme.

Uncompromising over the principle of *Algérie française*, many officers nevertheless held the *colons* themselves in absolute contempt. Today's regular soldiers, distanced by time and circumstance from old colonial loyalties — and specially trained for overseas deployment — must view the *caldoches* with a mixture of indifference and bemusement. Antipathy, fuelled by racism, is more likely felt towards those most appreciative of military aid, the *métis* or 'mixed bloods'. The *métis* regard themselves as being as European as anybody else, ostensibly on the basis that paternal ancestry is what really counts. They consciously choose to be Francophone, but still honour their Melanesian forefathers' way of life. The Kanaks' customs and 26 languages are deemed wholly admirable, so long as they are confined to the past. With grim irony, the *métis* articulate their fears via the National Front, albeit welcoming Jacques Chirac warmly during his brief triumphal tour of Nouméa following the referendum.

More ominously, *métis* farmers have been accused of carrying out reprisal killings on FLNKS members in December 1984. The murders came at the end of several weeks of open rebellion by militant Kanaks, during which arson claimed four *caldoches* lives. The FLNKS strategy was to boycott the November 1984 elections to the territorial assembly, and maintain pressure on the metropolitan authorities to accede to Kanak demands. The compromise of regional councils and an early referendum on self-determination in early 1985 with the then Socialist government in Paris, secured a ceasefire. It also formed the basis of the accused *métis*' defence. Counsel successfully justified retaliation, claiming that the mal-administration of an alien civil service had provoked a prolonged breakdown in public order. The government which had made such disastrous administrative appointments comprised the same discredited ministers who — prior to their deserved electoral defeat — had advocated the even more disastrous course of 'independence-in-association' (a proposal subsequently rescinded by Chirac's victorious conservative coalition). In such circumstances, the lawyers concluded, the Francophone community had every reason to protect itself. An all-European jury accepted the defence case that the rule of law was scarcely worthy of respect in the 18 months preceding the Socialists' departure from office in March 1986.

Majority support for the status quo is guaranteed by the most recently arrived immigrants' fears that independence might bring expulsion or second-class citizenship. The referendum result confirmed the FLNKS's failure to placate such fears. Various ethnic groups make up at least 20 per cent of New Caledonia's total population, and are drawn from all over the Pacific and the Far East. Substantial numbers come from French Polynesia, and the other Francophone islands of Wallis and Futuna, their right of entry being unrestricted.

The most adaptable, the most industrious, and now the most loyal, of these recent immigrants are the Vietnamese boat people. Today, Francophone leaders regret having restricted refugee entry in the mid-1970s, in the same way that they lament turning away *pieds noirs* a decade earlier.

Finally, what of the Melanesians themselves? 'Kanak' was originally a pejorative term used by the early settlers. Today it has been revived as a conscious act of defiance (to some extent, the same applied to *caldoche* and *pied noir*). The FLNKS talks of an independent 'Kanaky', rejecting the name imposed by western imperialists. Official estimates of the Kanak community place their numbers at around 61,000, or 43 per cent of the total population. Unofficial estimates range from 72,000 to 90,000, with the lower figure more likely. Concentrated throughout most of the highlands and eastern seaboard, they retain an overwhelming majority on the outlying islands. In isolated jungle villages deep inland, the European presence is mainly confined to the army and scattered *métis* farmers. Villagers up-country in Tiendanite still live in fear of the December 1984 reprisal raid reoccurring. Their elders still recall France's punitive expedition to quell the 1917 Kanak rebellion.

Jean-Marie Tjibaou lost a grandmother 71 years ago, and two brothers

in the Tiendanite ambush. Today he is leader of the FLNKS, and mayor of Hienghène, on the north-east coast. Tjibaou exemplifies the islands' ethnic mix — part Melanesian, part Japanese, and part French. He defends the FLNKS as the most visible manifestation of '*l'identité canaque*', to support the struggle is to choose your identity. Thus, the principal division in New Caledonia is seen as cultural rather than ethnic. There is a choice of two communities, albeit most *métis* prefer the Francophone to the Kanak. As befits a former priest and anthropologist Tjibaou argues with conviction that an independent Kanaky would debar discrimination and recrimination. He holds together a fragmented coalition, too often divided by differences of region and tactics. The FLNKS has nevertheless displayed an aptitude for attracting international concern. In this respect, the support of neighbouring Vanuatu proved crucial in securing formal condemnation of French rule by the 1986 Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, and more crucially, by the United Nations General Assembly. Ironically, the UN's redesignation of New Caledonia as a colony prompted France to hasten arrangements for the referendum.

Acknowledging the propaganda rewards of adhering to their current policy of non-violence, FLNKS leaders distance themselves from the 1984 decision to accept Libyan assistance. Despite an isolated incident in late February, Tjibaou kept his movement's more militant elements under control during this spring's election campaigns until the final week of the President's campaign, even the fifty veterans of Colonel Gadafy's guerilla training. Vanuatu's response to Libyan interest in the region is at worst ambivalent. For the FLNKS, renewed contact would quickly forfeit powerful support within the South Pacific Forum. Both Australia and New Zealand have taken uncompromising positions on Libyan involvement in the Pacific, partly to alleviate American pressure on Wellington.

The FLNKS took full advantage of the 1987 referendum to brief western journalists. Tjibaou warned that non-violence is 'not a dogma, but a tactic', dictated by the circumstances of the time — *and* by his personal authority over youthful advocates of political violence. A month later he was charged with incitement, and his deputy imprisoned. The FLNKS entered 1988 with a multi-faceted strategy of consolidating regional and global support, maintaining mass non-violent pressure; boycotting all elections other than those which it could win, and simply threatening a return to widespread insurgency. The movement has been accused of inconsistency and confused tactics during the past four years, most notably over its decisions to contest the September 1985 regional elections, and, to withdraw its original endorsement of the referendum proposal. Inconsistency is scarcely surprising given Tjibaou's need to impose some unanimity upon the FLNKS's constituent parties. If there is any rationale behind his policy-formulation then it is very firmly rooted in pragmatism. Given the electoral system and the present composition of the Caledonian people, there is no way the FLNKS could have secured a favourable referendum result. The Kanaks *and* the *caldoches* knew this, which was why Paris so readily acceded to loyalist demands for an early

vote. The FLNKS already had a recognised policy of abstention. The only reason an exception was made of the 1985 elections was because most constituent parties agreed that Melanesians would be adequately represented on the new, and economically powerful, Regional Councils. This in fact proved the case, with the FLNKS securing control of three out of four, the predictable exception being the Council embracing Nouméa.

No other elections take account of the imbalance in the geographical distribution of the ethnic groups. For example, the Territorial Assembly seats are concentrated in the densely-populated and predominantly non-Melanesian south. In 1985 the former Socialist government had sought to counter this problem by creating the Regional Councils. The FLNKS could experience decentralised power-sharing, thereby muting their more radical demands. Within the separatist coalition Tjibaou successfully argued during 1985 the case for accepting a referendum. The then assumption was that Paris would support self-determination. The terms of 'independence-in-association' could be hammered out in the aftermath of a successful campaign, during which the electorate would have come under heavy pressure from Paris to accept a break with metropolitan France.

It was a gamble by the FLNKS leadership which, once the Socialists had left office in March 1986, could never bear fruit. In reality, the very opposite scenario occurred. President Mitterand was left isolated, and content to appear incapable of influencing events. On 13 September 1987 the Melanesians abstained, and, on a turn-out of 59 per cent, 98 per cent rejected independence. The referendum result was portrayed to sceptical correspondents and commentators as a triumph for the revised policy of Prime Minister Chirac. The FLNKS was caught out by Mitterand and Chirac's mutual tactical interests in preserving 'co-habitation'. The rights and aspirations of the Kanak community were then judged by Mitterand's aides as tangential to the forthcoming presidential campaign. The Socialists had every reason to remain mute. Dismissed from office only two years ago, the party had too many skeletons in the cupboard regarding former ministers' handling of South Pacific affairs. Past scandals were and still are regularly uncovered or revived, most notably the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior*. Nevertheless, Mitterand launched his re-election campaign with an attack on Chirac's treatment of the Kanaks.

The Pacific's most potentially damaging crisis might attract greater attention and concern at home if more of the electorate had heard one *caldoche* government official jokingly relish 'bathing in the blood of the Kanaks', and Jean-Marie Tjibaou promise that his people 'will cover France in shit until we have independence'. Yet, Paris still displays an unreal air of complacency, and a disturbing indifference to the violence of the recent past.

[Dr Adrian Smith will contribute a second article on New Caledonia in August to discuss the French Elections and their effect on the island community.]

OLD MASTER PAINTINGS FROM THE VILLA FAVORITA — THE THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION

by Muriel Julius

UNTIL mid-June the Royal Academy in Piccadilly, London, is showing fifty-three paintings from a remarkable collection made in this century by the first Baron Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza (1875-1947) and his younger son Hans Heinrich. *The Times* newspaper is co-sponsoring the exhibition.

With an overkill unparalleled in my recollection, the heavy Murdochian hand primed readers daily with details of the Baron's life-style. As one of the world's richest men, we are informed that even his guard dogs wear livery. He is photographed looking suitably serious at his desk, and somewhat sheepishly at his fifth wife. She, we learn, was once Miss Spain and previously married to a film Tarzan, his fifth wife also. She has been allowed to decorate one of their six homes — the London one — her favourite tint being salmon pink.

These revelations made me reluctant to visit the exhibition itself. And all this was at total variance with what one discovers once inside.

The first gallery is dimly lighted and is hung with eleven small fifteenth century portraits by the great masters of the Northern Renaissance. I saw them with some difficulty. As Geraldine Norman wrote in the *Independent* newspaper on 8th April: 'The exhibition of Baron Thyssen's pictures at the Royal Academy has raised howls of pain from visitors who are unable to see the paintings because of the dense crowds. An average of 2,743 people per day milled through the exhibition during the week ending 31st March'.

Fortunately it was some years ago that I twice visited the Thyssen Collection outside Lugano. I strolled up a leafy path to the exquisite seventeenth century Villa Favorita beside the lake. Its marbled galleries were silent and calm. One hardly noticed the dozen or so others that were there. Today one reads with dismay that 250,000 people visit the Villa annually.

I believe the answer for such special places is successfully implemented at the Getty Museum in Malibu. Entrance is free but by reservation, so numbers are controlled.

Baron Thyssen is exceptionally generous in lending pictures. This is particularly true when allowing Flemish works of the 15th century to travel. Being painted on wood panel, they are particularly liable to damage since they react to changes in temperature and humidity. Dr Emil Bosshard, Chief Conservator of this collection, must have had many anxious moments. R. H. Marjniszen, Chief Conservator of Belgium's *Institut Royale du Patrimoine Artistique* in an article in 1986 catalogued the damage sustained by Flemish paintings sent round the world. Every exhibition, he wrote, damages one or two paintings and the original appearance, once lost, is gone forever.

In an effort at least to determine when and where damage occurs, Lord Dunluce, head of the Conservation Department at the Tate Gallery, has ingeniously devised a pedometer which records knocks. This is placed inside his packing cases

In the first room the eye is drawn to the compelling bulk of King Henry VIII (No 27) by Hans Holbein the Younger, (1497-1543) one of the greatest acquisitions of the first Baron who purchased it from Earl Spencer at Althorp

The catalogue tells us: 'This oak panel is the only universally accepted autograph likeness of Henry VIII to survive. It was probably executed not long after the beheading of Anne Boleyn on 19th May, 1536. By this date Holbein had become the King's official Court painter'.

The small scale of the painting and minute attention to detail remind us that Holbein was also a painter of miniatures. Although small, the effect is one of grandeur and monumentality. The broad shoulders spread beyond the picture-space. Despite the splendour of the costume, covered with fur, rubies, silver and gold, it is the head which dominates. The small, piercing, cold eyes, the unexpectedly insignificant mouth are lost in a sea of flesh. It is not a flattering likeness but an awesome one.

In the centre of this gallery is the 'Portrait of a Young Man' (No. 35a) by Hans Memling (1433-1494), another early purchase, this time from the Duchess of Montrose. Originally part of a triptych or diptych one side shows a young man at prayer, hands clasped. He is richly dressed in furs, his white shirt fastened with five golden knots. His handsome, serene face framed in thick hair compels admiration. On the reverse is a still life in restrained tones. A maiolica jug with black decoration stands on a patterned carpet. The lilies, iris and columbines in the jug have symbolic significance.

Two panels that would surely have pleased his father were bought in 1954 and 1960 by the present Baron. One by Francesco del Cossa (1436-78) painted in Bologna, shows a handsome young man, immaculately dressed, his hair carefully arranged beneath a neat black cap. In his beautifully painted hand he holds a ring, indicating perhaps that he has become betrothed. Yet his expression is severe and unyielding so that one admires without liking him.

In total contrast is the portrait (No 32) by the Master of Flemalle (1380-1444), now attributed to the great Robert Campin. The subject is Robert de Masmines who was in the service of the Dukes of Burgundy and became a Knight of the Golden Fleece in 1430, the year he died. Middle-aged, the first impression is of an ugliness almost grotesque. Close-set eyes, a large bulbous nose, a great double chin and a truly terrible haircut. Yet the creases beneath the eyes, the stubble above the mouth, and the fine fur band round the huge neck have been painted with touchingly meticulous attention. This artist has conveyed such a sympathetic understanding of the sitter that through facial expression we recognise a good and faithful human being and warm to him.

The second, Reynolds Room, contains religious and mythological paint-

ings of outstanding quality. The rarest being the fragment from the Duccio altarpiece (No. 18) painted for Siena Cathedral about 1310. Christ is sitting barefoot at Jacob's Well conversing with the Woman of Samaria. The rich colours against a gold background and the unusual perspective accentuate the beauty of this gem-like panel. Two exquisitely painted panels are *The Nativity* (No. 16) by Jacques Daret (active 1418-68) and *The Virgin and Child* (No. 53) only six inches high by Rogier van der Weyden (1400-1464), both pupils of Roger Campin.

The originality of the Ferrara painter Dosso Dossi (1512-1542) is what fascinates in his *'The Martyrdom of Saint Stephen'* (No. 17). The luckless first Christian martyr and his attackers occupy a small foreground in the painting, it is the landscape beyond that enchants. It is the artist's conception of Jerusalem, all pinnacles, towers and spires set upon a calm blue sea with huge rocky formations beyond and gently sloping lawns and trees leading towards it. A fairy-tale city.

It would be a great coup for anyone to add one El Greco painting (1541-1614) to his collection. The present Baron Thyssen has added two, one acquired in 1954, the other as recently as 1975. The subject of both is *The Annunciation* (Nos. 24 & 25). The earliest was recorded in Venice in 1568, a city where the artist spent some years. In style it owes much to the great Venetian painters, Titian, Tintoretto and Veronese. The second was painted for a religious college in Madrid in 1600. By then El Greco's style had been transformed into that of the highly idiosyncratic Master of Toledo whose elongated flame-like forms were not due, as was supposed, to the artist's astigmatism, but to accord with the theology of the philosopher, Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite. He conceived the illumination of the soul in terms of light which he likened to a flame.

The next room is dominated by Venetian, Spanish and French paintings of the eighteenth century. From one of Goya's powerful and grotesque *'Black Paintings'* — a portrait head of a blind beggar — one turns with relief to the only frivolous work in the exhibition. It is *'La Toilette'* (No. 7) by Francois Boucher (1703-1770). Boucher was at his most charming in his paintings of elegant, intimate domestic scenes. He shows a pretty woman in a slightly improper pose. She is dressing and her silk dress and petticoats have been pushed up so that she may fasten her garter. Her kitten lies at her feet enjoying the view, while she turns to look at a white cap with pink ribbons that her maid holds up for her approval. She sits in front of a fire, a teapot, still steaming, on a table at her side. On the mantel a porcelain bird, another garter, a Chinese vase with ormolu mounts and a candle burning in a silver candlestick. Behind her is a beautiful yellow Chinese screen.

This painting was purchased from Boucher direct by Count Karl Gustav Tessin who was Swedish Ambassador to France 1735-1742. His love of France was inherited from his grandfather, Architect to the Swedish Count, who built Drottningholm Castle in imitation of Versailles, and his father, Nicodemus Tessin the Younger, who succeeded his father. They laid the foundation of the extraordinary collection of 18,000 sheets of

original drawings now in the Nationalmuseum, Stockholm At the Cooper-Hewitt Museum in New York in April I saw an exhibit of some hundred designs by Le Nôtre, Le Vau, Mansart, Nicolas de Launay among others

In this room is one of the five views that Canaletto (1697-1798) painted of Warwick Castle, this time from the South (No 9). The imposing façade with its twin towers facing the river is bathed in a luminous cloudless Italianate light, the gilded, canopied barge on the river heightening the impression of the artist's native Venice.

In the whole exhibition the painting I would most wish to own is 'The Death of Sophonisba' (No 49) by Giambattista Tiepolo (1696-1770). It is only a small bozzetto or sketch for a larger painting, but this makes it all the more precious The freedom and fluidity of the brush strokes confirm that it was by Tiepolo's own hand The drama of the moment after Sophonisba has drunk of the poisoned cup is captured in a swirl of gleaming red and yellow silks The architectural arches, the balustrade, the whites upon white, the inimitable pale Tiepolo sky, the baroque panache make it uniquely special.

The final room contains important Dutch, Flemish and Italian paintings. It is of particular interest to scholars for it provides a rare opportunity to see not only a fine Caravaggio but to compare it with the work of some of his followers. With his potent combination of intense realism and dramatic use of light and shade, Caravaggio (1571-1610), became the most famous and admired painter of his day His 'Saint Catherine of Alexandria' (No 10) dominates this room. She was a young noblewoman who rejected the arguments of fifty philosophers to change her religion, was tied to a spiked wheel and later beheaded.

She is painted full length in a dark brocaded gown, the vast wheel beside her. The light falls sharply from the right upon her white sleeve and upon her face. Her eyes look directly out at us inviting us in.

On an adjacent wall we see 'David with the Head of Goliath' (No. 50) by Valentin de Boulogne (1591-1632) A Frenchman who went to Rome about 1613 and came under the influence of Manfredi, who not only followed but faked the work of Caravaggio

Orazio Gentileschi's 'Lot and his Daughters' (No. 21) was painted in 1621 in Genoa for his patron Antonio Sauli. The group of three figures, all dramatically posed, are bathed in light against dark rocks and a stormy sky Gentileschi came to London in 1626 and became Court painter to Charles I He died here in 1639

Mattia Preti (1613-1699) had absorbed the influence of Caravaggio in Naples, since he came from Calabria. His painting 'The Convert' (No. 38) with its three musicians in muted browns and blacks and its dramatic *chiaroscuro* is the most Caravaggesque painting here

Hendrik Ter Brugghen (1588-1629) born in Holland was the most gifted of the Utrecht School of the followers of Caravaggio In the example we see, 'Esau selling his Birthright' (No 48) the action centres dramatically round a candle which forms the focus and light for the whole composition. In the darkened background Isaac sleeps, unaware of the treachery being

enacted.

The most enigmatic and charming of all the many portraits in the exhibition is by Michael Sweerts, born in Brussels in 1618 who died as a lay missionary in Goa in 1664. Even today scholars are not quite sure if the subject of 'The Sense of Smell' (No 47) is a boy or a girl. The head is entirely swathed in a yellow fringed turban, and while the sleeve and the hand holding a small posy of flowers seem to be those of a girl, the neck and the collar of the shirt could be that of a boy. He too came to Rome where he came under the influence of Caravaggio.

These five artists from such different milieux but united in their admiration of Caravaggio make a fascinating study.

The only still life in the exhibition is monumentally gorgeous. By Willem Kalf (1619-1693) (No 30), it depicts different materials with supreme virtuosity. On a casually arranged Turkey carpet on a table stand two handsome pieces of Chinese ceramic, a bowl and a long-necked ewer in blue and white with gilt embellishments. They rest on a pewter plate, there is some fruit, the invariable half-peeled lemon, a beautiful Nautilus cup and two wine glasses. The opulence fits.

Pieter de Hooch (1629-1684) who so perfectly transmits the well-scrubbed domestic interiors of Delft is here shown in far grander mood. 'The Council Chamber of the Amsterdam Town Hall' (No 28) is a large ambitious work that lacks some of this artist's habitual charm.

Nearby is Anthony van Dyck's portrait of Jacques Le Roy (No 20). The fine head of this important official is handled with the aplomb learnt after years in Italy. It was painted in 1631, the year before Van Dyck (1599-1641) settled finally in England where, as Court Painter to Charles I, he glorified not only that monarch but glamourised English portraiture ever after.

Even so he never outshone his master, Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640). His 'Portrait of a Lady with a Rosary' (No 39) bears comparison with that of his beautiful Marchesa Spinola Doria in the National Gallery, Washington which says a great deal.

The present sitter also is dressed in the height of fashion. Her face, painted as if in enamels, displays intelligence and assurance. She wears an impressive ruff and an even more imposing lace head-dress. Set against a red silk damask, her plain black dress provides a perfect foil for the rich silver and gold floral decoration of her bodice, its gleam achieved by flicked white brushstrokes. A marvellous conclusion.

The paintings were selected by Norman Rosenthal of the Royal Academy and Mr. David Ekserdjian who also wrote the excellent catalogue, illustrated in colour. My only quibble is the lack of provenances.

The strongest flavour of this selection is one of humanity; of the great variety of the human face and of the many unusual ones. And of how far removed all this pre-industrial humanity is from all the money that bought it.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE PREFACE

Dear Madam,

Now that the inquest on the death of Dr Gareth Bennett has been closed and a successor to him appointed, and following the debate during the recent General Synod conference, it may seem appropriate to re-consider the issues raised in the Crockford Preface.

One of the subjects which caused concern to the author, Dr Bennett, was the ineffective operations of synodical government with debates mainly for show. We can now see what he meant. It could hardly however have been imagined that an assembly of Bishops, other clergy and laity of such a diversity could manage, in any coherent or practical manner, all the affairs of the Church of England. Open discussion and delegation to properly elected committees which the author decried are the only manner that Synod could function to make any sense at all from its deliberations. For all its faults, therefore, in these days of popularism and open society, it is a strength rather than a failing for the Anglican Community to embrace this form in contrast to the authoritarian institutionalism evident in some other Churches. Dr Bennett's concern seems to have been so extreme that it prompted him to make totally unjustified personal comments along with much obscurity and contradiction. Deeply held religious convictions can easily lead to over emotional reaction, but it is only fair to draw attention to some of the inconsistencies behind the elegant prose style before considering the *cri de coeur* at the root of his essay. It is stated that Anglicans have never been happy to set out coherent and precise doctrines. Why then, when in an age when new knowledge and science is bombarding mankind and its institutions as never before, should the Church of England change course and declare rules and certainties? It is also complained that both Evangelical and Anglo-Catholics are being pushed into religious ghettos. A strong leadership is called for but which, if given, would result inevitably in one section or the other being driven into the wilderness. This if in the direction favoured by the author would apparently have been quite acceptable.

Yet the increasing power of the bishops was criticised, their views on doctrine, despite the mixed range of opinion, not acceptable and described as a focus for Anglican disunity. Events are inevitably increasing the stress and difficulties of reconciliation. But surely Christian duty demands forbearance and efforts for mutual understanding? How can it possibly be suggested that such problems as women priests, sexual conduct, divorce and theological issues can be resolved by firm leadership in any one direction? One thing certain is that firm unequivocal authority dictated in any particular path would lead rapidly to division and disintegration. For one who claimed a lack of theological training and knowledge in so many Bishops and others the author made many strange observations. The last exponent of classical Anglican divinity he stated, was Archbishop Michael Ramsey, who made a last stand before falling to the

repeated assaults of a younger generation of academics. During and after Dr Ramsey's period of office much original and important work has been completed on Dogmatics and Systematic Theology and all aspects of Christology, in the main from Roman Catholic scholars from Germany and the USA, and most of these advances have been erudite and responsible and as such generally welcomed and acclaimed. With new knowledge of languages and biblical texts we know now more about the life and times of Jesus than ever before. With very few exceptions all this accumulated exegesis has not dimmed the message of the Gospel in the slightest and the attraction of God as Father of our Lord Jesus Christ shines brighter and wider. Theology as an academic discipline must investigate and question and it is only to be expected in a scientific age that less emphasis is placed on myth, miracle, and the supernatural. This may cause some stress to conventional and institutional religious adherents but there has been a great gain in the wider concepts of Christianity with greater appeal to the intellect and the imagination. Religion has difficulty in developing at the same rate as theology and philosophy, but develop it must, and without rationality it will wither and die.

We need to bear in mind the genuine concern of the Preface and many who have expressed agreement with its message. The status and position of Christian teaching and example in the nation seems in substantial decline. At one time we were strongly upheld by the Faith of our Fathers. We have moved away from this. There was a time quite recently when the Christian faith was taught effectively and sincerely in our schools. There was a time when Christian moral principles were the norm in society both public and private. By and large, to our great detriment, this is no longer the case. The Church of England does not impinge upon the life and conscience of the nation and especially the strong and powerful institutions as it once did. Is religious learning, and the gap between academic theology and Church traditional doctrine however to blame for this decline? This appears to be the Preface Author's main contention. Surely the problem is far more complicated and deep-seated than this?

The solution advanced in the Preface is that we must resume 'the classical Anglican search for an authority on the sources of faith'. This is a phrase of some obscurity. What traditional search for the origins of faith, peculiar to the Church of England, have we been engaged upon since the Reformation? At intervals perhaps by the theologically inclined but in this narrow sense by few others. What if a thorough search with all the insights and modern tools at our disposal reveals that some doctrines, man-made, look somewhat flawed and unfruitful? Surely myth, however respected, if revealed must be identified!

Now is the time, before the controversy over the Preface is forgotten for Anglican clergy in particular, to sing the song of confidence, of unity and pride so that differing beliefs and ideas can work and live in harmony

Yours faithfully,

95 The Crescent, Stockport, SK3 8SL

SYDNEY SHENTON

Literary Supplement

THE MEMOIRS OF A CONGRESSMAN

Man of the House Tip O'Neill Bodley Head £15 00

By the time of his retirement two years ago Tip O'Neill had become a legend in his own life-time. He became a State Congressman when he was 24, and eight years later a Representative in Washington for the 8th District of Massachusetts (replacing John F. Kennedy who went to the Senate), he stayed there for 34 years. Length of tenure ensured seniority, his Irish-Americanism (and his skill at poker, and his blarney) ensured his popularity, his political savvy made him a deft dealer of deals. He did many favours for many people in and out of Congress, and favours accordingly were done in return. His memoirs — largely anecdotal, and given a shape by journalist William Novak — are a useful handbook on how to be or to become a political pro.

There is one emphasis in particular that strikes a British ex-MP. There is little here on ideals, on policies, on party programmes or manifestoes. All politics, he says, is local. He lived in the patch where he was born, North Cambridge, across the river from Boston, which was part of the 8th District. He knew everybody there and walked its streets and called in its shops every week-end. Until he became Speaker, he was content with a tiny bachelor pad in Washington, and he never cooked a meal there. Forty per cent of his people were Irish-Americans, as he was. Another thirty-five per cent were Italian-Americans. But he took no interest in foreign policy matters until the Vietnam War, and then chiefly because in that same patch were no less than 22 Universities and Colleges, including Harvard, MIT and his own alma mater, Catholic Boston College. A Representative voted for his District, or his conscience, and foreign policy was for the latter. He gave preference to the former. He was a model constituency member, and British MPs, more than half of whom sit in safe seats and make no attempt to live there (and visit it all too infrequently), could pay attention to Speaker O'Neill's dedication.

Yet his memoirs are at their best not when he spins his yarns of the great and of the sundry, but when he is under stress — as in differing with President Johnson on Vietnam, and in his many differences with Ronald Reagan, whose victory in 1980 altered O'Neill's role. He became then not only a Speaker but also the nearest the US has to a Leader of Opposition — the President was a Republican, but the House Democratic. When they met privately he could gossip with the President, especially over the days of the Depression and of Harry Truman's Presidency, when Reagan too had been a Democrat. But O'Neill saw supply-side economics as simply the politics of Hoover, and as harsh on the underdog, for him America was a land of refuge and of opportunity for all, and not least for the Irish. Some Irish, like himself, did well by their own skills, and with a little bit of luck. Some fell by the wayside, and should be helped, out of charity but also from a public purse. Some became lace curtain Irish. Some went over, like Reagan, to the enemy. Some became extravagantly successful, and rich beyond the dreams of avarice — the Kennedys. Indeed quite the most disturbing feature in the book is O'Neill's acceptance

of the Kennedy ability to buy talent and staff, editors and writers-up of biographies, radio and TV time — and with it 'fame' — on such a scale — and nationwide — that no one without those resources could stand up against them including Hubert Humphrey, whom O'Neill admits would probably have been the best President the US never had. The problem of those not in his patch (only three per cent of his voters were Black) go unmentioned. Civil rights did not bulk large in his plotting, Martin Luther King is unmentioned.

This is an immensely readable series of anecdotes of the Great and of the moderately Good. But it is the assumptions it makes without analysis that leave this reader disturbed.

ESMOND WRIGHT

WHAT IS SOVEREIGNTY?

Sovereignty L. L. Blake Shephard-Walwyn £7.95

This is a thought-provoking study on 'power beyond politics' by Mr L. L. Blake, the barrister. There are two basic angles to his arguments. First what is sovereignty in a State, and second, where does it lie. He has given a great deal of thought to considering the outstanding thinkers on constitutional problems, during the period since our civil war. He concludes that sovereignty is 'the ultimate power in the state to do right to the people, or, better still to let right be done. Letting right be done is thus a very natural affair'. He insists that it must vest in an individual who will not seek to impose his views 'but simply to remove the impediments'.

He has little use for the doctrine of the separation of powers. Indeed he holds that the President of the United States is the sovereign power by reason of his immense executive authority. The fathers of the American constitution would have been shocked at the thought. They designed to separate the ultimate powers in the State to prevent arbitrary rule. In many South American states the United States constitution was copied with similar division of powers. It is significant that in a number of them the president found himself confined by the constitution and its overthrow followed.

In Britain, the general view is that sovereignty rests in the King-in-Parliament. Since the Act of Settlement 1688, the British Crown has been a creature of Parliament. No Bill has received the royal veto since the reign of Queen Anne, and by well established convention the Crown, at least in United Kingdom affairs, has to comply with the wishes of the Prime Minister. The Crown would seem to perform a very subordinate constitutional role. Nonetheless Mr Blake argues that in the event of a breakdown in machinery of government the monarch would be obliged to exercise residual powers as sovereign. He argues with effect that the present Queen would make an admirable constitutional longstop, with her detachment and impartiality, without political ambition except to restore the constitution to its proper course. Mr Blake however, fails to draw his argument to its full conclusion. As the British monarchy, is hereditary, there is no choice in her successors. If one of them is found to be incapable of exercising the residual authority properly, by reason of capacity, unfitness, impartiality, personal political ambition, or otherwise, what then? Where does the sovereign authority? Are we back to divine right? There is little doubt that under the pressure of public opinion, Parliament would right itself and either would depose or correct the erring monarch. The sovereign

power rests in Parliament, with or without the monarch. It is useful to remember that, upon dissolution, and in the absence of government decision, new elections must be held without the intervention of crown or cabinet.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

BYRON, POET AND TRAVELLER

Byron's Travels Allan Massie Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd £14 9s

After the return of Lord Byron in 1811 from his first Grand Tour of the Mediterranean countries his subsequent fame was assured in three ways. His exciting and successful (as well as profitable) long poem *Childe Harold*, the fictionalised account of his journey published by John Murray, established him in the front rank of contemporary poets. His libertarian sympathies had become evident in the concern and active assistance which he had afforded to the Italian Risorgimento and subsequently to the Greek struggle for independence. And the maiden speech which he had made in the House of Lords before his departure in 1809 had impressed on the government the depth of his Liberal convictions for it was an inspired and mature defence of the Nottingham frame-breakers whose livelihood had seemed threatened by new, less labour-intensive machines.

The volume on Byron's travels written by Allan Massie contains a lively narrative, concentrating not only on the voyages but also on Byron's political and personal impressions in the course of living in and addressing his mind to the daily problems of the inhabitants of many parts of Southern Europe. The second tour, precipitated by personal disappointment over his divorce from Anne Isabelle Milbanke, took him through Switzerland, where he stayed with Shelley and argued about their differing views on liberty, and Milan where he conversed with the great French writer Stendhal. For the next seven years Byron lived in Venice, Ravenna, Pisa and Genoa.

In spite of his resolve, expressed in letters to his mother at the exhausting end of the first Grand Tour, never again to 'scribble' his journeys and indeed to rely on the sketches made by 'a famous Bavarian artist' for pictorial records of his beloved Athens, the second journey gave him irresistible copy for *Beppo*, *The Corsair* and the beginning of his masterpiece, *Don Juan*. The resolve had, from the outset, seemed unlikely to be carried through because he was, at the same time, assuring his correspondents that he abhorred the insularity of his compatriots. Also to his mother, he had written 'I am convinced of the advantages of looking at mankind instead of reading about them and the bitter effects of staying at home with all the narrow prejudices of an islander'. The liberating power of poetry has never perhaps been so clearly demonstrated in English as it was in *Childe Harold*, an immediate best-seller and the means of freeing its author from the previously often assumed label of mere libertine and poetic dilettante. Thomas Moore, Byron's first biographer, asserted that the poet's great concern, after that of Greek Independence, was that his fellow countrymen should be induced to bear him and his efforts constantly in mind, as though the place of judgement should be his native land. The willing exile and adventurous nobleman was far from indifferent to his reputation at home, even though he was 'born to opposition' as stated in *Don Juan* (Canto 15).

His third extensive journey was his last. At the age of thirty-six he died of a virulent fever at Missolonghi, whilst working to assist the Greeks in a vigorous

fight against their Turkish oppressors. The subsequent fame as a martyr to the Greek cause was perhaps as exaggerated as his former notoriety as a womaniser had been and Allan Massie has produced a most balanced assessment of the poet, the lover and the champion of liberty. He has written a delightfully readable book with only one possible fault. That is the omission of clear references to his many apt and pertinent quotations. The illustrations are clear and pleasant, and these are rather better referenced than many more important facts and figures in the text. But Mr Massie has brought out in his story the relevance to our own times of Byron's character and temperament and the fact that, as man and as writer, he was a contemporary of all the ages.

BETTY ABEL

THE FIRST PERESTROIKA

Peter the Great by Henri Troyat, translated by Joan Pinkham. Hamish Hamilton £15.95

This biography was first published in Paris nine years ago. Its author, Henri Troyat, has established his reputation in France as a biographer of Russian subjects. Troyat is a Frenchman born in Russia although he does not appear to read Russian: all the sources cited in his Bibliography are either in French or English. M. Troyat is a member of the Académie Française.

The author's judgement on Peter the Great is that he 'had always sacrificed the happiness of the Russians to the glory of Russia'. The court and government of this most bewildering of men come to life in the book; indeed, sometimes the prose rather gets carried away with itself. This may be partly the impressionistic style used by many French historians or partly the exuberance of the American translator. Thus, when discussing Basil Goltzín, the lover taken by Peter's mother, Sophia, the writer or translator tells us 'He served her in her bed and at her desk with equal ardour. Oddly enough, this stud was also an intelligent, refined, capable politician'. Also, one would like to have had fuller references in the notes: as it is, only those references in English which the translator could presumably double-check, have page numbers.

Having said that, the book reads well and gives the reader an insight into why Peter the Great remains, perhaps, the single most important ruler the Russian Empire ever had. With all the faults of a Stalin he had, nevertheless, some of the attributes of the 'enlightened' despot so beloved by French intellectuals like Voltaire.

Peter the Great's achievements, and they were many, centred on forcing Russians into a European mould for which neither their history nor their racial constitution had equipped them. A question that continues to bedevil historians and statesmen is to what degree his changes really did alter the Russian character.

JAMES MUNSON

A GRIMM FAIRY-TALE OF NEW YORK

The Molineux Affair Jane Pejsa Piatkus Books £9 95

It is a fairy-tale (Grimm) of turn-of-the-century New York. It invokes a city, a milieu, a way of life, as vanished as *les neiges d'antan*, under which, that December of 1898, the stately West Side streets and avenues beside Central Park lay gleaming in the winter twilight.

There stood in that long ago time, on the corner of Madison Avenue and 45th Street, a great Gothic palace of a place, the Knickerbocker Athletic Club. It was to this splendidly named slab of towering monumental masonry — a sort of Manhattan Doge's Palace — that two intertwined riddles of love and death were to bring immortality, as the setting for one of America's classic mysteries of murder.

Christmas 1898. Seasonable snow fell. The bells and carols rang out across white-muffled Broadway, Fifth, Madison and Park. To sentimentally festive Manhattan came red-robed Santa, mock reindeer, sleigh — and a slaying. For that Yuletide brought a silver gift of death. Unheralded by any token of its donor, addressed to Harry Cornish, athletic director of the Knickerbocker Club aforesaid, nestling in a Tiffany's discreet blue tissue-papered box, came a beautiful little silver container, holding the *outré* offering of a bottle of Bromo-seltzer. It was not Cornish, the obviously intended, but his aunt, Mrs. Katherine Adams, with whom he lodged, who fell victim to the cyanide with which the bogus healing draught had been, of malice afore, thoughtfully laced.

Minds at the athletic club were exercised. Memories flexed. The strange death there that autumn of a notably sexually athletic member, man-about-the-avenues, Henry Barnet, was recalled. What, muscularity aside, had Barnet and Cornish in common? Both were linked — friend and enemy, respectively — with Roland Molineux. Molineux had made no secret of his hatred of Cornish. It emerged that he came to hate, too, Barnet, because Blanche Chesebrough, his fiancée, had shown herself susceptible to Henry's somewhat overblown charms.

Barnet, too, had received an unsolicited *poudre de succession* by mail. His exhumation confirmed that it also was cyanide laced.

Molineux was arrested, tried, condemned, retried and acquitted. Blanche, who after Barnet's demise had exchanged a Roland for a Henry in matrimony, promptly left her husband after his release and, until now, vanished from posterity's ken.

There died in Minneapolis in 1954, a stooped, eighty-year-old woman, with hennaed hair, a painted face and outlandish garments. She lived in a tattered room, with curtains drawn and rose-coloured cloths covering the shades of lighted lamps, in an old house on Kenwood Parkway. There, like a ghost, frail, insubstantial, she sat by the fireplace setting down the past, on paper sometimes wet with tears. A ghost indeed, the wrinkled shade of the dashing young seductress of the nineties, Blanche Molineux. She left those revelatory papers to Jane Pejsa's mother, who had befriended her, and it is with their help that Miss Pejsa has constructed this unique book. In it she has, with pains of infinite research, most entrancingly summoned back to the deserted stage those ill-starred players whose shame, compounded of pride, ambition and old green-eye,

had blasted them from their High Society launch pad across America in a blaze of scandal to disgraced oblivion

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

LAYING THE GHOST OF HAUPTMANN

The Lindbergh Case Jim Fisher Rutgers University Press £19 95

It is just fifty years now since Bruno Richard Hauptmann was executed for the murder of the kidnapped baby of Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh. There was at the time scant feeling of doubt as to the guilt of Hauptmann, but with the passage of the decades misgivings have been evoked. Aside from the uninformed, ill-informed, and absolutely incorrect maunderings about the unsatisfactory nature of circumstantial evidence — circumstantial evidence is the footprint seen on the beach by Robinson Crusoe — there have been well-argued and, at a credulous glance, persuasive cases put forward for the innocence, the railroading, of a prejudice-condemned Hauptmann, notably in my friend Ludovic Kennedy's wonderfully readable *The Airman and the Carpenter* (1985) and in *Scapegoat* by Anthony Scaduto (1977).

Professor Fisher, a former FBI agent, a lawyer and Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Edinboro University, Pennsylvania, is the first author to have been permitted access to the two-hundred-thousand documents lodged in the New Jersey State Police Lindbergh archives. He was actually able to handle the kidnap ladder, the fifteen ransom notes and the baby's garments, and to listen to taped interviews of deceased Lindbergh case principals. He has also raked through the twenty-one-thousand Lindbergh documents discovered in the garage of the late Harold G. Hoffman, governor of New Jersey at the time of the case.

Professor Fisher categorically asserts — and gives his reasons for so doing — that it is nonsense to aver, as Scaduto and his coadjutors do, that every piece of physical evidence against Hauptmann was fabricated, distorted, or tampered with, that all the key prosecution witnesses perjured themselves, that evidence tending to prove Hauptmann's innocence was wilfully suppressed, that the body found was not that of twenty-month-old Charles Lindbergh. He is convinced that the New Jersey State Police conducted a thorough investigation. He thinks that Hauptmann received as fair a trial as possible. It is his opinion, based upon his knowledge of Hauptmann's criminal record and his understanding of his personality, 'as well as other evidence I have encountered', that he murdered the baby in cold blood for the money. And he has been unable to find any hard evidence to support the contention that Hauptmann was aided in the crime by accomplices.

It scarcely needs to be said that Professor Fisher's book — the first on the case to be based upon primary source materials — the most authoritative and important that we have had, is absolutely indispensable. Not only is it very well and entertainingly written and presented, but its carefully researched and weighed conclusions would appear to lay for good and all the uneasy spectre of an innocent Hauptmann. Was it not Thoreau who said 'Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk'?

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Migration and Society in Early Modern England (editors Peter Clark and David Souden Hutchinson £25) This is a welcome contribution to the continuing investigation of migration within England. It is generally known that by 1851 England was an urban society, indeed, it was the first time in modern history that the majority of a country's population lived in towns and cities. These cities grew because of migration from the countryside. Yet studies have concentrated on the nineteenth century movements. This collection of essays studies migration before then and shows how important it was as far back as the 16th century in the creation of London, of town life in general and of the colonies. A very useful collection of essays (J M)

The Battle of Berlin 1945 (Jonathan Cape £15 00) Mr Tony Le Tissier has written an absorbing study of the final struggle between Germany and Soviet Russia in the battle of Berlin, April-May 1945. He has carried out an immense amount of research in seeking on both sides all relevant material. The fighting was prolonged and bitter with huge casualties. From Moscow, Stalin personally directed the course of the Russian offensive, while Hitler from his Berlin bunker sought to command the German forces as conditions worsened and defeat was inevitable, his authority became undermined. He committed suicide just before the final surrender. Mr Le Tissier writes clearly and dramatically of events horrendous in their impact and carnage. Perhaps the most impressive part of his book is the account of the strategy and tactics employed on both sides.

A Dictionary of Irish Mythology (Constable, £12 95) Peter Berresford Ellis, an authority on Celtic culture and history has compiled this valuable dictionary, which comes at a time of increasing interest in the wealth of Irish myths and legends. It is based upon a great deal of research into sources, but it is not intended as 'an all embracing guide for academic reference'. The work is 'essentially for the lay reader'. It is simply 'an easy-to-use handbook, giving an immediate reference to the gods and goddesses, the heroes and heroines, the magical weapons, fabulous beasts and otherworld entities that populate the stories'. There is a short bibliography and also a useful introduction in which Berresford Ellis discusses the historical background and character of this mythology, and its place in literature.

The Golden Wreck (Hodder & Stoughton £7 95) This is a revised and updated edition, in the paperback New English Library series, of Alexander McKee's dramatic account of the loss of *The Royal Charter*, a steam iron clipper in a hurricane in 1859, first published in 1961. The ship had made a record passage to Melbourne in less than sixty days, on her maiden voyage. On her return voyage, loaded with new Australian prospector's gold and some 500 passengers, she had almost reached Liverpool when she was sunk in a Force 12 hurricane off Holyhead. The wreck was only discovered since the war, and has become the target for searchers of gold. The volume is well illustrated.

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